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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
DECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM PREF PINR SU LY FR CD
SUBJECT: THE CHADIAN GO-BETWEEN?  EX-REBEL SOUBIANE "TELLS 
ALL" AND MAKES A LOT OF SENSE 
 
REF: A. N'DJAMENA 499 
     ¶B. N'DJAMENA 457 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Ambassador and DCM met November 2 with Ahmat 
Soubiane, who described his reasons for going into rebellion, 
his reasons for returning to Chad, his intention to continue 
to work to reconcile his former rebel comrades with the GOC, 
his intention to devote himself initially to socio-economic 
projects designed to attract Chadian emigres back to Chad 
from other countries in the region rather than to engage 
politically in a big way, and his views on how to end the 
Chad-Sudan proxy war.  He gave us a copy of the agreement 
that governed his group's return (scanned copy sent to AF/C). 
  Soubiane's key points were: 
 
-- He broke with the GOC in 2003 over President Deby's 
successful amendment of the constitution to permit unlimited 
presidential terms; 
 
-- He decided to return to Chad because he soon became 
convinced that a violent overthrow of the Deby Government by 
the politically insincere or politically illiterate Chad 
rebel chiefs would be worse than working from within Chad to 
facilitate reform; 
 
-- He appreciated his conversations with DAS Wycoff over the 
past 20 months, which helped him arrive at his decision to 
return; 
 
-- He praised President Deby, FORMIN Faki and National 
Mediator Abderamane Moussa for the honesty and transparency 
of their dealing with him and his men; 
 
-- The Libyans had played a key facilitating role in his 
return to Chad, along with some 1700 ex-rebels, mostly his 
own fighters but also defectors from other rebel formations; 
 
-- The French had also been useful in facilitating his 
group's return; 
 
-- Some but not all of his fighters might enter the Chad 
military, and his senior counselors would be offered civil 
service positions if they were qualified; 
 
-- Remaining Chad rebels were still well armed and well 
equipped (some 450 armed vehicles) but were suffering from 
very low morale -- individual rebel fighters from all groups 
continued to present themselves at the border to re-enter 
Chad, and rebel chiefs in Sudan had difficulty keeping their 
fighters loyal; 
 
-- The Sudanese had the means -- money, intelligence, 
planning -- to "re-animate" the rebels, if they chose to 
increase their investment in the rebellion; 
 
-- The current bilateral Chad-Sudan effort aimed at detente 
had a good chance of success, because such detente was in 
Chad's interest and because Ghazi's involvement on the 
Sudanese side guaranteed a degree of seriousness and honesty 
in diplomatic approaches to Chad -- which was not the case 
with the previous chief Sudanese interlocutors with Chad; 
 
-- Soubiane had supported and tried to advance the current 
bilateral negotiating track and would continue to do so; his 
contacts within rebel groups and experience with the Sudanese 
gave him the ability to play a useful role if the Deby 
government chose to deploy him; 
 
-- He had told the Sudanese that their support of Chad rebels 
was a "diminishing resource" and that they should play the 
rebel card by ending support for them sooner, rather than 
later, because their hand was losing its value as rebels 
defected; 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000503  002 OF 004 
 
 
-- The next bilateral move was up to Sudan:  Claiming that 
the rebels had been "cantoned" at Ain Sirro and the rebel 
chiefs called to Khartoum was not good enough:  the rebel 
chiefs themselves had moved their fighters to Ain Sirro 
before Ghazi's visit to keep them from joining Soubiane's 
defecting group; 
 
-- Ending any "proxy war" would be tricky:  neither side 
wanted to be the first to lay down its "weapons"; 
 
-- President Deby's decision to move Oure Cassoni camp deeper 
into Chad and away from the border was a clear signal to 
Khartoum and to the JEM that Deby considered the JEM 
"expendable," if his conditions were met; 
 
-- Chad rebels had no/no international legitimacy, while JEM 
was the object of negotiations by the international 
community, invited to Doha, etc. --  so JEM had peaceful and 
negotiated courses of action open to it that the Chad rebels 
did not have; 
 
-- This could give Deby "cover" for an eventual ending of 
support for JEM in Chad as the JEM turned itself into more of 
a political movement than armed group in contact and 
negotiations with the international community; 
 
-- Soubiane himself intended to devote himself initially to 
socio-economic projects designed to attract Chadian emigres 
back to Chad from other neighboring countries rather than to 
engage in Chadian politics in a big way, at least at first. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Soubiane was relaxed, poised and quite willing to 
explore his political past and future as well as his 
perspective on the Chad-Sudan "proxy war" and the 
possibilities of Chad-Sudan detente.  He is obviously 
well-informed and capable of nuanced analysis of his 
political friends and enemies. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) If we had to bet, we would wager that his defection 
from the Chadian rebellion was based strictly on a 
cost-benefit analysis:  that is, on his judgment that the 
Chad rebellion is in decline and going to lose eventually, 
and that he should throw in his hand with the eventual 
winning side before it is too late, as DAS Wycoff had been 
telling him for some time.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------- 
U.S. INSPIRES 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Soubiane described his democratic ambitions for 
Chad as having been formed to a certain extent during his 
tenure as Ambassador to the U.S.  He stressed that his 
seven-year "quest" as a rebel leader and his ultimate 
decision to return home this summer were inspired by hopes 
for African democratization and improvements in rule of law 
and human rights.  He said that he had been motivated by the 
Chadian constitution, which had been abrogated by President 
Deby, but which he hoped to be able to teach "Chadian people 
at all levels" to respect and understand.  He said that he 
had never been a proponent of armed conflict, pointing out 
that units loyal to him had not taken part in fighting in 
N'Djamena in 2008 or in Am Dam in 2009.  He offered that 
leaving Chad had been relatively easy, but that coming back 
had required time and reflection -- "and if there had been 
more receptivity from my old friends here, I would have come 
back sooner."  Soubiane pointed out that his daughters, who 
remained in school outside Washington DC, were anxious about 
his welfare and safety, which he was now trusting to the GoC. 
 He said that the daughters were not shy about insisting that 
he adhere to their American-born ideals as he pursued 
reconciliation with the GoC.  He added that his conversations 
over the past seveal months with AF DAS Karl Wycoff had been 
very valuable in shaping his thinking, and that the French 
and Libyans had also been helpful in facilitating his return. 
 
------------------ 
HOME IS THE SAILOR 
 
NDJAMENA 00000503  003 OF 004 
 
 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Soubiane described his initial contacts upon 
return with President Deby, "a schoolmate from childhood," as 
cordial.  The two had spoken of Soubiane's desire to help 
with restabilization of Chad, including reintegration of 
military units formerly loyal to Soubiane into the Chadian 
National Army (ANT).  Soubiane said that he and President 
Deby had also discussed jobs for his supporters in the 
Chadian bureaucracy and assistance packages for Chadian 
refugees who had fled to Sudan, CAR and Libya when he had 
broken with the Deby regime.  "Some of my vision for Chad is 
economic," said Soubiane; "I want to create projects that 
will help Chadians who supported me."  This might not happen 
for a year or so, Soubiane conceded, but "I'll see what I can 
accomplish little by little to rebuild confidence over time." 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Ambassador made clear that the U.S. was pleased at 
Soubiane's decision to return to Chad, and supportive of the 
intra-Chadian reconciliation process that had been going on 
for some time (Refs A-B).  In 2008, at the time of rebel 
attacks on the capital, we had recommended GoC outreach to 
figures such as Soubiane.  Former CEMGA al-Jineidi had 
returned, and now political dissidents including Nahor 
Ngawara Mahamout were coming back from exile as well. 
 
-------------------------- 
ROLE IN ELECTORAL PROCESS? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Ambassador advised Soubiane that the U.S. hoped he 
would play a positive role in Chad's upcoming electoral 
process.  Soubiane said that he intended to do so, adding 
that he had always been a strong proponent of peaceful 
transfer of power.  One of the factors that had complicated 
his return, he continued, was the fragmented nature of the 
Chadian opposition.  "I don't agree with the government here 
or the government in Khartoum," said Soubiane.  "Here a state 
exists and there are systems and institutions and secure 
borders, but there is also injustice and no social planning." 
 Soubiane cautioned that political change in Chad would not 
necessarily be change for the better -- "we could easily go 
the way of Somalia, and I am saying this to both the 
government and opposition." 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  "I want to be discreet in my role here," continued 
Soubiane.  "I want to rebuild relations with the government 
first,  I have not yet said this to President Deby, but I 
don't have political ambitions for the moment.  I won't have 
time to mount an electoral campaign." 
 
-------------- 
CHADIAN REBELS 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Soubiane indicated that so long as the Deby regime 
continued to send the signal that former opponents were 
welcome to return voluntarily, "others will come back."  "But 
even dictators can say they are in favor of transparency," he 
observed.  Rebel leader Timan Erdimi, for his part, was 
poorly placed to take part in any sort of democratization or 
reconciliation processes in Chad because he had no political 
credibility.  The Chadian rebellion was definitely losing its 
steam.  Little by little, Chadian rebels were discovering 
that the rebellion lacked ideals.  As they came to see that 
the rebellion had no positive goals, they concluded that 
there was little point in continuing the fight.  Chadian 
rebels still in Sudan "don't like Deby, but beyond that they 
don't know what they want:  they don't know what a state is 
or what a democratic process is." 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Still, the Chadian rebels had a certain degree of 
military strength, as well as equipment furnished by Sudan, 
Soubiane cautioned.  Their vehicle strength was around 450 
SUVs.  They also had the support of Sudan's "powerful, 
wealthy intelligence assets," who could raise or lower 
Chadian rebel morale at will.  Khartoum itself "didn't really 
care about Chad," said Soubiane.  President Bashir was 
 
NDJAMENA 00000503  004 OF 004 
 
 
worried about his own political opponents. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Asked about the "congress of rebels" in Sudan 
that National Mediator Abderahmane had indicated the GoS 
might be organizing, Soubiane advised that the GoS was trying 
to "keep the Chadian rebels busy" in innocuous ways while 
waiting to see what the GoC would do with the JEM.  "I think 
that President Bashir wants to give up on them, but he has no 
confidence in the Chadian government."  Asked whether 
Sudanese claims that the Chadian rebels were now cantoned at 
Ain Sirro should count for the GoC as fulfillment of Sudan's 
initial confidence-building measure, Soubiane pointed out 
that the Chadian rebels had been at Ain Sirro all summer 
long, "on the far side of a ouaddi that will soon dry up, 
allowing them to go wherever they want."  What was more, "I 
told them to go there," asserted Soubiane.  The Chadian 
rebels were in Ain Sirro voluntarily, awaiting the end of the 
rainy season.  The Chadians were sure to see a Sudanese 
attempt to declare the status quo as fulfillment of a pledge 
to be disingenuous and unacceptable. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  When the two sides had actually taken steps to 
reassure each other, "we will help both sides with 
verification," said Soubiane.  Asked what the GoC could do to 
divest itself of the JEM, Soubiane said that this was a 
question he had posed of President Deby, and also of the 
Libyans.  When speaking with the JEM directly, Soubiane noted 
that he advised "finding political solutions," including 
through negotiation at Doha and efforts to transform the JEM 
into a political force.  Soubiane offered that the 
international community would have to help the JEM find a 
suitable role, on grounds that the IC had negotiated with 
Khalil Ibrahim and in doing so helped to "internationalize" 
him.  Soubiane described meetings he had recently had in 
Libya with Djibril Ibrahim, whom he had told to travel to 
Doha for negotiations.  "The JEM's political capital is like 
a debit card running down," said Soubiane.  Opportunities 
were disappearing, so the JEM should use what remained of the 
international community's tolerance for it to good purpose. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Soubiane told us that he had offered advice to 
both the GoC and GoS at the time of the visit of Presidential 
Envoy Ghazi to Chad in mid-October, to the effect that both 
sides should find peaceful means to resolve their 
differences.  Ghazi was "more or less interested in 
reconciliation," said Soubiane, but the Sudanese side 
remained suspicious of Chadian motives.  Sudan appreciated 
S/E Gration, whom they felt understood their point of view. 
The Chadian offer to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away 
from the border, and away for easy access by the JEM, would 
surely be seen as a confidence-building measure by Khartoum. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Soubiane was relaxed, poised and quite willing to 
explore his political past and future as well as his 
perspective on the Chad-Sudan "proxy war" and the 
possibilities of Chad-Sudan detente.  He is obviously 
well-informed and capable of nuanced analysis of his 
political friends and enemies.  If we had to bet, we would 
wager that his defection from the Chadian rebellion was based 
strictly on a cost-benefit analysis:  that is, on his 
judgment that the Chad rebellion is in decline and going to 
lose eventually, and that he should throw in his hand with 
the eventual winning side before it is too late, as DAS 
Wycoff had been telling him for some time. 
NIGRO