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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
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RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 003173 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: VERACRUZ: ALL EYES ON 2010 ELECTION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Poloff traveled to Veracruz State in early 
October to meet with state officials, opposition politicians, 
and civil society representatives to discuss local conditions 
in the run-up to state governor and local congressional 
elections next year. The major parties are already in full 
campaign mode, seeking to demonstrate strength and gain 
governorships ahead of the 2012 presidential election. 
Outgoing Governor Herrera of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI), widely criticized as undemocratic and overly 
controlling of the state's political landscape, will aim to 
play a key role in the state election in an effort to 
heighten his influence in the party and advance his 
well-known presidential aspirations. The campaign will 
probably be largely determined by the efficiency of the PRI 
machine, but discontent about the economy may also play a 
role: Veracruz suffers from high levels of poverty and has 
been hit hard by the economic downturn. While organized crime 
is less of an issue than in other states, efforts on security 
and human rights fronts still appear tepid at best. End 
Summary. 
 
Consolidating PRI Power, Governing Like the Bad Old Days 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Governor Fidel Herrera Beltran of the PRI barely 
defeated his National Action Party (PAN) opponent in 2004 and 
since then has worked to consolidate PRI control of the 
state. He led the party to significant victories in elections 
for local deputies and mayors in 2007 and for federal 
deputies in 2009. Though Veracruz has always been governed by 
the PRI, it has been a battleground over the past two 
decades, as the PAN gained strength and took control of 
important cities like the port of Veracruz and Boca del Rio. 
The leftist Convergencia Party is also strong in Veracruz, 
led by PRI deserter and former governor Dante Delgado. 
However, opposition strength has dwindled since Herrera took 
office, partly because of systematic intimidation of the 
opposition and questionable campaign and election tactics by 
the PRI, according to opposition politicians and political 
analysts in the state. Secretary of Government Reynaldo 
Escobar Perez told Poloff the PRI plans to win the 
governorship, the 212 mayorships and all 30 local deputy 
positions in next year's elections. (It currently holds 155 
and 28 of those positions, respectively.) This thinking 
permeated meetings with PRI state officials who repeatedly 
asserted that a PRI landslide will benefit the people of 
Veracruz by making the state more "governable." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Hoping to prevent a close race and with an eye 
toward his legacy and national ambitions, Herrera plans to 
impose a young protg, Javier Duarte, as the PRI 
gubernatorial candidate. Herrera's domineering approach, 
however, has alienated some PRI members who claim he is 
marginalizing more experienced and electable PRI politicians. 
His control of the state legislative process also rankles 
some in the party who complain that Herrera must approve each 
bill before it is even introduced. Local political analysts 
and academics who initially supported his campaign have also 
become somewhat disillusioned, frustrated by his politically 
motivated moves: meddling in the operation of universities, 
seeking control of the state's newspapers, and buying off 
taxi drivers and other influential constituencies. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Despite the disillusionment of some, Herrera remains 
popular throughout the state, thanks to an effective 
marketing strategy directed by a US firm, as well as his 
personal charisma and political skill. Herrera has branded 
himself the "bridge governor," constructing over 400 during 
his term; he labels each with the word "Fidelidad"-- a play 
on his first name and the word "faithfulness," as well as the 
slogan of the state PRI. This strategy of blurring the line 
between the party and the administration extends to painting 
bridges and all public buildings red, the defining color of 
the PRI in Veracruz. He also demonstrated his political skill 
and ability to spin situations to his advantage when a young 
boy in Veracruz was confirmed to have the first case of H1N1 
in Mexico. Herrera erected a statue to this so-called "Child 
Zero" in the boy's village and extolled the virtues of the 
Veracruz health system which he claims saved the boy's life. 
Images of the governor and his wife are splashed across the 
state, and officials often cite Herrera's natural skills as a 
politician and his qualifications--including speaking 
 
MEXICO 00003173  002 OF 005 
 
 
English, Portuguese, and French--to be a player on the 
national and international stage. While Herrera may have 
national aspirations, he will more likely be a kingmaker 
during the selection of the PRI candidate for 2012. His bloc 
of 20 deputies in the federal Congress and his role as one of 
the party's most prominent governors provide him with some 
influence and possibly a high-level position within a PRI 
administration, but he does not have enough strength to 
compete against more powerful candidates like Mexico State 
Governor Enrique Pena Nieto, PRI President Beatriz Paredes, 
and Senator Manlio Beltrones. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In an effort to break the PRI's hold on the state, 
the PAN and Convergencia are discussing forming an alliance, 
possibly to include the Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD) and the Workers' Party (PT), for next year's election. 
Similar alliances are under discussion in other 
PRI-controlled states like Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and Puebla and 
are likely seen by national-level officials of these parties 
as a way to interrupt the PRI's momentum ahead of 2012. 
Despite the apparent contradictions on the face of such an 
alliance, these parties from the left and the right appear 
willing to put ideology aside in the interest of unseating 
the PRI. Tension will likely arise, however, over candidate 
selection, as both PAN and Convergencia officials want the 
nomination. Moreover, a lack of unity within the PAN, which 
has four pre-candidates, may also complicate the formation of 
an alliance. PAN leaders insist, however, that their 
preferred candidate, federal State Employees' Social Security 
and Services Institute (ISSSTE) Director Miguel Angel Yunes, 
could carry the alliance to victory because of his statewide 
popularity stemming, ironically, from his tenure as a state 
and federal PRI congressman. In fact, PAN officials and some 
observers predict Governor Herrera, who harbors a deep 
personal animosity toward Yunes, will try to put Yunes in 
prison if he emerges as the candidate for the PAN or the 
alliance. 
 
Painting Over the Cracks on Security 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) The primary security issue in Veracruz is common 
crime, not organized crime, according to state security 
officials, the Attorney General, and the President of the 
State Human Rights Commission. They claim threats from Zetas 
reported last year have subsided, and the Director of the 
State Security Council, Ruben Dario Mendiola, says Veracruz 
is the fourth safest state in the country; the administration 
is planning a public relations campaign to educate citizens 
of this fact and highlight administration efforts on the 
security front. When asked about key security challenges, 
Dario went on at length about telephone extortion attempts 
and downplayed the presence of organized crime, despite other 
reports Poloff had seen regarding the importance of Veracruz 
as a drug transit and shipment zone. In a meeting with the 
Veracruz Attorney General, Salvador Mikel Rivera, to discuss 
judicial reform and security challenges, Mikel echoed other 
officials' statements that organized crime is not a major 
threat in Veracruz. He also highlighted the state's progress 
on judicial reform, which seem limited compared to other 
states. Mikel said Veracruz has passed the necessary judicial 
reform legislation but claimed implementation has yet to 
begin because of a lack of funding and resistance by some 
within the judiciary. He also claimed law curricula are 
already being adjusted in schools across the state--a point 
disputed by academics--and that the entire process will 
require at least six more years to complete. Prior to the 
current reforms, Veracruz had made some progress on expanding 
indigenous justice systems and alternative resolution 
mechanisms, both of which will be reconciled with the new law 
as it is implemented. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Poloff toured the state's C-4 Center (Control, 
Command, Communications, and Computation), which officials 
claim has been in operation since 2002. The Veracruz C-4 
appears to be a glorified emergency call center, not a center 
for coordinating state security operations and responses. 
Poloff toured the call centers for the state emergency 
response numbers (one for anonymous and one for traceable 
calls), and both seemed to be relatively modern, with 
operators also conducting analyses of where crimes were 
taking place and plotting the information on graphs and maps. 
 
MEXICO 00003173  003 OF 005 
 
 
Operators also watch video screens with images from cameras 
across the capital, and Dario said there are cameras in other 
cities across the state monitored by six other call centers. 
The cameras are a tool for crime prevention, investigations, 
and monitoring traffic--a technician can control traffic 
lights across the city if necessary. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Poloff also toured the new Center for Confidence 
Control, where state security officials will be vetted and 
applicants assessed for security-related positions. The 
center will come online in January, but the equipment and 
staff are in place, despite repeated claims of a lack of 
funding. The center has a staff of at least 30 people, most 
of whom were idly passing the day when Poloff toured the 
facility. The center's new equipment includes an in-house 
medical laboratory, video cameras and high definition 
televisions for monitoring polygraph sessions, and bays of 
computers for employees and applicants. The center is 
awaiting the arrival of polygraphers in training in Mexico 
City at the Center for Research and National Security 
(CISEN), and Dario asked that the Embassy put Veracruz at the 
top of the list as we assist with training under the Merida 
Initiative. Some 27,000 officials from across the state will 
be vetted in the center over the next four years, and the 
10,000 who have already been assessed by the Attorney 
General's office will be re-vetted, as only this center can 
legally certify qualification for employment in 
security-related positions in the state. While the premise of 
the center and its construction and staffing are laudable, 
several contacts during Poloff's visit warned that the 
political appointment of the head of the center could 
undermine the vetting process and make the center vulnerable 
to corruption. 
 
Roiled by Recession, Lightly Buffered by Key Sectors 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Veracruz has been hit hard by the recession, but 
Antonio Luna Rosales, the representative of the federal 
Secretariat of Economy in Veracruz, told Poloff Veracruz has 
been partly spared. Veracruz is not as reliant on 
manufacturing and exports to the US as some northern states 
and has relied on its production of primary goods--mainly oil 
and foodstuffs to weather the crisis. Veracruz is Mexico's 
leading producer of coffee, bananas, limes, pineapples, and 
oranges. Like other states, Veracruz collects little in the 
way of taxes, and at least 90 percent of the state budget 
comes from the federal government. Civil society, opposition 
politicians, and some PRI politicians are concerned about the 
state's spiraling debt, which has gone from zero to nearly $3 
billion USD during Herrera's term, according to local 
political analysts and press reports. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Oil deposits in the north near Chicontepec and on 
the Gulf of Mexico are a mixed blessing for Veracruz, 
providing something of an economic buffer but also tying the 
state to the trials and tribulations of the poorly run state 
oil company. Veracruz also has a refinery in the south and 
Mexico's only nuclear power plant on the coast in the north. 
However, much of the oil, electricity, and agricultural 
products are destined for consumption or processing in other 
parts of the country. Officials repeatedly lamented this fact 
but offered little in the way of ideas--besides demanding 
more money from the federal government--to leverage the 
state's economic advantages to increase development and 
promote growth. Around 50 percent of the state's population 
of seven million lives in poverty, and state and federal 
officials claim to be attempting to fight increased 
unemployment and poverty by building infrastructure and 
promoting investment. Jose Yunes Zorrila, who serves as 
president of the social development committee in the federal 
Chamber of Deputies, told Poloff he is not sure he can do 
anything specific for Veracruz to improve social development. 
Yunes may even run into opposition from Governor Herrera 
because he is planning to seek the PRI gubernatorial 
nomination next year. 
 
Lackluster Performance on Human Rights and Trafficking 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Veracruz officials claim trafficking is not a 
serious problem in the state despite Embassy trafficking in 
 
MEXICO 00003173  004 OF 005 
 
 
persons (TIP) officials citing it as one of the states with 
the highest incidences of TIP. Officials acknowledge the 
presence of traffickers moving immigrants from Central 
America to the US but assured Poloff that trafficking 
involving women and children destined for industries in which 
they will be exploited is not an issue in Veracruz. The 
president of the State Human Rights Commission, Nohemi 
Quirazco Hernandez, told Poloff that violations involving 
women and children mostly include cases of indigenous 
citizens--up to a million people--participating in "cultural 
practices" such as selling young daughters. Local PRI deputy 
Dalia Perez Castaneda disagreed, asserting that trafficking 
in persons is a major problem in Veracruz, with women and 
children from Central America and southern Mexico trafficked 
through the state to the US border or to Mexico's resort 
areas on the Yucatan Peninsula. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Quirazco told Poloff her commission issued nearly 
40 recommendations last year, all of with which the state 
government complied. Quirazco said Veracruz does not 
experience many human rights complaints and has only limited 
problems stemming from the military deployment to the state. 
She claimed her office maintains its autonomy and that she is 
free to issue recommendations as she sees fit, but her 
admission that the state government cut her budget by more 
than half calls into question her assertion of complete 
autonomy. Given the political environment in the state and 
Quirazco's tenure as the Secretary of Government for the 
previous PRI administration, it would not be surprising if 
the commission were affected by government pressure and 
politics before and during the recommendation process. 
 
Limited Operating Space for NGOs and Civil Society 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Poloff spoke with leaders of two local private 
universities and officials from an NGO focused on water 
conservation and sanitation issues, all of whom expressed 
reservations about the ability of civil society to operate 
freely in Veracruz. The leader of one university claimed 
state officials shut down his school for political reasons 
but covered their tracks by citing the violation of an 
administrative code. Both academics said universities are 
pressured to avoid criticizing the government, and the state 
subsidizes universities it deems friendly to the 
administration. The head of the NGO said his organization 
operates freely but only because it focuses on a relatively 
nonpolitical issue. The governor attends some of the group's 
functions, but the organization does not appear to be 
politicized like many of the other NGOs in the state. 
 
Corruption, Clientelism, and Control 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Beyond Herrera's efforts to impose his 
hand-selected candidate and expand PRI control in Veracruz, 
Poloff heard about several troubling trends that could be 
considered threats to democracy and a regression to old-style 
PRI rule. Multiple contacts accused the Herrera 
administration of clientelism and patronage, including 
co-opting universities and taxi drivers in the capital; 
corruption, to the point of calling the governor a Zeta; 
buying off the state's newspapers; and intimidating 
opposition parties by tapping their officials' phones and 
instructing state officials to drag their feet on any 
grievances filed against the PRI or the state government. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Veracruz PAN officials allege that criminals 
associated with the government stole the party's election 
materials days before campaigning began for July's midterm 
elections. State police and judicial officials assigned to 
the case allegedly failed to investigate, deeming it a 
"self-robbery." The PAN officials also claim government 
officials took PAN election observers to jail on trumped-up 
charges and that the PRI accused them of voter harassment and 
vote-rigging in the latest election, when in fact it was the 
PRI that was guilty of such acts. Herrera has also stacked 
the state electoral tribunal with his supporters, they say, 
making it virtually impossible to file election-related 
cases. In an effort to discredit Miguel Angel Yunes, a 
potential PAN gubernatorial candidate, Secretary of 
Government Escobar told Poloff that Yunes is a pedophile and 
 
MEXICO 00003173  005 OF 005 
 
 
has ties to narcotraffickers. The Secretary went so far as to 
give Poloff a copy of the book outlining the pedophilia 
allegations, marking the page with Yunes' picture with his 
own business card. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) All eyes in Veracruz, including--most 
importantly--those of Governor Herrera, are focused on next 
year's race for governor and the impact of that race on the 
2012 presidential election. In terms of raw numbers, an 
alliance among the opposition parties could unseat Herrera 
and the PRI. The likelihood of an alliance, however, is 
uncertain at this point because its prospective members have 
yet to reach a deal. Herrera will take seriously any threat 
to PRI dominance in the state and crank up the well-oiled PRI 
machinery accordingly. The developments in Veracruz over the 
next year will be instructive, both for the viability of an 
opposition alliance in other states across Mexico and for the 
strategies used by the PRI to regain control across the 
country. However, even if Herrera pulls off a victory in 2010 
and pursues his national aspirations, national level PRI 
dynamics will likely relegate him to the role of a dealmaker 
during the selection of the PRI candidate for 2012, rather 
than a candidate himself. 
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