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DE RUEHKI #1042/01 3340634
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0332
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 001042 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT:    War Crimes Ambassador Rapp visits DRC; 
            3mphasizes need for accountability 
 
REF:        (A) Kinshasa 1027; (B) Kinshasa 1023 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Ambassador at Large for War Crimes (S/WCI) 
Stephen Rapp visited the DRC from November 12-14 as part of a 
follow-on mission to Secretary Clinton's August visit.  He 
interacted with a variety of Congolese and international actors in 
meetings with the Minister of Justice, the Vice Minister of Defense, 
UN officials, North Kivu's Vice Governor, and Congolese NGOs.  At 
the North Kivu Vice Governor's, he met with the press and exhibited 
the latest Rewards for Justice posters.  He also traveled to 
Kiwanja, the site of a massacre of local civilians by CNDP troops in 
November 2008, to commemorate that event and meet with survivors and 
members of the MONUC contingent based in the town.  End comment. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) As a follow-up to Secretary Clinton's visit, S/WCI Rapp's 
mission to Goma was designed to assess and demonstrate U.S. 
engagement in efforts to combat the problem of continuing war crimes 
and human rights abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence 
committed by the Congolese military (FARDC) and other armed groups. 
He also sought to publicize the ongoing U.S. effort to bring major 
perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide to justice by offering 
"Rewards for Justice" to those who provide information leading to 
the arrest of certain high profile genocidaires wanted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  End summary. 
 
Warm welcome and cold shoulder in Kinshasa 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On November 12, Ambassador Stephen Rapp, Special Envoy 
for War Crimes Issues, accompanied by Ambassador Garvelink, met with 
Minister of Justice Emmanuele Luzolo Bambi.  Rapp emphasized the 
opportunity to work together on issues of accountability for those 
who have perpetrated war crimes especially at the senior military 
leadership level.  He highlighted the cooperation by the GDRC with 
the ICC noting that those currently in The Hague are Congolese but 
there remains a profound need for a strong national justice system. 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Luzolo referenced the common commitment against war crimes 
by the two governments.  He provided a long history of the justice 
system starting with the notion that the post conflict situation has 
created a fragile environment for the prosecution of war crimes.  He 
emphasized the fact that he has been fighting for peace "every day" 
but has been hampered in his efforts by a lack of funding. 
According to Luzolo, a paradox exists within the international 
community.  They want justice but they do not provide the means to 
provide it in the DRC.  There is a desperate need for new 
equipment. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Luzolo acknowledged there are problems between the GDRC 
and NGOs.  "I am sorry to see misunderstandings between NGOs and the 
government.  That kind of attack makes me ill at ease."  He has 
invited NGOs to meet with him especially when they "angrily demand" 
prosecutions.  "They [NGOs] are needed, they are necessary to keep 
us on the right path."  Luzolo asserted that human rights are not 
possible without justice.  He promised a more thorough discussion 
with Rapp when they are in The Hague together. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Luzolo shared with Rapp the comments he [Luzolo] made to 
Anneke Van Woudenberg in an earlier meeting.  Luzolo said that the 
international community has a right to demand the arrest of Bosco 
Qinternational community has a right to demand the arrest of Bosco 
Ntaganda but that it is not possible to do so at this stage.  He 
reiterated that the GDRC is going to arrest him sometime and the 
standing position is to collaborate with the ICC, but challenges 
remain.  He agreed that military justice needs to be reformed. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In a meeting with Vice Minister of Defense Oscar Masamba, 
Rapp reassured the Vice Minister that he was there to begin a 
dialogue and a relationship of cooperation with the Ministry of 
Defense and the GDRC as a whole.  He reiterated the importance of 
accountability especially for high-ranking military officials. 
Masamba stated that although reinforcement of accountability and war 
crime prosecution is needed, there are encouraging signs as well. 
In order to strengthen the system, financial resources and political 
will are required.  Masamba told Rapp that the current system, in 
which judges need to be of higher rank than those being prosecuted, 
will be eliminated.  When Rapp pressed for more specific details 
regarding the role of the ICC and cases like Ntaganda, Masamba did 
not provide a substantive reply, rather promising to report to the 
Minister of Defense.  He further stated that he did not have details 
about the "FARDC 5," but added that the Minister of Defense could 
provide these in future conversations. 
 
UN Views 
 
KINSHASA 00001042  002 OF 005 
 
 
-------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In Goma, representatives from several MONUC offices 
briefed Ambassador Rapp on the ongoing situation in the Congo and 
MONUC activities.  Ambassador Rapp raised USG questions about 
actions such as MONUC support for the FARDC's Kimia 2 military 
operation against the FDLR and the sudden emptying of internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camps around Goma in September.  Rapp 
engaged with several MONUC representatives in Goma, including MONUC 
North Kivu Head of Office Hiroute Guebre Sellassie, Regional 
Coordinator for the Joint Human Rights Office Raphael Yoho, Civil 
Affairs Head of Office Edem Blege, MONUC Eastern Coordination Acting 
Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Charles Armstrong and 
Stabilization Team Leader Spyros Demetriou. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The UN briefings touched on a number of issues and 
combined to provide a good overview of the current situation: 
 
-- North Kivu Head of Office Sellassie spoke of the complexities of 
the MONUC presence in the DRC-to operate effectively MONUC needs 
both the good will of the host government and support of the UN 
member states.  After ten years in the Congo, MONUC has had some 
success, but it would have been more effective if UN member states 
had been more willing to pressure Kinshasa and other states in the 
region.  She did not believe the government was serious about 
addressing some key issues, including security sector reform, 
refugee return, even peacemaking efforts; it lacks both the will and 
the capacity. 
 
-- UN officers (primarily Yoho and Blege) described the evolving IDP 
situation, including the sudden evacuation of over 60,000 people 
from the IDP camps near Goma in September.  They said that some 
800,000 North Kivu IDPs had returned to their homes since the 
Kinshasa-Kigali accord in January, mostly to Kitchanga, Kiwanja and 
Masisi.  Some 900,000 IDPs remain in the province, the vast majority 
of who have relocated relatively close to their homes.  Several push 
and pull factors contributed to the closure of the camps near Goma 
where 110,000 were housed at the peak of the crisis:  camp surveys 
indicated some 80% of IDPs in Goma said they thought conditions had 
improved sufficiently to return home; UNHCR thought most IDPs could 
return and wanted to consolidate the camps and limit populations to 
the most needy; politicians, notably former North Kivu governor 
Eugene Serifuli, encouraged IDPs to return home by warning them that 
if they did not, then Rwandan Tutsi refugees would return to take 
their land; IDPs moved quickly to take advantage of "return 
packages" of supplies while they were available.  Most have not yet 
gone all the way home but have relocated to "secondary points of 
displacement" near their homes after collecting their return 
packages where they are waiting until conditions improve. 
 
 
-- The IDP returns are being stimulated in some areas by Congolese 
politicians who are hyping the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees 
from Rwanda who are reportedly crossing clandestinely at night in an 
organized fashion.  UN officers strongly believed this movement is 
indeed occurring.  UNHCR reportedly believes that some 12,000 people 
have clandestinely crossed from Rwanda, but refuses to describe them 
as refugees because camp populations do not appear to have changed; 
the MONUC military G2 strongly embraces that figure.  The returnees 
Qthe MONUC military G2 strongly embraces that figure.  The returnees 
are reportedly mostly heading toward Mushake, Kichanga and Kirolirwe 
in Masisi district.  Some have speculated that they might be 
Congolese Tutsis who went to Rwanda intending to stay, but have 
since decided to return home--or are being pushed to go. 
 
-- Local chiefs strongly oppose the movement of these refugees, 
which they believe is related to the issue of land-grabbing by 
ex-CNDP integrated into FARDC.  Ex-CNDP FARDC moved into the Bisie 
mines and violently pushed civilians, primarily Hutu and Hunde, from 
areas around Nyabiondo and Lukweti.  UN Joint Human Rights teams who 
were prevented by hostile Mai Mai groups from investigating reports 
that ex-CNDP had killed hundreds in the Nyabiondo area in October 
stumbled across solid evidence of massacres in nearby Lukweti (ref 
A). 
 
-- Fear that ex-CNDP/Tutsi will move back to their land has fueled 
the growth of Mai Mai groups to defend locals against the outsiders, 
according to UN officials.  Mai Mai are also disenchanted by their 
inability to integrate into the FARDC at ranks they consider 
appropriate and resent the influence of ex-CNDP in the army.  Major 
active, unintegrated groups in the area include Janvier's ACPLS 
(Hunde), LaFontaine's PARECO group (Nande), and Mai Mai Kifuafua 
(Tembo, Nyanga, etc).  The ACPLS appears to be the most powerful of 
these at the moment and is notable for its hostility to FARDC and 
MONUC, its working relationship with FDLR in the area and its good 
ties with (non-Tutsi) local civilians (ref B). 
 
KINSHASA 00001042  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
-- There was an interesting difference of emphasis between Blege 
from Civil Affairs and Yoho from the Joint Human Rights Office, who 
together met with the Rapp group.  Yoho believed that FDLR crimes 
were worse than the CNDP's, whereas Blege noted that the FDLR's 
worst massacre, at Busurungi in May was immediately preceded by a 
massacre of Hutu civilians by FARDC at nearby Shalio. 
 
-- MONUC North Kivu Head of Office Sellassie expressed shock at the 
problem of gender and sexually based violence throughout the DRC, 
even in the large parts of the country not affected by the war or 
instability.  This, she thought, might be a question for 
ethnologists.  Ambassador Rapp indicated that the problem might be 
the lack of an effective justice system because when people know 
they will be punished for such behavior, they are less likely to do 
it.  Sellassie disagreed.  Other countries in Africa lack strong, 
formal legal institutions, but we do not see such violence.  This, 
she said, is a puzzle we do not understand.  Rapp noted that when 
effective legal institutions were restored in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, criminal violence dropped. 
 
North Kivu Vice Governor Luhaichirwa 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In his meeting with Vice Governor Feller Luhaichirwa, 
Ambassador Rapp spoke of USG concern about violence against 
civilians and USG willingness to cooperate with Congolese 
authorities on justice issues.  Luhaichirwa, who is an ethnic Hunde, 
said that the situation in North Kivu had in many ways improved from 
the nadir of the early 2000s.  The political arrangements of recent 
months, including the detente between Kinshasa and Kigali and the 
integration of the CNDP and PARECO into the national army had marked 
a step forward; now the FDLR, which had caused so much instability 
in the past, was everyone's common enemy.  He recognized that crimes 
had been committed by elements in the army in the ongoing operations 
against the FDLR, but the command had made every effort to arrest 
perpetrators of crimes against civilians; he said over 500 FARDC 
criminals had been arrested since March-April and are now being 
housed in a prison designed to hold 300. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Luhaichirwa's main theme -- "just a reflection," as he 
put it -- was the need for economic development to give the 
hard-working Congolese population hope and reason not to fight one 
another over land and resources.  North Kivu needed international 
investment to build roads and schools, to develop electricity and 
gas power generation, and to improve the health system.  The 
international community had to follow through on its promises to pay 
demobilized soldiers.  He emphasized that with economic development 
investment to the tune of ten billion dollars, the economy would be 
able to provide employment for all Congolese.  Even Rwandans, who 
had been brought to Congo by the Belgians to work in agriculture and 
the mines, would be able to find employment.  With money, with 
investment, with economic development, all of Congo's problems would 
be solved. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Ambassador Rapp agreed that economic development was of 
key importance, but also noted that is difficult to find people 
willing to invest in violent, unstable areas where people could not 
be safe. 
 
Meet the Press and Rewards for Justice 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Q 
¶13.  (SBU) Immediately after their session, Rapp and the Vice 
Governor met with the press outside the Vice Governor's office. 
Rapp spoke briefly of his mission and of USG willingness to 
cooperate with Congolese and North Kivu authorities on war 
crimes/justice issues, and took several questions.  One question 
implied that the U.S. was being hypocritical when Special Advisor 
Wolpe called for General Bosco Ntaganda's arrest and transfer to the 
ICC when the US did not even recognize the ICC.  Rapp responded that 
the United States had consistently called for Bosco to be brought to 
justice for his alleged involvement in war crimes, but that this was 
a ultimately an action to be taken by sovereign Congolese 
authorities.  Regarding the US relationship with ICC, Rapp said the 
U.S. had cooperated with the ICC in the past, in Sudan for instance, 
and that the Obama administration was in the process of defining the 
modalities of future cooperation.  Ambassador Rapp also took the 
opportunity to publicize the "Rewards for Justice" program; 
journalists and Congolese officials eagerly grabbe a number of the 
latest "wanted posters" handed ut.  Local staff at the U.S. Goma 
residence told us the Rapp press conference and Rewards for Justice 
received good play on the UN's Radio Okapi and on local Congolese 
radio. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00001042  004 OF 005 
 
 
Human Rights NGOs 
----------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) In Kinshasa, Mirna Adjami, Country Director for 
International Center for Transitional Justice, organized a dinner 
with several members of civil society dedicated to justice and the 
media.  They pushed the idea of a mixed tribunal in the DRC and were 
also very interested in Rapp's ideas for mixed investigative teams. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Human Rights Watch Goma researcher Ida Sawyer organized a 
meeting of eight representatives from civil society and local human 
rights-oriented NGOs.  They were generally critical of Operation 
Kimia 2, which they said hurt civilians more than the FDLR.  They 
criticized MONUC for supporting the military operation and for not 
doing enough to prevent FARDC abuses.  One representative, Raphael 
Wakenge from Bukavu, South Kivu, asserted that Kimia 2 was illegal 
because it was not approved by parliament. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) A representative of NGO "Synergie Des Femmes" (Women in 
Synergy) complained of the problems of gender-based violence in 
North Kivu.  There is no one to call for help as the police are 
corrupt or non-existent, perpetrators are almost never brought to 
justice, and there is minimal access to health care to treat 
injuries related to sexual violence.  Others reiterated her 
complaint about impunity: past crimes are not or prosecuted in DRC 
and there is no international mechanism to do so since the ICC is 
only authorized to prosecute crimes committed since 2002. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Following on this thought, Wakenge and others proposed a 
special mixed tribunal, which would be a national judicial 
institution comprising elements from the government and civil 
society and supported temporarily by international staff.  Such a 
commission, which was also recently proposed by Human Rights Watch, 
would be able to deal with a broad range of crimes, including those 
that would not be heard by the ICC because they occurred before 2002 
or other reasons. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) In response, Ambassador Rapp asked if the Congo had made 
progress in establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as 
called for in the Sun City agreement of 2002.  He was told that the 
idea had been virtually abandoned.  Rapp said the trouble with the 
mixed commission is that it would be difficult to find international 
funding as the Europeans in particular supported the establishment 
of the ICC in order to have a permanent mechanism in place so that 
expensive "special courts" as established for Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone would no longer be necessary.  He concluded by speaking 
about the Rewards for Justice program and passing out some of the 
wanted posters. 
 
Kiwanja--MONUC 
-------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Early the following morning, the Rapp delegation headed 
off to Kiwanja, the site of a major massacre of some 150 civilians 
at the hands of the CNDP on November 4-5, 2008.  The visit was 
intended to signal that the U.S. remembered the massacre and was 
concerned about continuing human rights abuses at the hands of the 
FARDC, including by units dominated by ex-CNDP.  He also met with 
members of INBATT 2, the Indian-manned MONUC battalion stationed at 
Kiwanja, which had been unwilling or unable to protect civilians 
being slaughtered literally a stone's throw from the front gate of 
their camp. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) The delegation met with officers from the battalion who 
had worked hard to put structures in place to prevent another 
Qhad worked hard to put structures in place to prevent another 
massacre.  The Indians were now making an effort to get out of the 
base, make contact with civilians, and build trust so as to 
understand the local situation and thus not to be blindsided by 
events in the future.  To build ties, it was necessary to 
demonstrate to civilians that MONUC has "the will, means, and 
ability" to protect them.  It was also necessary to listen carefully 
to civilians while displaying a "high tolerance for nonsense", i.e. 
recognizing that false alarms and conspiracy theories would likely 
be mixed in with good information.  INBATT 2 had in the last year 
begun establishing Temporary Operating Bases (TOB) in which a 
platoon-sized unit would deploy for 1-2 weeks to an area that 
intelligence indicated might be threatened by banditry or rebel 
activity; this has become a model for the rest of MONUC.  The INBATT 
2 officers indicated that in their area of responsibility FDLR 
elements are active west of Rutshuru/Kiwanja in Virunga Park as well 
toward the northeast in the direction of Ishasha and Nyamilima. 
 
Kiwanja:  civil society and massacre survivors 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
KINSHASA 00001042  005 OF 005 
 
 
¶21.  (SBU) The Rapp delegation also met in Kiwanja with a group of 
civil society representatives and then with a group of survivors of 
the massacres the year before.  The civil society representatives 
described the tensions in Kiwanja as basically a conflict between 
Tutsis from the CNDP military and Hutu civilians, though much of 
Kiwanja is also ethnic Nande.  They complained about impunity and 
how people had not been punished for their crimes, specifically 
mentioning Bosco Ntaganda, who commanded the CNDP troops during the 
Kiwanja killings.  They complained that the presence of the FDLR 
destabilized Congo, but also blamed Rwanda for its unwillingness to 
allow an inter-Rwandan dialogue that might encourage the FDLR to 
return. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) The survivors of the Kiwanja massacre told a series of 
horrifying tales.  In almost all cases, CNDP moved through the town, 
knocking on doors and killing, possibly because they suspected the 
residents were hiding anti-CNDP fighters.  Each story was worse than 
the one before.  A young mother with an infant said that she lived 
only because one of the soldiers told the others that, while they 
should kill everyone else in the house, if they killed the mother 
with the baby they would be cursed.  Notably, one of the victims -- 
a man crippled by gunshot wounds in an arm and a leg -- said he had 
been shot in August 2009, not during the Kiwanja massacres.  Members 
of the Rapp delegation were struck by the follow-on effects of the 
disaster that lingered in Kiwanja a year later:  survivors were 
often rendered homeless; they not only lost their property but also 
the family breadwinners; the wounded, who were sometimes badly 
maimed, lost the ability to generate income until they recovered 
sufficiently to return to work. 
 
Kimia 2 North Kivu Commander Colonel Bobo Kakudi 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) The Rapp delegation also met with Colonel Bobo Kakudi, 
the North Kivu Kimia 2 commander to discuss Kimia 2 and issues of 
military justice.  Colonel Kakudi readily admitted that FARDC had 
poor ties with civilians in some areas of North Kivu, especially 
Lubero and Masisi districts.  He said that he was trying to deal 
with the problem by building ties to politicians and civil society 
leaders to "sensitize" them to FARDC and improve communications 
between FARDC and civilian communities.  FARDC still had a long way 
to go in this effort, but he said military integration bringing in 
the CNDP and Mai Mai groups to FARDC was generally going well. 
Kakudi noted that he, a member of the "old" FARDC, was the North 
Kivu commander, while his deputy was ex-CNDP and the head of 
operations was ex-PARECO.  He said the high command was a melange 
and had learned to work well together.  True, some Mai Mai had not 
been integrated, but this was because their leaders generally wanted 
too high a rank.  "[Mai Mai leader] Janvier wants to integrate as a 
major general -- I am a colonel and I command the Kimia 2 operation 
in North Kivu." 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Kakudi said that Operation Kimia 2 had made major 
progress in military operations against the FDLR, but that the 
ultimate solution to the FDLR problem was "difficult" and a question 
for the politicians.  Many FDLR are tired of living in the bush for 
years, but fear returning to Rwanda.  To get them back, they need 
"sensibilization" and perhaps negotiations with the Rwandan 
Q"sensibilization" and perhaps negotiations with the Rwandan 
government.  Perhaps it would be possible to resettle some of them 
elsewhere in the DRC or in third countries, but the international 
community has labeled them "terrorists", which makes a solution 
difficult. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) In response to Rapp's queries, Kakudi said that the FARDC 
had been increasing efforts to promote military justice, improve 
discipline and punish criminal behavior.  When asked how many FARDC 
had been jailed for criminal behavior snce March-April, Kakudi said 
he did not know exatly, but said "a big number, several hundred" 
had been "sent to Kinshasa."  He said that, ultimately, 
responsibility for discipline lay with "the colonel in charge." 
Referring to a statement by President Kabila, Kakudi said the FARDC 
had embraced a policy of "zero tolerance" for criminal behavior by 
military elements. 
 
¶26.  (U) Ambassador Rapp was unable to clear this cable.  S/WCI's 
Todd Anderson, who traveled with him, did/did clear. 
 
GARVELINK