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Viewing cable 09MEXICO3205, CONGRESS APPROVES MOST 2010 REVENUE LEGISLATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MEXICO3205 2009-11-10 23:25 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO5093
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3205/01 3142325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 102325Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8981
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003205 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR WHA/MEX, WHA/EPSC, EEB 
NSC FOR RESTREPO, FROMAN 
USDOC FOR 4320/ITA/MAC/WH/ONAFTA/GWORD 
TREASURY FOR NANCY LEE, IA 
ENERGY FOR WARD, LOCKWOOD AND DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD ENRG ELTN EAIR PGOV SENV MX
 
SUBJECT:  CONGRESS APPROVES MOST 2010 REVENUE LEGISLATION 
 
REF: MEXICO 3110 
 
1. Summary.  Legislators watered down the original GOM revenue and 
tax proposals (see reftel), eliminating some key elements of the 
original package, but maintaining an increase in value added taxes 
(IVA) and income tax rates.  Finance Secretary Carstens said the 
package will help revive the economy.  While President Calderon 
welcomed approval of the legislation, he emphasized that that 
declining oil production left the country with no fiscal leeway, and 
called for all political actors to work together to boost growth and 
employment. It is unclear whether this bill will help the GOM avoid 
a significant increase in the medium-term fiscal deficit, or a 
public debt downgrade from the main ratings agencies.  With the 
economy expected to contract by about 7% during 2009 (its worst 
performance since the early 1930s), momentum for a downgrade may be 
unstoppable End Summary. 
2. While President Calderon, publicly welcomed the November 2 
approval of most 2010 revenue legislation, he emphasized that 
plunging oil production left the country with no fiscal leeway, and 
made a vague call for all political actors to reach an accord on an 
economic strategy to boost growth and employment.  In a separate 
speech, Secretary Carstens said tax increases approved this week by 
lawmakers will generate public revenue of more than 1% of GDP and 
help revive the economy.  The tax legislation passed November 1 as 
part of the 2010 budget package will provide MX$136 billion (US$10.2 
billion) in extra revenue.   He added that the extra money will be 
used for public works projects, social programs and the fight 
against organized crime. 
 
3.  The most significant defeat for the GOM was its proposal for an 
additional 2% value-added tax (IVA) - called a "sales tax" in the 
legislation -- that would cover all goods and services with no 
exceptions.  Goods and services assessed at the current 15% rate 
would have paid 17%.  Foodstuffs, health and education services, 
which currently have a 0% VAT, would also been taxed at the new 2% 
rate, which the GOM pledged to use to expand anti-poverty programs. 
However, the attempt to expand this 2% generalized IVA was soundly 
defeated, as was the case in the 2002 and 2004 budgets. Contacts in 
the GOM said the idea behind the 2% no-exception tax was to 
gradually replace the IVA, which has many exceptions, thereby 
creating a broader tax base. 
 
Electoral Fear 
-------------- 
 
4.  While the PRI formed an alliance with Calderon's Administration 
to approve revenue legislation, the IVA defeat clearly showed that 
the PRI remains unwilling to risk bold taxation action, fearful that 
its chances of regaining the presidency in 2012 would be 
jeopardized. (Comment: The PRI still blames the increase in the VAT 
rate in 1995, from 10% to 15%, as a crucial factor in its defeat in 
both the 2000 election (after holding power uninterruptedly since 
1929) and their 1997 (first-time) loss of majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Therefore, the possibility of radical fiscal reform before 
2013 is extremely low.  End Comment.) 
 
5.  The legislative approval process was also extremely contentious 
and heavily politicized.  President Calderon's hand-picked PAN party 
president and former private secretary, Cesar Nava, hamfistedly 
blamed the PRI for the tax increases in Chamber of Deputies revenue 
proposals and for being responsible for a budget that is 
"insufficient" in addressing Mexico's economic woes. His statements 
came after it was widely known that a deal had been worked between 
the GOM's budget team and key opposition deputies.  The PRI in the 
Senate took revenge, modifying several taxes -- notably cancelling a 
3% duty on internet use. It also forced Secretary Carstens to accept 
before the Senate that the GOM took full responsibility for tax 
increases. 
 
 
Tax Increases 
------------- 
 
6.  Other than the IVA proposal, Congress approved the main tax 
increases that the GOM had sought: 
 
-- The top rate of income tax was increased from 28% to 30%.  The 
hike exempts those who earn 10,300 pesos ($780) per month or less, 
who account for more than two-thirds of taxpayers. 
 
 
MEXICO 00003205  002 OF 003 
 
 
-- The general VAT rate was increased from 15% to 16% (and 10 to 11% 
at the border), the first rise since the 1995 crisis. 
 
-- The tax on bank cash deposits of 15,000 pesos and above was 
increased from 2% to 3%. The bank-deposit tax is aimed at the large 
informal economy in Mexico, where transactions are largely carried 
out in cash. It applies to cash deposits of 15,000 pesos or more per 
month. 
 
-- There will be a 3% tax on telecommunication services except 
internet (instead of the 4% the GOM sought). 
 
-- Taxes also were increased for beer, alcohol and tobacco 
products. 
 
-- Businesses will be required to pay deferred taxes within five 
years.  Mexico's leading business consortium, the Consejo 
Coordinador Empresarial (CCE) said they will file injunctions 
against this measure and appeal to the Supreme Court.  (See Reftel) 
 
Fiscal Meddling 
--------------- 
 
7.  Congress also amended key macroeconomic assumptions, increasing 
elbowroom to boost fiscal revenues, at least on paper: 
 
-- It increased the fiscal deficit target from 0.5% to 0.75% of GDP. 
 
 
-- It raised substantially the expected average price for the 
Mexican barrel of oil, from US$53.9 to US$59.0. 
 
7.  The oil price boost may well be realistic, as Mexican crude on 
November 3 stood at US$73.16 per barrel. If the price stays at 
similar levels throughout 2010, pressure on public finances would 
diminish significantly (during January-September, the Mexican oil 
price averaged US$52.9 per barrel). However, even if international 
demand for oil increases in 2010, increased worldwide supply would 
be expected to meet it. Therefore, it may be irresponsible for the 
GOM to expect prices to maintain the trend observed in recent weeks. 
 Moreover, even if oil prices remain relatively high and stable, 
production continues to decline. During January-September, crude 
production averaged 2.6 billion barrels per day, a 6.6% fall from 
levels recorded during the whole of 2008, and 22.9% plunge from the 
production peak recorded in 2004. 
 
8.  There are no indications that the GOM would save any unexpected 
oil windfall (if it materializes) to build a fiscal cushion. On the 
contrary, there is strong pressure from state and municipal 
governments to share any extra revenues (as in recent years). 
Therefore, there is no sign of serious medium-term fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
Downgrade Momentum? 
------------------ 
 
9.  It is unclear whether this budget will satisfy rating agencies, 
as revenue changes probably will not. Both Standard & Poor's and 
Fitch assign Mexico's external debt BBB+, the third-lowest 
investment grade rating, with a negative outlook. What Congress 
approved appears to signal GOM inability to adapt to a situation 
where oil production is falling rapidly, and the economy remains 
extremely reliant on a volatile oil price. The most recent GOM 
figures indicate that from January-September, income from oil 
represented approximately 30% of all GOM revenues. 
 
10.  With the economy expected to contract by about 7% during 2009 
(its worst performance since the early 1930s), momentum for a 
downgrade may be unstoppable. Mexico's total public debt, according 
to its broadest definition, is equivalent to 38% of GDP, well below 
that of many developed countries recording significant fiscal 
deficits. (Note: By comparison the U.S. runs a gross debt ratio 
close to 100% and Japan almost double that, according to the OECD. 
End Note.)   However, it is open to question whether Mexico could 
find the additional financing it will require in 2010 in 
international capital markets without paying a higher cost. 
 
Carstens Move? 
-------------- 
 
 
MEXICO 00003205  003 OF 003 
 
 
11.  Another element of uncertainty is the future of Carstens, who 
is tipped to become the next governor of the central bank (Banxico) 
for 2010-15. Guillermo Ortiz, central bank governor since 1998, is 
respected internationally. However, Calderon is unlikely to ratify 
him for another term, as the two clashed repeatedly when Calderon 
was a member of Congress in the late 1990s. Carstens also is 
well-respected in the private sector and in the Congress, and 
finding a replacement of similar stature to head the finance 
ministry would be difficult.  The Inter-American Development Bank 
vice-president, Santiago Levy, is being mentioned as a potential 
replacement as well as current Energy Secretary Georgina Kessel. 
Calderon will probably announce his decision on Banxico (which needs 
to be ratified in the Senate) after the budget has been approved. 
 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
12.  The rejection of the 2% anti-poverty tax does represent a blow 
for the GOM.  Although the fiscal gap for 2010 is covered by the 
weaker tax changes, the increase in the fiscal deficit to 0.75% of 
GDP and a higher oil benchmark price, stop short of providing a 
long-term solution to falling public revenue and generating 
alternative income sources to replace its dependence on oil.   While 
showing that it is willing to work with the GOM, the PRI also has 
shown that it fears the electoral consequences of supporting more 
radical tax reform, which may have to wait until 2013. After 
fighting the 2% tax and the IVA increase, PRI Senator Manlio Fabio 
Beltrones and private sector groups are currently calling for broad 
tax reform that includes general, indirect taxes.  However, PRI 
lawmaker Oscar Levin -- close to PRI President Beatriz Paredes -- 
publicly acknowledged that a comprehensive tax reform would be 
likely when the PRI recovers the presidency in 2012, not before. 
Nevertheless, a downgrading of government debt may indeed take place 
as Congress has clearly shown that it is unable to respond with 
tough choices and adapt to a situation where oil production is 
falling rapidly.