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O 201419Z NOV 09
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001091 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: Nicaragua's November 21 Dueling Marches, Some Violence 
Likely 
 
REF: A) MANAGUA 794; B) MANAGUA 232; C) MANAGUA 35 
D) 08 MANAGUA 1405; E) 08 MANAGUA 1393; F) 08 MANAGUA 1328 
G) 08 MANAGUA 1195; H) 08 MANAGUA 1057; I) 08 MANAGUA 1049 
J) 08 MANAGUA 1035 
 
MANAGUA 00001091  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: RobertJ.Callahan, Ambassador, State, US Embassy 
Managua; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: On Saturday, November 21, civil society together 
with opposition parties will march on the streets of Managua to 
protest the 2008 municipal election fraud and the re-election of 
President Daniel Ortega. On the same day (and on nearby streets) 
the governing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) will be 
marching to celebrate its "victory" in the 2008 municipal 
elections. The FSLN already has begun to employ its tactics of 
intimidation to suppress opposition turnout the day of the march, 
and will use government coffers for its own logistics on November 
¶21. Meanwhile, civil society and opposition parties will be 
challenged by the task of amassing large crowds the day of the 
march. While the general public rejects the election fraud and 
Ortega's re-election, due to past violence there is a sense of fear 
in publicly protesting, especially if the FSLN will be nearby. The 
police, whose actions have been questioned in past marches, also 
have become a central figure in the November 21 events. Police 
Commissioner Aminta Granera has personally taken charge of the day, 
and is placing the legitimacy of her institution (and herself) on 
the spot. The announced marches have led to heightened tensions in 
Nicaragua's already politically divided population. This along with 
the violence in recent protest marches has led to the popular 
belief that at least some violence is likely on November 21.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
 
Civil Society Calls a March, FSLN Announces Countermarch 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) On November 9 a group of 18 civil society organizations 
(the Citizens' Union for Democracy, UCD) called for a march on 
November 21 to commemorate and protest the 2008 municipal election 
fraud and protest Ortega's re-election efforts (ref J). The UCD 
previously had received the necessary permit from the police and 
the police had informed them that no other group had requested 
permits for that day in that (or an adjacent) location. Following 
the announcement of the march, all major opposition political 
parties have joined the call for the march. Leaders of the 
opposition who have stated they will participate include National 
Assembly Deputy and former presidential candidate Eduardo 
Montealegre and former President Arnoldo Aleman. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) On November 10, FSLN National Assembly Deputy (and close 
confident to Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo) Gustavo Porras 
announced that his party would celebrate the first anniversary of 
the "Sandinista victory" in the municipal elections.  The FSLN had 
not yet applied for a permit, but announced their march would 
follow the same route as that of the UCD's march. Porras stated 
that his National Labor Front (FNT) along with other 
FSLN-affiliated organizations would occupy Managua's rotundas and 
streets because the streets "belonged to them."  True to his word, 
as of November 19 FSLN sympathizers were occupying the rotunda that 
will serve as the starting point for the UCD march; these 
sympathizers were also throwing rocks at local media that drove by 
the rotunda.  Porras claimed that through the various FSLN 
structures, his party will bring 100,000 people to demonstrate 
their support for Ortega's government on November 21.  Members of 
civil society and the opposition note the FSLN uses public 
resources and forces public employees to attend the party's 
activities and will do so again to reach the 100,000 mark.  The 
FSLN has publicized its march on television, radio and internet 
news websites.  The governing party's advertisements significantly 
outnumber those of the UCD's march. 
 
MANAGUA 00001091  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Intimidation Tactics Begin, Violence Expected 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Even before the November 2008 municipal elections, the FSLN 
had responded to what it viewed as "opposition" protests with 
violence and used this as an intimidation tactic to suppress 
further acts of protests. Their intolerance recently resulted in 
the beating and kidnapping of opposition youth in Managua and Leon 
(ref H, I). Since the announcement of the marches, their 
intimidation tactics have continued both directly and indirectly. 
In the early morning of November 11, government supporters defaced 
the homes of civil society and opposition members in Leon, using 
material from the Leon City Hall. Similar incidents were reported 
in Managua. FSLN Political Secretary (and former head of security 
in the FSLN government of the 1980s) Lenin Cerna held a private 
meeting with members of the transportation unions, where it was 
suspected he might have discussed mechanisms to disrupt the UCD 
November 21 march.  FSLN political secretaries from departments 
publicly have stated the party would block the opposition's 
November 21 march, and media reported the FSLN would use improvised 
weapons to block access to Managua from other parts of Nicaragua. 
The mere mention that the FSLN will have 100,000 supporters the day 
of the march is viewed by civil society and the opposition as a 
mechanism to try and intimidate the UCD marchers.  Given the FSLN's 
recent history in violently suppressing protests (ref A, B, C, E, 
F, G), the party is surely relying on intimidation tactics to 
suppress turnout on November 21. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Nonetheless, civil society and opposition parties argue 
that the people's fear is beginning to abate, and they expect 
people to attend the Saturday march.  Both sides have publicly 
stated their marches are peaceful, but both sides also appear to be 
preparing for other scenarios.  It is widely expected that the FSLN 
will use the makeshift weapons and former gang members it has 
employed in the past.  In attempts to encourage its own turnout, 
opposition leaders have publicly stated that they will respond in 
kind to any acts of violence from the FSLN.  In private, members of 
the opposition have told us that their people will be armed with 
the same tools the FSLN usually carries - namely sling shots, 
improvised hand-held projectile devices ("morteros"), and other 
makeshift weapons.  The likelihood of violence increased when the 
police publicly stated that the use of "morteros" (illegal under 
Nicaraguan law) would be permitted.  The UCD quickly responded 
asking the police to ban these weapons, as they have inflicted 
injuries and damage in past marches. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Given the past violence and this heightened tension, 
religious and private sector leaders have called for peaceful 
marches on November 21.  In a joint letter to President Ortega, the 
presidents of the Higher Council of the Private Sector (COSEP) and 
the American-Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) advised Ortega 
that it was in his hands to avoid confrontations at the marches and 
that past violence had only negatively affected private investment. 
Nicaragua's Conference of Bishops issued a statement November 18, 
in which it expressed its concern over the threats to fundamental 
freedoms such as the freedom of expression and assembly.  The 
bishops then called on Ortega and other political leaders to reject 
and condemn any attempts to repress the freedom of expression and 
assembly.  Evangelical leaders have made similar calls for 
peaceful, nonviolent marches. 
 
 
 
Police on the Spot 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) On November 21, Police Commissioner Aminta Granera and her 
institution will be put to the test.  Given their recent track 
 
MANAGUA 00001091  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
record of passivity in protecting people's basic rights and 
freedoms (ref D), Granera has very publicly taken the lead of the 
institution's efforts to ensure a peaceful November 21.  Appearing 
to have conceded to the FSLN's march plans (despite being 
subsequent to the UCD march plans), Granera was publicly criticized 
for asking the UCD to change its route for November 21.  In a 
November 18 press conference, the commissioner and her senior staff 
presented the police's plan for the day of the marches.  They 
discussed the two routes for the marches, explained that the police 
would serve as buffers at certain points throughout the march, and 
stated that the police would provide security to those traveling 
from outside Managua.  Publicly the organizers of the UCD march 
have stated they place their trust in the commissioner, but many 
doubts persist on whether or not the police will function 
effectively the day of the marches.  While Granera might wish to 
avoid violence, questions remain as to how much control she has 
over her own institution.  One security analyst said that within 
the police there is a corporate mentality to obey the political 
directives of the FSLN - i.e., Ortega and not Granera. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The FSLN violence over the past year has for the most part 
been effective for the governing party in that people are not 
likely to publicly protest against the government.  However, 
people's fears are increasingly dissipating and they more regularly 
speak of "an eye for an eye."  This combined with the increased 
rhetoric from both sides in the lead-up to the November 21 marches 
and the police's decision to allow "morteros" has placed a blanket 
of uncertainty (and insecurity) over the events of November 21.  A 
big factor in what actually happens will be the ability for UCD 
marchers to reach Managua from other departments.  Police 
Commissioner Granera's public statements and visible role in the 
days ahead of the march also make clear that Saturday will be a 
clear test for her and her institution.  While the likelihood for 
violence is high on November 21, Nicaragua is always full of 
surprises and anything can happen - even a peaceful march. 
CALLAHAN