Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09NDJAMENA536, CHAD/JEM: FRENCH AND LIBYANS ON JEM ISSUES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NDJAMENA536.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NDJAMENA536 2009-11-16 13:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO9166
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0536/01 3201354
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161354Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7437
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000536 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR SU LY PINR ER FR CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/JEM: FRENCH AND LIBYANS ON JEM ISSUES 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1278 
     B. NDJAMENA 0483 
     C. 2008 NDJAMENA 557 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) The French ambassador told us 11/14 that he had no 
information regarding recent or upcoming deliveries of arms 
to JEM in Chad and that he believed that the GOC has put 
Khalil Ibrahim "on a short leash," restricting his in-country 
travel to prevent him from getting involved in JEM armed 
activity in eastern Chad.  The Libyan ambassador told us 
11/12 that The Libyans and President Deby had been pressing 
JEM to leave Chad and engage in meaningful Darfur 
negotiations, including going to Doha, but that Chad 
ambassador to Libya Daoussa Deby was still involved in JEM 
affairs, including funneling Eritrean assistance to JEM from 
Tripoli. The Libyan called for increased international 
pressure on JEM and its supporters in Eritrea and the Gulf, 
to help Chad break with JEM. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Libyans are probably telling us what they 
assume we want to hear; they know that U.S. relations with 
Eritrea are poor; and they conveniently ignore their own 
support for JEM.  The French Ambassador's unsurprising 
remarks reflect both French Chad policy and long-standing 
French views on JEM, as well as France's excellent sources of 
information here.  The Libyans once claimed (Ref C) that they 
got Daoussa Deby re-appointed to Tripoli to remove him from 
the Chad/JEM equation; but now they acknowledge that 
Daoussa's current position may not have stopped him from 
keeping his hand in with JEM. 
 
3.  (SBU) Embassy NDjamena remains prepared to meet with 
Khalil or his advisors 
here to pass messages or seek information regarding JEM 
actions and plans (Ref B), whenever the  Department provides 
guidance and talking points for further engagement with JEM. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
FRENCH AMB 
---------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Ambassador talked to the French Ambassador Bruno 
Foucher on November 14.  Foucher's key JEM-related points 
were: 
 
-- French Embassy has no information regarding recent or 
upcoming deliveries of arms to JEM in Chad; 
 
-- French Embassy believes that the GOC has put Khalil 
Ibrahim "on a short leash," restricting his in-country travel 
to prevent him from getting involved in JEM armed activity in 
eastern Chad. 
 
-- French Embassy is puzzled by actions of JEM representative 
in Paris, whose apparent antipathy to Khalil Ibrahim's 
leadership results in the Paris rep spreading 
"disinformation" designed to discredit Khalil:  French 
Ambassador cited a recent "report" from the JEM Paris rep 
that JEM had received 30 vehicles from the GOC, evidence for 
which the French cannot find. 
 
---------- 
LIBYAN AMB 
---------- 
 
5.  Ambassador spoke to Libyan Ambassador Green Saleh Green 
on November 12.  Green's key JEM-related points were: 
 
-- Eritrean support for JEM is at root of many problems with 
JEM; 
 
-- Eritrean political and material support for JEM is far 
greater than any Chad-related support for JEM; 
 
NDJAMENA 00000536  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
-- Chad Ambassador to Libya (and President Deby's 
half-brother) Daoussa Deby is more supportive of JEM than 
President Deby and might be involved in transferring support 
from Eritrea to JEM via Tripoli, involving Eritrean Embassy 
there; 
 
-- Libya has been pressing President Deby to continue be 
tough with JEM, encourage JEM to negotiate a solution in 
Darfur, go to Doha, etc; 
 
-- Libya has been pressing Khartoum to negotiate seriously on 
Darfur; 
 
-- President Deby has been clear with Khalil Ibrahim and 
wants to "break" with JEM, but there are limits to how far he 
can go within the "Zaghawa nation;" 
 
-- President Deby needs help in getting JEM out of Chad and 
into negotiations; 
 
-- International pressure must be put on Asmara to stop 
backing JEM; 
 
-- International pressure must be exerted to stop support for 
JEM emanating from "Gulf States" and "Gulf Arab people. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The Libyans are probably telling us what they 
assume we want to hear; they know that U.S. relations with 
Eritrea are poor; and they conveniently ignore their own 
support for JEM.  The French Ambassador's unsurprising 
remarks reflect both French Chad policy and long-standing 
French views on JEM, as well as France's excellent sources of 
information here.  The Libyans once claimed (Ref C) that they 
got Daoussa Deby re-appointed to Tripoli to remove him from 
the Chad/JEM equation; but now they acknowledge that 
Daoussa's current position may not have stopped him from 
keeping his hand in with JEM. 
 
7.  (SBU) Embassy NDjamena remains prepared to meet with 
Khalil or his advisors here to pass messages or seek 
information regarding JEM actions and plans, whenever the 
Department provides guidance and talking points for further 
engagement with JEM.  END COMMENT. 
 
NIGRO