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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09SEOUL1839, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 23, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1839 2009-11-23 05:38 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO5386
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1839/01 3270538
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230538Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6301
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9447
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0547
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6969
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7029
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1532
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5342
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4283
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7497
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1772
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3078
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2157
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2763
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 001839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 23, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
ROKG Seeks to Move International Middle Schools and Foreign Language 
High Schools to Sejong City 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Rival Parties Agree on Administrative District Reform 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmun, Seoul Shinmun 
Contentious Four-River Restoration Project Starts; Local Government 
Heads Affiliated with Opposition Democratic Party (DP) Attend 
Groundbreaking Ceremony against DP's Policy 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
Survey: 76 out of 147 Ruling Grand National Party (GNP) Lawmakers 
Polled Favor Revising Sejong City Plan, while 39 Lawmakers Favor 
Maintaining Original Plan or, 
if Necessary, Introducing "Plus Alpha" 
(additional measures to make Sejong city more self-sufficient) 
 
Segye Ilbo 
Korea Development Institute (KDI) Calls on ROKG to Implement an 
"Exit Strategy" to Head off Adverse Effects 
of Protracted Stimulus Policies 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
According to a diplomatic source in Beijing, Chinese Vice President 
Xi Jinping will visit the ROK from Dec. 17-19 at the ROKG's 
invitation. Xi is considered the most likely candidate for China's 
next top leadership. (All) 
 
 "Two-faced North Korea:" Pyongyang recently suggested that the two 
Koreas hold working-level talks to discuss resuming the suspended 
tours to Mt. Kumgang, while criticizing the ROKG through various 
media outlets. (Dong-a) 
 
The ROKG is likely to respond to the North Korean proposal following 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen 
Bosworth's Dec. 8 visit to North Korea. (Dong-a) 
 
 
International News 
------------------ 
 
On Nov. 20, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved Robert King as 
Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights. (Chosun, Seoul) 
 
Three U.S. experts on Korean Peninsula affairs, including Jack 
Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute, and Scott 
Snyder, director of the Asia Foundation's Center for U.S.-Korea 
Policy, visited North Korea on Nov. 21. They will stay in Pyongyang 
until Nov. 24. (Dong-a, Seoul, All TVs) 
 
A senior State Department official said on Nov. 20 that the U.S. 
agreed to direct talks with North Korea due to a clear sign from 
Pyongyang that it plans to return to the Six-Party Talks. (Hankook, 
Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul, all TVs) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
Most ROK media on Saturday (Nov. 21) carried reports quoting a State 
Department official as saying that Special Representative for North 
Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth will stay in Pyongyang for one and a 
half days, leading a delegation of four or five interagency 
 
SEOUL 00001839  002 OF 006 
 
 
officials, including Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Sung 
Kim. 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun commented that the size and the 
length of Ambassador Bosworth's delegation are relatively "small and 
simple," despite the great attention attracted to the visit.  The 
article's sub-headline read, "This Four-or Five-Member Delegation is 
Almost Half the Level of Previous Visits to N. Korea; It May Show 
Washington's Determination that This Visit Is Not For Substantial 
Negotiations but for Discussing Resuming Six-Party Talks." 
 
Most ROK media today and over the weekend covered Nov. 19 press 
remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which she said: 
"We are going to go with a very clear message that there are 
significant benefits to North Korea if they recommit to the 
verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
The U.S. would explore some of the issues which they have raised 
continually with us over the years: namely, normalization of 
relations, a peace treaty instead of an armistice, and economic 
development assistance." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized today: "There will be no one 
who does not want (to see) North Korea to give up its nuclear 
ambitions and a peace treaty to be signed on the Korean Peninsula to 
permanently remove the dangers of war from the Peninsula.  However, 
should the envisioned peace treaty include the withdrawal of USFK, 
we may face a situation where the USFK, the most effective deterrent 
against war, vanishes in return for a peace treaty, which could be 
reduced to a mere scrap of paper at any time. ...  Even if 
discussions start on a peace treaty after progress is made in 
nuclear negotiations with North Korea, we must be assured that the 
ROK will be a key party to the peace treaty." 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo observed in an editorial: "The question is how 
North Korea will respond, but recent developments seem positive.  Ri 
Gun, Director General of American Affairs at North Korea's Foreign 
Ministry, has reportedly clearly hinted during his recent visit to 
the U.S. that the North will return to the Six-Party Talks. 
Furthermore, China is strongly pressing North Korea to rejoin the 
Six-Party Talks through various channels." 
 
A senior State Department official was widely quoted today as saying 
on Nov. 20 that the U.S. agreed to direct talks with North Korea due 
to a clear sign from Pyongyang that it plans to return to the 
Six-Party Talks. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
-------------------- 
 
OBAMA'S VISIT TO SEOUL LEAVES SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED 
(JoongAng Ilbo, November 23, 2009, Page 34; Excerpts) 
 
By Editorial Writer Kim Jin 
 
President Obama's four-day three-night visit to China was full of 
events.  He met with his half-brother, Mark Ndesanjo, whose wife is 
Chinese.  Knowing that China and the White House are in-laws, people 
probably thought, "Human races will be more mixed."  President Obama 
climbed the Great Wall.  While looking at the huge structure that is 
reportedly seen even from the moon, people must have keenly felt the 
high spirit of the Chinese (people.).   In Shanghai, President Obama 
had a town hall meeting with ambitious college students.  He talked 
with a future China. 
 
President Obama's 20-hour stay in the ROK was successful to some 
degree.  During the meeting and the press conference, the two 
leaders praised the ROK-U.S. alliance.  It was a "splendid 
restoration of friendship" strained under the previous Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations.  Big news of a U.S. Presidential 
envoy's visit to Pyongyang also came out. 
 
However, President Obama's visit left something to be desired.  His 
stay in the ROK was not only short but also prosaic.  President 
 
SEOUL 00001839  003 OF 006 
 
 
Obama arrived by plane at night and had a good sleep.  The next day, 
he met with the ROK President and had lunch together.  During his 
20-hour stay, all the ordinary people he met were the employees of 
the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and U.S. troops in the ROK.  After meeting 
U.S. troops, he hurried back home.  He said that his daughter's play 
was scheduled for the following day.  His visit to Seoul wrapped up 
like that. 
 
The ROK and China are, of course, different.  China is in the G2 
with the U.S., but the ROK just joined the ranks of the G20.  The 
ROK does not have either Ndesanjo or the Great Wall.  Still, the ROK 
is special.  The ROK is the U.S.'s 60-year ally, and President Obama 
made his first trip to the nation.  Furthermore, Obama is more 
popular in the ROK than in any other nation.  If President Obama had 
guessed Koreans' affection for him, he should have stood in front of 
Koreans, whether it was a university or an orphanage.  How 
impressive it would have been if he had responded in his own way to 
Korean teenagers' questions, such as "How did you overcome 
difficulties as an African American?" and "Why did you decide to go 
to  the slums in Chicago, even though you had a promising future 
after graduating from a prestigious university?"  The same goes for 
the North Korean issue.  If he had entered the demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) and declared, "If North Korea abandons its nuclear programs 
and tears down the walls, we will help you," how eloquent it would 
have been.  In 1993, then-President Clinton visited the "Bridge of 
No Return" at the truce village of Panmunjom.  In 2002, 
then-President Bush gave a speech at Dorasan Station, which was 
broadcast live. 
 
Why did President Obama's visit leave much to be desired?  Was it 
attributable to lack of diplomatic skills on the part of the ROK or 
due to Washington's lack of consideration for the ROK?  If the 
latter is true, is the U.S. displeased about the ROK's troop 
withdrawal from Afghanistan or its "passive" troop redeployment?  Is 
the affection that Koreans feel for Obama one-sided love? 
 
 
NO RENEGOTIATION OF THE FTA 
(JoongAng Ilbo, November 21, 2009, Page 38) 
 
President Lee Myung-bak said he'd be willing to talk about 
automobiles in the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement if there are any 
problems there.  That's not surprising.  But Lee's words left room 
for some misunderstanding and some foreign news agencies reported 
that Korea had taken a 180-degree turn on its previous stance.  The 
Democratic Party and other opposition sectors criticized the 
government for giving in to the U.S. request for renegotiations. 
But Lee more than likely referred to additional negotiations, which 
would entail revising supplementary documents through extra 
discussions. 
 
The (text of the) Korea-U.S. FTA runs over a thousand pages. 
Renegotiating only the automobiles part (of the agreement) would 
break the balance of benefits for both sides.  And it's difficult to 
find any precedent where countries fixed their already-agreed-upon 
FTA pacts.  And once the renegotiation is under way, Korea could 
raise complaints on intellectual property rights and medicine.  When 
the balance that was achieved through a packaged settlement is 
endangered, then the Korea-U.S. FTA will be all but wiped out. 
Renegotiation is not right, nor is it possible. 
 
The U.S. discontent with the automobiles section is understandable. 
Last year, the United States sold 8,864 vehicles in Korea, but 
Korea's Hyundai-Kia Motors sold about 53,000 cars in the U.S.  in 
October alone.  Of course, it's not all because of systematic 
problems, such as tariffs.  The essence of the problem is that the 
U.S. cars are no longer competitive.  It's easy to see that when you 
consider that the European Union exports 50,000 cars a year to Korea 
under the same conditions.  The United States has never presented 
any benchmark for review of the FTA or made any specific requests. 
Revision to the taxation on cars with large engine displacements and 
other U.S. demands are already included in the current agreement. 
But U.S. auto unions and some members of Congress are constantly 
raising issue with the deal.  They keep saying they won't accept the 
 
SEOUL 00001839  004 OF 006 
 
 
Korea-U.S. FTA in its current form. 
 
When Lee said he was ready to listen, he may have tried to quell any 
doubts surrounding the agreement.  Fortunately, U.S. President 
Barack Obama responded that he'd acquired a tool to persuade 
Congress once he returns home. 
 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan was busy fending off speculation 
about renegotiation, saying it would never take place.  But it's 
time the two countries got past defensive postures and tried to 
solve problems creatively and diplomatically.  As we witnessed 
during the candlelight vigils last year, any Korea-U.S. deal can be 
incendiary.  It'd be wise to leave the agreement itself untouched 
and then revise annexed documents, exchange side letters or reach 
pacts between industries in order to resolve the automobile issue. 
And both sides must never insert any toxic clause that could provoke 
the people of their own countries. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
LEE'S FTA COMMENTS CREATE NEEDLESS CONFUSION 
(Chosun Ilbo, November 23, 2009, Page 39) 
 
In a press conference on Thursday with U.S. President Barack Obama, 
President Lee Myung-bak said, "If there are any problems in the 
automobile sector... then we are ready to resolve this issue."  The 
comment came in response to a question by an American journalist who 
asked if Lee was willing to open up Korea's automotive market 
further to expedite ratification of the bilateral free trade 
agreement.  The U.S. side probably interpreted Lee's comments as 
signaling his willingness to either re-negotiate the FTA or hold 
additional talks. 
 
But faced with questions from lawmakers on Friday, Foreign Minister 
Yu Myung-hwan said the President's comments did not signify a 
re-negotiation or additional talks, while Trade Minister Kim 
Jong-hoon said they meant that Korea would "listen to what the U.S. 
has to say."  In other words, there is no change in the government's 
stance that the FTA stands as signed by both sides in 2007. 
 
Two-and-a-half years later, the FTA has yet to be ratified by either 
side, due to opposition by the U.S. Senate.  U.S. discontent over 
the trade imbalance with Korea in the automotive sector played a 
major role in Washington's lack of action.  Last year, Korea 
exported around 598,000 cars to the U.S. worth US$7.32 billion.  But 
imports of American-made cars to Korea totaled just 8,864 vehicles 
worth $220 million.  At the crux of the matter is the fact that this 
imbalance is not the result of a systematic discrimination against 
American cars by the Korean government, but that Korean consumers 
find American cars inferior to European and Japanese ones in terms 
of fuel efficiency, design, performance and comfort.  U.S. pressure 
forced Korea's automotive market wide open, but the benefits of 
increased access have gone to the Japanese and Germans instead. 
 
A government official explained that Lee's comments expressed his 
willingness to listen to U.S. complaints and explain Korea's 
position, in order to end the continued delays.  But the bottom line 
is that the comments have generated unnecessary confusion. 
 
Such comments can be thrown out as the last card if all else fails, 
but such impromptu comments sap the (government's) negotiating 
power.  Korea's national interests suffered in the five years of the 
previous administration from impromptu comments by the former 
President.  It is time we went beyond such mistakes.  The 
President's aides have made a big mistake in allowing this blunder 
to happen. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
IS THE U.S. MOVING TOWARD A PEACE TREATY WITH N. KOREA? 
 
SEOUL 00001839  005 OF 006 
 
 
(Chosun Ilbo, November 23, 2009, Page 39 
 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters at a press 
conference on Thursday, "We are going to go with a very clear 
message that there are significant benefits to North Korea if they 
recommit to the verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula."  She added that the U.S. "would explore some of 
the issues which they have raised continually with us over the 
years; namely, normalization of relations, a peace treaty instead of 
an armistice, (and) economic development assistance." "All of that 
would be open for discussion," she said.  In the September 19 Joint 
Statement of 2005 and the February 13 Agreement of 2007, the two 
Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia agreed to hold separate 
talks over a permanent peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, but 
this is the first time for a top U.S. diplomat to mention the peace 
treaty publicly. 
 
Until now, North Korea has been demanding a peace treaty as a 
precondition to giving up its nuclear weapons program.  In a recent 
meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-il said the nuclear standoff could end only if the U.S. 
government abandons its "hostile" policy toward the North.  By that 
he means the signing of a peace treaty that will replace the 
armistice, the dissolution of the South Korea-U.S. alliance or 
similar measures and the departure of American troops on the 
peninsula.  Regardless of whether North Korea really wants U.S. 
troops to leave, it could view the evacuation of American forces as 
the greatest threat to South Korea and seek to use that weakness to 
its benefit.  The reason North Korea has been so adamant about a 
peace treaty is because the signatories of the armistice were China 
and the U.S.  and the participation of those two superpowers in 
signing a peace treaty would play into Pyongyang's strategy of 
excluding South Korea from the negotiating table. 
 
There will be no one who does not want (to see) North Korea to give 
up its nuclear ambitions and a peace treaty to be signed on the 
Korean Peninsula to permanently remove the dangers of war from the 
Peninsula.  However, should the envisioned peace treaty include the 
withdrawal of USFK, we may face a situation where the USFK, the most 
effective deterrent against war, vanishes in return for a peace 
treaty, which could be reduced to a mere scrap of paper at any time. 
 South Korean and U.S. officials are fully aware of this. But if 
North Korea demands a peace treaty and the departure of U.S. troops 
in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, it is difficult to 
gauge Washington's response, whose first priority is to get rid of 
nuclear threats against the U.S. From that standpoint, Clinton's 
"peace treaty" comment deserves a closer look. 
 
Even if discussions start on a peace treaty after progress is made 
in nuclear negotiations with North Korea, we must be assured that 
the ROK will be a key party to the peace treaty. The ROK accounts 
for two-thirds of the population of the Korean Peninsula, and it 
makes no sense to discuss any treaty of that kind which would 
exclude the main economic force in the region. The issue of U.S. 
troop presence can be discussed later after a watertight security 
framework is created in Northeast Asia, similar to the common 
security system shared by European countries. 
 
There is no chance that Washington and Pyongyang will sign a peace 
treaty any time soon. But Clinton's comments have made it clear that 
the U.S. could simultaneously discuss the North Korean nuclear 
problem and a peace treaty with the North.  South Korea should not 
miss this critical point. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
GROWING EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S.-N. KOREAN BILATERAL TALKS 
(Hankook Ilbo, November 23, page 31) 
 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen 
Bosworth's December 8 visit to North Korea creates a bright prospect 
for U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks.  The North has reportedly 
 
SEOUL 00001839  006 OF 006 
 
 
hinted at the possibility of returning to the Six-Party Talks.  The 
U.S. has expressed willingness to discuss normalization of relations 
with North Korea and a Korean peninsula peace treaty.  These 
indicate a favorable atmosphere (for U.S.-North Korea relations.)  A 
ray of hope is shining on the Korean Peninsula where a dark cloud 
has hung. 
 
It seems that the U.S. does not want to stir up too many 
expectations from the North because the number of Ambassador 
Bosworth's delegation will not exceed 5-6 and he will stay in 
Pyongyang just for one and a half days.  In addition, it is too 
early to be optimistic since North Korea has often disappointingly 
made capricious moves.  However, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton made significant remarks during a November 19 press 
conference that if North Korea seeks denuclearization in a 
verifiable way, the U.S. may consider normalization of diplomatic 
relations with the North, a peace treaty and economic assistance." 
She used a flexible expression, "if North Korea seeks 
denuclearization", instead of strongly demanding that the North 
should be committed to nuclear dismantlement first. 
 
Secretary Clinton made it clear that Ambassador Bosworth will visit 
North Korea with this message.  During his trip to Asia, including 
the ROK, President Obama delivered similar messages.  The question 
is how North Korea will respond, but recent developments seem 
positive.  Ri Gun, Director General of American Affairs at North 
Korea's Foreign Ministry, has reportedly clearly hinted during his 
recent visit to the U.S. that the North will return to the Six-Party 
Talks.  Furthermore, China is strongly pressing North Korea to 
rejoin the Six-Party Talks through various channels. 
 
When Hyundai Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun recently visited Mt. Kumgang, 
North Korea suggested to the ROK that both countries hold a meeting 
to resume tours to Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong.  This shows that North 
Korea is very willing to improve relations with the ROK and the U.S. 
 The North may be well aware that it would be hard to normalize 
inter-Korean cooperation such as the resumption of Mt. Kumgang tour 
project without making progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. 
The ROKG should actively respond to the North's offer in order not 
to hamper overall progress while thoroughly preparing for the 
outcome of U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks. 
 
 
STEPHENS