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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #2369/01 3221142
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181142Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1568
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6687
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3345
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3180
RUEAWJA/DOJ WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002369 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N /A 
TAGS: ASEC KJUS PGOV PHUM KE
 
SUBJECT: POLICE REFORM TASK FORCE PREVIEWS ITS 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
REF: NAIROBI 2252, NAIROBI 1886, NAIROBI 1567, NAIROBI 
1183, NAIROBI 1172, NAIROBI 1167 
 
------- 
Summary 
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¶1. On November 11, three members of the Police Reform 
Task Force (PRTF) briefed members of the diplomatic corps 
on the Task Force's unanimous recommendations to the 
Government of Kenya.  Carrying an estimated price tag of 
81.4 billion Kenyan shillings (approximately $1.1 
billion) over the next three years, the recommended 
reforms would create effective police oversight; improve 
performance, community relations, and conditions of 
service; reduce corruption; and clarify roles and 
responsibilities among different police organizations. 
The 300-page report is scheduled for a Cabinet review on 
November 19, after which the report should be made 
public.   According to the Task Force's Vice Chair, the 
first real test of the Government's commitment to the 
police reform process will be whether President Kibaki 
uses his executive power to immediately establish Police 
Reform Implementation Commission (PRIC), which would be 
responsible for monitoring implementation of the 
recommended reforms.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. On November 11, the British High Commission invited 
like-minded diplomatic missions to a briefing by three 
members of the PRTF on the group's recommendations to the 
Government of Kenya.  PRTF's South African Vice Chair, 
Peter Gastrow, led the briefing. (Note: The British 
Government provided significant funding for this effort. 
End note.) 
 
¶3. Gastrow began the brief by noting that the report, 
which is approximately 300 pages long and contains over 
200 recommendations, was agreed to by all 18 members of 
the Task Force, and that this level of consensus was by 
no means a given. 
 
--------------------- 
Major Recommendations 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. Perhaps the most controversial issue on the police 
reform agenda has been the recommendation (originating 
from the Waki Commission) that the Kenya Police Force and 
the Administration Police be combined.  The PRTF agreed 
that something needed to be done to mitigate the 
unhealthy, destabilizing competition and functional 
overlap that has arisen between the two organizations but 
concluded that merging the two bodies ahead of the 2012 
elections would be too destabilizing. (See, for example, 
ref C.) They recommended instead the creation of a 
National Policing Council (NPC) that would be composed of 
the Kenya Police Force, Administration Police, Criminal 
Investigation Division, General Services Unit, and 
Provincial Commissioners to coordinate police activities 
and set policy.  The NPC would also set common standards, 
oversee common budget and procurement processes, and 
ensure training facilities are shared. 
 
¶5. Similar to ideas surrounding constitutional reform, 
the PRTF recommended devolution of power to the 
provincial level.  The status quo, in which all decisions 
regarding police policy, operations, and budgeting are 
made in Nairobi, discourages local responsibility and 
creates an environment in which illegal orders are 
followed without question, the PRTF concluded. 
 
¶6. The PRTF also recommended establishing two feedback 
mechanisms for the public, both to air grievances and set 
local priorities for police actions (e.g., combating 
drugs in Coast Province, dealing effectively with the 
Mungiki criminal gang in Central Province, responding to 
livestock rustling in pastoral areas, etc.).  One of 
these bodies would be the Provincial Police Authority, 
which would be composed of nine civilians and would 
oversee the provincially-managed police budget and help 
set police priorities for their province.  The other body 
would be the Independent Police Oversight Authority, 
which would also be composed of civilians and have the 
power to subpoena and investigate allegations of police 
misconduct. 
 
¶7. To control the rampant corruption in the police force, 
 
NAIROBI 00002369  002 OF 003 
 
 
the PRTF recommended the creation of a code of conduct 
that would include eliminating police conflicts of 
interest (e.g., officers who have financial links to the 
transport industry).  They also recommended that the 
police recruitment process be made more transparent and 
competitive to eliminate the current patronage/bribery 
network that police recruit hopefuls must navigate to 
secure jobs.  (Note: Gastrow noted that Minister of 
Internal Security George Saitoti had already agreed to 
freeze recruitments for the rest of the year so that the 
mechanisms can be put in place to make the process more 
transparent. End note.) 
 
¶8. Poor conditions of service (for example, poor living 
conditions and medical treatment, low salaries and non- 
payment of allowances) must be fixed to improve police 
morale, which is abysmally low, the PRTF said.  (Note: 
Gastrow noted that Saitoti intends to commit the 500 
million Kenyan shillings (approximately $7 million) saved 
by the recruitment freeze to pay arrears in allowances 
owed to police officers. End note.) 
 
¶9. Police leadership and specialized units, such as the 
Criminal Investigations Division, need to have the 
necessary skills and commitment to perform their jobs. 
To this end, the PRTF recommended that all senior police 
leaders be subjected to a suitability review. 
Unqualified officers would be transferred or let go (with 
a severance package) while those remaining would have 
opportunities to participate in foreign exchange 
programs. 
 
-------------- 
Implementation 
-------------- 
 
¶10. Cabinet is scheduled to review the PRTF's report at 
its weekly meeting on November 19.  Gastrow said that the 
next step will be for the Government to make the report 
public and decide how much of the report they will 
accept.  After that it is up to parliament to implement 
the necessary legislation, a process that will take 
approximately four months, he said. 
 
¶11. Implementation of recommended reforms has always been 
a challenge in Kenya, Gastrow admitted, and police reform 
would be no different.  To guarantee follow-through, the 
PRTF is recommending the immediate formation of a Police 
Reform Implementation Commission (PRIC).  The PRIC would 
include international and domestic police reform experts, 
Permanent Secretaries from relevant Government 
ministries, and civil society actors such as the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission and the Law Reform Commission. 
The PRIC would have a two-year mandate to monitor the 
implementation of the report's recommendations.  Gastrow 
said that in his discussions with Francis Kimemia, the 
Permanent Secretary of Internal Security, Kimemia assured 
him that the PRIC could be established within one week of 
the November 19 Cabinet meeting. PRTF member Mohamud 
Saleh said that President Kibaki can establish the PRIC 
immediately by using the authority of Section 23 of 
Kenya's constitution. (Note: This section gives the 
President ''executive authority.''  End note.) 
 
¶12. Other recommended reforms, such as the creation of 
the Independent Police Oversight Authority, are better 
left to the constitutional reform and legislative process 
and not executive orders.  This will necessarily take 
longer, Gastrow said. 
 
¶13. The PRTF is estimating that the reform package will 
cost approximately 81.4 billion Kenyan Shillings 
(approximately $1.1 billion) between 2010 and 2013.  Of 
that, Saitoti estimated that the Government would be able 
to fund half of that amount.  The PRTF representatives 
made a clear pitch to the assembled diplomats that donor 
assistance would be required to make up the difference. 
 
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Comment 
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¶14. Police reform is a critical component of Kenya's 
reform agenda and could become one of the determining 
factors for the country's continued stability. The first 
indicators of the Government?s good faith intentions will 
be how the cabinet handles its review, whether the PRTF's 
 
NAIROBI 00002369  003 OF 003 
 
 
full report is released to the public, and if the 
Government does move forward within the next few weeks to 
establish an oversight mechanism for reform 
implementation. 
 
¶15. While we understand the PRTF's position on the need 
for both internal and external oversight mechanisms to be 
established via constitutional reform, we are concerned 
that, without these mechanisms, other efforts to combat 
corruption and human rights abuses by the security forces 
will not be fruitful. We also note that the external 
civilian oversight mechanism as described by the PRTF 
will apparently rely on the Attorney General's office to 
initiate prosecutions against police officers who commit 
criminal acts, which raises concerns that, as with the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, such cases will not be 
acted on. This could lead to continued impunity and 
increasing public cynicism. 
 
¶16. On October 22, the Ambassador met with Minister for 
Internal Security Saitoti and his senior security team 
(see ref A) to urge them to move forward on police 
reform, including especially establishing independent and 
credible police oversight mechanisms. We will continue to 
engage with our Kenyan and diplomatic counterparts on the 
contents of the KPRC report and provide recommendations 
septel on the possible way forward and requests for 
specific support for police reform. 
 
RANNEBERGER