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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1263, DEMARCATION OF ABYEI BOUNDARY REMAINS FROZEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1263 2009-11-08 08:33 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2452
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1263/01 3120833
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 080833Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4706
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001263 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KDEM MOPS SU
SUBJECT:  DEMARCATION OF ABYEI BOUNDARY REMAINS FROZEN 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 862 B) KHARTOUM 1135 C) KHARTOUM 1174 D) KHARTOUM 
2034 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. On November 5, Poloff spoke with Kwol Biong 
(SPLM), Deputy Chair of the Abyei Border Demarcation Committee, who 
said that no physical demarcation of the Abyei border has occurred. 
Biong said that security issues are the committee's primary concern, 
but also complained of insufficient equipment and the lack of an 
oversight committee.  In an October 29 meeting with CDA Whitehead, 
Al Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed (NCP), Abyei point-person for the 
Government of Sudan (GoS), admitted that neither the National 
Congress Party (NCP) nor the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) have formed a joint task force to disseminate the PCA 
decision as agreed in the trilateral talks.  On November 5, Abyei 
Chief Administrator Arop Mayak Monytoc (SPLM) told CDA Whitehead 
that he has not received the budget promised by Khartoum.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The six member Abyei Border Demarcation Committee was 
formed by Presidential decree on August 27, in furtherance of the 
points of agreement signed by the SPLM and the NCP on August 14th. 
The Committee was given thirty days to demarcate the boundary of 
Abyei as described by the July 22 ruling of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague (Ref A).  To date, however, Biong 
said the demarcation team has not physically demarcated any of the 
Abyei boundary, though it has done some reconnaissance of the 
proposed boundary via helicopter. 
 
3. (SBU) Biong said that demarcation team has been unable to work 
because of security issues.  Large numbers of Misseriya, an Arab 
tribe in Southern Kordofan who migrate through Abyei with their 
cattle during the dry season, see Abyei's demarcation as a threat to 
their livelihoods.  Elements of the Misseriya have rejected the PCA 
decision and threatened violence against demarcation efforts (Ref 
B).  Biong said that the team has already been subject to threats 
and intimidation by local Misseriya while in the field.  Biong said 
that this situation is made intolerable because half of Abyei's 
Joint Integrated Unit (JIU), tasked with providing security to the 
demarcation team, is Misseriya.  In the event of a security 
incident, Biong states that it is unclear whether the Misseriya JIU 
members will protect the demarcation team.  In addition, Biong says 
that the protection team is currently limited to 100 members, but 
that a larger force is called for given the large number of 
Misseriya currently migrating into Abyei. 
 
4. (SBU) Biong stated in the coming days the team would attempt to 
construct the two pillars demarcating the southern corners of the 
Abyei boundary.  He said, however, that until the team is provided 
with soldiers from outside the local community to provide security, 
the team will not attempt to work on the northern portion of the 
Abyei border, as this area is already occupied by Misseriya. 
 
5. (SBU) Biong noted that other issues, described in an October 9 
letter to Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Vice President Riek 
Machar, written by the SPLM members of the committee, continue to be 
a hinderance (Ref C).  Biong stated that the team has not been 
provided with equipment sufficient for the task, including any kind 
of digging machinery to install the pillars and posts that will 
demarcate the boundary.  (Note: The Government of Sudan (GoS) has 
provided at least one helicopter to the committee which the 
committee planned to use on November 5, both because of security 
issues and given that the terrain is still too wet for normal 
vehicles.  End Note.)  Biong also noted that his technical committee 
still lacks an oversight committee as called for by the Points of 
Agreement.  (Note: The GoS maintains that an oversight committee is 
unnecessary, as the demarcation of the Abyei boundary is strictly a 
technical task.  End Note.)  Instead, without the consent of the 
SPLM, responsibility for coordinating administrative and security 
issues rests with Sami Bushara (NCP), as administrative secretary of 
the committee.  Biong stated that Bushara is carrying out his duties 
in a manner calculated to frustrate the team. 
 
6.  (SBU) In an October 29 meeting with CDA Whitehead, GoS Abyei 
point-person Al Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed (Ref. D) admitted that neither 
the NCP nor the SPLM have formed a joint task force to disseminate 
the PCA decision as agreed in the trilateral talks.  (Comment. 
Ironically, the only official on either side to tackle the issue is 
South Kordofan Governor Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, an ICC-indictee for 
his involvement in the Darfur conflict.  He continues active 
outreach to the Misseriya in an attempt to keep temperatures down. 
End Comment.) 
 
7.  (SBU) On November 5, Abyei Chief Administrator Arop Mayak 
Monytoc told CDA Whitehead that he has not received the budget 
promised by Khartoum.  Since last January the Abyei Administration 
has received only six million Sudanese pounds (appx. USD 2,400,000), 
 
KHARTOUM 00001263  002 OF 002 
 
 
including an early November tranche of one million Sudanese pounds, 
barely enough to cover salaries and basic operating expenses. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment.  The demarcation team's problems are a sign and 
product of the greater political issues facing both Abyei and 
greater Sudan.  With the Misseriya having begun their annual 
migration south into Abyei, boundary demarcation there is unlikely 
to move ahead in the near future and could be a catalyst to broader 
conflict.  End Comment. 
 
WHITEHEAD