VZCZCXRO0309
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1300/01 3211314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171314Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4754
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001300 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS, GRASSROOTS EFFORTS KEY TO DARFUR PEACE, SAYS GOS 
LEAD NEGOTIATOR 
 
REF: Khartoum 829 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The biggest obstacle to a political solution of 
the Darfur conflict is not the rebels' lack of political will, but 
rather their lack of capacity, the GOS lead negotiator to the Doha 
talks told CDA and S/USSES Peace and Security Team in a meeting on 
November 16. Dr. Amin Hassan Omer, State Minister for Culture, Youth 
and Sports, also cautioned that while the Doha peace process could 
address security arrangements, the best mechanism to address the 
question of power sharing was the holding of elections, which would 
neutralize the movements' personal and tribal aspirations to 
political power. Other contentious issues such as land rights and 
tribal reconciliation would ultimately have to be solved not in Doha 
but rather at the grassroots level in Darfur, he said. Omer also 
expressed concern about the marginalization of Darfur's Arab tribes 
in the peace process. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Omer believes that the rebels' lack of capacity is a 
greater obstacle to a peace agreement than a lack of political will. 
The real problem is finding credible representatives from the 
movements, he said, adding that unlike the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) in Naivasha, Darfur's rebels were largely naove and 
unsophisticated. Civil society can help fill these gaps, he said, by 
addressing issues like justice and reconciliation which the 
movements are ill-suited to tackle. While the movements can 
negotiate security arrangements and power sharing, issues such as 
land rights and compensation will ultimately have to be solved at 
the grassroots level. "Not everything can be resolved in Doha," he 
said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While an eventual peace agreement will clear an important 
hurdle to a sustainable peace in Darfur, improving the security and 
humanitarian situation is not incumbent on negotiations, said Omer. 
The reactivation of some security provisions of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA), such as IDP involvement in community policing, can 
go a long way towards improving security on the ground, he said. He 
also lauded the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID)'s community policing efforts and training of local police 
as positive steps in increasing security. 
 
¶4. (SBU) With regard to the next steps in the peace process, Omer 
noted that Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole had told him he 
expected to convene a roundtable in Doha following the Eid holiday 
(Note: The Eid al Adha holiday occurs November 28-30. End Note), 
with representatives from the Addis Group and possibly the Tripoli 
Group as well. JEM may also feel pressure to attend given the 
nascent rapprochement between Chad and Sudan, but the real problem 
is Abdul Wahid. Omer does not expect Abdul Wahid to return to the 
negotiating table, an obstacle he believes can be overcome if the 
Addis Group achieves enough popular legitimacy. (Note: The Tripoli 
Group, largely a collection of individuals, has no such legitimacy. 
End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Omer noted that following Eid, discussions between the GOS 
and the Addis Group and/or Tripoli group on a cessation of 
hostilities and framework agreement will likely be cut short by the 
Christmas holiday, although a cessation of hostilities with those 
parties should not take long to negotiate, he said, given that it 
already exists in de facto form. A framework agreement addressing 
issues such as power sharing would take longer, he said, but noted 
that the ultimate solution to the power sharing dilemma was to focus 
on elections as a way to neutralize personal and tribal aspirations 
to political power on the part of the movements. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Omer also expressed concern about the marginalization of 
Darfur's Arab tribes in the current peace process, noting that most 
were not a part to the conflict. "They feel that if peace ever 
comes, it will be at their expense," he said. He noted that while 
banditry is rampant along the vast territory of Darfur, some of it 
is "politically instigated" by frustrated Arab tribesman. The tribal 
leadership has the ability to curb such activity, but a vigorous 
outreach is needed, he said. He further noted that talk of 
development in Darfur needs to go beyond the needs of settled 
peoples to include nomads as well. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: Omer is correct about the de facto ceasefire 
between the GOS and indigenous Darfuri rebel groups, save for the 
occasional GOS offensive to "rout out bandits", which more often 
than not results in GOS encroachment on Darfur's "liberated zones". 
With UNAMID approaching full deployment and looking to strengthen 
its implementation of rules of engagement, there is hope for an 
improved security situation in 2010; however, Darfur's restive Arab 
tribesmen responsible for much of the banditry and kidnappings must 
be reined in, a responsibility that ultimately lies with the 
government. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001300  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
 
WHITEHEAD