VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPS #0527/01 3291324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251324Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9511
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1279
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1816
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

UNCLAS PRISTINA 000527 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, INL, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM EAID SR KV
SUBJECT: MAINTAINING KOSOVO'S POST-ELECTION MOMENTUM:   CREATING AN 
ANCHOR FOR SERBS IN KOSOVO 
 
REF: A) PRISTINA 510 AND PREVIOUS  B) PRISTINA 357 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED Q PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: November 15 municipal elections in Kosovo saw 
levels of Serb turnout not seen in years, with Serbs winning the 
mayor's offices of three new Serb-majority municipalities outright 
and gaining an opportunity to contest "new" Novo Brdo and Strpce in 
December runoffs.  This turnout presents a rare opportunity to make 
decentralization -- the key to Serb participation in Kosovo 
structures -- work.  We need to take advantage of it.  With this in 
mind, our short-term strategy will focus on maintaining the momentum 
as we move towards the December 13 runoffs where successes in new 
Novo Brdo and/or Strpce would help cement our gains on November 15. 
Over the longer-term, we must pursue a strategy that: 1) engages 
with the new municipalities and ensures their success (this may 
require additional assistance resources); 2) focuses on the two 
Ahtisaari-mandated Serb-majority municipalities that have yet to 
hold an election, including North Mitrovica; and, 3) ensures the 
Kosovo Government makes the policy and financial decisions required 
to support decentralization.  These steps are important, but they 
are not sufficient.  We must do more to counter Belgrade's pressure 
on the Kosovo Serb community.  Finally, we also believe that it is 
now time to begin challenging the legitimacy of the illegal Serb 
parallel structures in Kosovo. END SUMMARY 
 
BIG SERB WINS IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) As results are finalized, we are beginning to get a clearer 
picture of the small revolution that occurred among ethnic Serb 
voters south of the Ibar River during Kosovo's November 15 municipal 
elections.  Serb mayors were elected outright in the 
newly-decentralized Serb-majority municipalities of 
Gracanica/Gracanice, Klokot/Kllokot, and Ranilug/Ranillug, and Serb 
candidates will take part in December 13 runoff elections for mayor 
in the newly expanded municipality of Novo Brdo/Noveberde and in 
majority Kosovo Serb Strpce/Shterpce.  Serbs in Strpce have a 
legitimate chance to elect Bratislav Nikolic of SLS, who won 36.9 
percent of the vote in round one, if they turn out in sufficient 
numbers.  Prime Minister Thaci told us on November 18 that his PDK 
will not run hard in Strpce, but we expect Strpce's Albanian 
community to stand behind the PDK's candidate. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Significant Serb turnout should also translate into 
participation in Kosovo's municipal assemblies. Municipal assembly 
seats are awarded according to a proportional representation system. 
 Apportionment will not be finalized until official results are 
certified, which should occur sometime in the next few days. 
Nonetheless, preliminary, uncertified results are positive.  Kosovo 
Serbs should dominate the assemblies in Gracanica and Ranilug.  They 
should also form the single largest blocs in Klokot and Strpce, 
while the 28 percent of votes cast for Kosovo Serb candidates in 
Novo Brdo, a municipality thought to be fairly evenly balanced 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, should ensure a 
multi-ethnic municipal assembly coalition. 
 
MAINTAINING MOMENTUM FOR ROUND TWO 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The municipal election results provide us with an historic, 
but limited, opportunity to help Kosovo Serbs, at least those south 
of the Ibar, to integrate into Kosovo structures.  We need to seize 
it.  The first challenge is maintaining the momentum as we head into 
the December 13 runoffs.  The historic Serb turnout on November 15 
was, in part, a function of a weeks-long effort by the international 
community to encourage Serb participation.  Serb turnout is even 
more critical for the second round of balloting in Strpce and Novo 
Brdo.  With this in mind, we will continue to pursue our political, 
public diplomacy, and assistance strategies aimed at emphasizing the 
benefits of and the need for local citizens to run their own 
governments.  We will communicate this message through visible 
project support for majority-Serb municipalities, appearances by the 
Ambassador at media roundtables with candidates, and interviews with 
the Ambassador for local media that receive Serb attention. 
 
MAKING THE NEW MUNICIPALITIES GO 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Second, we are also starting to look ahead to see how we 
can ensure that the new ethnic Serb-majority municipalities succeed. 
 We must avoid Serb leaders inheriting empty shells as municipal 
structures that do not afford them the tools they need to develop 
thriving, self-governing communities for Kosovo's Serbs.  The 
municipal preparation teams (MPTs) that have been laying the 
foundation for Gracanica, Klokot, Ranilug, and the expanded Novo 
Brdo to operate as functioning municipalities will disband at the 
end of the year.  With U.S. assistance, these MPTs have created the 
organograms for the new municipalities; have ensured that the new 
municipalities can respond with provisional measures to fulfill 
devolved responsibilities such as social welfare, health care, and 
education; and have established mechanisms for basic services such 
as trash collection and fire protection. 
 
¶6. (SBU) These initial steps have developed a skeletal frame for the 
new municipalities, but it does not mean that they are ready to 
stand on their own.  While we sense that some of our European 
partners are ready to declare decentralization a completed success 
now that elections have taken place, this transition point only 
marks the start of the hard work to follow.  In fact, our engagement 
with the new municipalities needs to intensify, and as we have 
suggested previously, our work must focus on four key areas: 1) 
governance structure; 2) organizational structure; 3) 
competencies/services; and, 4) facilities and equipment (Ref. B). 
This may require greater assistance resources from Washington and 
will necessitate a close examination of our plan for working in the 
new municipalities.  We have one chance to get decentralization 
right, and we cannot afford to let these new municipalities limp 
with crippled resources and uncertain direction.  They must thrive 
from day one. 
 
FOCUSING ON PARTESH AND NORTH MITROVICA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Two remaining Ahtisaari-mandated, Serb-majority 
municipalities have not yet held elections: Partesh and North 
Mitrovica.  Elections are planned to take place in both 
municipalities in May 2010.  There are reasonable prospects for 
success in Partesh, which is almost 100 percent Serb and located 
south of the Ibar.  Success in North Mitrovica will be much more 
difficult to achieve.  The MPT process alone will not be a 
sufficiently robust vehicle to promote political participation in 
North Mitrovica, and our avenues for constructively engaging Serbs 
north of the Ibar are limited.  However, the success of 
decentralization in Gracanica, Klokot, Ranilug, and "new" Novo Brdo, 
and progress in Strpce would demonstrate that decentralization's 
benefits are real and tangible.  Though this does not guarantee 
success in the north, without it there is little prospect of 
countering claims from parallel structures and elsewhere that 
decentralization is a mirage. 
 
GETTING THE KOSOVO GOVERNMENT TO DO ITS PART 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GOK has primary responsibility for ensuring 
decentralization's success, and its record has been spotty so far. 
We have had to push and prod the Ministry for Local Government 
Administration (MLGA) to appoint MPTs, and the minister, Sadri 
Ferati, has often been hesitant to proceed without an explicit green 
light from Prime Minister Thaci.  Too often we have seen the GOK try 
to put decentralization on the back burner.  The reasons are many: 
it is a concept imposed by the international community; Albanians 
generally oppose carving out land that will reify separate Serb 
political structures; the PDK is uncomfortable with a process that 
runs against its preference for centralizing power in its own hands; 
the mother municipalities often oppose losing territory; and, 
nationalist organizations like Vetevendosje have caricatured 
decentralization as an assault on the Albanian nation and Kosovo 
statehood.  GOK inaction, however, is unacceptable, and we will 
continue to work to ensure that the central government recognizes 
its responsibility to make decentralization work, both in the new 
municipalities and through the extension of additional competencies 
 
to all municipalities that is mandated by law. 
 
¶8. (SBU) We have spoken to Thaci about making some significant 
gestures and investments in the new municipalities -- for example, a 
new hospital in Gracanica that will fill a long-standing need and 
that will fall outside the control of parallel structures -- and we 
are pushing both the Prime Minister and the President to initiate a 
public outreach campaign that addresses Serbs as Kosovo citizens and 
welcomes and respects them as national resources, voters, and 
neighbors.  We must also work with the MLGA and the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy to guarantee that the new municipalities receive 
the resources they need to operate.  This includes funding that was 
awarded to the mother municipalities for standing up new 
municipalities and now risks being returned to the central 
government without being used.  We are telling the GOK that 
decentralization is an international mandate, but it is Kosovo's 
responsibility, and we will be watching and judging the GOK's 
actions. 
 
COUNTERING BELGRADE'S INTERFERENCE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Pushing the GOK to do the right thing, however, will not 
yield results unless we can also get Belgrade to ease its pressure 
on Serbs living in Kosovo.  Following the November 15 elections, 
Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary Oliver Ivanovic told the 
media that the Serb turnout in Kosovo's elections had shaken 
official Belgrade, and he suggested that Belgrade needs to change 
its engagement with Kosovo Serbs.  Serbian Minister for Kosovo Goran 
Bogdanovic alleged the polls had been manipulated and questioned the 
likelihood that Kosovo Serbs will ever receive institutional support 
from Albanians in the GOK.  We take these statements to mean that 
the Government of Serbia (GOS), or recalcitrant elements within it, 
may renew efforts to promote parallel structures by threatening to 
cut financial ties and other benefits to Serbs who engage with 
Kosovo institutions.   We will likely need to regularly remind the 
GOS of Kosovo Serbs' right to engage with Kosovo institutions, 
without fear of retribution, in order to survive as a community. 
 
RETHINKING TOLERANCE OF PARALLEL STRUCTURES 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) As we work on Belgrade, we also need to take advantage of 
increasing Serb voter participation to take on Serbian parallel 
government structures in Kosovo.  The parallel structures are 
illegal institutions that perpetuate the myth that Serbia still 
controls Kosovo and only Serbia can serve Kosovo Serbs' needs.  This 
is dangerous and keeps Kosovo Serbs in a state of limbo and 
insecurity.  Annex Two of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1244 -- a document that Belgrade uses as a tool to prevent 
Serb integration in Kosovo -- specifies how Serbian personnel may 
operate in Kosovo, and there is no role for any kind of Serbian 
civilian administration.  We believe it is time to underscore that 
the parallel institutions are illegal, and Serbia's continued 
support for them violates UNSCR 1244.  It is the international 
community's responsibility to lead this charge.  We do not want the 
GOK taking on Serbian parallel personnel and structures -- a certain 
recipe for major unrest among Kosovo Serbs that would reverse our 
recent gains -- but we need to start delegitimizing Serbia's claims 
in Kosovo.  It is time to confront Belgrade with its own hypocrisy. 
 
USING SERBIAN MEDIA FOR KOSOVO'S BENEFIT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) One tool for confronting Belgrade and for reaching 
Kosovo's Serbs is the Serbian media, an underutilized resource for 
local outreach.  Serbian media remain the fundamental source of news 
for Kosovo Serbs, who pay scant attention to Kosovo Albanian and 
locally produced Serb-language media sources.  Responsible coverage 
in Serbia could help convince Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia, itself, 
of the benefits of decentralization and electoral participation.  It 
is critical to get responsible, thoughtful Kosovo Serb leaders and 
politicians on select Belgrade media.  We want to see trusted Kosovo 
Serb voices arguing for a large audience the case for 
decentralization and for Serb engagement with Kosovo institutions. 
Let Kosovo Serbs counter the Serbian government's rhetoric on its 
 
own territory, on its own airwaves.  Talented orators, such as 
newly-elected mayor of Gracanica Bojan Stojanovic (SLS), do not have 
the resources or contacts to garner national coverage from Serbian 
media outlets.  With Embassy Belgrade's assistance, it may be 
possible to get a media platform for certain Kosovo Serb 
politicians, especially with a view to runoff elections in Novo Brdo 
and Strpce, races that pit Serbs against Albanians. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Initial success in municipal elections has given Kosovo 
Serb parties a chance to prove themselves.  We now need to make sure 
that these nascent Kosovo Serb leaders and municipal structures 
succeed.  Decentralization's success -- our best hope for 
significant Serb participation in Kosovo -- hinges on developing 
these municipalities into thriving, economically viable communities. 
 Each bit of progress will make it easier to convince more Serbs 
that there are rewards for operating within Kosovo institutions and 
cooperating with Albanians.  Achieving this progress will require 
comprehensive cooperation among the international community, the 
GOK, and the Serb community.  It will require resources, assistance, 
and expertise.  Success now means real implementation of the 
Ahtisaari Plan and anchoring in place the multi-ethnic Kosovo which 
is the crux of USG policy here.  While the specifics of how to deal 
with northern Kosovo remain cloudy, successful new municipalities 
south of the Ibar will be an important agent of change there as 
well.  We cannot lose this opportunity, and we need to be able to 
step up with the investments and the resources required to 
capitalize on the opportunities that these extremely successful 
municipal elections afford us. 
 
DELL