VZCZCXRO5591
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0832/01 3141142
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101142Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1348
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0009
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2581
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2411
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0726
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3314
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EEB, IO 
SINGAPORE PLEASE PASS TO DAS SCOT MARCIEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS TH CB
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN PREVIEWS THAKSIN VISIT 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000832  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL A. RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The diplomatic spat between Cambodia and 
Thailand took center stage during the Ambassador's meeting 
with Prime Minister Hun Sen November 8.  Hun Sen confirmed 
that former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra would 
arrive in Cambodia on November 10 and would deliver a speech 
to Cambodian officials at the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
on November 12.  He also confirmed that, aside from the 
diplomatic friction, tensions were low and military 
commanders remained cooperative at the border, and that he 
would continue to monitor Thailand's reaction and would 
respond in kind to each diplomatic downgrade that the Abhisit 
government initiated.  We expect Hun Sen will now shift 
largely from an offensive to a defensive position.  He is of 
course hopeful that the Thai will refrain from taking 
precipitous actions, but he is prepared to match any Thai 
action with a Cambodian reaction.   In that context, Hun Sen 
will likely be both confident and relaxed during the upcoming 
Singapore meetings, amenable to suggestions that a 
de-escalation of rhetoric and a re-engagement between 
Cambodia and Thailand is in the best interests of the region 
as well as the parties.   End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In raising this issue during a meeting previously 
scheduled to discuss a broad range of other issues (septel), 
the Ambassador reaffirmed that both Cambodia and Thailand 
should work to reduce political tensions and to refrain from 
acts that could be considered provocative.  Hun Sen replied 
that military cooperation was proceeding very well at the 
border ) "there is no chaos," he explained, and "things 
remain very quiet."  He also said  there is no need "to keep 
so much force there" and confirmed press reports that he had 
ordered the 911 Brigade paratrooper unit be recalled to Phnom 
Penh and that he would do his best to ensure that Thai and 
Cambodian commanders continued to cooperate and avoid any 
military confrontation.  If the situation remained calm, Hun 
Sen added he would also recall Division 1, which would reduce 
the Cambodian military presence at the border to normal, 
pre-July 2008, levels.  Hun Sen reiterated that he wanted to 
"build up mutual trust between the armies," and that he hoped 
that Thai military commanders would continue to cooperate and 
work to "reduce tensions. 
 
¶3.  (C) Hun Sen underscored that Thaksin would travel to 
Cambodia from "another ASEAN country," but that "the Thai 
don't care" about the purported double standard that has led 
the Thai government to criticize Hun Sen so publicly while 
ignoring Thaksin's presence elsewhere in the region.  (Note: 
Hun Sen did not cite the name of the country where Thaksin 
was reportedly currently residing.  End Note.).  "Whether 
Thaksin comes or not," Hun Sen explained, it remains the 
"business of Cambodia" to engage him as an economic adviser 
during the current economic downturn. Hun Sen confirmed what 
he has said publicly: that the RGC would not "accept" any 
extradition request from Thailand as this case was "purely 
political" and the Thai-Cambodian extradition agreement was 
based on customary international law that clearly allowed 
extraditions to be rejected based on political context.  And 
although he said he expected the Thai government to deliver a 
"letter of extradition," he said that the RGC had already 
prepared a reply rejecting the request. 
 
¶4.  (C) Because military relations at the border remained 
cooperative, Hun Sen said that the principal conflict with 
Thailand was diplomatic and that the public pronouncements 
from various Thai officials to downgrade diplomatic relations 
between Thailand and Cambodia reflected "internal confusion" 
within the Thai government.   After Thaksin's arrival, Hun 
Sen said he would simply monitor the Thai reaction day by 
day.  "There are many in the Thai government who are not 
acting under orders of the Thai Prime Minister," Hun Sen 
stated, pointing to the example of the Thai army, which "had 
to obstruct the yellow shirt protesters" sent from Bangkok 
from reaching Preah Vihear on September 19.  In fact, Hun Sen 
averred that the Thai business interests in Sisaket Province 
were "already complaining" and would suffer most if Thailand 
prolonged and exacerbated the diplomatic dispute by closing 
the border with Cambodia in a "frenzied reaction" to 
Thaksin's visit.  He added that the RGC had already sent a 
message to Bangkok that it was indeed the right of Thailand 
to close the border but, unlike in 2003 when the Thais 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000832  002 OF 003 
 
 
allowed goods to continue to cross, he would respond by 
directing that Thai goods would also be barred from crossing 
into Cambodia if Thailand did so. 
 
¶5.  (C) Again referring to perceived dissension among key 
leaders of the current Thai government, Hun Sen claimed that 
"not everyone is on good terms" and that Deputy Prime 
Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Minister of National Defense 
General Prawit Wongsuwan  did not agree with Prime Minister 
Abhisit and Foreign Minister Kasit on this issue.  "I met 
with them here," Hun Sen noted, and "spent three hours with 
them in Hua Hin" on October 23, where their lack of support 
for the direction of the current Thai government was clear. 
Moreover, Hun Sen said that he had been contacted by 
unspecified Thai Senators and other members of the government 
to begin the work of diplomatic "remediation." 
 
¶6.  (C) As previewed by the Prime Minister, Thaksin's private 
commercial charter arrived at the military side of Phnom 
Penh's airport at about 9:30 a.m. on November 10, originating 
from Mumbai.  Although local and international press viewed 
the arrival from a distance, Ministry spokespersons were 
guarded in their comments about the visit.  Thaksin's car 
entered a motorcade secured by Hun Sen's bodyguard unit and 
departed for a lunch at Hun Sen's residence in Takhmao, south 
of the capital.  At the end of the day, MFA spokesman Koy 
Kuong told reporters that no Thai request for extradition had 
yet been officially received, although others report that an 
extradition request from the Thai government has been already 
transmitted.  Thaksin is reported to be staying in a villa 
close to the Cambodian Peoples Party headquarters not far 
from the Royal Thai embassy.  Unconfirmed reports indicated 
that Thaksin is scheduled to depart Cambodia on November 13. 
Separately, in response to the Ambassador's inquiry during a 
meeting November 10, Commerce Minister Cham Prasidh commented 
that he was very familiar with the popularity polls recently 
conducted in Thailand and did not think they were the least 
bit credible.  He added that he thought nothing Thaksin did 
or said in Cambodia would have much effect on the domestic 
situation in Thailand. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  Hun Sen remained thoughtful and calm 
throughout his discussion with the Ambassador, and there was 
no hint of the provocative rhetoric that he sometimes 
displays in public or private.  In the weeks since Hun Sen's 
October 23 announcement that he would appoint Thaksin as an 
adviser, he has been most concerned about increases in border 
military activity; he now seemed pleased with the extent of 
military cooperation and believes that his decision to reduce 
the number of troops will contribute to continued 
cooperation.  With that in place, Hun Sen has now turned his 
attention to the diplomatic front and seemed focused 
predominantly on how much and how quickly the Thai would 
erode diplomatic relations in what he believes is an effort 
to attract public support for a regime that can command long 
term support of neither the military nor a majority of the 
people.  While it remains to be seen whether he has 
miscalculated in that assessment, it is apparent that he has 
received indications from some Thai officials that he has 
not.  But, more importantly, none of that seems to matter 
much to the Prime Minister.  Hun Sen has clearly calculated 
that whatever diplomatic downgrades are initiated by the 
Abhisit government do not outweigh the benefits that Hun 
Sen's friendship and support to Thaksin could provide to 
Cambodia both now and in the future.  He seemed similarly 
uninterested in ASEAN or international reaction to the spat 
and did not directly respond to the Ambassador's inquiry 
about the message he intended to send to ASEAN or the 
international community about his actions. 
 
¶8.  (C) As much of the press and other reporting has 
suggested, Hun Sen's motivations are best described as 
personal political moves designed to attract perceived 
benefits to himself and Cambodia and to disarm his foes in 
the current Thai government.  As this continues to play out, 
we expect Hun Sen will shift largely from an offensive to a 
defensive position.  He is of course hopeful that the Thai 
will refrain from taking precipitous actions, but he is 
prepared to match any Thai action with a Cambodian reaction 
every step of the way, as he has done with the reciprocal 
recall of Ambassadors.  In the meantime, we expect the U.S. 
and others will find a confident and relaxed Hun Sen during 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000832  003 OF 003 
 
 
the upcoming Singapore meetings amenable to suggestions that 
a de-escalation of rhetoric and a re-engagement between 
Cambodia and Thailand is in the best interests of the region 
as well as the parties themselves.  End Comment. 
RODLEY