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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7400
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 NDJAMENA 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES 
STATE ALSO FOR PRM/AFR 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/RD/AF 
USAID FOR OFDA 
KHARTOUM FOR OFDA 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PREF PREL PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: EASTERN CHAD: SECURITY FAMILIARIZATION VISIT TO ABECHE -- 
REPORT OF FINDINGS 
 
Ref A. NDJAMENA 40; B. NDJAMENA 150 
 
-------------------- 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Post's current security practices for travelers to Abeche 
and eastern Chad under Chief of Mission authority are largely 
adequate within the security context.  These practices are based on 
the operating rule that travelers will be under the protection of, 
and will abide by, the practices and procedures of MINURCAT or the 
traveler's partner UN Agency.  The relative threats in Abeche of 
residential break-in (low) vs. that of carjacking (high) may 
indicate a need to adjust lodging requirements to minimize USG 
employee transit times while working in that city.  Air travel 
continues to be reliable and safe, and serves all significant field 
operations centers.  Ground travel is increasingly dangerous due to 
entrenched, violent, politically protected criminality that targets 
the international community in general and humanitarian workers in 
the field in particular with near-total impunity. 
 
¶2. (SBU) It appears that the trustworthy security forces in the 
area, whether MINURCAT troops or the special Chadian humanitarian 
police force DIS (see below), are deployed in insufficient numbers, 
and  are unsuited by mandate and design, to the task of providing 
area security through presence, or point-to-point escort of the 
hundreds of humanitarian workers and supply convoys operating in a 
vast territory of great distances and difficult terrain.  While 
there remains hope that MINURCAT will eventually achieve its full 
deployment force, and that the DIS will slowly evolve into a 
functioning policing capability, neither of these two events will 
happen during the potentially dangerous dry season that has just 
begun, and will last into June of 2010 -- and even a MINURCAT at 
full force will be hard pressed to successfully implement a very 
difficult mandate in a hostile space.  Post will ensure that our 
vulnerable partners in the field are fully apprised of this 
probability, and given every opportunity to take such actions as 
they believe appropriate to ensure their safety, within the 
internationally accepted principles guiding humanitarian and 
military operations in a conflict zone.  END SUMMARY OF FINDINGS. 
 
------------- 
INTRODUCTION 
------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) RSO and RefCoords visited Abeche, eastern Chad, from 27 to 
29 OCT.  Official USG travelers under Chief of Mission authority 
have to date utilized the support and abided by the security 
practices and requirements of partner UN agencies when traveling in 
eastern Chad.  The goal of this visit was to develop contacts within 
UN Agency and MINURCAT Security offices; become familiar with UN 
Department for Safety and Security (UN DSS) and MINURCAT standard 
operating procedures for movement and residential security; and 
review current best practices for travel to the humanitarian 
assistance areas of operation in eastern Chad.  RSO and RefCoords 
held discussions with MINURCAT, International Criminal Court, and 
UNHCR civilian security, operations, and intelligence officials and 
with MINURCAT military officers attached to the Irish Headquarters 
and Sector South units.  Additional attention was given to the 
operations of the International Organization for Migration (IOM -- 
an international organization outside the UN structure) in 
preparation for broad collaboration among the State and Homeland 
Security Departments and IOM for the resettlement of refugees from 
eastern Chad to the U.S., to be reported separately. 
 
--------------------- 
ABECHE: HUMANITARIAN 
OPERATIONAL HUB 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The town of Abeche serves the eastern Chad "humanitarian 
space" as the logistics and operational hub for all UN humanitarian 
agencies, including the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), etc.  It is also 
the forward deployed operational headquarters of the UN Mission to 
the Central African Republic and Chad (Mission des Nations Unies en 
 
NDJAMENA 00000511  002 OF 007 
 
 
Rpublique centrafricaine et au Tchad -- MINURCAT), a Peacekeeping 
Operation (PKO) with a UN Security Council mandate to improve 
operational security for IOs and NGOs assisting refugee and 
internally displaced persons (IDP) populations in the humanitarian 
space.  Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) maintain operational 
and logistical offices and residences in Abeche to both interface 
with UN agencies, and to provide support to staff implementing 
projects in the "deep field".  The eastern Chad region is roughly 
the size of California, with three major "deep field" operations 
areas clustered around the towns of Iriba and Guereda in the north, 
Farchana in the center, and Goz Beida in the south.  Bahai in the 
far north is also an important center from which services to refugee 
populations are deployed. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UN Agencies are operating in Abeche and the entire region 
of eastern Chad under UN DSS security rating of "Phase IV".  This 
designation is officially defined as "Emergency programmes only. 
All staff who are not directly concerned with emergency or 
humanitarian relief operations or security matters are relocated 
outside the country."  This indicates a highly volatile and 
potentially dangerous security environment in which remaining UN 
Agency personnel should be prepared to evacuate at any time.  In 
practice, UN Agency personnel appear to exercise the same level of 
caution in Abeche as in N'Djamena (under Phase III -- "Relocation: 
Staff and families are temporarily concentrated or relocated to 
specified sites/locations and/or eligible dependants are relocated 
outside the country"), with some additional precautions, (see below) 
while being prepared for changed circumstances with little or no 
notice. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The UN designated Eastern Chad as a Phase IV security 
environment in December 2006, following the rebel incursions during 
which fighting between the rebels and the government put 
humanitarians at risk, and humanitarian warehouses and facilities 
were looted.  The continuation of the Phase IV security designation 
is based on the "continued tensions in the border areas" [July 14, 
2009 SG report to SC on MINURCAT] and is largely driven by the 
possibility of another major, organized armed incursion into Chad by 
an armed Chadian opposition group or groups seeking to overthrow the 
current authorities in N'Djamena.  However, the security briefing to 
newly arrived UN Agency personnel focuses entirely on the risks 
posed by a high and increasing level of violent criminality that 
appears to be deeply entrenched; to be connected to and protected by 
instances of official and unofficial power; to enjoy nearly complete 
impunity; and to target the international humanitarian community as 
the most attractive source of goods for theft, and individuals for 
kidnap and extortion. 
 
---------------------- 
SECURITY IN ABECHE -- 
RESIDENTIAL 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Mission policy until early 2009 was that all USG visitors 
to Abeche and the deep field would house on the residential compound 
of their UN partner agency, and abide by the UN DSS Minimal 
Operational Safety Standards (MOSS) and Minimal Operational 
Residential Standards (MORS) in effect.  (NOTE: RSO and RefCoords 
requested that UN security officers share the MOSS and MORS 
documents; security officers were reticent to approve such a 
request, suggesting that Post approach MINURCAT Chief Security 
Officer Bertrand Bourgain with our request.  END NOTE.)  Following 
an outbreak of residential compound invasions and robberies in 
Abeche, some accompanied by violence, Post determined in early 2009 
that only the French and EUFOR bases provided sufficient residential 
security and  suspended all official USG overnights in Abeche, as 
lodging on those bases was not available [Ref A].  Negotiations 
between IO Bureau/USUN New York and UN DPKO, and between Post and 
MINURCAT in N'djamena, resulted in a cooperative agreement for USG 
travelers under Chief of Mission authority to house in pre-fab 
housing units on the MINURCAT military base in Abeche.  Visits to 
the deep field remain under the original policy requiring housing on 
UN Agency compounds under UN DSS MORS and MOSS. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Lodging on the MINURCAT base is now Post's "gold standard" 
against which other housing options are measured.  The base is 
 
NDJAMENA 00000511  003 OF 007 
 
 
considered to be essentially guaranteed against residential invasion 
or break-in.  It is within the same perimeter berm and walls of the 
airfield.  The housing units are co-located on base with a dining 
facility providing three acceptable quality meals per day, and with 
high-standard medical care at the Norwegian Deployable Field 
Hospital. (NOTE: Although the USG does not have a formal agreement 
with MINURCAT guaranteeing medical treatment should travelers under 
Chief of Mission Authority require it, RSO and RefCoords were 
assured that such treatment would not be refused.  END NOTE). 
 
¶9. (SBU) The housing is nonetheless distant from areas where USG 
visitors must conduct business -- 15 to 20 minutes' drive to 
circumnavigate the airfield, along unpaved roads with clear 
choke-points where carjackings were routinely perpetrated and that 
now require 24/7 Dtachement Integr de Scurit -- "DIS" (see 
below) mounted units at a static post. 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) A review and walk-through of the UNHCR compound -- the 
facility USG visitors used most in the past, and where many conduct 
USG business -- revealed physical security standards that are 
commensurate with Post's residence policy for N'Djamena, including 
perimeter walls, gates, invasion deterrence (concertina wire and 
window bars, lighting, etc), and contract guard services.  In 
addition, the extensive UNHCR compound -- actually at least six 
separate housing compounds that have been linked together to form 
single unit about the size of a city block, containing offices, 
separate residences and the guesthouses -- is co-located with the 
UNICEF compound and a number of partner NGO office and housing units 
making contact with partner agencies highly secure.  The compound 
has a food service canteen integrated into it; is within five 
minutes' drive of the airfield and MINURCAT headquarters; and has 
DIS mounted units standing 24/7 static-post guard.  The compound had 
been approved for daytime use as a refugee interview site by DHS 
officers. [Ref B] 
 
¶11. (SBU) At this time, the primary threat to travelers in Abeche 
appears to be carjacking (see below), with the number of incidents 
continuing to be high.  The spate of residential compound break-ins 
of early 2009 subsided at mid-year, and the placement of DIS 
static-post guards at the major UN compounds appears to have been a 
factor.  Given that day-light vehicle movements appear more 
vulnerable than night-time lodgings, a reconsideration of the 
requirement that travelers under Chief of Mission authority be 
housed on the relatively distant MINURCAT base may be in order. 
 
---------------------- 
SECURITY IN ABECHE -- 
GROUND MOVEMENTS 
---------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Abeche and eastern Chad has been the location of numerous 
carjackings in recent months -- a total of 51 since January 2009. 
UN DSS MOSS appears to mitigate this problem by ensuring that all 
vehicles operating in Abeche are equipped with VHF and HF radios, 
and that all movements respect institutional curfews (there are no 
curfews in Chad enforced by the authorities).  These allow movement 
by single vehicle from 0500 hrs to 1800 hrs; all movements from 1800 
hrs to 2100 hrs are to be in two-vehicle convoys; all personnel and 
vehicles must be behind secured compound walls at 2100 hrs. 
Emergency movements after 2100 hrs must be in two-vehicle convoys, 
and accompanied by DIS escort. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Driving into the Abeche commercial center even during 
daylight hours is not recommended; circulation on foot in these 
areas is discouraged.  In practice, most carjackings have been 
documented to occur between 1700 and 1900 hrs; DIS escorts are 
difficult to obtain without significant advance notice, though in 
extremis DIS officers have been more responsive in recent months 
than in the early days of the force (see below). 
 
----------------------- 
SECURITY FORCES IN THE 
"HUMANITARIAN SPACE": 
MINURCAT 
----------------------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00000511  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Field operations centers serve as hubs to support project 
implementation in refugee and IDP population concentrations and 
camps.  MINURCAT forces, once fully deployed, are mandated to 
provide "area security" through high visibility presence throughout 
the "humanitarian space".  Battalion-strength (800-troops) MINURCAT 
military units are to be deployed to Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
installations at the field operations centers.  The mandated force 
strength is roughly 5,200 troops, of which 2500 are eventually to be 
operationally deployed to forward bases in Abeche, Iriba, Farchana 
and Goz Beida; the rest of the planned troop strength is in support 
functions.  Troop contributing countries include Albania, Austria, 
Croatia, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Serbia and Togo; Mongolian, Nepalese Ghurka, Pakistani and 
Senegalese troops are to replace rotating Austrian, French and 
Polish troops and equipment as the force pushes toward full 
strength. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Currently deployed MINURCAT force strength as of 
end-October is at some 51 percent of mandate, with only 998 troops 
operationally deployed to patrol the humanitarian space in the deep 
field, with another 1207 troops based in Abeche with some patrol 
duties.  The Polish and Croatian combined force in Sector-North 
(Iriba) are at quarter-strength (258 troops), with another 43 troops 
in Guereda 75 kms away; the Irish and Finnish units in Sector-South 
(Goz Beida) have exceeded half-strength (495 troops).  The Ghanaian 
"Battalion" deployed to the heavily criminalized area around 
Farchana is under quarter-strength at 202 troops (all figures as of 
01 NOV).  In all units, only a portion of the troops deployed -- 
generally around 50 percent, -- are operationally assigned to patrol 
and escort, with the rest devoted to headquarters and support 
duties.  Deployment schedules have rarely been respected.  European 
troops ending their deployment in October are rotating out taking 
with them all their vehicles.  Non-European troops routinely arrive 
late and without essential equipment, especially vehicles -- the 
recently deployed Nepalese Ghurka units arrived without ammunition. 
The MINURCAT RSO estimates that for the next several months 
MINURCAT's operationally effective force strength will be less than 
40 percent, even if there is a one-for-one replacement of troops, 
due to the reduction in mobility assets connected to the departure 
of Austrian, French, and Polish forces. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Helicopter support has consistently been less than 
mandated or recommended.  The humanitarian space to be patrolled and 
dominated to provide area security through presence on the ground is 
roughly the size of California.  At the currently deployed 
operational strength of 1,137 troops to patrol such a vast space, 
and even at full strength of the planned operational complement of 
2500 troops sometime in the undetermined future, without adequate 
vehicles to ensure ground mobility and under-served with air assets, 
it is difficult to imagine how this small force can ever succeed in 
fulfilling this mandate of the provision of area security, even if 
only along the most heavily used roadways -- the cumulative 
distances to secure are in the tens of thousands of kilometers. 
Effective use of the force has been made, however, in the provision 
of security for specific operations in carefully defined, limited 
areas, including the ongoing camp-by-camp population verification 
("braceleting") exercise that UNHCR is currently conducting. 
 
----------------------- 
SECURITY FORCES IN THE 
"HUMANITARIAN SPACE": 
THE "DIS" 
----------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Dtachement Integr de Scurit -- "DIS" is a 
specialized policing capacity created with international funding and 
UN POL training and mentoring to provide security specifically to 
vulnerable refugee and IDP populations, and to humanitarian workers. 
 Mixed Police/Gendarme units of the DIS are deployed in Abeche and 
to the field operations centers, with smaller units deployed in 
police stations at refugee camp locations.  Total DIS strength is 
roughly 800 officers, who have received one or two months training 
(depending on date of entry to service), and are generally 
considered to be better trained and equipped than conventional 
Chadian police and gendarme units.  These units also operate in the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000511  005 OF 007 
 
 
towns co-located with refugee and IDP populations. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The DIS may be at a turning point after some eight months 
in operation.  The first six months were characterized by acts of 
indiscipline including theft, abuse, and rape; poor driving and 
numerous crashed vehicles; confusion over chain of command; poor UN 
POL supervision by international police officers drawn from 
countries with sub-standard forces; and either unresponsiveness or 
inappropriate and sometimes extreme actions taken in response to 
requests for assistance.  Conflict has erupted among DIS and 
conventional police and gendarme units.  DIS units have been 
targeted for theft, and have at times been as vulnerable to attack 
as the populations they are to protect.  This has led some 
humanitarian workers, including some senior personnel in the UN 
Agencies, to characterize the DIS as "worse than nothing."  At the 
minimum, it could not be considered a functional police force under 
even the most charitable of definitions. 
 
¶19. (SBU) However, in the last two months, there are more reports of 
better responsiveness from DIS units.  Response times have improved 
in recent residential break-ins; actions have been effective to 
impede or interdict some crimes and to recover stolen property, 
especially in the case of recent attempts at carjacking and 
kidnapping; fewer accusations against DIS personnel of rape or abuse 
are being made.  A revised two-month training program is in place 
with 150 graduates expected end-October.  Current members are to 
begin refresher training once the new recruits enter on duty. 
Female DIS officers have received praise from humanitarian workers 
and vulnerable populations. 
 
------------------------- 
AIR TRAVEL AMONG CENTERS 
OF FIELD OPERATIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Mission's SOP is currently to travel the roughly 600 kms 
between N'Djamena and Abeche by air, using either the daily United 
Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flights operated by the 
logistics element of the WFP, or special flights organized by 
MINURCAT.  Airport security is determined by GoC regulation and 
practice. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Air travel via daily UNHAS flights is also required 
between Abeche and the deep field centers of Iriba (approx 210 
kmks), Farchana (approx 130 kms), and Goz Beida (approx 190 kms). 
Additional deep field locations of Bahai (approx 300 kms) and 
Guereda (150 kms) are also served with daily flights.  The NGO Air 
Serv International also operates regularly scheduled (though not 
always daily) flight routes to Guereda, Iriba, and Bahai in the 
north; to Goz Beida, Koukou (approx. 210 kms), and Dogdore (approx 
300 kms) in the south; and to Haraze in the southwest.  Air Serv 
will organize special flights on an urgent basis, flying when and 
where the need is most, including to areas un-served by UNHAS, with 
flexibility to provide medevac and conflict evacuation. 
 
-------------------------- 
GROUND TRAVEL AMONG FIELD 
OPERATIONS CENTERS AND 
PROJECT SITES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Mission policy has been to strongly discourage/prohibit 
ground transport for personnel under Chief of Mission authority 
between N'Djamena and Abeche, and from Abeche to all deep field 
destinations served by air, due to high levels of criminality along 
all roads to these locations.  Mission policy is that USG personnel 
operating in these areas between field centers and refugee or IDP 
population locations submit to the security procedures of the 
partner UN Agency, and conduct all ground movements in accordance 
with that agency's practices. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The UN Agencies require all ground movements outside urban 
areas of any duration (generally beyond 10 kms) to have armed escort 
from one of the available security forces in the area.  UN Agencies 
such as the WFP conduct long-distance transport of large cargoes 
(food and non-food assistance and heavy equipment) via road under 
 
NDJAMENA 00000511  006 OF 007 
 
 
armed MINURCAT and sometimes armed DIS escort (not all DIS units are 
armed).  For day-to-day operations between the field operations 
centers and the locations of refugee and IDP populations, UN 
Agencies assemble at the field center in daily DIS-escorted convoys 
for all humanitarian organizations wishing to avail themselves of 
the escort. 
 
¶24. (SBU) NGOs operating in collaboration with UN Agencies and/or 
under cooperative agreement with the USG are responsible for 
determining their security practices and procedures.  While many 
accept to work within UN Agency guidelines on ground movements, some 
subscribe to internationally recognized humanitarian principles that 
call for the demilitarization and neutrality of the provision of 
assistance.  (NOTE: The Departments of State and Defense, the US 
Institute for Peace, and the NGO umbrella group InterAction, 
published in 2008 guidelines for appropriate collaboration between 
military units and humanitarian NGOs in conflict areas, which 
recognized the principles of demilitarization and neutrality.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶25. (SBU) Faced with rising criminality along all roads essential to 
humanitarian operations and in the towns and camps where operations 
are undertaken and humanitarian workers reside, and under-manned to 
provide area security through presence on the ground, MINURCAT has 
tried to free some of the small forward deployed force to provide 
point-to-point escort for humanitarian workers and goods convoys. 
This has been somewhat effective for large convoys of goods, such as 
bulk food and non-food items deliveries.  This has been too 
cumbersome for small groups of humanitarian workers needing maximum 
flexibility of movement to be able to achieve the results 
established in their funding agreements with the UN Agencies, the 
USG, and other donors, given the requirements of a minimum 72- 
(preferably 96-) hour advance request period.  Humanitarian workers 
report that they are told MINURCAT escort must be the last resort 
for their operations, with their first recourse being the 
Dtachement Intgr de Scurit (DIS). (Note: The DIS' standard 
operating procedures are not to escort convoys farther than 10 km 
outside Abeche or away from their established base.  However, it is 
clear that UNHCR and other agencies organize DIS escorted convoys 
for significantly greater distances.  END NOTE.)  The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) has been facilitating refugee 
movements between the camps and the processing site in Abeche by 
road convoy.  During the pilot in February, some 11 were escorted by 
MINURCAT or DIS.  However, since September, there has been some 
difficulty securing escorts; 3 of 4 of IOM's requests were refused 
as they exceeded the 10 km limit for DIS and MINURCAT resources were 
not available. 
 
¶26. (SBU) A significant gap in DIS capabilities has been in the 
provision of point-to-point escort for humanitarian workers.  The 
DIS force was not conceived for this activity.  It was designed to 
provide policing to the areas in the immediate vicinity of 
vulnerable populations, including vehicle and foot patrols and 
response to incidents of crime.  Keeping a minimum required force in 
place for these activities leaves few officers for escort duty. 
Vehicles are in very short supply after numerous accidents, and the 
Nissan Patrol and Toyota Prado SUVs are inadequate to the 
environment, leaving a large percentage of the force's vehicles 
either totaled or down for repair. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Escort requests placed 72- to 96-hours in advance are 
routinely refused for lack of personnel and vehicles.  Despite some 
improvements in operational effectiveness, DIS units routinely do 
not arrive on time to conduct a ground movement escort, and are 
known to not show up at all.  Delayed convoys from operations 
centers to camps, which must travel in some areas up to 100 kms in 
each direction over poor roads at slow, convoy speeds have resulted 
in daily work hours in camps of only 3 to 4 hours per day -- 
insufficient to accomplish required tasks in safety.  DIS officer 
numbers, although set to increase somewhat, will not receive 
sufficient reinforcement to make a noticeable difference in these 
operational gaps. 
 
------------------------- 
EVACUATION PLANNING IN 
THE "HUMANITARIAN SPACE" 
 
NDJAMENA 00000511  007 OF 007 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) As noted above, widespread, entrenched, and politically 
connected criminality has become the primary security threat in 
Abeche and eastern Chad.  Evacuation planning, on the other hand, is 
currently integrated into the UN DSS Phase IV security rating, and a 
response to the threat of major incursion of an armed Chadian 
opposition group or groups.  Such groups have in the past entered 
Chad from several points along the Chad-Sudan border, and pushed 
westward toward N'Djamena.  The Chadian authorities have countered 
with a powerful build-up of armed forces along the border.  In 
recent incursions, armed opposition forces have either advanced or 
retreated through field operations locations as well as Abeche. 
Some force-on-force confrontations have occurred in these urban 
areas, posing a threat of cross- and indirect fire incidents to 
humanitarian workers.  More dangerous, however, has been the 
convulsions of lawlessness, looting, and violence that the 
populations of these urban areas have committed in immediate run-up 
and aftermath of these events. 
 
¶29. (SBU) UN DSS and MINURCAT security officers have stated that USG 
travelers under Chief of Mission authority, traveling in the region 
in partnership with a UN Agency or MINURCAT, are considered members 
of that Agency's population to be accorded security and evacuation 
should events require.  All field locations are organized under a UN 
Warden System, with volunteer wardens responsible for compiling and 
maintaining personnel lists for UN and NGO staff who would fall 
under evacuation assistance provisions.  Abeche and deep field 
locations have designated assembly points for all staff under UN DSS 
security provisions.  The UNHCR residential compound in deep field 
sites is the assembly point for most such locations.  Abeche is 
divided into 5 zones, each with one or several assembly points, 
depending on the number of personnel residing or working in each 
zone; the UNHCR compound is the assembly point for a large 
concentration of UN agencies and NGOs with offices and residences in 
the zone nearest the airport.  Assembly points are to be equipped 
with water and food supplies to cover a "bunkering" period; it is 
not clear that all assembly points have safe-haven facilities. 
 
¶30. (SBU) MINURCAT forward deployed elements have assigned duties 
for the securing of all designated assembly points.  The MINURCAT 
bases and headquarters compounds in Abeche, Iriba, Farchana, and Goz 
Beida -- all co-located with the airfields in these sites -- also 
serve as assembly points.  As soon as practicable in a given crisis, 
MINURCAT units are to provide escort for all eligible personnel from 
assembly points to the appropriate airfield.  This may involve 
helicopter evacuation of deep field personnel to the nearest field 
operations center.  From that location, fixed-wing air assets from 
MINURCAT, UNHAS, and Air Serve are to airlift all eligible personnel 
to safety in either Abeche or N'Djamena, depending upon the nature 
of the crisis. 
 
¶31. (SBU) These plans have been executed in the recent past, with a 
more or less good success.  Although some staff isolated in 
compounds or deep field locations were missed in first round 
personnel movements, in all cases second sorties were successfully 
executed.   While UN officials provide assurances that all 
international humanitarians will be evacuated, the necessary 
bureaucratic procedures to operationalize this are not fully in 
place.  NGOs -- in particular a large staff from a US-based NGO not 
under Chief of Mission authority, working in a PRM -funded operation 
-- have found it difficult to get staff added to the appropriate 
warden list; to receive security briefings on arrival; and to have 
access badges and properly programmed VHF radios issued.  Important 
questions remain, however, as to who exactly qualifies as eligible 
staff for evacuation assistance  particularly host national staffs 
of both NGOs and IOs, especially though not uniquely those whose 
home regions in Chad are far from the eastern area.  The USG has no 
established cooperative agreement with UN DSS or MINURCAT to ensure 
that US Embassy personnel, whether US citizen or Locally Engaged 
Staff members, traveling on official business under Chief of Mission 
authority would be availed assistance. 
 
NIGRO