VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #0913 3311822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 271822Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0341
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0189
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0002

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000913 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR NEA/FO--CATALANO, ISN/RA--NEPHEW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/27 
TAGS: PREL IR CI BR AR CU
SUBJECT: CHILE SHARES US CONCERNS ON IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
REF: STATE 120288 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Urban Carol, DCM, State, US Embassy Santiago; REASON: 
1.4(B) 
 
¶1.  (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche to Alvaro Guzman of the 
MFA's International and Human Security Office on November 25. 
Guzman said that Chile was in agreement with US concerns and that, 
in general, Chile adheres closely to the positions of the IAEA and 
UNSC.  Chile feels that Iran has not been transparent or honest in 
dealing with the nuclear issues, and Chile believes that the UNSC 
should take more concrete actions to pressure Iran to make their 
nuclear activities public.  Chile does not have any suggestions as 
to what concrete actions might be useful. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Guzman also noted that Chile had been working within the 
Non-Aligned Movement to try to persuade the group to modify the 
language in a draft resolution on the issue.  The current language 
is very sympathetic to Iran and Chile would like to see the 
organization take a harder line.  However, Cuba is one of the main 
protagonists in the drafting process, and is not supportive of the 
change.  Guzman anticipated that, despite Chile's best efforts, the 
language would remain relatively conciliatory towards Iran.  In 
that case, Chile will make a public reservation to explain why it 
does not support the text. 
 
 
 
Worries that Brazil is Cozying Up to Iran--Can Argentina Help? 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Guzman said that his office is concerned about possible 
Brazilian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, and noted that Iranian 
president Ahmadinejad is currently in Brazil.  Brazil is seeking an 
avenue to promote its authority as a rising leader, and may see an 
opportunity in stepping in to this issue given the difficulties 
that the P5+1 is having securing Iran's engagement.   Although he 
believed that Brazil was only likely to offer civil--not 
military--nuclear cooperation, Guzman nonetheless found the 
prospect worrying. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Guzman said that Chile has not talked to Brazil about its 
concerns, and noted that Ambassador Alfredo Labbe, the head of the 
MFA's International and Human Security Office, was very frustrated 
by the Chilean Embassy in Brazil's lack of engagement on security 
issues.   However, even if Chile were to voice its concerns to 
Brazil, Guzman cautioned that they may have little effect as Chile 
is a small country.  Guzman suggested that Argentina could possibly 
help pressure Brazil to distance itself from Iran and its nuclear 
ambitions.  Argentina and Brazil have the most advanced nuclear 
technology in Latin America, Guzman said, and are signatories to a 
bilateral nuclear agreement, the Argentine-Brazilian Agreement on 
Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Comment.  Guzman was surprisingly frank in his comments, 
particularly on Brazil.  His comment probably accurately reflects 
thinking within his office, but Chile has other interests in Brazil 
which it will have to balance against its concerns with possible 
Brazil/Iran nuclear cooperation.  We suspect other Foreign Ministry 
officials, including those from Guzman's office, might be more 
circumspect in their description of Brazil's relations with Iran. 
End Comment. 
SIMONS