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Viewing cable 09NDJAMENA513, SUDAN REBELS: DEMARCHE TO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE REPS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NDJAMENA513 2009-11-03 17:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO7675
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0513/01 3071707
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031707Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0551
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7409
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000513 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
DECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN REBELS:  DEMARCHE TO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE REPS 
 
REF: NOVEMBER 2 NIGRO-HUDSON E-MAIL AND PREVIOUS 
 
------------ 
U.S. MESSAGE 
------------ 
 
1.  (SBU)  DCM, accompanied by DATT and RSO, delivered points 
provided in ref message to members of the Technical Committee 
representing SLA and URF factions November 3, stressing that 
S/E Gration commended progress thus far, including via the 
road map signed in Addis Ababa, toward unification under one 
banner.  DCM made clear that the U.S. remained committed to 
helping spur unification, but stressed that our concerns on 
timing were mounting.  She pointed out that the proposed 
Technical Committee conference was only two weeks away, and 
that although we had just received budgets deemed crucial for 
moving people, we had yet to receive other transportation 
details.  She reminded the group that the U.S. was prepared 
to reach out to third countries to try to secure funding for 
outstanding items on the budget.  She advised the group that 
the U.S. would not be in a position to continue to devote our 
own resources to the reunification effort unless the movement 
participants themselves took full responsibility for 
organizing their members and the conference at the time the 
group had previously chosen. 
 
-------------------- 
CONFERENCE LOGISTICS 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  The SLA and URF reps -- Babiker Abdallah, 
Tajelldin Bashir Niam, Abdallah Jafar Khalil, and Mahmoud 
Mohammed Korina -- insisted that they were entirely committed 
to unification, to attending the Technical Committee 
conference, and to peace in a unified, stable Sudan.  They 
thanked the U.S. for agreeing to provide food and water for 
travelers, but also claimed that delays had occurred in 
Washington over whether funding could be provided for some 
necessary items, including fuel and spare parts allowing 
vehicles to travel great distances.  Babiker and Niam 
stressed that their groups were indeed armed groups, adding 
that the U.S. had agreed to ask the Swiss and French to pick 
up funding for items the USG could not provide to such 
entities.  An additional problem had been that "logistics 
with the house you rented for us, including lack of internet 
connectivity" had slowed things down, 
 
3.  (SBU)  DCM told the reps that the USG sought on an 
immediate basis a complete list of names of those who needed 
to travel to the conference, as well as details of their 
transportation needs.  Babiker and Niam advised that the 
various movements who were part of the rebel unification 
effort presently needed to engage in individual, 
faction-specific, internal pre-consultations, perhaps 
involving 500 people.  Once those pre-consultations had 
occurred -- with the help of the international community if 
possible -- attention could shift to the November 15-25 
conference itself.  The main unknown as far as conference 
participation was concerned was who from the Diaspora would 
attend.  Before settling on a finalized conference list, the 
group hoped to receive clarity on how much assistance the 
Swiss and French were likely to provide toward fuel costs. 
Babiker indicated that his organization had asked the Swiss 
to shift funding for three consolidation workshops planned 
for some point in the future to the pre-consultation effort, 
but the Swiss had told him they "were waiting for a green 
light from the U.S." 
 
--- 
JEM 
--- 
 
4.  (SBU) Niam then raised the divisive stance of Khalil 
Ibrahim -- who he said was presently in N'Djamena -- pointing 
out that Khalil had posted a statement on a website earlier 
in the day to the effect that he did not want a unification 
conference, did not want to go to Doha, and preferred to 
resume fighting.  Jafar added that the JEM was threatening 
 
NDJAMENA 00000513  002 OF 002 
 
 
the entire peace process, seemed bent on undermining the 
efforts of others to pursue peace, and might even pose a 
direct physical threat of members of the Technical Committee 
in N'Djamena -- "we are afraid we will meet him here," said 
Jafar.  "He may commit crimes here." 
 
5.  (SBU)  Niam said that in addition to seeking 
international financial support for the Technical Committee 
unification conference and pre-consultations, the SLA and URF 
factions also sought USG assistance in "protection from the 
JEM"; in obtaining the release of SLA/AW commander Yousef 
Ahmet Yousef (currently held by the JEM); and in convincing 
President Deby to meet with the SLA and URF team (Deby had 
met with them three times in the past).  Perhaps S/E Gration 
could come to N'Djamena in the coming days to work with Deby 
and the Technical Committee in the aim of delivering all 
Sudan rebels, including the JEM, to an event in Doha, said 
Naim. 
 
6.  (SBU)  DCM asked whom the SLA and URF usually met with in 
the GoC when Deby was unavailable.  Babiker said that 
officials from the Interior Ministry and the Secretary 
General of the MFA normally were willing to receive them, but 
"people below Deby do not have power." 
 
----------- 
WAY FORWARD 
----------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  Korina reiterated that the pre-consultation 
process with individual movement members still in the field 
needed to proceed before final decisions could be made about 
the conference.  DCM reiterated that S/E Gration's patience 
was wearing thin, and that the USG did not want to continue 
to invest efforts in a process that was going nowhere.  She 
recommended that the group immediately provide the USG with a 
list of conference participants, including identity details 
and information on where they needed to travel from.  Niam 
and Babiker acknowledged that rounding up the right Diaspora 
reps might in the end not be so important as identifying key 
players from the field, "so if necessary, we will forget 
about Diaspora participation."  They noted that they would 
have a larger meeting among themselves this evening to try to 
nail down information on who could attend the conference. 
This would involve trying to contact potential JEM defectors 
currently in Tripoli.  If allowed to proceed as they wished 
with pre-consultations, "maybe more than ten groups will come 
to the conference," said Naim.  DCM asked that a rep of the 
present gathering get in touch with Embassy N'Djamena 
November 4 to let us know whether they had put together their 
list.  She stressed that the group could always reach out to 
S/USSES staff or to Embassy Khartoum as well. 
NIGRO