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R 101040Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0038
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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UNCLAS SAO PAULO 000660 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KPAO KIRF BR
SUBJECT: PT Insiders Say Don't Count Dilma Out 
 
REF: BRASILIA 1250; RECIFE 66; (08) SAO PAULO 581 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Workers Party (PT) insiders acknowledge Dilma 
Rousseff's 2010 presidential candidacy has run into some problems, 
but express confidence her campaign will rebound.  Across a series 
of recent meetings, PT leaders in Sao Paulo say Dilma can come from 
behind and beat likely PSDB nominee Jose Serra.  They, as well as 
some non-PT contacts, argue that the press is too negative on Dilma 
and Lula can work his vote-transfer magic in Dilma's favor (despite 
his failure to do the same for PT Sao Paulo Mayoral candidate Marta 
Suplicy in November 2008 -- Ref C).  They also suggest the PT's 
alliance with the Brazil's largest party, the PMDB, will guarantee 
ample TV time, that wild-card candidate Ciro Gomes will make a 
perfect attack dog against Jose Serra (Ref B) and, perhaps most 
significant, that the PT has a strategy for outreach to Christian 
voters, both Catholic and Evangelical.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Dilma's Rousseff: Looking More Vulnerable 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Despite strong support from a popular President, Dilma 
Rousseff's candidacy as the PT's presumptive nominee has yet to 
take off.  Her pre-campaign has been beset with a number of 
obstacles, including: a cancer scare, a dust-up over alleged 
exaggerations in her resume, a problem with the tax authorities, 
and, most recently, weak poll results that showed possible PSB 
candidate Ciro Gomes polling slightly ahead of her and gave a wide 
lead to her most likely opponent, Sao Paulo Governor Jose Serra 
(Refs A-C).  Compounding Dilma's apparent difficulties are broader, 
PT-related problems, most notably President Lula's vigorous defense 
of PMDB ally Senator Jose Sarney against corruption charges and the 
subsequent departure of former PT stalwart and Environment Minister 
Marina Silva from the party in August to run as the Green Party 
(PV) presidential candidate. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The pile-up of dim news for Dilma caused one local 
PMBD-oriented pundit, Gaudencio Torquato, to tell Poloff recently 
that he was revising his ideas on Rousseff's chances.  Just a few 
months ago, Torquato had considered Rousseff a shoe-in to win the 
presidency citing a long list of popular programs -- Bolsa Familia, 
Minha Casa (My House), cuts in taxes for car purchases, as well as 
the plans to distribute oil revenues from the pre-sal deposits off 
Rio de Janeiro State --  as well as the backing of a popular 
president.  Nonetheless, she remains stuck in the polls and the PT 
apparently has no "plan B," according to Torquato.  He stated that, 
while it was too early to write Dilma off, her candidacy seemed far 
more fragile than just a few months ago.  Compounding these 
programs, Torquato said, is Dilma's difficult personality and lack 
of experience in national politics. 
 
 
 
PT Regulars Dismiss the Doubts/Describe the Strategy 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) PT insiders dismiss these doubts and radiate confidence 
that Dilma Rousseff, with President Lula's help, can win the 
presidency.  Their assurances appear to reflect more than just the 
party loyalty.  In discussions with various PT insiders, they laid 
out cogent arguments that could underpin a come-from-behind 
second-round win for Dilma based on several factors, the most novel 
of which is the PT's ongoing efforts to court Christian voters, 
both Catholics and Evangelicals.   Among the chief reasons they 
cited for optimism: 
 
 
 
-Many of Dilma's troubles are nothing more than a press meme.  The 
media, in the words of Walter Pomar, like to report every problem 
Dilma confronts as a "fatal bullet" that will do in her candidacy. 
 
-The Lula-Transfer Factor: President Lula retains sky-high 
popularity and can be expected to accompany Rousseff on constant 
attempts to showcase government programs, events that will, in the 
words of PT State Deputy Rui Falcao, "bathe Dilma in the people." 
When Poloff noted President Lula's failure to help PT candidate 
Marta Suplicy win the November 2008 Sao Paulo Mayor's race (despite 
strenuous efforts - Ref A), PT representatives dismissed the 
comparison.  PT International Relations Secretary Walter Pomar said 
that Sao Paulo has always been tough territory for Lula and the PT, 
and that this limited Lula's ability to help Suplicy.  Once a 
national campaign begins in earnest, the Lula campaign machine will 
begin to roll and, particularly in the Northeast, PT insiders 
believe the vote transfer from Lula to Dilma will be very high. 
 
 
 
-Television Time: PT contacts seemed somewhat embarrassed by 
President Lula's September defense of Jose Sarney.  They 
acknowledged, however, that "it was all about TV time." The PMDB 
brings TV time to its alliance with the PT, and this will be a 
crucial factor favoring Dilma in the campaign. 
 
 
 
-Ciro Gomes as Hatchet Man: PT insiders professed joy at Gomes 
possible candidacy (Ref B).  They stated that Gomes does not like 
Governor Serra and will go after him, opening up a second flank 
that Serra will have to cover.  At the same time, they seemed 
doubtful that Gomes could control his own rhetoric enough to reach 
the second round.  In any case, without large amounts of TV time, 
Gomes' cannot upset the basic two-way nature of the PT-PSDB race. 
 
 
 
-The Religion Factor: In recent years, the PT has worked out a 
careful balancing act with both its Catholic Church supporters and 
the new, rising Evangelical Churches, according to Pomar.  Catholic 
support for the PT is historical, but as the party has gained 
support among Evangelicals, the Catholic Church had cooled to the 
PT.  PT insiders maintain the party has countered with a unified 
strategy to smooth relations on both fronts.  PT City Councilman 
for Sao Paulo Jose Americo cited a recent concordat signed between 
Lula and the Vatican as a key strategic move to placate Catholics. 
(Note: President Lula signed the concordat in question in November 
2008 and the Senate approved it on October 8 of this year.  Among 
several planks, it guarantees continued Catholic education in the 
public schools.  End Note.)  Americo also lauded the potential 
political influence of popular Charismatic Catholics, often 
represented by young priests who sing or are talented entertainers, 
and strong potential vote-mobilizers for the PT.   PT State Deputy 
Rui Falcao added that the GOB had recently widened its advertising. 
Formerly limited to Catholic publications, the GOB is now putting 
public service messages in publications put out by the Universal 
Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, 
UCG), a controversial Evangelical Church that has sometimes been 
investigated by the government for corruption.  The UCG owns 
Brazil's second largest television network. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The PT would appear to be putting the religion strategy 
into practice.  Dilma Rousseff participated in the annual 
two-million person religious procession of the C????rio of Nazar???? 
in 
Belem on October 11.  The candidate admitted that she had never 
attended such an event before.  She expressed surprise that many of 
the faithful carried miniature houses or even bricks in their 
hands, in hopes of receiving a place to live, according to press 
reports.  During the same trip, Dilma also met with Evangelicals. 
She indicated to journalists that her religious outreach would not 
end with this one visit because "In Brazil, this [popular religious 
feeling] can't be contained."  (NOTE: Post plans to report more on 
religion and the upcoming elections septel. END NOTE.) 
 
Comment: 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The confidence of PT insiders regarding Dilma Rousseff's 
candidacy appears to be based on more than just the party line. 
Their logic for, among other things, a powerful Lula vote-transfer 
at the national level (particularly in the northeast) and an 
intelligent strategy of outreach to Christians, both Catholic and 
Evangelical, is understandable.  Likewise, Dilma can count on both 
the resources of her party and a popular President to help her in 
the lengthy contest to reach Planalto.  Nonetheless, Dilma's lack 
of personal charisma, apparent limited personal connection with 
influential religious voters, and lingering doubts about her health 
and overall presidential credentials will remain challenges for her 
campaign.   End Comment. 
White