VZCZCXRO1101
OO RUEHBZ
DE RUEHC #2828 3061751
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021727Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 112828 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER IS KPAL
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST ON THE GOLDSTONE REPORT 
 
REF: State 098567, USUN 0958 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an Action Request.  Please see paragraph 
three. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary.  On September 15, South African Justice 
Richard Goldstone released the report of his fact-finding 
Mission into alleged violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law in the fighting between Hamas 
and Israel in the Gaza Strip from December 2008-January 2009 
and other matters.  While we acknowledge the serious 
allegations raised in relation to the Gaza conflict, the USG 
has serious concerns about the report, including its 
unbalanced focus on Israeli actions, its overly sweeping legal 
conclusions, and many of its recommendations.  In response to 
a request from the Palestinian observer and the Arab Group, 
the General Assembly has scheduled a discussion of the report 
starting on Wednesday, November 4 (possibly continuing on the 
5th).  The Arab Group, the OIC and others will present a 
resolution for adoption by the Assembly at that time which is 
likely to include elements unacceptable to the United States. 
If adopted, these elements could severely undermine the Arab- 
Israeli peace effort, and damage U.S. efforts to re-engage in 
multilateral fora and to develop impartial mechanisms for the 
consideration of human rights.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Action Request: Drawing on the background in paras 4- 
8, the goals outlined in paras 9, and talking points in paras 
10-13, Missions should demarche host governments on the U.S. 
position on the upcoming General Assembly debate on November 4 
on the Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict (the Goldstone Report).  Missions should approach 
host governments at a level sufficient to generate support for 
the U.S. position, using the materials provided in a manner 
designed to convince them to vote against any resolution that 
would include counterproductive elements, as described below. 
 
Background 
----------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) In January 2009, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in 
Geneva held a Special Session on the December-January conflict 
in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas.  It mandated a 
fact-finding mission to investigate "all violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law" by Israel.  In April, the HRC President appointed South 
African Justice Richard Goldstone to lead the mission.  He 
said he would investigate all parties to the conflict: Israel, 
Hamas and Fatah, although the HRC did not formally change his 
one-sided mandate.  Separately, the United States has engaged 
with Israel since January, 2009 to understand the 
investigations they have underway and to stress the importance 
of complete and credible inquiry into alleged allegations of 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. 
Due to the prominence of the conflict, capitals have been 
engaged on this at a high level to include frequent statements 
and interventions by Foreign Ministers and above (a factor 
posts should take into account in making the demarche). 
 
¶5. (SBU) On September 15, after conducting hearings in Gaza 
and Geneva, Goldstone conveyed his final report to the HRC. 
The USG has serious concerns about the report, including its 
unbalanced focus on Israeli actions; its overly sweeping legal 
conclusions; and many of its recommendations, some of which 
must be resolved politically between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians.  Nonetheless, we attempted to negotiate with the 
Palestinian delegation to the HRC to reshape an initial, one- 
sided draft into a balanced, minimalist HRC resolution on the 
report.  However, the Arab Group, the NAM, the African Group 
and the OIC (at the urging of the Palestinians) changed course 
on October 2 and asked that the resolution be deferred until 
the next regularly-scheduled HRC session in March, 2010. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Arab Group, the NAM, the African Group and the 
OIC (again at the urging of the Palestinians) changed course 
again on October 9, by calling for an HRC Special Session to 
take up the report.  While we did not support holding this 
session, we did not actively oppose it; it took place on 
October 15-16.  At the Special Session, the HRC passed a 
resolution endorsing the full report and its recommendations, 
and referring the report to the General Assembly, but 
explicitly citing only alleged violations by Israel.  Neither 
Hamas nor its tactic of intentionally launching rocket and 
mortar attacks into civilian areas that places civilians at 
severe risk were mentioned in the resolution.  The resolution 
passed by a vote of 25 to 6, with 11 abstentions and five 
(evidently intentional) absences, by far the smallest margin 
of support for a resolution dealing with Israel in the three 
years the HRC has existed.  Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, 
Slovakia, and Ukraine joined the United States in voting 
against the resolution.  Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Norway, the 
Republic of Korea, Slovenia and Uruguay abstained.  The UK, 
France, Angola, Kyrgyzstan and Madagascar chose not to 
register any vote.  Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
South Africa, and Zambia voted for the resolution.  However, 
in explaining their votes in favor, Russia and China clearly 
indicated they did not support all of the report's 
recommendations, particularly the proposals that it be 
referred to the UN Security Council or the International 
Criminal Court.  Many other delegations expressed reservations 
in Geneva through somewhat helpful statements that blunted 
their yes votes - including India and Argentina. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Simultaneous to developments in Geneva, in New York 
we agreed to move forward a regularly-scheduled monthly UN 
Security Council Open Debate on the Middle East from October 
20 to October 14, to give the Arab Group and other members a 
chance to express their views about the Goldstone report, 
though there was virtually no support in the Council for 
adding the Goldstone report to the regular UNSC agenda.  The 
session, held as a regularly scheduled open debate, gave many 
NAM and OIC members the opportunity to express their views on 
the report.  Subsequently, in response to a request from the 
Palestinian observer which was endorsed by the Arab Group, on 
October 28, UN General Assembly President Ali Treki (Libya) 
scheduled a discussion of the report in the Assembly starting 
on Wednesday, November 4 (and possible continuing on the 5th). 
We believe a General Assembly discussion was predictable, as 
the HRC Special Session referred the report to the UNGA.  In 
light of the positions taken by Russia, China and some NAM 
members at the HRC, there is a possibility for somewhat 
greater support for the U.S. position in the Assembly than has 
been the case in the past with regard to issues dealing with 
Israel.  In addition, while the Goldstone Report does not 
ignore Israeli investigations, it summarily dismisses the 
willingness of the Israeli government to carry out impartial 
investigations.  Since September 15, more information has 
emerged on the nature and breadth of those investigations and 
new ones have been initiated. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Arab Group, the OIC and others will present a 
resolution for adoption by the Assembly on November 4 or 5. 
They have not yet finalized their text, so we have not yet 
seen a draft resolution, but according to several delegations 
many elements now under discussion appear unacceptable because 
they are entirely political in nature.  This carries a great 
risk of setting dangerous precedents and severely undermining 
our efforts to re-launch Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on 
final status issues.  These include: 
 
-- Attempting to direct or pressure the Security Council to 
take up the matter.  As noted above, many Council members are 
already on record opposing adding the report to its agenda. 
The Council is already seized of the situation in Gaza as part 
of its monthly deliberations on the Middle East. 
 
-- Establishing an UNGA committee or other body to monitor 
domestic investigations.  The capability of such a body to 
pronounce impartially on the adequacy of ongoing criminal 
investigations without the full cooperation of the parties is 
highly questionable, as the rights of both the accusers and 
those under investigation must be maintained, and much of the 
relevant information to make an outside assessment may be 
restricted by military necessity.  The Gaza situation has not 
been resolved, and there has been a noticeable increase in 
rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza into Israel in recent 
months.  It is unrealistic to think that Hamas will make those 
who launch the rockets available to a UN committee, that Gazan 
civilians would risk their lives to share with such a body 
information about Hamas' violations of international 
humanitarian law, or that Israel would reveal the methods and 
sources it uses to establish who is launching rockets at it 
from specific locations, while the conflict is still ongoing. 
 
-- Setting time-limits for Israeli or Palestinian domestic 
investigations.  Time limits on a legal process would be 
artificial and might incentivize investigators to do a rush 
job, or serve to delegitimize genuinely independent domestic 
investigations that need time to hear evidence from all sides. 
We should not put the parties under a gun to produce results. 
 
-- Calling for the exercise of jurisdiction by other national 
courts over GoI actions alleged in the report.  Israel has the 
democratic institutions to conduct credible investigations. 
With such an UNGA endorsement in hand, some states might try 
to initiate political show trials against Israeli leaders 
designed intentionally to scuttle efforts to re-initiate peace 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  This could 
be cited as a dubious precedent in the future that could be 
used against officials from other countries.  As a separate 
matter, attempts to issue warrants for Israeli leaders in 
Europe or elsewhere would also complicate the environment for 
Middle East peace efforts. 
 
-- Attempting to establish an International Tribunal.  The GA 
does not have the authority to impose such a tribunal and 
indeed has never attempted to do so before.  Without the 
consent of the parties such a body would be unable to 
function, and it too might be cited in the future as a 
precedent that could be used against other countries. 
 
-- Encouraging the Security Council to refer allegations in 
the report to the International Criminal Court.  The GA does 
not have the authority to refer matters to the ICC itself.  In 
addition, neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority (which 
is not a state) are parties to the ICC.  The Rome Statute 
which established the ICC is clear on the need to respect the 
principle of complementarity, which provides for 
international-level legal action only after legal efforts at 
the national level are exhausted.  Israel's investigations are 
ongoing. 
 
-- Referring the matter to the International Court of Justice. 
No purpose would be served by referring a question to the ICJ 
for an Advisory Opinion while active investigations are 
underway that could resolve those questions or render them 
irrelevant. 
 
-- Encouraging the convocation of the parties to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.  The purpose would be to discuss the future 
legality of munitions like white phosphorous (WP), which was 
used by the Israelis during the Gaza conflict.  This goes far 
beyond questions related to the fighting in Gaza, and the 
United States would not support such a step.  WP is a lawful 
conventional munition possessed by many armies worldwide. 
 
-- Calling for sanctions against Israel.  This would clearly 
be a politicized step at a time when Israel is actively 
investigating its own actions and the Palestinians are not. 
 
-- Welcoming or endorsing the report or its recommendations in 
full.  Many of the elements described above are included in 
the report.  A blanket endorsement would open the door to many 
negative initiatives. 
 
¶9. (SBU) USG Goals.  Our broad objectives are: 
 
-- to prevent the passage of a General Assembly resolution 
that includes elements detrimental to U.S. interests, or at 
least to maximize the number of no votes and abstentions. 
-- to promote accountability for violations of international 
law. 
-- to keep any future action on the Goldstone report out of 
the Security Council, ICC, ICJ or other international venue. 
-- to avoid US isolation, and minimize damage to the process 
of U.S. reengagement in multilateral fora and our efforts to 
break down regional bloc divisions. 
-- to minimize potential damage to ongoing efforts to re- 
launch permanent status negotiations between two viable 
parties that would lead to the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state. 
-- to avoid, or at least minimize, political damage to the 
Palestinian Authority and President Abbas, and any public 
U.S.-Palestinian confrontation. 
 
¶10. (U) Talking Points For All Recipients.  Posts may deploy 
these points or select material contained therein in the best 
manner to meet USG objectives. 
 
-- The President of the UN General Assembly has scheduled for 
Wednesday, November 4, a debate on the Goldstone Report on the 
fighting between Israel and Hamas last winter in Gaza.  The 
Arab Group and others will present a resolution for the 
Assembly's consideration. 
 
-- The rush to GA consideration will provide virtually no time 
for most UN members to study and deliberate on this important 
issue, which could set precedents for other conflicts, 
potentially involving any UN member, including your own 
country. 
 
-- As members of the UN Human Rights Council, we have had time 
to study the Goldstone report in detail and have serious 
concerns about many of its aspects.  It contains not only 
numerous allegations about violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law that the report's authors admit 
have not been fully corroborated, but also a sweeping set of 
recommendations for UN and other international bodies whose 
adoption would be without precedent in prior legal or 
diplomatic practice. 
 
-- Having noted the above, we understand and share the deep 
concern of the international community regarding the fighting 
last winter in Gaza.  The United States is moving vigorously 
to pursue comprehensive peace in the Middle East, including 
the two-state solution. 
 
-- The United States also strongly supports accountability -- 
including criminal investigations and punishments when cases 
are proven -- for violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law.  We have engaged with Israel to understand 
the investigations they have underway and to stress the 
importance of complete and credible inquiry into alleged 
allegations of violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law.  International law provides for 
complementarity -- the opportunity for states to objectively 
examine their own actions, and to prosecute violations when 
the evidence warrants. 
 
-- The Goldstone recommendations do not give sufficient weight 
to the fact that Israel is currently investigating or has 
already investigated most of the cases noted in the report, 
and conducted five overarching investigations into different 
aspects of its military operations.  The Government of Israel 
advises us that it currently has twenty separate investigative 
teams looking into allegations, with provision for 
Palestinians in Gaza to make complaints about Israeli actions 
and give evidence, and for criminal prosecution if the 
evidence warrants.  The Israeli government was not previously 
aware of twelve specific incidents covered in the Goldstone 
report, and has stated that it forwarded these cases for 
investigation upon learning of them. 
 
-- Israel has the capacity and democratic institutions to 
conduct investigations of this sort, and the United States 
will continue to urge it to do so in an in-depth manner, 
ensuring the investigators' full ability to pursue cases 
wherever they lead. 
 
 
-- We were not alone in having concerns about this matter when 
a resolution endorsing the recommendations in the report -- 
that cited Israeli actions but did not mention Hamas at all -- 
was rushed before the Human Rights Council in a Special 
Session on October 16.  Others voted with us or abstained, or 
cited their concerns about the reports' recommendations. 
 
-- We are thus deeply concerned about possible elements the 
General Assembly might adopt in a resolution, such as 
referring the matter to other institutions, or even attemping 
to create new ones.  Several delegations have shared with us 
their concern that such elements are being discussed by Arab 
Group members and others in New York.  These would seriously 
undermine efforts towards peace and do nothing to encourage 
actual accountability. 
 
-- We urge your country to oppose any resolution that contains 
any or all of the following elements: 
 
Attempting to direct or pressure the Security Council to take 
up the matter.  As noted above, many Council members are 
already on record opposing adding the report to its agenda. 
The Council is already seized of the situation in Gaza as part 
of its monthly deliberations on the Middle East. 
 
Establishing an UNGA committee or other body to monitor 
domestic investigations.  Even with the best of intentions, 
the capability of such a body to pronounce impartially on the 
adequacy of ongoing criminal investigations without the full 
cooperation of the parties is highly questionable, as the 
rights of both the accusers and those under investigation must 
be maintained, and much of the relevant information to make an 
outside assessment may be restricted by military necessity. 
The Gaza situation has not been resolved, and there has been a 
noticeable increase in rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza 
into Israel in recent months.  It is unrealistic to think that 
Hamas will make those who launch the rockets available to a UN 
committee, that Gazan civilians would risk their lives to 
share with such a body information about Hamas' violations of 
international humanitarian law, or that Israel would reveal 
the methods and sources it uses to establish who is launching 
rockets at it and from where, while the conflict is still 
ongoing. 
 
Setting time-limits for Israeli or Palestinian domestic 
investigations.  Time limits on a legal process would be 
artificial and might incentivize investigators to do a rush 
job, or serve to delegitimize genuinely independent domestic 
investigations that in the current environment need time to 
hear evidence from all sides.  We should not put the parties 
under a gun to produce results. 
 
Calling for the exercise of jurisdiction by other national 
courts over GoI actions alleged in the report.  Israel has the 
democratic institutions to conduct credible investigations. 
With such an UNGA endorsement in hand, some states might try 
to initiate political show trials against Israeli leaders 
designed intentionally to scuttle efforts to re-initiate peace 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  This could 
be cited as a dubious precedent in the future, that could be 
used against officials from other countries.  As a separate 
matter, attempts to issue warrants for Israeli leaders in 
Europe or elsewhere would also complicate Middle East peace 
efforts. 
 
Attempting to establish an International Tribunal.  The GA 
does not have the authority to impose such a tribunal and 
indeed has never attempted to do so before.  Without the 
consent of the parties such a body would be unable to 
function, and it too might be cited in the future as a 
precedent that could be used against other countries. 
 
Encouraging the Security Council to refer allegations in the 
report to the International Criminal Court.  The GA does not 
have the authority to refer matters to the ICC itself.  In 
addition, neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority (which 
is not a state) are parties to the ICC.  The Rome Statute, 
which established the ICC, is clear on the need to respect the 
principle of complementarity, which provides for 
international-level legal action only after legal efforts at 
the national level are exhausted.  Israel's investigations are 
ongoing. 
 
Referring the matter to the International Court of Justice. 
No purpose would be served by referring a question to the ICJ 
for an Advisory Opinion while active investigations are 
underway that could resolve those questions or render them 
moot. 
 
Encouraging the convocation of the parties to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.  The purpose would be to discuss the future 
legality of munitions like white phosphorous (WP), which was 
used by the Israelis during the Gaza conflict.  This goes far 
beyond questions related to the fighting in Gaza, and the 
United States would not support such a step.  WP is a lawful 
conventional munition possessed by many armies worldwide. 
 
Calling for sanctions against Israel.  This would clearly be a 
politicized step at a time when Israel is actively 
investigating its own actions and the Palestinians are not. 
 
Welcoming or endorsing the report or its recommendations in 
full.  Many of the elements described above are included in 
the report.  A blanket endorsement would open the door to many 
negative initiatives. 
 
-- We urge your country to join us in opposing these elements. 
Your doing so would help to avoid setting precedents that can 
affect us all, and help promote peace in the Middle East.  We 
urge you to convey an instruction to your mission in New York 
to take this approach and to work closely with the U.S. and 
other missions. 
 
¶11. If Asked: 
 
-- Among our principal concerns with possible General Assembly 
action on the Goldstone report is the potential for damage to 
ongoing efforts to re-launch permanent status negotiations 
that would lead to the creation of an independent Palestinian 
state. 
 
-- Bringing about a comprehensive peace -- not only between 
Israel and the Palestinians, but also between Israel and Syria 
and Israel and Lebanon, with the full normalization of 
relations between Israel and its neighbors -- is chief among 
our goals in the Middle East.  The resolution of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict through the two-state solution is central 
to our goal of comprehensive peace. 
 
-- Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell has 
been working closely with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, 
regional leaders and allies, our partners in the Quartet and 
others.  Progress is steadily and quietly being made, and the 
President and his team will continue to approach this effort 
with perseverance and determination. 
 
-- Both in public and private, President Obama has made clear 
that the negotiations should cover all permanent status issues 
-- borders, security, Jerusalem and refugees.  We seek to 
create a dialogue that facilitates the compromises necessary 
to ensure the long-term interests of both sides. 
 
¶12.  Only for Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Ukraine, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, 
Uruguay, the UK, France, Angola, Madagascar, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and China: 
 
-- Your opposition to counterproductive elements is important 
to us and to our shared efforts to promote peace in the Middle 
East.  We appreciate your opposition to problematic ideas in 
Geneva, and hope this will continue in New York. 
 
¶13.  Only for Security Council members: 
 
-- We do not see the Goldstone Report as an appropriate matter 
for consideration of the Security Council. 
 
-- We should make it plain to those trying to force a Security 
Council action, that the Council chooses the matters it will 
take up based on its mandate in the UN Charter to maintain 
international peace and security. 
 
¶14.  Posts should reply by front channel cable to the 
Department, infoing USUN New York, no later than, 12:00 noon 
EST, Wednesday, November 4, noting host-government reaction to 
the demarche.  Please slug cables for IO/HR, Paul Kruchowski; 
IO/UNP, Andrew Morrison and NEA/IPA, Jeffrey Giauque; and USUN 
New York, Ellen Germain. 
CLINTON