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Viewing cable 09KYIV2069, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KYIV2069 2009-11-30 13:44 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kyiv
VZCZCXRO2794
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHKV #2069/01 3341344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301344Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8893
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002069 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RS UP
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary: The status of the Russian language in 
linguistically divided Ukraine has thus far featured less in 
the current Presidential election campaign than it did in 
2004.  The Regions party (PoR), which calls for Russian to 
become a second state language, has chosen instead to 
concentrate more on economic themes that resonate with the 
broader range of voters at a time of economic crisis. 
Nonetheless, the status of the Russian language remains a 
hot-button issue in the Russophone East and South.  While 
Regions leader Yanukovych, if elected, would likely be unable 
to change the Constitution to make Russian a second state 
language, he would be able to roll back various decrees by 
the current government to encourage greater use of Ukrainian. 
 End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Russian Language as a Campaign Issue 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (U) The 18 registered presidential candidates present a 
broad spectrum of views on the status of the Russian language 
in Ukraine.  Only three candidates, Viktor Yanukovych (PoR), 
Petro Symonenko (Communist Party of Ukraine), and Inna 
Bogoslovska, advocate in their campaign platforms for making 
Russian the second state language.  Among the other 
candidates, Rada Speaker Lytvyn defends Russian as a language 
for interethnic communication, Prime Minister Tymoshenko 
supports Ukrainian as the sole state language, and President 
Yushchenko makes no mention of language in his platform, 
despite his government's strong encouragement of the use of 
Ukrainian. 
 
3. (SBU) In a recent conversation with us, PoR MP 
Miroshnychenko discussed his party's current approach to the 
language issue, explaining that the PoR sees the issue 
narrowly as one of a citizen's right to communicate with the 
government.  He noted that outside of official written 
communication, Russian-speaking Ukrainians experience little 
difficulty or discrimination.  While reiterating his party's 
position that Russian should be the second state language, 
Miroshnychenko said that the PoR would not emphasize the 
divisive language issue in the current presidential campaign 
in order to avoid alienating potential voters, especially in 
Western Ukraine. 
 
4. (SBU) Nevertheless, Miroshnychenko made a point to confirm 
that the PoR has already gotten enough signatures to put the 
official-status issue to a referendum.  Moreover, Leonid 
Klimov, an Odesa oligarch and chief of the Odesa Oblast PoR 
branch, told us that language is the central issue of the 
presidential campaign in his region.  He alleged that having 
to deal with Ukrainian-only documents is a hardship for 
Russian-speakers, and said that the government discriminates 
in its hiring practices against applicants who do not speak 
Ukrainian well.  Klimov especially criticized recent 
regulations to strengthen the position of the Ukrainian 
language in education, claiming that teachers would face 
disciplinary measures for speaking Russian at any time within 
the confines of a school building, even during off-hours. 
 
5. (SBU) Yanukovych himself alluded to the possible approach 
of a PoR government during a campaign stop in Donetsk on 
November 18, explaining that it would be "simple" to solve 
the Russian language problem: all that is needed is the 
President and 226 votes in the Rada.  Changing the 
constitution to make Russian a second state language would, 
however, require 300 votes in the Rada, which none of our 
contacts believe the PoR would be able to muster.  Rather, 
they suggest a PoR government could probably satisfy its core 
constituency by rolling back some of the Yushchenko-era 
decrees and regulations to promote Ukrainian, and could tweak 
existing legislation to enhance use of Russian. 
 
-------------- 
Public Opinion 
-------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The status of the Russian language remains a 
resonant issue for many Ukrainians in the East and South. 
One is Kostyantyn Shurov, head of the "Russian Community in 
Ukraine," the largest organization supporting ethnic Russians 
and Russian speakers in the country.  Shurov told us his 
organization has over 8,000 full members, and claimed he 
would be able to rally over 200,000 supporters into the 
streets (without paying them) if the need arose.  Shurov 
maintained there is widespread discrimination against Russian 
speakers.  He complained in particular about an alleged 
scarcity of access to Russian-language schooling at all 
levels.  When asked whom Russian speakers would most likely 
support in the upcoming polls, Shurov dismissed Tymoshenko, 
Yushchenko, and Yanukovych, indicating disillusionment with 
 
KYIV 00002069  002 OF 002 
 
 
all the major parties.  Even the PoR, which is typically 
viewed as more supportive of the Russian language, garnered 
his disapproval. 
 
7. (SBU) However, according to a November poll conducted by 
the Ukrainian Democratic Circle, the majority of Ukrainians 
do not consider the language issue a priority.  54.7% of 
respondents called the issue "not pertinent", with only 14.7% 
finding it "urgent".  Oleksandr Lytvynenko, an expert on 
domestic politics at the Razumkov Center for Economic and 
Political Studies, reinforced this impression, telling us his 
think tank was not conducting a survey on the status of the 
Russian language this year because they do not see it as an 
issue of great concern to most Ukrainians.  He noted that in 
contrast to the 2004 campaign season, candidates this year 
are generally downplaying the divisive issue. 
 
------ 
Russia 
------ 
 
8. (SBU) Though Shurov never said so outright, he alluded 
that much of his organization's support comes from Russia. 
The Razumkov Center's Lytvynenko said he believes that Russia 
is using the language issue as a tool to attempt to influence 
Ukraine's electoral agenda, and that Russia is bolstering its 
"hard" tools, like the Black Sea Fleet and gas, with "soft" 
tools like language. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: The PoR is, thus far at least, downplaying 
the language issue at the national level as it uses criticism 
of economic policy and the current leadership to attract 
disillusioned voters in Ukrainophone, historically "orange" 
western and central Ukraine.  At the same time, the PoR is 
stressing the issue locally in the East and South to rally 
their core electorate.  A President Yanukovych might not be 
able to fulfill his campaign promise to make Russian a second 
state language, but he could probably satisfy most of his 
supporters with more modest measures rolling back the present 
government's efforts to promote Ukrainian. 
PETTIT