VZCZCXRO8387
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0562/01 3291141
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251141Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7467
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000562 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EU MARR PREF SU CD
SUBJECT: EU TROIKA REP ON CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMICS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1273 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 536 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 522 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 503 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 485 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  EU Special Chad Rep Georg Lennkh gave DCM a 
November 24 read-out of the recent UN/AU-sponsored Darfur 
civil society conference in Doha, which he attended.  Lennkh 
emphasized that public statements from both Chad and Sudan at 
the Doha event confirmed the three-step sequence of 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed in N'Djamena 
October 10 (reftels), and provided the international 
community with further means to engage both Sudan and Chad so 
that they would carry out respective responsibilities.  He 
urged the U.S. to step up pressure on Sudan in the aim of 
achieving cantonment of remaining Chadian rebels well inside 
Darfur, the first of the three bilateral CMBs.  Lennkh 
indicated that he believed Chad's commitment to ending 
military support for the JEM was sincere. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Lennkh plans to travel to Washington in the coming 
weeks to discuss international equities in Chad's electoral 
process with Department and other officials.  We will advise 
if we learn more about his onward travel plans.  We also 
intend to see Faki upon his return to N'Djamena; MFA 
officials who accompanied Faki to Doha have told us that Faki 
and Sudanese Presidential Advisor Ghazi remain in close and 
cordial contact on the CMB process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  An EU Troika delegation headed by Special 
Representative for Chad Georg Lennkh, in N'Djamena to learn 
more about the status of preparations for 2010-2011 
elections, met with DCM November 24, inter alia describing 
last week's civil society conference in Doha arranged by 
UN/AU Darfur Negotiator Djibrill Bassole.  Lennkh said he had 
spoken with both Chadian FM Faki and Sudanese Presidential 
Rep Ghazi Salahhudin in Doha, as well as with Bassole. 
Lennkh noted that both sides seemed to appreciate that the 
task confronting Sudan -- to canton Chadian rebels well 
inside Sudan in a location with sufficient amenities that 
they would not return to border areas -- presented 
significant challenges.  He urged the U.S. to maintain 
pressure on Sudan so that momentum would not flag. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The Chadian side was patient, continued Lennkh, 
and wanted to give the Sudan side sufficient time to do the 
job correctly.  This said, the Chadians seemed to be 
increasingly nervous that Sudan would cut corners, either by 
design or because of the logistic difficulties of the task 
before it.  Thus Faki had proposed to Ghazi that 
international representatives be permitted to observe the 
cantonment effort, and to accompany Chadian "verifiers" of 
the final result, so that a judgment on what the Sudanese had 
managed to do would not boil down to Chad's word against 
Sudan's.  Faki had also made clear that Chad would welcome 
international observers of its own follow-on effort to 
eliminate vestiges of JEM military presence in Chad, and 
would also welcome international witnesses to Sudan's 
eventual verification mission to assess Chad's efforts in 
that regard. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Ghazi had said he saw no problem with Faki's 
proposal of international observers, Lennkh stressed, adding 
that Ghazi personally struck him as an honest broker.  But 
those on the Sudan side who continued to distrust Chad were 
apparently using Faki's request for international observers 
as an excuse to reiterate assertions to the international 
media that Chad was dragging its feet with regard to the set 
of bilateral initiatives agreed in N'Djamena October 10. 
Asked who on the Sudan side was repeatedly -- and erroneously 
-- advising the media that the ball was in Chad's court, 
Lennkh indicated that he assumed the NCP was to blame. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000562  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Lennkh offered that public statements from both 
sides issued in Doha were the first open acknowledgments that 
a three-step process had been agreed in N'Djamena, with Sudan 
to take the first step (cantonment of Chadian rebels), Chad 
to take the second (elimination of JEM military facilities, 
subject to Sudanese verification), and Faki himself to take 
the third (a visit to Khartoum to discuss additional 
measures).  In Lennkh's view, the international community 
should use the Doha statements to press the two sides -- 
particularly Sudan -- to hasten their efforts.  Lennkh also 
said that he viewed Chad's tacit admission of past 
involvement with the JEM, and avowed desire to sever 
remaining military links, as credible and significant. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Lennkh plans to travel to Washington in the coming 
weeks to discuss international equities in Chad's electoral 
process with Department and other officials.  Although he 
said that his staff would be in touch directly, we will 
advise if we learn more of his onward travel plans. 
Meanwhile, we intend to see Faki -- who remains in travel 
status himself -- upon his return to Chad, to continue 
discussions of the Doha process and other matters.  MFA 
officials who accompanied Faki to Doha have confirmed that 
Faki maintains cordial and frequent contact with Ghazi even 
while on the road. 
NIGRO