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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1801, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 12, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1801 2009-11-12 08:11 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO5680
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1801/01 3160811
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120811Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6205
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9390
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0497
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6913
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6975
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1481
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5288
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4233
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7445
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1721
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3027
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2106
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2713
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 001801 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 12, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Industrial Wastes Illegally Buried in Yongsan Development District; 
Account For 80% of Total Area 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Court Rulings Contradict Each Other Depending 
on Judges' Ideological Orientation 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Damaged North Korean Ship Is Towed Shortly 
After Crossing Northern Limit Line 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
Officials to Accelerate Sejong Revision; Alternative Plan 
to Be Unveiled in December 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Middle Class-friendly Policies Fail to Protect Middle Class; "Safety 
Net" Should Be Established 
 
Segye Ilbo 
North Korea Targets Only One ROK Vessel 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
Following Tuesday's naval skirmish with North Korea, the ROK 
yesterday beefed up forces in the Yellow Sea and deployed a 
destroyer to waters near the maritime border. (JoongAng, Seoul) 
 
In a related development, White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs said on 
November 10, "I would say to the North Koreans that we hope that 
there will be no further actions in the Yellow Sea that can be seen 
as an escalation." (Chosun, Dong-a) 
 
According to the ROK's Foreign Ministry officials, an ROK company 
operating in Afghanistan has recently been attacked three times by 
the militants. (Dong-a, Hankyoreh, Hankook, Seoul, Segye) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
The U.S. has informed North Korea of its decision to send Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth to discuss 
the regime's possible return to the Six-Party Talks. (All) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-North-South Korea naval clash 
------------------------------ 
Most ROK media carried reports speculating about the motives behind 
North Korea's attack on an ROK vessel.  Right-of-center JoongAng 
Ilbo ran an inside-page report on the North's provocations.  The 
newspaper noted that the North Korean patrol boat attacked the ROK's 
high speed patrol boat even though the North knew that it had little 
chance of winning a fight with the vessel.  The daily also reported 
that it seems that North Korea deliberately ignored the warnings 
from the ROK and opened fire first as a calculated maneuver. 
JoongAng Ilbo questioned the mild nature of the North's response, 
given that it suffered casualties.  The newspaper also speculated, 
citing an ROK military expert, that the North Korean military itself 
may have decided to stage this limited clash to increase tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula by trying to highlight that the ROKG's North 
Korea policy prompted inter-Korean conflicts.  According to the 
newspaper, the expert also views that the North's provocations may 
be a bargaining ploy to increase leverage in negotiations with the 
 
SEOUL 00001801  002 OF 005 
 
 
U.S. 
 
In a related development, Conservative Chosun Ilbo quoted White 
House Spokesman Robert Gibbs as saying on November 10, "I would say 
to the North Koreans that we hope that there will be no further 
actions in the Yellow Sea that can be seen as an escalation." 
 
-Bosworth's visit to North Korea 
------------------------------- 
Most ROK media carried reports on the U.S. State Department's 
announcement that Special Representative for North Korea Policy 
Stephen Bosworth will travel to Pyongyang by the year's end. 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo ran an inside-page report saying that 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley 
announced this decision only with three sentences, while repeatedly 
stressing that Ambassador Bosworth's discussions in Pyongyang will 
take place in the context of the Six-Party Talks.  The newspaper 
noted that the State Department intentionally played down the 
decision in order to prevent the North from maneuvering to 
strengthen its bargaining position. 
 
Hankyoreh Shimun editorialized: During Bosworth's visit to North 
Korea, the U.S. should not be overly cautious but instead try to 
create a good atmosphere for negotiations. ... Even though, as the 
USG said, the visit is not for direct talks between the U.S. and 
North Korea but for discussions in the context of the Six-Party 
Talks, the Six-Party Talks will face difficulties if the two sides 
do not trust each other as negotiating partners.  The U.S. should 
lay out its vision on how to get North Korea to give up its nuclear 
ambitions while making efforts to engage in in-depth discussions 
with the North. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
CONFIRMATION OF BOSWORTH'S NORTH KOREA VISIT PRESENTS CRUCIAL 
OPPORTUNITIES 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, November 12, 2009, Page 27) 
 
On Tuesday, it was officially announced that Stephen Bosworth, the 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, plans to visit 
North Korea.  This announcement marks three months since former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton visited North Korea and opened a path for 
North Korea-U.S. dialogue.  The two nations discussed the resumption 
of dialogue through the New York channel and during North Korean 
Foreign Ministry U.S. Affairs Bureau Director Ri Gun's visit to the 
U.S.  The announcement of Bosworth's trip indicates that an 
agreement has been made on the agenda and format of the dialogue 
that is to take place between North Korea and the U.S. 
 
The U.S., prior to President Barack Obama's tour of Asia, announced 
Bosworth's trip despite the first inter-Korean naval clash in the 
West Sea in seven years.  This shows that the U.S. has moved a step 
closer, since Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to North 
Korea early last month, towards a firm position to resolve the 
nuclear issue through dialogue.  As a result, it appears that 
full-scale negotiations will begin during (Bosworth's visit to the 
North.) 
 
During Bosworth's visit to North Korea, the U.S. should not be 
overly cautious but instead try to create a good atmosphere for 
negotiations.  It is hard to deny that fundamentally, the two most 
important actors in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue are the 
U.S. and North Korea.  Even though, as the USG said, the visit is 
not for direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea but for 
discussions in the context of the Six-Party Talks, the Six-Party 
Talks will face difficulties if the two sides do not trust each 
other as negotiating partners.  The U.S. should lay out its vision 
on how to get North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions while 
making efforts to engage in in-depth discussions with the North. 
 
 
North Korea, for its part, must not engage only in dialogue with the 
 
SEOUL 00001801  003 OF 005 
 
 
U.S. and ignore the Six-Party Talks, which has provided the 
framework for discussing the nuclear issue for the last six years. 
The Six-Party Talks is the most appropriate framework for furthering 
discussion on the economic aid, security guarantees, and the Korean 
peace regime that North Korea hopes for.  If North Korea continues 
to appear rigid, the Obama Administration, which began talks after 
much difficulty, could suffer a backlash. 
 
The South Korean government must stop going against the greater 
trend of resolving the nuclear issue through dialogue and consider 
more intensely what it can do to play a leading role.  It is a good 
thing that the Lee Administration has decided to handle the West Sea 
naval clash in a way that does not aggravate inter-Korean relations, 
but it must not maintain this passive attitude.  The objective is to 
improve inter-Korean ties because the level of inter-Korean 
relations and South Korea's voice on matters pertaining to the 
Korean Peninsula go hand-in-hand. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
BOSWORTH VISITS PYONGYANG, BUT WHEN? 
(Dong-a Ilbo, November 12, 2009, Page 5) 
 
By Washington Correspondent Ha Tae-won 
 
Five questions about Bosworth's visit to Pyongyang 
 
The U.S. has notified North Korea of a decision to send U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley said 
on November 10, "President Barack Obama and Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton prepared for (Bosworth's) visit to Pyongyang after 
careful consideration and extensive consultation among our allies 
and partners."  He added, "Ambassador Bosworth... will travel with a 
small interagency team to Pyongyang." Regarding the timing of the 
visit, he said it has not been determined yet, but added that 
U.S.-North Korea dialogue is expected to take place "sometime 
between now and the end of the year."  He explained, "The purpose 
(of Ambassador Bosworth's visit to Pyongyang) will be to facilitate 
an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks and to secure North 
Korea's reaffirmation of the September 2005 joint statement of the 
Six-Party Talks." 
 
Ambassador Bosworth's official North Korean counterpart is First 
Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju.  Kang will make his first 
appearance at an official meeting in seven years after he 
acknowledged the uranium enrichment program in an October 2002 
meeting with then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, which sparked the second North 
Korean nuclear crisis.  Ambassador Bosworth's visit will become the 
first trip to Pyongyang by a U.S. official in charge (of the nuclear 
issue) since Christopher Hill, then U.S. Chief Negotiator to the 
Six-Party Talks, visited the communist state in August, 2008.  There 
are five points at issue regarding Bosworth's trip to Pyongyang. 
 
Why Did Washington Not Determine the Timing of the Visit Yet? 
The reason seems to be that during Director General of the American 
Affairs Bureau of the North Korean Foreign Ministry Ri Gun's visit 
to the U.S., North Korea did not send a clear signal to Washington 
that it will return to the Six-Party Talks.  When asked if he is 
sure about North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks, Assistant 
Secretary Crowley answered no, simply saying, "We believe that North 
Korea understands what the purpose of the meeting is."  Park Sun-won 
Park, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution who previously 
served as a member of the ROK delegation at the Six-Party Talks, 
said, "The decision to send Bosworth to Pyongyang cannot be seen as 
Washington's active judgment to improve its relations with North 
Korea but as a passive response to North Korea's conciliatory 
moves," adding, "It indicates that there is still a difference of 
 
SEOUL 00001801  004 OF 005 
 
 
opinion over the goal of dialogue." 
 
Will Bosworth Bring Some "Carrots" with Him? 
The overall atmosphere in Washington is that since the main purpose 
of Bosworth's visit to Pyongyang is not to have negotiations with 
the North but to coax the North back to the table, he will not 
likely provide incentives to the North in return for its returning 
to dialogue.  Assistant Secretary Crowley said, "We are not going to 
reward North Korea simply for returning to the Six-Party Talks.  We 
will be looking to see if they are prepared to take the kinds of 
affirmative steps that they had previously agreed to."  Stephen 
Costello, the president of ProGlobal Inc. who previously directed 
the Program on Korea at the Atlantic Council, noted, "I do not think 
that President Obama will delegate all negotiating authority to 
Ambassador Bosworth and grant him the status of a special envoy." 
 
Some observers say that the issue is how sincere North Korea will 
be.  Assistant Secretary Crowley said, "If North Korea takes the 
kind of steps that they've committed to in the past, other 
possibilities open up." 
 
Will a Second U.S.-North Korea Dialogue Take Place? 
Experts agree that the situation following the upcoming meeting is 
vital.  Since the two nations are not likely to find a breakthrough 
for denuclearization at their first meeting, it is important for 
them to have a second Bosworth-Kang meeting in the U.S. or at a 
third location at an early date.  They should admit that it is 
realistically difficult to achieve much progress in one meeting and 
should meet for the second time as early as possible.  This can 
provide a yardstick for judging how seriously the two sides will 
engage in the upcoming dialogue. 
 
Will Bosworth Meet with North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il? 
Regarding the possibility of Bosworth meeting with North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il or whether Bosworth will deliver President 
Obama's personal letter to North Korean leader Kim, a senior State 
Department official simply said, "I don't know."  In order to 
increase Bosworth's negotiating power, experts advise that the 
President throw his weight behind Bosworth by having an exclusive 
meeting with him before his visit to Pyongyang.  In other words, 
"political weight" should be given to Bosworth for his dialogue with 
North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, (to counter 
any appearance) that the "part-time" North Korea envoy has been 
sidelined in the process of setting Washington's North Korea policy. 
 
 
Relations between the Inter-Korean Naval Skirmish and Resumption of 
U.S.-North Korean Dialogue 
Secretary Clinton told a November 11 news conference on the 
sidelines of an APEC meeting that the recent inter-Korean skirmish 
in the West Sea will not have an impact on the decision to send 
Ambassador Bosworth to Pyongyang.  This statement suggests that 
Ambassador Bosworth's visit to the North will proceed as planned. 
 
 
THE U.S.'S THREE-SENTENCE BRIEFING ON BOSWORTH'S VISIT TO PYONGYANG 
(Chosun Ilbo, November 12, 2009, Page 5) 
 
By Washington Correspondent Lee Ha-won 
 
The way that the U.S. Department of State announced a decision to 
send U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen 
Bosworth to North Korea was disappointing for Pyongyang.  During a 
November 10 regular briefing, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs Philip Crowley said, "I've got several announcements 
before taking your questions" and mentioned Secretary Hillary 
Clinton's itinerary.  After that, he announced Bosworth's visit 
while mentioning the "Six-Party Talks" three times in only three 
sentences. 
 
When Washington announces an "important" decision, it is customary 
for a Secretary-level official to stand in front of a microphone 
with other officials at his side.  On November 10, however, that was 
not the case.  Neither Secretary Clinton nor Ambassador Bosworth nor 
 
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Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Sung Kim showed up when the 
announcement was made on the first significant dialogue with North 
Korea since the launch of the Obama Administration in February.  No 
one was seen beside Assistant Secretary Crowley, and he repeatedly 
stressed "bilateral dialogue in the context of the Six-Party Talks" 
in response to questions from reporters. 
 
This manner of announcing the decision contrasts sharply with the 
(more formal) statement issued by then-President George W. Bush on 
the resumption of dialogue with North Korea on June 6, 2001.  At 
that time, President Bush personally said, "I have directed my 
national security team to undertake serious discussions with North 
Korea on a broad agenda."  After meeting with visiting ROK Foreign 
Minister Han Seung-soo, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell took 
reporters' questions (about dialogue with North Korea) in person at 
the front gate of the Department of State. 
 
Some observers in the State Department say that the Obama 
Administration intentionally did not give weight to its announcement 
that Ambassador Bosworth will visit North Korea.  The U.S. played 
down its talks with North Korea to prevent the North from 
maneuvering to strengthen its bargaining position.  The U.S. has 
been saying for more than one month that it will decide soon on 
sending Ambassador Bosworth to North Korea for one-on-one talks with 
Pyongyang. 
 
A diplomatic source in Washington said that Obama Administration 
officials think that if the U.S. makes a fuss over holding talks 
with North Korea, it would only give North Korea more room to 
maneuver.  The officials say that unless North Korea changes its 
attitude, the Obama Administration will continue to respond to the 
North in a calm manner. 
 
Some observers also believe that the Obama Administration played 
down its decision to send Ambassador Bosworth to Pyongyang because 
it is not optimistic about the outcome of U.S.-North Korea bilateral 
talks.  The observers claim that since the prospect of the talks may 
not be so bright, the USG did not need to attach importance to the 
announcement. 
 
 
STEPHENS