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DE RUEHC #7021 3170148
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TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC 0000

UNCLAS STATE 117021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KTFN PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR USUN FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL JOINT 
MEETING ON THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE, 
AL-QAEDA/TALIBAN COMMITTEE, AND 1540 COMMITTEE 
 
¶1.  This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
¶2.  (U) On Friday, 13 November, the Chairman of the 1267 
(Al-Qaeda/Taliban) Sanctions Committee (Austrian PermRep 
Thomas Mayr-Harting), the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (Costa 
Rican PermRep Jorge Urbina, and the Chairman of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (Croatian PermRep Ranko 
Vilovic) will brief the UNSC on their ongoing efforts to 
cooperate and coordinate activities, where appropriate. This 
meeting presents an opportunity to recognize the fine work of 
all three committees, and to underscore key challenges that 
lie ahead. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
¶3.  (U) Department requests USUN deliver the following 
remarks in response to the statement for the Security Council 
Joint Meeting on the Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
Al-Qaeda/Taliban Committee, and 1540 Committee: 
Mr. President, I would like to thank the Chairmen for their 
briefings.  Their dedicated leadership is central to the 
effectiveness of the 1267 Committee, the 1373 Committee, and 
the 1540 Committee.  Today we have an opportunity to focus on 
the accomplishments of the three committees over the past 
several months.  But more importantly we want to underline 
the importance of these committees and to invite all member 
states to unreservedly cooperate with their efforts. 
The United States supports the important role the United 
Nations plays in reinforcing national and regional 
counter-terrorism efforts.  As President Obama said in his 
September 23 address to the UNGA, the United States has "set 
a clear and focused goal: to work with all members of this 
body to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its 
extremist allies -- a network that has killed thousands of 
people of many faiths and nations, and that plotted to blow 
up this very building." 
The Security Council-based work of the three committees, and 
of the 1267 Monitoring Team and Counter-terrorism Executive 
Directorate, along with the General Assembly's Global 
Counter-terrorism Strategy and the Counter-terrorism 
Implementation Task Force, constitute interlocking and 
complementary pieces of the Global Community's response to 
terrorism.  This includes preventing non-state actors' access 
to WMD-related materials.  We also applaud the efforts of the 
UNODC,s Terrorism Prevention Branch in its important mission 
of promoting and assisting states to ratify and implement the 
universal counterterrorism conventions and protocols. 
1267 
Ambassador Mayr-Harting, the United States appreciates the 
leadership you have displayed as chair of the 1267 Committee. 
 We particularly welcome the personal commitment and 
dedication you have shown in helping the Committee address 
some very challenging questions.  We also commend the work of 
the Monitoring Team, which has played a vital role as an 
independent and objective fact-finding body, and which has 
supplied the Committee with important information on 
individuals and entities on the Consolidated List, as well as 
the practices of Member States. 
Countering the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
remains one of the most important challenges facing this 
Council.  The threat is real and it continues to evolve. 
Without the efforts of Member States to work collectively, 
the world would be much more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 
 What can we do to ensure this regime remains a vital and 
effective multilateral tool to respond to this threat? 
First, we can reaffirm the international community's 
commitment to full implementation of the 1267 measures. 
Imposing these targeted sanctions -- whether in the form of 
an asset freeze, arms embargo, or travel ban -- has 
unquestionably enhanced our security.  The 1267 regime can 
only function well if states actively participate in the 
regime, such as by proposing new names for listing.  We 
should further develop this tool and ensure that it adapts to 
the ever-changing nature of the threat. 
Second, we should continue our efforts to ensure that the 
Consolidated List is as accurate and up-to-date as possible, 
ensuring that our procedures for imposing sanctions are fair 
and clear.  Resolutions 1735 and 1822 introduced new measures 
to help the Committee confirm the accuracy of the list.  The 
Committee's work to implement what is perhaps the most 
significant measure in 1822 -- the review of every name on 
the Consolidated List by June 2010 -- will continue in the 
coming months.  By reviewing every listed individual and 
entity on the Consolidated List, the Committee is emphasizing 
the importance of keeping the List updated and fresh, so that 
the international community can respond to new threats in a 
manner that is efficient and effective.  The United States is 
committed to ensuring that this review is meaningful and 
working with Member States to finish this review on time.  We 
encourage the Committee and Member States to carefully review 
entries lacking sufficient identifiers to develop this 
information in order to facilitate implementation of 
sanctions of those individuals and entities that continue to 
meet the criteria for listing.  Improving identifiers for 
listings will serve to bolster the overall credibility and 
integrity of the List. 
And, third, we should continue our efforts to ensure that the 
sanctions are applied in a fair and transparent way. 
Resolution 1822 and its predecessors introduced significant 
enhancements to ensure fairness.  The Council will negotiate, 
in the coming weeks, a new resolution to renew the mandate of 
the 1267 Monitoring Team and will take the opportunity to 
enhance the regime and improve our ability to counter the 
al-Qaeda and Taliban threat.  The United States believes this 
resolution should take additional steps to ensure that the 
process for listing and delisting individuals is as fair and 
transparent as possible.  We believe there is room to improve 
the way in which the 1267 Committee decides to list 
individuals and how it considers requests from those seeking 
to be removed from the list.  We encourage the committee to 
build upon the ambitious reforms articulated in UNSCR 1822 
and to work towards strengthening the principles set out in 
that resolution. 
As global terrorism continues to evolve, so too must our 
efforts to counter this threat anywhere and everywhere it 
surfaces.  We stand ready to help the Council and 1267 
Committee address these challenges, and we are confident that 
the resolve of the international community cannot be matched 
by those who wish to do us harm. 
1373 
Regarding the Counter-terrorism Committee, I would like to 
thank Ambassador Ranko Vilovic for filling in and doing an 
exceptional job of guiding the work of this Committee.  As 
the interim Chair of the Counter-terrorism Committee, 
Ambassador Vilovic fostered greater efficiency in the 
Committee's work.  Ambassador, we wish you well and we thank 
you for your leadership. 
The United States welcomes significant improvement in CTED,s 
performance since Mike Smith took over leadership of the 
group some two years ago.  We are pleased to see more CTED 
engagement outside of New York, in capitals and with experts 
in the relevant ministries on the ground.  This is where the 
United States would like CTED to place even more emphasis. 
We applaud CTED,s work in South Asia, in particular the 
workshop it organized earlier this month in Dhaka with the 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute that brought together police 
and judicial officials from across South Asia for 
counter-terrorism training, which was delivered by experts 
from the UN, Commonwealth Secretariat, and bilateral 
partners. The United States encouraged CTED to organize more 
practical, on-the-ground activities, thus taking advantage of 
the UN,s ability to offer a multilateral platform for 
expert-to-expert networking and delivery of assistance by 
experts from member states, regional organizations, and NGOs. 
 CTED,s work in South Asia is a great example of the UN 
using its convening power to work on a regional level where 
there are few actors with the same degree of legitimacy and 
neutrality to ensure widespread acceptance.  We encourage 
CTED and the wider UN to explore similar opportunities in 
North Africa. 
Mr. President, the United States welcomes efforts to develop 
a more holistic UN counterterrorism program that a) is more 
integrated with the wider UN efforts to promote international 
peace and security and b) involves working with states around 
the world to build the capacities needed to confront a range 
of inter-related transnational security challenges, including 
terrorism.  This effort involves not just the UNSC, but the 
UNGA and other relevant UN bodies.   In this context, the 
United States looks forward to further participation of the 
UNSC committees and their expert groups in the CTITF. 
We welcome the recent visit by UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Pillay to the CTC and her constructive recommendations 
for strengthening existing approaches to underscore the role 
of human rights in the fight against terrorism in the work of 
CTC/CTED.  As President Obama said in his inaugural address, 
there need not be a tradeoff between our security and our 
ideals.  The United States looks forward to working with 
partners both in and outside UNSC to ensure that the UN is 
playing its part to ensure that national counter-terrorism 
measures are grounded in the respect for human rights and the 
promotion of the rule of law, and that cooperation between 
the CTC/CTED and the UN human rights bodies is further 
strengthened. 
With strong leadership at the helm of CTED, the United States 
is looking forward in 2010 to ensuring that the CTC itself 
becomes a more dynamic body and a forum where the practical 
challenges of implementing UNSCR 1373 at national and 
regional levels are debated more regularly and the 
committee's work is made more relevant to CT practitioners on 
the ground. 
It has been more than eight years since the adoption of 1373, 
and the time is right to ratchet up efforts, including 
through increased outreach by the CTC, to ensure that 
implementation remains a priority for countries around the 
world. 
1540 
Regarding the 1540 Committee, I would like to take a moment 
to praise Ambassador Urbina for his leadership and enthusiasm 
in guiding the work of this Committee.  As Chair of the 1540 
Committee, Ambassador Urbina has promoted greater 
transparency and supported a range of ideas to make the 
Committee's work more effective and relevant.  The agreed 
work program he put forth is to be adopted again in January, 
and we believe the four Committee-led working groups -- on 
monitoring of implementation, provision of assistance, 
cooperation among regional and intergovernmental 
organizations, and coordination of transparency and outreach 
-- have been very successful.  Moreover, he and his 
delegation presided over the Comprehensive Review of the 
Status of Implementation of Resolution 1540, an event that by 
any measure proved to be a great success. 
Ambassador, we wish you well and we thank you for your 
leadership.  You will leave behind a Committee with a strong 
mandate and a clear vision. 
In the six months, time since these three Committees 
addressed the Council, the world has seen a growing interest 
in the work of the 1540 Committee.  With the unanimous 
adoption of resolution 1887 on September 24, this Council 
sent a loud and clear message that resolution 1540 is an 
essential tool for building the non-proliferation regime. As 
President Obama made evident during the Security Council 
Summit, my government -- at the very highest levels -- views 
the Security Council's efforts on non-proliferation as vital 
to our common efforts to prevent the spread and use of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
Resolution 1887 affirms the need for full implementation of 
Resolution 1540, welcomes the work that the 1540 Committee 
has done to date on funding mechanisms, and reinforces the 
Security Council's commitment to ensure effective and 
sustainable support for the Committee's activities, including 
capacity building. 
Within a week of adopting resolution 1887, the Committee 
conducted its Comprehensive Review of the Status of 
Implementation on Resolution 1540, as called for in 
resolution 1810.  This three-day event offered an inclusive 
forum to all States and relevant inter-governmental bodies to 
share experiences and express their views on various aspects 
of implementation of the resolution.   The review was 
accompanied by a civil society event that included dozens of 
nongovernmental organizations and industry leaders, resulting 
in a wealth of ideas for the committee to consider further 
measures to facilitate 1540 implementation.  The 
presentations and statements made during the Comprehensive 
Review demonstrated that the 1540 Committee has moved beyond 
being considered a temporary stop-gap measure to stem 
proliferation to become a centerpiece in our common battle 
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The United States is moving quickly with twelve co-sponsors 
on a broad initiative to better coordinate trilateral mission 
capacity-building in Vienna related to UNSCR 1540 among the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the UN Office of 
Drugs and Crime.  During a September 30 meeting, OSCE 
participating states adopted the first chapter of a UNSCR 
1540 "Best Practice Guide on Transshipment and Export 
Controls," and subsequently met on October 20-21 to further 
discuss the broader regional strategy initiative. 
We urge the 1540 Committee to enhance similarly broad 
cooperation with international, regional and non-governmental 
organizations. 
Success of the 1540 Committee lies in its ability to move 
forward with its work program to fully implement 1540,s 
provisions.  We urge the Committee to streamline the 
assistance request process to make requests more transparent 
and to ensure that requests are answered in a timely and 
efficient manner.  As part of this effort, the United States 
is committed to establishing a voluntary fund to help provide 
the support and expertise necessary to facilitate 
implementation of Resolution 1540. We will seek to make a 
meaningful contribution to such a trust fund once it is 
established, provided it contains effective transparency and 
accountability mechanisms.  A voluntary UN trust fund would 
help identify and ultimately fix gaps in national export laws 
and detection systems and could, in that manner, prevent 
materiel, technology, and financial resources from making 
their way to governments and terrorists seeking to build 
these weapons. 
In conclusion, regarding all three CT-related bodies, there 
needs to be more cross-fertilization among them. Good 
practices in one should be adopted more regularly by others. 
This does not happen often enough.  We would especially like 
to commend the successful outreach efforts by the 1540 
committee, including through the unprecedented three-day open 
meeting the 1540 Committee organized this fall as part of its 
comprehensive review of member states' implementation of 
resolution 1540, as well as its successful efforts to reach 
out to civil society and involve it in the committee's work. 
All of the Council's CT-related committees should remain 
mindful of the need to enhance the transparency of their 
work, make it more accessible to the wider UN community and 
national actors, regional organizations, and civil society. 
We encourage further engagement by the three committees with 
Member States on a broad range of issues to ensure the 
committees' work is fully understood and relevant to Member 
States' efforts to combating terrorism. 
 
¶4.  (U) Department further requests USUN draw from the 
following points, if needed, should the case of Luis Posada 
Carriles and five Cuban Spies be raised (likely by the 
Governments of Cuba and/or Venezuela), following the SC joint 
briefing.  Cuba and Venezuela have in the past been placed on 
the speakers' list for the Joint Public Meetings on the CTC, 
1267, and 1540 Committee Security Council briefings, and have 
used such opportunities to raise such issues.  Begin remarks: 
 
POSADA: 
 
-- Contrary to the statements you have heard, the United 
States has taken a number of actions with respect to Luis 
Posada Carriles ("Posada"). 
 
-- The United States' actions are consistent with 
international law as well as our domestic legal framework 
that provides for due process and various constitutional 
safeguards. 
 
-- As with democracies around the world that follow the rule 
of law, these safeguards provide that an individual cannot be 
brought to trial or extradited unless sufficient evidence has 
been established that he committed the offense charged.  In 
the United States, this standard is described as "probable 
cause." 
 
-- Let me give you a brief overview of steps the United 
States has taken with respect to Posada within this legal 
framework: 
 
-- Posada entered the United States illegally in early 2005. 
 
-- Posada was detained by immigration authorities in the 
United States on May 17, 2005, and he was, in accordance with 
U.S. law, placed in removal proceedings. 
 
-- The immigration judge who handled the removal proceedings 
ordered that Posada be removed from the United States on 
September 27, 2005. 
 
-- This order remains in effect.  The United States has been 
seeking ways to carry out the terms of the order consistent 
with U.S. regulations that implement the obligations of the 
United States under the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
 
-- Specifically, at the time the immigration judge ordered 
Posada removed, the immigration judge also determined that 
Posada could not be removed to either Cuba or Venezuela as it 
was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he were 
so transferred.  As a matter of U.S. immigration law, the 
United States is not in a position to remove Posada to either 
country. (For use if appropriate.) 
 
-- Moreover, the United States sought and obtained a criminal 
indictment charging Posada with violations of our immigration 
laws.  On April 8, 2009, new criminal charges were brought 
against Posada in that case, accusing him of lying about his 
involvement in certain terrorist bombings in Havana, Cuba. 
The case is currently scheduled for trial early next year. 
 
-- In the meantime, Posada remains subject to the order of 
removal issued by the immigration judge and is without legal 
status in the United States. 
 
-- He is also subject to an Order of Supervision from the 
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), which imposes certain restrictions on 
Posada, including reporting and monitoring requirements. 
 
-- In sum, with respect to Posada, the United States 
continues to be engaged in an ongoing series of actions, 
consistent with our legal requirements and due process. 
 
FIVE CUBAN SPIES: 
 
-- In the case of the five Cubans accused of spying, the 
facts of the case help address the misrepresentations issued 
by the Cuban Government and others in relation to this case: 
 
-- The Cuban Five were tried in U.S. federal court and were 
accorded all guarantees of due process provided under the 
U.S. Constitution.  They were ultimately convicted for being 
unregistered agents of the Cuban government.  Three of the 
defendants were also convicted of attempting to obtain 
non-public national defense information, and one was 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder.  In fact, the 
defendants never denied that they were covert agents of the 
Cuban regime. 
 
-- The defendants have made full use of their extensive due 
process rights, benefiting from their vast procedural 
protections and the provision of U.S. government-funded legal 
assistance.  The defendants continue to take advantage of 
their rights as guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. 
Millions of Cubans on the island have been waiting for a 
half-century for the rights these defendants were afforded in 
the United States. 
 
-- A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit 
initially determined that the defendants should have been 
granted a pre-trial change of venue, but in August 2007, the 
full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta 
held that the defendants did receive a fair trial. 
 
-- On June 4, 2008, another panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided all remaining issues 
raised by the defendants.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
convictions of all five defendants, holding that all of the 
legal arguments challenging their convictions were without 
merit, and that sufficient evidence supported each 
conviction.  The panel affirmed the sentences for the other 
two defendants, including the life sentence of the defendant 
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in connection with 
the Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down. 
 
-- The panel also vacated sentences for three of the five 
defendants and remanded their cases so that new sentences 
could be imposed.  On October 13, the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida reduced Antonio Guerrero,s 
life sentence to 21 years and 21 months.  The remaining two 
defendants are scheduled to receive new sentences in 
December. 
 
-- The five convicted Cuban spies are serving sentences in 
federal institutions throughout the U.S. They are held among, 
and have the same privileges available to, the general prison 
population.  Under the Federal Bureau of Prisons, provision, 
inmates are allowed visits by immediate family members and 
other approved relatives; friends and associates with 
pre-established relationships; as well as their attorneys and 
Cuban consular officials.  All prospective visitors, other 
than immediate family members, may be subject to a background 
check and approval by institution staff. 
 
-- The five convicted Cuban spies have received numerous, 
lengthy visits from eligible family members.  According to 
State Department visa reports, relatives of the five have 
been issued visas on more than 120 occasions for visitation 
purposes.  However, two of the wives of the "Cuban 5" 
participated in the spy network, and as such, it has affected 
their eligibility to be granted visas to enter the United 
States.  The USG has determined that it is not possible, due 
to the national security risk she poses, to provide Olga 
Salanueva with a visa to enter the United States.  Salanuvea 
was originally deported from the United States in 2000 for 
activity related to espionage. 
 
 
End remarks. 
 
¶5. (U) Finally, Department requests that mission draw from 
the following points if the issue of Venezuelan support for 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) is raised.  Mission may also 
draw on points below regarding the U.S.-Colombian Defense 
Cooperation Agreement, if reference is made to the 
installation of U.S. military bases in Colombia. 
 
Begin Remarks: 
 
-- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's ideological sympathy 
for the FARC and the ELN for the past decade has limited 
Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia and others in combating 
terrorism. 
 
-- In January 2008, Chavez called for, and the Venezuelan 
National Assembly approved, a resolution calling for 
international recognition of the FARC and ELN as belligerent 
forces, not terrorist groups. 
 
-- Chavez has repeatedly made statements glorifying the FARC, 
including by calling the group's former  second-in-command a 
"good revolutionary." 
 
-- Venezuela has further provided safehaven to FARC fighters, 
and has made little effort to systematically police the 
1400-mile Venezuelan-Colombia border to prevent the movement 
of groups of armed terrorists or to interdict arms or the 
flow of narcotics. 
 
-- As a result, the FARC, ELN, and remnants of the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia have regularly crossed into 
Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup as well as to extort 
protection money and kidnap Venezuelans to finance their 
operations. 
 
DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT 
 
-- The U.S. and Colombia on October 30 signed the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement, which facilitates U.S. access to 
Colombian bases in support of mutually approved activities 
within Colombia only. 
 
-- The agreement harmonizes existing bilateral cooperation on 
eliminating narcotics production and trafficking, illicit 
smuggling of all types, and augments assistance efforts for 
humanitarian and natural disasters. 
 
-- This agreement explicitly indicates that all activities 
will be consistent with the principles of sovereignty, 
non-interventionism, and territorial integrity.  It has no 
regional or extraterritorial application. 
 
End Remarks 
 
¶6.  (U) Department appreciates Mission's assistance. 
CLINTON