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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 003174 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: OAXACA: STATE ELECTORAL POLITICS WITH NATIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
MEXICO 00003174  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Poloffs traveled to Oaxaca State October 
14-16 to meet with a variety of local political leaders, 
government officials, and civil society representatives. 
Local elections in Oaxaca next year have caught the attention 
of national party leadership, with more at stake than the 
governorship, 25 local deputy slots, and hundreds of 
mayorships.  Talk of a broad alliance between six parties to 
defeat the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) next year 
is on everyone's lips, but the viability of establishing and 
maintaining such a disparate coalition is uncertain.  Such an 
alliance will hinge on the ability of participants to agree 
to a unity gubernatorial candidate.  Deep wounds from the 
2006 civil unrest still scar the state, but defeating the 
incumbent PRI will be difficult.  Oaxaca remains a highly 
divided, tinderbox of a state.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) One of the poorest states in Mexico, Oaxaca is still 
trying to recover from the 2006 civil unrest that decimated 
its critical tourist sector, left deep wounds on its 
population, and further alienated the government from civil 
society groups.  Oaxaca features 16 different indigenous 
groups, and about 1/2 to 2/3 of the population is indigenous. 
 Some 418 of its 570 municipalities are run predominantly 
under the "uses and customs" system, which allows citizens to 
adhere to traditional indigenous customs and practices in 
judicial and electoral matters.  State officials and 
opponents alike pointed repeatedly to Oaxaca's numerous 
municipalities -- the state accounts for about a quarter of 
the national total -- as an important complicating factor in 
running elections and effectively governing the state.  State 
officials complained, for example, that local police forces 
are wholly uncoordinated across municipal lines and often 
respond to their own internal rule set rather than to 
codified regulations.  With levels of organized crime-related 
violence low but unemployment high, Oaxaca is one to the top 
exporters of migrant workers to the United States, with 
estimates of 1 to 3 million living abroad at any one moment. 
 
 
Politics: All Eyes on Elections 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) With the governorship, 25 state-level deputy slots, 
and hundreds of mayorships up for grabs in July 2010, the 
Oaxacan political buzz is almost exclusively focused on the 
elections.  A stronghold of the PRI old guard, Oaxaca would 
be a valuable prize to PRI-opponents looking to turn the 
electoral tide in the run-up to the 2012 presidential 
election.  Opposition to incumbent PRI Governor Ulises Ruiz 
may capitalize on anger still simmering from the 2006 
conflicts, but will face a formidable PRI electoral machine 
bent on maintaining its current control of the state. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Governor Ruiz has tried to run a tight political 
ship since his near loss in the 2004 election, a race in 
which he was widely suspected of electoral chicanery. 
Opponents allege that he relies on old school tactics of 
media control, pressure on electoral observers, and vote 
buying.  The PRI also maintains an elaborate patronage 
network, such as doling out development programs to the party 
faithful.  Local academics note that the "uses and customs" 
systems of governance in 418 municipalities often abets the 
PRI's influence efforts (Note: Unsurprisingly, the PRI 
codified the system by local law).  In many municipalities, 
mayors are selected and decisions made by a select few 
elders, councilman, or in an open, public vote.  In 27 
municipalities, women are not allowed to vote in local 
elections.  Broadly speaking, the systems allow for the PRI 
to deal with a small number of leaders to ensure continued 
support, and open voting practices allow for increased 
influence by the party on constituents.  Moreover, analysts 
and political leaders told Poloffs that, due to endemic 
poverty, these districts  would remain vulnerable to economic 
manipulation under any leadership. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Governor Ruiz hardly seems loved by most of the 
Oaxacan population, perhaps providing an opening for a 
gubernatorial candidate to break the PRI dynasty.  While PRI 
 
MEXICO 00003174  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
local congressman Herminio Cuevas Chavez pointed to Ruiz's 
work building hospitals and universities throughout the 
state, most observers complained that both were barely 
staffed and funded.  Moreover, the 2006 civil unrest, the 
state's heavy-handed response, and Oaxaca's slow recovery are 
still seared in the minds of the state officials, analysts, 
and opposition parties.  Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) 
leaders Jesus Romero Lopez, coordinator of the PRD bloc in 
the state congress, and Amador Jara, president of the PRD's 
state executive committee, told Poloffs they hope to 
capitalize on the October Supreme Court ruling that found 
Ruiz and a number of his top security officials responsible 
for human rights violations during the 2006 protests. 
National press devoted considerable coverage to the ruling, 
and Oaxaca state officials were clearly uncertain about how 
to respond.  Academics from a local university suggested that 
the decision could have a real political impact, even if the 
ruling itself does not mandate legal action against Ruiz. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The state electoral council assured Poloffs that 
they are well-prepared for the elections next year, but it 
can hardly be considered a fair arbiter of the state 
elections scene.  They claimed to have fully resolved issues 
that led to controversy and allegations of wrong-doing in the 
2004 vote.  Blaming "outsiders" and "guerrillas" for the 2006 
unrest, they expect a peaceful electoral process next July. 
Virtually every other analyst or political leader with whom 
Poloffs spoke indicated that elections in Oaxaca are always 
difficult and highly contentious, and that they expect at 
least some sort of political unrest.  A local academic (and 
of course, Ruiz's detractors) also noted that the voting 
public does not have much confidence in the monitoring 
authority and believes them to be compromised by the state 
government. 
 
PAN-PRD: An Unnatural Alliance 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) There is widespread talk of a broad alliance between 
six parties to defeat the PRI next year, but the viability of 
establishing and maintaining such a disparate coalition is 
uncertain.  Composed of the center-right National Action 
Party (PAN), leftist PRD, Convergencia, Worker's Party (PT), 
New Alliance (PANAL), and a local state party, the alliance 
would be a grab bag of political ideologies and interests. 
Nevertheless, Ruiz's rivals are convinced that a unified 
opposition would afford them a real chance at defeating the 
Oaxacan PRI dynasty.  PRD state deputy Jesus Romero told 
Poloffs that the PRI can count on some 485,000 votes.  The 
PRD's 430,000, along with backing of the state teachers' 
union and 150,000 votes for the PAN, could be enough to usher 
a "transition government" into the state capital.  He noted 
that with the backing of the teachers' union, the party would 
not necessarily need the PAN for votes but would need the 
PAN's financial backing for campaign and voter mobilization 
purposes.  The parties will have to register an alliance with 
the state electoral authorities by February 9. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The viability of such an alliance -- which is not 
unheard of in the annals of Oaxacan politics -- will mostly 
hinge on the ability of participants to agree to a unity 
gubernatorial candidate.  PRD leaders and local analysts 
suggested that Convergencia Senator Gabino Cue Monteagudo -- 
Ruiz's opponent in the 2004 elections and the candidate of a 
PAN-PRD-Convergencia alliance -- is well-liked and would be a 
strong contender.  He is already touring Oaxaca along with 
2006 PRD presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador 
to build support.  The benefit of a Gabino Cue candidacy, 
according to Oaxacan opposition politicians and observers, is 
that he is well-known and liked in the state.  Moreover, 
Deputy Romero indicated that Lopez Obrador has pledged 
tacitly to support the alliance if the candidate is Cue by 
not speaking out against PAN's participation.  If the 
alliance were to select a PAN candidate or a leader from 
outside the political realm, such as a businessman or state 
celebrity, then Lopez Obrador might not stay quiet. 
 
¶9. (SBU) PRD leaders indicated that the alliance is part of a 
broader national strategy in preparation for the 2012 
presidential elections.  They told Poloffs that they, along 
with the PAN, would like to deprive the PRI its leadership of 
 
MEXICO 00003174  003 OF 005 
 
 
a state that is electorally significant for the party -- at 
the very least, a non-PRI governor would certainly not use 
state resources to support a PRI candidacy.  Moreover, the 
PAN, in particular, is looking to replicate the alliance 
approach in Mexico State in the 2011 gubernatorial vote in an 
attempt to defeat PRI presidential hopeful, Governor Enrique 
Pena Nieto.  The PAN believes that a PRI loss in his own 
state would seriously tarnish Pena Nieto's image and 
compromise his own presidential campaign.  The PAN and PRD 
are discussing similar strategies in Veracruz and other PRI 
states with upcoming elections next year. 
 
PRI Dynamics 
------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) The October Supreme Court ruling against Ruiz has 
complicated his role in the election and his political 
future.  While the governor generally selects his preferred 
successor as candidate, PRI contacts in Mexico City have told 
Emboffs that the PRI's National Executive Committee will step 
in to impose someone who is perhaps less close to the 
governor, but more palatable to the voting population.  Party 
president Beatriz Paredes will reportedly have a larger role 
in Oaxaca than she usually does in local elections in 
PRI-controlled states.  Local analysts in Oaxaca suggested 
PRI Senator Adolfo Toledo would be a PRI candidate who could 
unify the various party factions, but said that he had been 
defeated by Gambino Cue at the ballot box before and would 
therefore be at a disadvantage should Cue be the contender. 
Ruiz, who has been angling for either the party presidency 
and/or a cabinet position in a potential future PRI 
administration, may have to temper his political aspirations. 
 His already dubious national reputation has been further 
stained with the Supreme Court ruling, and it is unlikely 
that the party would select him to be the next PRI 
standardbearer.  Nevertheless, he will continue to have 
considerable sway within the party and in the federal 
congress, with his 14 deputies (and with some level of 
influence over an additional 30-40, according to a Oaxacan 
academic) giving him effective control of the third largest 
PRI bloc in the lower house. 
 
Judicial Reform Moving Forward 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) While Oaxaca's judicial reform efforts have been 
questioned as a model for the rest of the country, they do 
serve as a bright spot for this troubled state. 
Implementation of the new model -- including oral trials and 
alternative dispute resolution -- began in 2007, and State 
Attorney General (PJE) Evencio Martinez Ramirez says that the 
reduction of bureaucracy, decrease in corruption, and 
increase in the speed of trials have had a real impact on 
citizens in the state.  Oaxaca's implementation process 
started in specific districts but covered all crimes, much 
like that of Chihuahua.  Unlike Chihuahua, which invested 
millions, Oaxaca had to adopt the new system with very 
limited resources.  Attorney General Martinez told Poloffs 
that state governments that complain that a lack of resources 
inhibit the transition to a new system are merely looking for 
excuses -- claiming that they need a great deal of resources 
means they are fundamentally rejecting the reform.  Oaxaca 
has also tried to include indigenous justice traditions -- 
including public proceedings -- to facilitate its 
transformation process. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Oaxaca started using oral trials about 2 years ago, 
and so far has had 72 audiences under the system.  Oral 
trials have actually reduced the number of bureaucrats 
necessary to process cases, increased the speed of trials, 
and improved the quality of investigations.  The Attorney 
General noted that prosecutors are forced to prepare cases 
better since they are now accountable to the public, and that 
cooperation between investigators, prosecutors, and judges 
has also improved.  Instead of a jury, cases are tried before 
a panel of three judges. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Oaxaca is also proud of its restorative justice 
system.  About 50 percent of cases can be dealt with through 
alternative justice mechanisms, which can be applied to over 
200 kinds of crime.  The use of restorative justice is 
 
MEXICO 00003174  004 OF 005 
 
 
voluntary, but so far thousands of cases have been dealt with 
using these mechanisms.  These tools have helped expedite the 
judicial process since it enables prosecutors to weed out 
cases going to trial.  PJE officials noted that the use of 
restorative justice, such as mediation, has also caused a 
cultural shift in the understanding of justice in the state. 
For example, many mediation cases end with the defendant 
accepting responsibility for their crimes and asking 
forgiveness from victims.  The Attorney General was effusive 
in his praise for USAID's work in assisting the state's 
efforts, saying that its training support has been 
fundamental. 
 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) President of the Oaxaca State Human Rights 
Committee Heriberto Antonio Garcia -- appointed by the local 
congress -- told Poloffs that the state government is 
responsive to its recommendations.  The Committee made 28 
recommendations to the state in 2008, of which 26 were 
accepted (if not fully complied with).  So far, the Committee 
has received 1,700 complaints in 2009, and has made 26 
recommendations, of which 20 have been accepted.  Garcia 
opined that citizens are making more complaints because they 
have more confidence in the system, and noted that local 
police, municipal leaders, and teachers are the greatest 
offenders -- over 50 percent of complaints are against the 
latter.  Tellingly, a high-ranking Committee official told 
Poloffs in the moments before the president's arrival that 
while the Committee is technically autonomous, it is fully 
funded by the state government and, therefore, cannot truly 
be independent.  Moreover, he said he is concerned that next 
year's budget will be seriously curtailed since the state 
government will be pulling funds to run its election 
campaign. 
 
¶15. (SBU) A local representative of human rights NGO 
CentroPro, Alejandro Sandoval, had a different take on the 
state's human rights situation.  He noted that Oaxaca 
citizens have always suffered from flagrant human rights 
abuses, mostly due to the highly authoritarian nature of the 
state government.  Sandoval also pointed to a recent UN Human 
Rights Commission document naming Oaxaca as the most 
dangerous state in Mexico for human rights defenders.  He 
noted that the local NGO community is working more closely 
with federal government officials given its poor relationship 
with the state.  Civil society's relationship with the state 
Human Rights Committee is very bad, and Sandoval argued that 
the Committee is unresponsive to complaints made by the 
organization.  He disparaged judicial reform efforts, and 
said that he is concerned about the state government's 
efforts to pull funds from various programs for electoral 
campaign purposes.  Sandoval did note that civil society 
organizations are dialoguing with Ruiz's political opponents 
and support the idea of an electoral alliance. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Political parties are viewing Oaxaca's local 
elections through a national lens as they gear up for the 
2012 presidential contest.  The gubernatorial vote may be 
particularly hard fought, although the PRI's opponents seem 
far from finalizing an alliance.  Given the PRI's virtually 
guaranteed 480,000-plus votes, its control of state spending, 
and its extensive patronage networks, an alliance is the only 
way to unseat the PRI from the state house.  Deep wounds from 
the 2006 civil unrest still scar the state, and the recent 
Supreme Court ruling may open some political space for PRI 
rivals.  It will be far from an easy fight, however -- the 
supposedly "very unpopular" governor still ensured a PRI 
sweep of the July 2009 legislative contest, winning every 
federal deputy seat.  National party leadership will meddle 
in the state political process, but the PAN and PRD's ability 
to replicate an alliance strategy to defeat other PRI leaders 
in local elections over the next two years is uncertain given 
the peculiarities and conditions unique to each state. 
Oaxaca remains a highly-divided, tinderbox of a state, where 
seemingly contentious local issues have national resonance. 
 
 
MEXICO 00003174  005 OF 005 
 
 
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