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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1762, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 4, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1762 2009-11-04 09:09 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO8383
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1762/01 3080909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040909Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6133
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9355
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0468
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6873
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6938
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1450
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5252
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4198
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7408
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1692
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2998
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2077
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2684
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SEOUL 001762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 4, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Japanese Prime Minister: "Japan-U.S. Alliance is 
under Comprehensive Review... Tokyo will Say 
What It Has to Say to America" 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Prime Minister Chung to Announce Roadmap 
for Sejong City Project Today 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Six LPG Suppliers Face Largest Ever Fair Trade Commission Fine for 
Price Fixing 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
ROKG Measures to Contain New Flu Insufficient 
to Ease Public Anxiety 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROKG and Ruling Party under Mounting Criticism for Giving Special 
Treatment to Comprehensive Program Channels 
 
Segye Ilbo 
U.S. Foreign Policy Magazine: "N. Korea, U.S. Agree to Hold Two 
Rounds of Official Talks before North Returns to Multilateral 
Talks" 
 
Seoul Shinmun, All TVs 
ΒΆN. Korea Says It Completed 
Reprocessing 8,000 Spent Fuel Rods 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
---------------------- 
 
U.S. Ambassador to the ROK Kathleen Stephens, in a Nov. 3 speech at 
the National Assembly, said: "The U.S. is not prepared to consider a 
completely normalized relationship with a North Korea that insists 
upon having a nuclear weapons program. That makes normalization very 
difficult." (Hankook, KBS, Yonhap) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency said yesterday 
that North Korea "successfully completed reprocessing 8,000 spent 
fuel rods" in late August and made "remarkable achievements in 
weaponizing the extracted plutonium" to strengthen the North's 
nuclear deterrence. (All) 
 
The ROK Foreign Ministry expressed "deep regret," saying: "There is 
no way to confirm the statement, but if it is true, it would be a 
clear violation of UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874." (JoongAng) 
 
According to Foreign Policy magazine, the U.S. and North Korea have 
agreed to hold two rounds of official talks before the North returns 
to multilateral talks. According to the magazine, this agreement was 
reached during recent negotiations in the U.S. between Ri Gun, the 
North's No. 2 nuclear negotiator, and Sung Kim, Special Envoy for 
the Six-Party Talks. (Dong-a, Hankyoreh, Segye, all TVs) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
--------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
---------- 
All ROK media gave front- and inside-page play to North Korea's 
claim yesterday that it "successfully completed reprocessing 8,000 
spent fuel rods" in late August and made "remarkable achievements in 
 
SEOUL 00001762  002 OF 005 
 
 
weaponizing the extracted plutonium" to strengthen the North's 
nuclear deterrence. 
 
According to media reports, if the North's claim is true, the North 
could have obtained some 6-8 kg of plutonium, enough for one nuclear 
weapon, for which about 6-7 kg of plutonium is normally needed. 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo quoted the ROK Foreign Ministry as 
expressing "deep regret," saying: "There is no way to confirm the 
statement, but if it is true, it would be a clear violation of UNSC 
Resolutions 1718 and 1874." 
 
Most media cited experts as viewing this North Korean announcement 
as designed to press the USG to hold direct talks to deal with the 
nuclear issue.  Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo, in particular, 
carried an analysis that said: "North Korea seems determined to 
enhance its status as a nuclear state by strengthening its nuclear 
capability. ... Given that this announcement came shortly after Ri 
Gun, the North's No. 2 nuclear negotiator, headed back home after 
talks in the U.S., it may suggest that the talks between Ri Gun and 
Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, fell short of the 
North's expectations." 
 
Most media covered a Nov. 3 report by Foreign Policy magazine saying 
that the U.S. and North Korea have agreed to hold two rounds of 
official talks before the North returns to multilateral talks. 
According to the U.S. magazine, this agreement was reached during 
recent negotiations in the U.S. between Ri Gun, the North's No. 2 
nuclear negotiator, and Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party 
Talks. 
 
On the other hand, conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized: "It will 
not be too late if the U.S. (waits) to enter into dialogue (with 
North Korea) until after the North takes substantial steps to 
resolve its nuclear issue and to resume the Six-Party Talks.  If the 
U.S. takes a laid-back attitude and misjudges the North, it will 
deal a blow not only to international cooperation but also to the 
Obama Administration's vision for a 'nuclear-free world.'" 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
-------------------- 
 
U.S.-N. KOREA DIALOGUE; RESULTS MORE IMPORTANT THAN DIALOGUE ITSELF 
(Dong-a Ilbo, November 4, 2009, page 35) 
 
The U.S. Department of State said on November 2 that Sung Kim, 
Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, had useful discussions with 
Ri Gun, Director General of American Affairs at North Korea's 
Foreign Ministry.  During his 11-day visit to the U.S. beginning 
October 23, Ri met with U.S. government and academic officials 
including Ambassador Sung Kim.  The meeting between Sung and Ri was 
the first U.S.-North Korea contact since the inauguration of the 
Obama Administration.  The State Department's positive remarks seem 
to signify the USG's position that it is ready to hold bilateral 
talks with the North.  The possibility of U.S.-North Korea bilateral 
talks was raised when President Bill Clinton visited Pyongyang. 
According to sources in Washington, Special Representative for North 
Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth is highly likely to visit North Korea 
this month. 
 
It is too early to say that the U.S.-North Korea contact this time 
will pave the way for the international community to shift toward 
dialogue over sanctions.  North Korea's official Korean Central News 
Agency claimed yesterday that North Korea successfully completed 
reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods in late August and made 
remarkable achievements in weaponizing the extracted plutonium.  The 
North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a threatening statement a day 
earlier that if the U.S. is not ready to sit down face to face, 
North Korea will go its own way.  What is clear is that North Korea 
has not ceased its nuclear development.  The North also has not 
changed its tactics to use U.S.-North Korea dialogue as a place for 
nuclear disarmament talks. 
 
 
SEOUL 00001762  003 OF 005 
 
 
It will not be too late if the U.S. (waits) to enter into dialogue 
(with North Korea) until after the North takes substantial steps to 
resolve its nuclear issue and to resume the Six-Party Talks.  If the 
U.S. takes a laid-back attitude and misjudges the North, it will 
deal a blow not only to international cooperation but also to the 
Obama Administration's vision for a 'nuclear-free world.'   In 
addition, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao that his country is ready to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, 
depending on progress in its negotiations with the U.S.  It seems 
that North Korea intends to decide whether to rejoin the Six-Party 
Talks after receiving what it wants from the U.S. through salami 
tactics, in which Pyongyang slices the process of nuclear 
abandonment as thinly as possible in order to maximize its gains. 
The U.S. should not hastily respond to this North Korean maneuver. 
 
 
The ROK and the U.S. should further step up their coordination since 
North Korea has been alternating threats and conciliatory gestures. 
The ROKG 's position is to not resume the Mt. Kumgang tour project 
and massive food aid before the North changes its attitude to a 
satisfactory level.  There should not be any reward for the North's 
provocations.  The U.S. should not hold dialogue for the sake of 
dialogue.  The U.S. will be able to get North Korea to give up its 
nuclear ambitions only when it thoroughly responds to the North 
Korea's tactics of resorting to both threats and dialogue. 
 
 
FEATURES 
--------- 
 
NORTH KOREA RENEWS PRESSURE ON THE U.S. TO HAVE BILATERAL TALKS 
(JoongAng Ilbo, November 4, 2009, Page 10) 
 
By Reporter Ye Young-joon 
 
North Korea officially announced on November 3 that it has completed 
reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods and was successful in 
weaponizing plutonium.  This announcement came a day after the North 
urged the U.S. to make a decision on U.S.-North Korea bilateral 
talks, saying, "If the U.S. is not ready (to sit down face-to-face 
with us,) we will go our own way." 
 
North Korea's move is interpreted as meaning that North Korea seems 
determined to enhance its status as a nuclear state by strengthening 
its nuclear capability.  It could also be a message that the North 
will turn bilateral dialogue with the U.S. into nuclear reduction 
talks.  The announcement has made the process of denuclearizing 
North Korea more complicated.  This is because now the process of 
plutonium reprocessing in August should also be verified. 
 
Through this announcement, Pyongyang pressured the Obama 
Administration, which has been postponing laying out its position on 
dialogue with the North.  A diplomatic source said that the timing 
of the announcement is worth attention.  According to the Korean 
Central News Agency, the reprocessing of spent fuel rods was 
completed at the end of August.  Prior to this, in April, Pyongyang 
announced that it would start to reprocess nuclear fuel rods, and, 
in June, Pyongyang said that it would weaponize all extracted 
plutonium.  The reprocessing took four months and was completed by 
the end of August, but Pyongyang delayed its official announcement 
for over two months. 
 
At the end of August, North Korea was in the middle of its "charm 
offensive."  It made a series of conciliatory gestures, such as 
releasing detained U.S. female journalists during former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton's visit, releasing an ROK employee working at 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and sending a condolence delegation 
to the ROK for the funeral of the late President Kim Dae-jung.  It 
was around this time that the North invited U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang. 
 Afterwards, the North also invited Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, 
signaling its intention to return to the Six-Party Talks.  In other 
words, the North did not make the announcement on the completion of 
reprocessing nuclear fuel rods (in August), which could have cast 
 
SEOUL 00001762  004 OF 005 
 
 
cold water on the conciliatory mood, so that it could use it as a 
bargaining chip in the future. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the announcement came shortly after Ri 
Gun, the North's No. 2 nuclear negotiator, headed back home after 
talks in the U.S.  This may suggest that the talks between Ri Gun 
and Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, fell short of 
the North's expectations.  North Korea said on November 2, "This 
contact was not a preliminary meeting for the DPRK (North 
Korea)-U.S. talks, and thus there were no substantive discussions 
related to the DPRK-U.S. talks."  This indicates that both sides 
simply reiterated their positions and failed to make concrete 
progress on the schedule for Bosworth's possible visit to the North. 
 Contrary to expectations, Ri and Kim had only one one-on-one 
meeting.  An ROKG official noted, "Unlike the North, the U.S. did 
not give much significance to the Ri-Kim meeting.  This is because 
the North did not show any big change in its position, and it is 
also part of Washington's tactics to lower Pyongyang's 
expectations."  In short, by belatedly announcing that it has 
completed reprocessing spent fuel rods, the North openly expressed 
its displeasure about the U.S.'s lukewarm attitude. 
 
In addition, considering Pyongyang's previous negotiating tactics, 
it can be said that the announcement was intended to strengthen the 
North's bargaining position at possible bilateral talks with the 
U.S. and (multilateral) nuclear negotiations.  Pyongyang thinks that 
it can reap many rewards only when it has increased its nuclear 
capability before returning to dialogue. 
 
 
AMBASSADOR STEPHENS: "U.S. IS NOT READY TO CONSIDER NORMAL RELATIONS 
WITH NUCLEAR-POSSESSING N. KOREA" 
(Hankook Ilbo, November 4, 2009, Page 6) 
 
By Reporter Chung Sang-won 
 
U.S. Ambassador to the ROK Kathleen Stephens said on November 3, 
"The U.S. is not prepared to consider a completely normalized 
relationship with a North Korea that insists upon having a nuclear 
weapons program. That makes normalization very difficult." 
 
Ambassador Stephens made the statement during her speech before the 
Peaceful Unification Forum at the VIP restaurant in the National 
Assembly Main Building.  The title of the speech was the "Obama 
Administration's Smart Diplomacy and Peace Policy toward Korean 
Peninsula." 
 
Ambassador Stephens stressed, "The U.S. remains willing to engage 
North Korea bilaterally within the framework of the Six-Party 
process," adding, "Just to be clear, we do think that this is a 
multilateral issue, not a bilateral issue simply with the United 
States.". 
 
Ambassador Stephens said that the Six-Party Talks are important 
because the September 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement  of 
Principles "remains a good definition of what an eventual outcome 
should look like; a denuclearized Korean Peninsula with new 
opportunities for normalized relations between North Korea and the 
U.S. and North Korea and Japan, much better inter-Korean relations 
with the eventual replacement of the armistice by a more permanent 
peace agreement and, very importantly, quite substantial economic 
and energy assistance.".  She added, "On October 26 Ambassador Sung 
Kim met with North Korean representative Ri Gun in New York.  It is 
our sincere hope that this meeting will start the process of getting 
North Korea back into a multilateral talks process."  Stephens also 
noted, "We have made it clear that the international community as a 
whole is not prepared to accept the notion of nuclear weapons 
programs in North Korea."  She added, "We also need to continue to 
be concerned about North Korea's export of nuclear and ballistic 
missile-related equipment, materials and technologies to countries 
concerned.  And that's why not only the U.S. but all the countries 
in the international community are united in full implementation of 
the relevant UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874 in order 
to prevent proliferation activities by North Korea. " 
 
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STEPHENS