VZCZCXRO7202
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0533 3171215
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131215Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7435
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000533 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE ALSO FOR AF/EX 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/AF 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/TIA/ITA 
STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES 
STATE ALSO FOR PRM/AFR 
USAID FOR OFDA 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF ASEC PREL PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: EAC -- EMBASSY N'DJAMENA -- EASTERN CHAD TRAVEL 
 
REF: (A) N'DJAMENA 521; (B) N'DJAMENA 520; (C) N'DJAMENA 511; (D) 
N'DJAMENA 166; (E) N'DJAMENA 40 
 
¶1. (SBU) Ambassador convened Embassy N'Djamena's Emergency Action 
Committee on Thursday, 12 November, in order to discuss the evolving 
security situation in eastern Chad. EAC meeting was attended by 
ADCM, RSO, PRM, Pol/Econ, Pol/Mil, DATT, PAO, D/D, and CON. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The area referred to as eastern Chad, comprised of the 
region from Abeche, the regional capital, to the Sudan border at 
Adre, as far north as Bahai, and as far south as Haraze, has seen a 
significant evolution in threats to Chadian and humanitarian 
organization staff.  The most dangerous area at present and for the 
last several weeks since the end of Chad's rainy season has been the 
Abeche-Adre axis through Farchana, north to Guereda, south to Hadjer 
Hadid.  The following incident list from the last ten days -- not 
exhaustive -- gives an indication of the situation: 
 
-- Kidnapping of an ICRC French international south of Adre; 
-- Spraying with AK-47 fire by men in uniform of a van belonging to 
the NGO Solidarite and the killing of their national driver; 
-- Armed attack by horse-mounted assailants against a DIS post to 
steal weapons; 
-- Five organizations suspending operations (Premieres Urgences, 
Mine Tech, MSF, Solidarit, ICRC); 
-- Attempted forced entry into the UNICEF compound in the deep 
field; and 
-- At least 6 carjackings. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Most events have happened after dark, and involved vehicle 
road movements without escort, or residential compounds far from 
population concentrations.  International staffs of humanitarian 
organizations are clearly the intended targets, although Chadian 
nationals are also victimized, especially those associated with 
humanitarian operations. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In light of this evolving situation, the EAC recommended 
to the Chief of Mission, and he has approved, updating Post's Travel 
Warning for Chad, and the following revised Post policy for travel 
to eastern Chad, including Abeche town.  The main elements of the 
travel policy build from Refs D and E: 
 
(A) Official travel of USG personnel subject to Chief of Mission 
(COM) authority to eastern Chad is prohibited without express COM 
authorization on advice of the EAC. 
 
(B) Authorized official travel of USG personnel subject to COM 
authority to eastern Chad shall be coordinated with US Embassy RSO, 
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and UN partner agency 
security officers in Abeche and N'Djamena (MINURCAT, UNHCR, WFP, 
etc.) 
 
(C) Housing arrangements for authorized overnights in Abeche and 
"deep field" locations for USG personnel subject to COM authority 
shall be established at approved secure compounds on a case-by-case 
basis, with the object of reducing to the absolute minimum vehicle 
road movements. 
 
(D) Travel in the region by road is prohibited for USG personnel 
subject to COM authority wherever air service from approved UN or 
NGO aviation assets is available. 
 
(E) Where such air service in unavailable, travel in the region by 
road for USG personnel subject to COM authority shall be under the 
security constraints of the UNDSS, including required security 
escorts. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) EAC will reconvene as events require. 
 
NIGRO