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DE RUEHNJ #0520/01 3101133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061133Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7414
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000520 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES 
DECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM CASC UNSC ASEC SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD:  MINURCAT AND PERM-5 AMBASSADORS SHARE 
GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT RISING INSECURITY IN EASTERN CHAD 
 
REF: A. N'DJAMENA 511 
     ¶B. N'DJAMENA 444 
 
 ¶1.  (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE:  See Para 16. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo told Perm-5 
Ambassadors accredited to Chad on November 4 that he was 
deeply concerned about rising criminality in Eastern Chad, 
which was beyond the current ability of international or 
Chadian security forces to control adequately, and that 
humanitarian aid workers would be at greater risk during the 
upcoming dry season.  All Perm-5 Ambassadors made clear that 
they intended to reconsider standing security advice for 
their nationals operating in the region, with a view to 
helping MINURCAT and civilian humanitarian organizations to 
make appropriate operational decisions.  (Similar concerns 
were raised in meeting of the Interagency Standing Committee 
(IASC) and in the SRSG's meeting with the wider diplomatic 
community that same day.)  The Perm-5 also discussed African 
and Afro-Arab initiatives to resolve Darfur and Chad-Sudan 
tensions, and agreed that Sudan showed no sign of taking the 
"next step" it had committed to in the series of bilateral 
confidence-building measures agreed between had FORMIN Faki 
and Sudan envoy Ghazi in N'Djamena October 10. The Perm-5 
reviewed the AU Peace and Security Council Summit in Abuja as 
well as the developing situation in CAR.  The 
newly-accredited UK Ambassador to Chad (resident in Yaounde) 
indicated that his own ability to obtain meetings with 
Chadian officials seemed to be affected negatively by what 
the Chadians perceived as the UK's history-based "tilt" 
toward Sudan. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The SRSG recognizes and the partners all agree on 
the nature of the threat to civilians, especially 
humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad, and the likelihood 
that it could limit materially the ability of the 
humanitarians to provide services to refugees and displaced 
persons in some areas.  We applaud his realism in admitting 
the inadequacy of MINURCAT forces currently deployed to some 
sectors to ensure security there.  Angelo's Head of Security 
was more pointed in his assessment of MINURCAT, DIS and GOC 
capability to ensure civilian security in eastern Chad, and 
he gave cogent examples.  Although there is disagreement 
regarding the willingness of some NGOs to accept MINURCAT 
security services at current capability, it appears that at 
current strength and capability, the combined available 
security forces of the GoC, DIS, and MINURCAT, despite their 
best efforts, cannot ensure the security of civilians, 
especially refugees and IDPs and humanitarian workers, in 
eastern Chad.  This could have a negative impact on the 
ability of humanitarian organizations, including USG partners 
and individual American citizens, to maintain operations 
because of the increased risk to themselves in coming months. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Embassy will continue to monitor closely the 
security situation in eastern Chad, and review regularly the 
security parameters for USG operations, USG-funded 
operations, and AMCITS presence there.  We believe the 
Department should undertake immediately to discuss with the 
PERM-5 and with UN/DPKO in NY how best to ensure the full 
mandated deployment and adequate resourcing of MINURCAT to 
ensure that humanitarian assistance operations in eastern 
Chad are not threatened by growing risk to civilians, 
especially refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers there. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
INSECURITY IN EASTERN CHAD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Victor Angelo reported that the border area, and 
the area around the towns of Guereda and Farchana were too 
unsafe for an international presence for the moment, although 
 
NDJAMENA 00000520  002 OF 004 
 
 
other border areas around Goz Beida and Iriba were relatively 
safe.  All Ambassadors expressed grave concern about evidence 
of rampant banditry.  A "security vacuum" seemed to be taking 
hold in Eastern Chad, said Ambassador Foucher.  "People will 
be killed in the dry season."  Angelo attributed the 
deteriorating situation in part to demobilization of soldiers 
on both sides of the border, and also to a noteworthy 
increase in banditry particularly from the Sudan side, where 
opportunities for gaining one's livelihood other than through 
criminality were very limited.  A recovered UN vehicle had 
contained a list of numerous Sudanese buyers of cannibalized 
car parts to whom the parts had evidently been destined. 
Angelo advised that he had been in Abeche the previous day to 
reach out to the humanitarian community and try to ensure 
that the best possible coordination would occur among 
humanitarians and MINURCAT.  Ambassador Foucher offered that 
the DIS seemed to have made a number of brave attempts to 
intervene, but that neither the DIS nor MINURCAT were likely 
to be effective against janjaweed, which had been sighted 
recently in Eastern Chad.  At this point, "quite 
understandable panic holds sway among humanitarians," said 
Angelo.  All Ambassadors noted that they would attempt to 
reach out to their citizens with new security advisories in 
the coming weeks. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Ambassador Foucher noted that the international 
community also needed to pressure the Chadian government to 
do what it could to increase security in the region.  He 
asked Angelo whether MINURCAT troops were able to patrol in 
dangerous locations.  Angelo made clear that some troops -- 
the Togolese and Mongolians -- were excellent, and adequately 
equipped for such a task.  But the Ghanaians, who were based 
in the most dangerous site, were not up to full strength and 
always seemed to have an excuse as to why they could not do 
their jobs.  With MINURCAT at only 52 per cent troop 
strength, problems were inevitable, said Angelo. 
 
------------ 
OURE CASSONI 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Angelo told the group that UNHCR had determined 
that the alternate site for the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, at 
Bir Douan, had proven unviable because of its lack of water. 
Other sites were now being looked at; the GoC was insisting 
that the chosen site be in Ennedi Province, President Deby's 
home. 
 
--- 
CAR 
--- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Angelo reported on his trip the previous week to 
CAR, where he said the prevailing concern had to do with the 
presence of both LRA fighters and approximately 800 Ugandan 
soldiers in the south.  The Ugandans were located "not 
coincidentally in the vicinity of a diamond mine abandoned by 
a South African concern."  "No one knows how many LRA are in 
the region," said Angelo, but their very existence could 
easily serve as a pretext for all manner of bad behavior on 
the part of others, even if they did not cause trouble 
themselves. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Meanwhile, said Angelo, the Chadians had rounded 
up and cantoned in Southwestern Chad several hundred Chadian 
rebels originating in Eastern Chad and their CAR mercenary 
backers -- the group that had spent time at Kaga Bandoro, 
CAR, separate from the groups supported by the Sudanese.  In 
Salamat Province in Southeastern Chad, an initiative was 
under way to increase ANT troop strength considerably in case 
Chadian rebels once again tried to enter Chad from "the 
out-of-control triangle of CAR near the Darfur border."  An 
ANT military platform was being built up in Am Timan in case 
operations needed to be carried out near Tissi, one of Chad's 
most dangerous localities, and one where the recent 
population census could not be carried out for security 
regions. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000520  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
INTRA-AFRICAN AND AFRO-ARAB 
INITIATIVES 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Participants discussed recent international 
efforts to resolve the Darfur and Chad-Sudan conflicts, 
including the November 3 visit to Chad of the Qatari Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister.  According to Ambassador 
Foucher, President Deby had agreed to a Qatari proposal that 
he try to "deliver" the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim to Doha for 
upcoming talks.  Consequently, the Chadians were now 
pressuring France to deliver the SLA's Abdul Wahid, whom they 
asserted that France "controlled."  The Qatari visit had also 
yielded a number of promises of bilateral assistance for 
Chad, said Foucher.  Angelo advised that he had been in touch 
with UN/AU negotiator Bassole, and that Bassole was planning 
trips to London and Paris before the Darfur civil society 
conference in Doha later this month. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The group also discussed the AU Peace and 
Security Council meeting in Abuja October 29, which 
considered recommendations of the Mbeki panel.  Angelo said 
that the UN found Mbeki's recommendations about the 
composition of the proposed hybrid criminal court interesting 
and potentially useful.  One of the benefits of the session, 
according to Angelo, was that it had facilitated ad hoc 
discussions among African leaders about how they might 
encourage positive Chad-Sudan dynamics to continue.  Burkina 
Faso wanted to be helpful, said Angelo, in part because UN/AU 
negotiator Djibril Bassole was from that nation.  But 
Ouagadougou was perceived by the Deby regime as being 
pro-Sudan and supportive of certain Chadian opposition 
figures.  Cote d'Ivoire also appeared to want to lend a hand, 
and might be easier for the Chadians to work with. 
Congo/Brazzaville sought to become more involved, said 
Angelo, describing his recent visit there; President 
Sassou-Nguessi was coordinating with the Libyans on some 
possible ways to resurrect the Dakar Group.  According to 
Angelo, the Chadians were supportive of this and hopeful that 
Congo/Brazzaville and Libya could encourage the Sudanese to 
take the step of cantoning the Chadian rebels, promised 
during Sudanese Presidential Envoy Ghazi's visit to Chad in 
October.  For the moment, the Sudanese "did not seem to be 
doing anything," the group agreed.  Recent press reports from 
Khartoum suggesting that a visit by Chadian FM Faki to 
Khartoum was in the offing most likely amounted to Sudanese 
"disinformation."  Victor Angelo indicated that he had 
himself hoped to visit Khartoum in the coming week, but the 
Sudanese had issued a blanket denial of flight clearances for 
him. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  UK Ambassador Joshi, also accredited to Cameroon, 
described what he believed had been accomplished during the 
visit last week of President Deby to Yaounde.  According to 
Joshi, the two sides had discussed border security and 
improved coordination between police and customs units on 
either side of the border, as insecurity in that region was 
of growing concern to both nations.  Foucher said that he had 
the impression Chad was trying to improve border control 
everywhere.  A new initiative involved Chad, Nigeria and 
Niger (why Cameroon was absent was not clear) in a joint 
effort to increase security around Lake Chad, so as to stop 
criminal activity there.  Approximately 1000 law enforcement 
personnel from the three nations were now deployed.  The 
Perm-5 group agreed that President Deby had a chance to prove 
his worth as a regional leader during his tenure as President 
of CEEAC -- he is currently in Libreville on CEEAC business 
-- but what he would do with that position remained to be 
seen. 
 
----------------------------- 
UN SECURITY OFFICER COMMENTS 
ON FORCE CAPABILITIES 
----------------------------- 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000520  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) Similar concerns about security in the east were 
raised in meeting of the Interagency Standing Committee 
(IASC) and in the SRSG's meeting with the wider diplomatic 
community that same day (November 4).  Angelo's Head of 
Security, UN DSS Chief Bertrand Bourgain, provided a briefing 
to the IASC of his assessment of MINURCAT, DIS and GOC's 
ability to ensure civilian security in eastern Chad.  He gave 
the example of the major international NGO "Premiere 
Urgence," having been the target of an armed residential 
compound invasion attempt, as well as a nearly-successful 
kidnapping the week of October 19, determining that security 
assets in the Farchana region were inadequate to provide area 
security for their operations, which require them to be able 
to react to emergency calls with no advance notice. 
"Premiere Urgence" subscribes to the internationally accepted 
humanitarian principle that armed escorts for humanitarian 
operations must be used only as a last resort for critical 
life-saving activities.  Faced with the inability to operate 
in the area, "Premiere Urgence" chose to shut down operations 
in the region, and requested MINURCAT escort for the movement 
of its personnel, vehicles, and assets to Abeche, which 
MINURCAT undertook to provide November 5. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The SRSG recognizes and the partners all agree on 
the nature of the threat to civilians, especially 
humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad, and the likelihood 
that it could limit materially the ability of the 
humanitarians to provide services to refugees and displaced 
persons in some areas.  We applaud his realism in admitting 
the inadequacy of MINURCAT forces currently deployed to some 
sectors to ensure security there.  The UN DSS Chief was even 
more pointed in his assessment that MINURCAT and DIS forces 
currently are insufficient in number and insufficiently 
resourced in materiel and transport to provide either enough 
escorts for all who may need them, or to secure routes and 
regions through an area security presence. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Although there is disagreement regarding the 
willingness of some NGOs to accept MINURCAT security services 
at current capability, it appears that at current strength 
and capability, the combined available security forces of the 
GoC, DIS, and MINURCAT, despite their best efforts, cannot 
ensure the security of civilians, especially refugees and 
IDPS and humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad.  Humanitarian 
organizations, including USG partners and individual American 
citizens, may justifiably determine, as did Premiere Urgence, 
the need to reduce or suspend operations because of the 
increased risk to themselves in coming weeks and months. END 
COMMENT. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Action Request: That the Department undertake 
immediately to discuss with the PERM-5 and with UN/DPKO in NY 
how best to ensure the full mandated deployment and adequate 
resourcing of MINURCAT to ensure that humanitarian assistance 
operations in eastern Chad are not threatened by growing risk 
to civilians, especially refugees, IDPs and humanitarian 
workers there. 
NIGRO