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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002248 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECTING PARA NUMBERS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH IN
SUBJECT: SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE TURNS INTO WAR OF WORDS 
(2ND CORRECTED COPY) 
 
REF: A. NA: NEW DELHI 01708 
     ¶B. B: BEIJING 03005 
 
NEW DELHI 00002248  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: India and China have launched a "war of 
words" over disputed territory in Arunachal Pradesh (AP). 
The GOI has been uncharacteristically bold in responding to 
Chinese moves, spurred on no doubt by unrestrained 
hyperventilation in the Indian media over Beijing's 
intentions.  It seems China may have pushed too far when it 
contested India's application last spring for an Asian 
Development Bank loan for watershed projects in AP. 
Subsequent Chinese criticism of PM Singh's election-related 
travel to AP in October and the Dalai Lama's planned travel 
to Tawang November 8 has spurred India to critique China's 
development activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). 
Opinion makers believe India's newfound firmness indicates 
greater GOI confidence in its relationship with China.  For 
the sake of domestic consumption, the GOI has to find ways to 
look tough on China, but ultimately it remains focused on 
boosting growing economic ties and avoiding serious 
confrontation, as illustrated by "business as usual" meetings 
between PM Singh and Premier Wen on the sidelines of the 
ASEAN summit and between EAM Krishna and FM Yang in Bangalore 
on the sidelines of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilaterals. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
The Game Changer?  Probably Not 
------------------------------- 
¶2. (U) Breathless Indian media reports on theIndia-China 
"war of words" have struck a chord in India because, within 
Indian society, a sense of nervousness and mistrust dominates 
the relationship.  In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Chinese 
PolCouns Hu complained about Indian media hype, and told us 
that China would like to "catch up" with the U.S. on 
people-to-people ties with India.  Hu was referring to a 
string of bad news stories on China, including reports of a 
series of border incursions, during one of which the Chinese 
left behind insulting graffiti on India's side of the border, 
and the August publication of a Chinese think tank article on 
balkanizing India.  The September collapse of a chimney at a 
Chinese built power plant that killed 35 Indian workers and 
the subsequent flight of the Chinese managers also led to 
criticism of what some view as China's economic arrogance. 
Indian media was also quick to take offense at harsh Chinese 
criticism of PM Singh's travel to AP during the state 
assembly elections and Chinese objections to the Dalai Lama's 
planned travel to AP.  While providing fodder for the 
tabloids and India's multiple 24 hour news channels, these 
stories are nothing new.  China experts like Jawaharlal Nehru 
University's Dr. Srikanth Kondappali point out that the 
recent media reports have all been about recurring points of 
friction that the two governments always downplay. 
 
¶3. (U) The recent development that may be a game-changer is 
India's perception that China has gone public with disputes 
that were previously handled quietly at a bilateral 
diplomatic level.  For example, China raised the border 
dispute in international fora with its spring bid to block 
India's ADB loan for watershed work in AP.  China has also 
reportedly been issuing separate visas to Indian passport 
holders from Jammu and Kashmir and is projecting the state as 
an independent country in maps and other publications.  The 
Indian government took a tougher stance in response to 
China's increasing assertiveness when the Indian MEA released 
a series of public statements in October which declared that 
AP is an "integral and inalienable part of India" and 
expressed disappointment at Chinese statements criticizing PM 
Singh's travel there.  Another particularly pointed GOI 
statement, clearly in retaliation for the ADB loan block, 
said that China was "aware of Indian concerns" about 
development activities in PoK, and urged China to refrain 
from engaging in such activities in "illegally occupied" 
areas of Kashmir (Full text available at 
http://meaindia.nic.in/).  To post's knowledge, this is the 
 
NEW DELHI 00002248  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
first public rebuke India has given China over the issue of 
development activities in PoK. 
 
¶4. (U) Most Embassy interlocutors, including Congress MP 
Rashid Alvi, maintain that China does not want conflict but 
wants merely to distract India from its other strategic goals 
for as long as possible.  To avoid outright confrontation, 
both the Indian and Chinese governments continue to focus on 
the story of the peaceful and tranquil border area, and on 
the growing economic relationship.  Alvi acknowledged that 
China is more powerful than India in 
many ways, but pointed out that in terms of the trade 
relationship, China and India each have much to lose if the 
relationship sours.  Though he does not anticipate a 
conflict, he highlighted growing Indian confidence by 
reminding us that 2009 is not the same as 1962, when China 
humiliated India militarily.  His view echoes what we hear 
from many retired military and other contacts. Communist 
Party of India Marxist (CPM) MP Sitaram Yechury also told us 
he can not envision an armed conflict with China: he is 
concerned primarily about "economic aggression." 
 
High Level Meetings: The Calm before the Storm? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶5. (SBU) On October 28 the Russia-India-China 
(RIC) meeting in Bangalore, a regularly scheduled Trilateral, 
provided a platform for EAM Krishna and FM Yang Jiechi to 
demonstrate that, despite the recent media maelstrom, the 
India-China relationship remains on track at the leadership 
level.  Media reported that the leaders characterized both 
meetings as "satisfying."  EAM Krishna's statement 
characterized his meeting with FM Yang as a "warm" and 
"fruitful" exchange and emphasized the importance of 
developing high level exchanges, enhancing trade and economic 
cooperation, and progressing on defense contacts between 
China and India.  It also noted an agreement to enhance 
media, cultural and people-to-people exchanges in the 
framework of celebrating the 60th anniversary of India-China 
relations.  The RIC joint communiqu avoided any discussion 
of bilateral issues, but focused on the positive areas of 
cooperation among the three countries including international 
organization reform, climate change, economic cooperation, 
and regional security/stability.  EAM Krishna announced after 
his meeting with FM Yang that he had accepted the latter's 
invitation to visit China next year.  Some media reports 
anticipated that the ASEAN and RIC sideline meetings were 
only a lull before the Dalai Lama's upcoming visit to Tawang 
would spur a renewed "war of words." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Painting a gloomier picture, Embassy contact Sandeep 
Dikshit of The Hindu (present in Bangalore during the RIC 
meeting) told Poloff that many signs indicate the RIC side 
meeting between Krishna and Yang was "not really cordial." 
He pointed to the absence of any comments about dates for 
President Patil's long-overdue China visit, or about the 
FM-level telephone hotline promised after the 13th round of 
border talks.  He dismissed the announcement that Krishna 
would visit China next year as insignificant.  A very 
high-profile visit such as the President's would be required 
to truly convey positive signals about the relationship, he 
indicated.  Dikshit claimed that he observed tense body 
language in FM Yang when he left the meeting with Krishna. 
He also noted that Krishna's press statement indicating that 
the GOI had not only asked the Dalai Lama to refrain from 
political activity, but also to avoid asking border 
questions, was a significant first revealing a GOI effort to 
reassure China.  He anticipates a great deal of quiet 
diplomatic activity will take place between China and India 
before the Dalai Lama's Arunachal Pradesh visit: the results 
will be reflected when the visit occurs, he said. 
 
NEW DELHI 00002248  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
The Tibet Card 
-------------- 
¶7. (U) In the end, the verbal jousting over Arunachal 
Pradesh's status is tied to the broader issue of Tibet.  Like 
most aspects of the India-China relationship, the dispute 
over AP is nothing new; its roots date back to 1914, when 
officials in British India and then autonomous Tibet agreed 
on the McMahon Line that still serves as the working border 
separating AP from Tibet. However, China has not accepted 
this boundary and refers to AP as "South Tibet."  From 1954 
until the 1962 War, India was bound by a "Panch Shila" or 
"Five Guiding Principles" an agreement with Beijing in which 
it formally recognized Tibet as part of China.   Fast forward 
to today and the picture looks different.  According to Dr. 
Sujit Dutta, a well-known China expert long involved in 
high-level track-two dialogues with China, a newly confident 
India is not bound by the Five Principles and is bolstered by 
its growing relationship with the U.S.  In his view, India 
feels that it can play a "Tibet card" as needed.  Dutta and 
Kondappali both told us that if China starts to push too hard 
on its  claim that Arunachal Pradesh is part of Tibet, the 
current GOI might eventually feel emboldened to try to play 
on China's Tibet sensitivities.  This would be a distinct 
change from India's position that sensitive bilateral issues 
like the border dispute should be shunted aside into 
never-ending negotiations. 
 
¶8. (U) COMMENT: If India and China had a Facebook page their 
relationship status would be "complicated."  On the Indian 
side, attitudes about China are split.  The recent GOI 
statements aimed at China were uncharacteristically 
bold, but follow-on statements by the Foreign Secretary and 
the outcome of the bilateral meeting of the foreign ministers 
at the RIC meeting show that the GOI remains focused on 
growing economic ties with China.  The "war of words" points 
to the fact that people-to-people ties between the two 
countries have yet to take root.  EAM Krishna and FM Yang 
hinted at this with their agreement to focus on such ties. 
The GOI must walk a fine line in order to sound tough on 
China at home while avoiding the most sensitive issue -- 
Tibet.   Despite our academic contact's enthusiasm for the 
"Tibet card," we doubt India will be willing to play this in 
the near future.  Given Chinese sensitivities over Tibet, the 
GOI would have to think long and hard before upping the ante 
over what amounts to a rhetorical dispute over territory 
India controls. 
END COMMENT. 
ROEMER