VZCZCXRO9873
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHNEH
DE RUEHCI #0305/01 3210439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170439Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL KOLKATA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2493
INFO RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 1009
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1006
RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD 0072
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2384
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 3109

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KOLKATA 000305 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/INSB (TITUS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC CASC IN
SUBJECT: WEST BENGAL RE-ESTABLISHES GOVERNMENT PRESENCE IN MAOIST 
AREAS, BUT ATTACKS CONTINUE 
 
REF: A. A) KOLKATA 287 
     ¶B. B) KOLKATA 194 
     ¶C. C) NEW DELHI 1349 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Since June 2009 state and central police have 
operated in West Bengal's three Maoist/Naxal insurgency-affected 
districts to re-assert government presence, eliminate 
anti-government armed resistance and win local tribal support. 
While police have re-established a limited government presence 
and arrested several suspected Maoist leaders, they have not 
eliminated the Maoist threat.  The People's Committee Against 
Police Atrocities (PCAPA), a local tribal organization that was 
formed in response to the police crackdown in the district in 
November 2008, has been discredited due to its association with 
the armed Maoists.  The West Bengal state government has 
recently shown greater resolve in tackling the Maoist security 
challenge, but it and the opposition lack a clearly articulated 
strategy of political engagement.   While the Indian domestic 
media continues to focus on the lack of security in some of 
these remote, tribal areas, life in the urban metropolis of 
Kolkata goes on with a notable lack of concern on the issue. 
 
 
 
West Bengal's Three Maoist-Affected Districts 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Maoist presence in West Bengal is concentrated in 
the three administrative districts of West Midnapore, Purulia 
and Bankura.  The 2,100 sq km area, or approximately 2.4 percent 
of West Bengal, is located approximately 250 km west of the 
state capitol of Kolkata, in a region bordering the neighboring 
states of Bihar and Jharkhand.  Overwhelmingly tribal, the 
250,000 residents are poor and have been left out of the state's 
economic development.  West Bengal is one of seven states 
affected by Maoist violence, the others being Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. 
 
 
 
Government Present, but Attacks Continue 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Since June, a 4,000-strong combined state and central 
police force have re-established administrative and police 
presence throughout the affected area, ever since closing or 
severely limiting operations there in December 2008 (Reftel B). 
The operation's second accomplishment was the arrest and capture 
of Chhatradhar Mahato, the spokesman for the People's Committee 
Against Police Atrocities (PCAPA) - a group promoting the local 
tribal population that is now widely viewed as a front 
organization for the banned Communist Party of India - Maoist. 
According the Additional Director General of West Bengal Police, 
Raj Kanojia, Mahato's capture and subsequent interrogation has 
facilitated the investigations into Maoist activities in the 
area. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) At the same time, Maoists continue to attack government 
personnel, property and political parties in the districts.  On 
October 20, a group of approximately 20-30 Maoists robbed a bank 
and attacked the Sankrail police post, taking one policeman 
hostage.  The Maoists eventually released the hostage in 
exchange for the release of 23 tribals in police custody.  On 
October 27, PCAPA supporters detained a train enroute to New 
Delhi to protest the police action in West Bengal and demand 
release of arrested supporters (Reftel A).  On November 9, 
Maoists ambushed and killed four policemen in West Midnapore 
district shortly after the Chief Minister had finished his 
two-day visit to the affected area.  One of the top Maoist 
leaders, Politburo member Koteswar Rao, aka Kishanji, still 
remains at large.  The state government appears unable to stop 
the string of attacks. 
 
 
 
PCAPA Exposed and Discredited 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The PCAPA had been formed in November 2008 to protest 
the police crackdown on the local population following the 
unsuccessful improvised explosive device attack on the Chief 
Minister's convoy earlier that month.  For a time, it had been 
 
KOLKATA 00000305  002 OF 003 
 
 
viewed as a legitimate interlocutor and representative of 
oppressed tribals.  However, its public image as a political 
organization distinct from the violent Maoist movement suffered 
in light of information gleaned from Mahato's capture and 
arrest, the October 20 police station attack and the October 27 
train detainment.  While the PCAPA itself is not currently 
banned, the state government has indicated a willingness to ban 
it as well, given its recently stated intention to raise an 
armed militia.  Intellectuals that had previously advocated for 
engagement with PCAPA as the voice of the oppressed and 
disenfranchised are now silent on the organization.  The Maoists 
have temporarily lost what had been viewed as a legitimate 
public mouthpiece for their cause. 
 
 
 
Political Engagement Lacking, While Political Accusations Fly 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Neither the state government nor the opposition has 
articulated a strategy of engaging the Maoists politically, 
although the Indian Home Minister P.C. Chidambaram has 
publically stated that the GOI is willing to talk to any group 
that is willing to pursue its objectives politically within the 
Indian democratic system without resorting to violence.  Despite 
their political differences, the central and state governments 
have indicated a willingness to work with one another; state 
police officials have confirmed a degree of intra-state 
coordination for the upcoming planned anti-Maoist police action. 
  However, at the state level, the ruling party, the Communist 
Party of India-Marxist, and the main opposition party, 
Trinamool, alternately accuse one another of partnering with the 
Maoists to eliminate their political opponents.  According to a 
journalist who visited the area during the recent parliamentary 
elections in April/May 2009, neither party is very active in the 
area as compared with the rest of the state.  Recently, both 
have been victim of Maoist attacks.  The leader of the state 
opposition party, and current national Railways Minister, Mamata 
Banerjee, has gone so far as to challenge the state government 
to prove an alleged Mamata-Maoist nexus and if so "throw her in 
jail", while she goes on lamenting an alleged Marxist 
(CPI-M)-Maoist connection.  Post does not know definitively 
whether the mainstream political parties in West Bengal maintain 
contact with the Maoists, although in the past both have been 
rumored to have done so. 
 
 
 
Lessons from Lalgarh: Improved Communications, Mobility and 
Intelligence 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to police and media contacts, the anti-Maoist 
police action in Lalgarh has exposed the need for improved 
police communications, mobility and intelligence to confront the 
Maoist security challenge.  The Maoist's attack on the Sankrail 
police station, in which two policemen were killed and one taken 
hostage, further highlights the need for better physical 
security.  On October 25, the state government announced that it 
would spend USD 1.5 million on security improvements at 30 
police stations in the three districts.  West Bengal police 
contacts indicate that the lessons from the recent police 
operation are being integrated into the central government's 
upcoming anti-Maoist operations. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Countering the Maoist insurgency in the remote tribal 
areas of West Bengal and other neighboring states will take a 
concerted whole-of-government approach addressing security, 
governance and development (Reftel C).  To date, most of the 
public rhetoric has focused on the security challenges posed by 
the Maoists and a corresponding police response.  Lately, there 
have been overtures of political dialogue if the Maoists cease 
their violent attacks.  The continuing attacks may however be 
counter-productive for the Maoists as they appear to have 
strengthened the state government's resolve to apply force as 
required.  It appears to be easier for the government to deploy 
police, than engage as politicians; and for the Maoists to 
detain trains, than positively contribute to the economies of 
 
KOLKATA 00000305  003 OF 003 
 
 
the surrounding communities.  The challenge for the government 
of India is not only to contain, but to eliminate the Maoist 
violence in the remote, isolated parts of the country and offer 
political engagement and development opportunities to the 
largely poor and disenfranchised tribal populations. 
Unfortunately, while the Indian domestic media, police and some 
elements of the state and national government are seized with 
the issue, life in the urban metropolis of Kolkata goes on with 
a notable lack of concern on the issue. 
PAYNE