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Viewing cable 09NDJAMENA510, CHAD HUMANITARIAN UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NDJAMENA510 2009-11-03 12:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO7204
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0510/01 3071236
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031236Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7398
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000510 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES 
STATE ALSO FOR PRM/AFR 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF ASEC PREL PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD HUMANITARIAN UPDATE 
 
1. (U) The following is an update of N'Djamena and Accra RefCoords' 
activities for the period of 26 - 30 OCT, 2009. 
 
------------------------------- 
REFCOORD AND RSO EASTERN CHAD 
SECURITY FAMILIARIZATION VISIT 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  N'Djamena and Accra RefCoords and N'djamena RSO visited 
Abeche, eastern Chad, from 27 to 29 OCT.  The goal of this visit was 
to review UN DSS and MINURCAT standard operating procedures for 
movement and residential security, and current best practices for 
travel to the humanitarian assistance areas of operation in eastern 
Chad.  Additional attention was given to IOM operations in 
preparation for broad collaboration among the State and Homeland 
Security Departments and IOM for the resettlement of refugees from 
eastern Chad to the U.S. (see items 2 and below) 
 
3.  (SBU)  Official USG travelers under Chief of Mission authority 
have to date utilized the support and abided by the security 
practices and requirements of partner UN agencies when traveling in 
eastern Chad.  RSO has assessed Post's current security rules for 
travelers to Abeche and eastern Chad to be largely adequate, with 
the best practice being for travelers to abide by the procedures of 
MINURCAT or the traveler's partner UN Agency.  Air travel continues 
to be reliable and safe, and serves all significant field operations 
centers.  Ground travel is increasingly dangerous due to entrenched, 
violent, politically protected criminality that targets the 
international community in general and humanitarian workers in the 
field in particular with near-total impunity.  The relative threats 
in Abeche of residential break-in (low) vs. that of carjacking 
(high) may indicate a need to adjust lodging requirements. 
 
4.  (SBU)  It appears that the trustworthy security forces in the 
area, whether MINURCAT troops or the DIS, are deployed in 
insufficient numbers, and are unsuited by mandate and design to the 
task of providing either area security through presence, or 
point-to-point escort of the hundreds of humanitarian workers and 
supply convoys operating in a vast territory of great distances and 
difficult terrain.  While there remains hope that MINURCAT will 
eventually achieve its full deployment force, and that the DIS will 
eventually evolve into a functioning policing capability, neither of 
these two events are likely to happen during dangerous dry season 
that has just begun, and will last into June of 2010.  RefCoord will 
ensure that our vulnerable partners in the field are fully apprised 
of this probability, and given every opportunity to take such 
actions as they believe appropriate to ensure their safety, within 
the internationally accepted principles guiding humanitarian and 
military operations in a conflict zone. 
 
------------------------------- 
ASSESSMENT OF MINURCAT HOUSING 
FOR DHS CIRCUIT RIDES AND 
OTHER USG VISITORS 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  Refcoords and RSO stayed at the MINURCAT compound during the 
three-day, two-night mission to Abeche.  Since the establishment of 
an agreement between PRM and the DPKO and then between the 
Ambassador and SRSG Victor Angelo, some 15 USG officials under Chief 
of Mission authority have stayed at the MINURCAT compound for a 
total of 42 visitor-nights since May 2009, with N'Djamena Refcoords 
past and present staying 15 nights between them.  None have raised 
the concerns voiced by one of the two DHS officers who were the 
first USG officials to stay on the base.  All USG visitors since May 
have been assigned to VIP trailers (four of only six containers 
which already have plumbing installed); found the electricity, water 
and air conditioning to be working; and found suitable food at the 
canteen.  RSO assesses the MINURCAT housing as the "gold standard" 
for residential security; however, questions of overall security are 
raised by the requirement for vehicle transit in Abeche, because of 
the high risk of carjacking.  RefCoords anticipate that, once 
reviewed and updated, Post's travel security policy will have 
greater nuance and flexibility regarding housing.  We will continue 
negotiations on all tracks to ensure that MINURCAT base housing 
continues to be an option, likely on a fee-for-use basis, as well as 
to pursue renewal of our former housing relationships with UNHCR, 
and to develop a strategy for a future IOM compound that may/may 
allow for housing of DHS circuit riders (see item 3). 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000510  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------------- 
ASSESSMENT OF IOM TRANSIT 
CENTER COMPOUND PLANS 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  Refcoords and RSO visited the IOM compound in Abeche to evaluate 
future possibilities for a large transit center for the coming 
increase in refugee populations requiring interviews and screening 
for resettlement in the U.S.  The existing transit center is 
favorably located near airfield and the well-secured UNHCR compound 
on a very large (by urban standards) tract of land.  Although it is 
too small to house the expected refugee populations to come, it is 
easily large enough for construction of IOM offices, interview 
rooms, and, if adequately designed, housing for both the OPE and DHS 
circuit riders.   IOM's Security Officer and the RSO noted key 
security difficulties to be overcome to make the site suitable for 
both daytime use and nighttime residence including:  Inadequate 
perimeter walls, gates and intruder deterrence; a single egress from 
the compound onto a badly eroded road; and construction in 
neighboring compounds too close to the perimeter walls.  IOM 
Security Officer believes that the single egress and neighboring 
construction may be mitigated by renting one compound next door to 
the current lot, and building new office and housing construction 
close to perimeter walls to block access.  Otherwise, all problems 
with the site may be addressed through smart construction design and 
sufficient funding.  IOM staff have so far been unable to find an 
alternative site in the Abeche urban area that would benefit from 
being closely located to the airfield and UNHCR compound.  Potential 
new sites for a large transit center to house the refugee 
populations have been identified on the outskirts of the city; IOM 
will engage the local and national governments on access to these 
sites in the coming week, during the visit of IOM Director for 
International Operations  Michel Tonneau, during which IOM's 
diplomatic status will be confirmed in an MOU with the GoC. 
 
--------- 
CALENDAR 
--------- 
 
02 -- 06 NOV: Accra RefCoord engagement with IOM Director Michel 
Tonneau 
 
04 NOV: IASC N'Djamena meeting on security situation in eastern 
Chad 
 
NIGRO