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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001033 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PGOV CG
SUBJECT: CLAN FIGHTING: EQUATEUR PROVINCE REMAINS TENSE 
 
REF: KINSHASA 997 
 
KINSHASA 00001033  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  Summary:  Dongo, the sleepy Ubangui river town that was 
the scene of recent fighting between the rival Enyele and 
Manzaya clans, is calm, but completely deserted.  A small 
detachment of MONUC's Ghanaian force is in Dongo, along with 
300 Congolese Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) elements.  The 
number of dead is uncertain, but the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 
100 people could have been killed in the violence.  UNHCR 
estimates that around 37,000 residents have fled across the 
river into the Republic of Congo, with approximately the same 
number of IDPs in the DRC.  There has been recent fighting in 
Bongoma Territory, where 9,000 residents of a village 
reportedly fled fearing an attack.  Although groups have 
issued communiques calling on residents to resist the DRC 
security forces, MONUC believes--and we agree--the fighting 
is clan-based and not part of a rebellion, for now.  The 
events in the area highlight the lack of state authority 
throughout the DRC and the small footprint (and capacity) of 
MONUC to deal with serious problems outside of the East.  End 
summary. 
 
History of Enyele-Manzaya Dispute 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The conflict between the Enyele and Manzaya clans 
of the Lobala ethnic group dates back to at least 1945-46, 
when the two groups began quarreling over fishing rights and 
profits from exports of fish across the Ubangui River to the 
Republic of Congo (ROC).  Fishing is the only source of 
income in the area.  In March/April 2009, the dispute 
reignited following the replacement of the local 
administrator (the central government's representative) in 
Dongo.  Enyele elements apparently attacked Manzaya elements, 
claiming the Manzaya were not indigenous to the area and 
therefore did not have the right to engage in local commerce. 
 Between March-September 2009, Enyele and Manzaya clashed in 
at least four separate incidents.  MONUC sources told us that 
in July, Enyele fighters burned down the town of Manzaya 
(Note: the name of the town is also spelled "Monzaya."  End 
note).  The newly appointed administrator, a Banzaya, fled 
the area. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In October, the deposed administrator returned with 
a small detachment of the Congolese National Police (PNC). 
Initial press reports indicated that the Enyele killed 47 
policemen (reftel).  MONUC told us that it could only verify 
that 16 policemen had been killed in Dongo, but 25 policemen 
were missing.  Our MONUC contact opined that, while the 
missing policemen could be dead, it is also possible that 
individuals, many of whom are highly superstitious, might 
have fled a much-feared witch doctor known as "General" 
Odjani, who led the Enyele fighters. 
 
Dongo Calm, But a Ghost Town 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Several MONUC sources told us that Dongo and a 
40-kilometer radius around the town is completely deserted, 
with its residents having fled across to the ROC or into the 
surrounding bush.  MONUC said that women and children had 
apparently preferred to flee across the river, while many men 
went into the forest.  Although numbers are fluid, UNHCR's 
Kinshasa Office estimated nearly 37,000 persons have fled 
into the ROC, confirming information received from Embassy 
Brazzaville.  According to MONUC, there are perhaps another 
QBrazzaville.  According to MONUC, there are perhaps another 
36,000 IDPs but our sources stressed this is extremely 
difficult to estimate. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) When the current fighting broke out, the nearest 
MONUC forces were 230 km away in Gemena.  After failed 
attempts to reach the area by various means--road, river, and 
assessment of air movement--a small detachment of 20 Ghanaian 
troops from Gemena reached Dongo, where 300 policemen from 
the PNC's Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) unit had already 
arrived.  NPC Second Deputy Inspector General Benjamin 
Alongoboni personally led the 500 PIR forces dispersed 
throughout the region and guided MONUC on a tour of Dongo, 
where bodies were "strewn all over the streets" (Comment: 
Alongoboni brought credibility to the operation as a native 
of the region, and member of the opposition Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo, MLC, party, which has its origins in 
Equateur. His selection makes it difficult for the opposition 
to claim human rights violations by the central government in 
 
KINSHASA 00001033  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
opposition territory. End comment).  A member of MONUC noted 
that the PIR had left the bodies of slain PNC on the street, 
perhaps in an effort to demonstrate that the PIR had not been 
responsible for the killings (Note: some observers were 
concerned that, following the initial killing of PNC troops, 
the PNC/PIR would respond with disproportionate force against 
the local population, as it did towards Bundu-dia-Kongo (BDK) 
supporters in Bas-Congo Province in early 2008.  End note). 
Apparently, many residents were coerced into participating in 
violent acts, much as many Rwandans had been forced to do 
during the 1994 genocide.  Recognizing this, the PIR told 
MONUC it would only target the leaders of the "rebellion." 
The PIR had arrested approximately 100 people in Dongo on 
various charges.  MONUC said it had information that the 
Enyele leaders were in the Imese area, using a boat, which 
they stole from UNHCR in June, to wreak havoc up and down 
this stretch of the Ubangui. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) A team comprised of representatives from several UN 
bodies returned November 14 from a fact-finding mission to 
Dongo, Tangal, Ozene, and Kungu.  A MONUC spokesman said the 
team could not establish an exact number of casualties.  GDRC 
Communications Minister Lambert Mende announced that the GDRC 
would send a second mission to the region with "more robust" 
humanitarian and security elements.  An OCHA spokesman said 
approximately 100 people had died in the violence.  Dongo, 
according to the spokesman, had been empty since the PIR took 
control of it on November 7 (Note: another MONUC contact told 
us that it was not clear if the population had already fled 
Dongo before the police arrived, or if they fled fearing the 
arrival of the police.  End note). 
 
Fighting Continues 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) MONUC reported that fighting continues in the 
Bomongo area, as Enyele troops reportedly killed 7 Manzayas 
on November 17 at Sabasaba, ad the Manzayas retaliated by 
killing five Enyeles on November 18.  A provincial deputy, 
Jean Faustin Mokoma (AMP), said that additional fighting 
occurred at Longundo, a village near Sabasaba. 
 
¶8.  (U) Radio Okapi reported that the village of Buburu in 
Bomongo Territory, with a population of 9,000, emptied on 
November 20 following a rumor that the village would be 
attacked.  A resident told Radio Okapi that, absent any 
FARDC, PNC, or MONUC presence, the population fled across the 
river to Impfondo and into the surrounding forest.  UNHCR and 
ICRC temporarily closed their offices in Buburu. 
 
Call to Arms? 
------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The "Patriotic Resistance of Dongo" issued a 
communique on November 18 stating that DRC security forces 
had attacked its positions in the Dongo area.  The group 
claimed to have access to significant numbers of arms and it 
announced it aimed to attack and capture Gemena.  The 
Alliance of Patriots for the Reform of the Congo (APARECO), 
led by Honore Ngbanda, has also published several texts 
critical of the GDRC and calling on local residents to resist 
the FARDC and PNC interventions.  It is uncertain whether 
these are real political associations and/or militias, or are 
simply taking advantage of violence in the area to draw 
attention to their grievances. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment:  We share MONUC's assessment that the 
Q10.  (SBU) Comment:  We share MONUC's assessment that the 
fighting is for now a clan-based dispute, not a rebellion. 
Nevertheless, some reports suggest that the fighting could 
have been sparked by supporters of jailed DRC opposition 
leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, a native of Equateur province, who 
were attempting to access an arms cache.  Neither UNHCR nor 
MONUC believe that the situation will improve enough to allow 
refugees and IDPs to return home in the near-term.  The 
situation is obviously very tense, and it will be difficult 
to obtain reliable, up-to-date information on the military 
and humanitarian situation in the area as the villages are 
mostly reachable only by boat.  We were also initially 
concerned that the PNC might use excessive force against the 
local population, but for now the PNC seems to have exercised 
restraint. 
 
The sudden eruption of fighting in Equateur is a reminder 
that the entire DRC, not just the East, remains fragile.  It 
also points to the lack of state authority throughout the 
 
KINSHASA 00001033  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
country, and the possibility that well-armed groups can 
easily employ their strength vis-a-vis locally-based FARDC 
and PNC units.  It is also a reminder of how important it is 
to forge ahead with SSR efforts.  Finally, this situation may 
be a foretaste of things to come should MONUC remove all 
troops from the western part of the DRC.  With the 
overwhelming majority of its forces already in the East, 
MONUC can still respond to challenges to state authority 
throughout the country, but cannot do so quickly and 
effectively.  End comment. 
GARVELINK