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Viewing cable 09STATE116029, DEMARCHE URGING GOA NOT TO SIGN IRAN AGREEMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE116029 2009-11-10 19:12 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6029 3141917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101912Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 116029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM EAIR IR AL
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE URGING GOA NOT TO SIGN IRAN AGREEMENTS 
 
REF: WITHERS-JONES 11-9-09 EMAIL 
 
Classified By: Acting Assistant Secretary Stuart Jones for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Department requests that Embassy Tirana demarche 
appropriate GOA officials on an urgent basis, urging the 
Albanian Government to reject overtures by the Iranian 
Government to sign free trade and cultural exchange 
agreements with Iran and establish an Iranian airline hub in 
Albania. Please see paragraph 4 for talking points. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
2. (C) Department understands per ref e-mail that Deputy 
Foreign Minister Edith Harxhi told Post that the Iranian 
Ambassador to Tirana recently delivered two draft agreements 
to Foreign Minister Meta during a courtesy call. Meta was 
surprised, however, when the Iranian Ambassador handed him a 
free trade agreement and another document which would 
establish a cultural agreement and education exchange program 
between the two countries. While the Iranian interest in 
discussing these issues appears to be long-standing, Harxhi 
said the Iranians are currently &pushing8 for signed 
agreements. 
3. (C) Additionally, Department understands that according to 
Harxhi, the Albanian Civil Aviation Agency has been asked by 
Albanian Airlines to facilitate flights from Tehran to 
Tirana.  Harxhi said the director of marketing for Albanian 
Airlines is scheduled to travel to Teheran in the near future 
to meet with her counterparts. Harxhi said Tehran would like 
to use Tirana as a hub for private charter flights to Western 
Europe, avoiding the Gulf. 
 
POINTS: 
 
4. (C) Department shares Post's view that the Iranian 
Government's overtures are motivated less by economic reasons 
and more by Tehran's desire to build political ties with 
Albania. Post is requested to draw on the following points in 
its demarche: 
 
- Thank the GoA for seeking US input on the proposed Iranian 
agreements. 
 
- Iran's overtures to Albania are attempts to create an 
impression of political and economic cooperation to distract 
the international community from concerns over Iran's nuclear 
program. 
 
- Expanding economic cooperation by establishing direct 
flights to/from Tirana and Tehran would reinforce Iran's 
belief that its current path is acceptable to the 
international community, and that Tehran has no reason to 
adjust its behavior to fulfill its international obligations. 
 
- Strengthening Albania's ties to Iran would be inconsistent 
with Albania's desire for Euro-Atlantic integration. While 
other countries have commercial ties to Iran, Albania's 
relatively small market size would mean that a few commercial 
flights originating/ending in Tirana would create the 
impression of a much bigger Iranian footprint in Albania, 
particularly if Albania were to embark on a dramatic 
expansion of air ties at this time. 
 
- Iran is actively attempting to evade the sanctions the 
international community has imposed on it, which it has done 
for decades.  These attempts include finding new places in 
which to conduct business.  Albania should avoid the risk 
imparted by opening itself up to serving as such a business 
hub. 
 
- Moreover, the advent of direct flights between Tirana and 
Tehran, and the use of Tirana as an Iranian hub, could expose 
Albania to the risk of unwittingly contributing to Iran's 
proliferation and/or support for terrorist activities. 
Specifically: 
 
     Iran has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to 
use international transportation air, land, and maritime 
networks to conduct shipments in violation of UNSCRs 1737, 
1747, and 1803. 
 
     In 2007, in the wake of the United Nations Security 
Council's adoption of UNSCR 1747, Iran attempted to export a 
cargo of munitions to Syria via train through Turkey.  The 
prohibited cargo was discovered only when the train was 
derailed by a terrorist attack. 
 
     In 2008, UNSCR 1803 cited Iran Air Cargo and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as entities 
whose cargoes to and from Iran should be subjected to 
inspections at Member States, seaports and airports, 
provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
aircraft or vessel is transporting prohibited goods.  The 
UNSCR was adopted in recognition of the serious risk of Iran 
using commercial transportation entities to conduct 
proliferation-related shipments of concern. 
 
     Just this year, three prohibited Iranian exports of 
arms or related materiel on board commercial maritime vessels 
of non-Iranian states ) the Cyprus-flagged M/V MONCHEGORSK, 
the German-flagged M/V HANSA INDIA, and the Antigua-flagged 
M/V FRANCOP ) have been halted thanks to the vigilance of 
states alert to Iran's deceptive transportation practices. 
 
     Any expansion of Albanian air links to Iran runs the 
risk of Albanian territory or flag carriers being ensnared in 
illicit Iranian procurement or export-related activities. 
Iran has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use 
foreign flag carriers, as well as its own, to conduct 
prohibited shipments. 
 
5. (U) Please report results of demarche to Department. 
CLINTON