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P 191151Z NOV 09
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001047 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MIDWEST NEPAL CALM, MAOIST SUPPORT DECLINES 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 0741 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Support for the Maoists in two districts 
in midwestern Nepal appears to have decreased since the April 
2008 elections, as ethnic-based political movements gain 
strength.  During a trip to Banke and Bardiya districts, 
EmbOffs found the security situation generally calm. 
Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is mixed; 
Young Communist League (YCL) criminal activity down, but 
local peace committees are not functional and only some 
Maoist-seized land has been returned.  No one has confidence 
that politicians will finish the new constitution on time or 
that it will make any difference in their lives.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) EmbOffs traveled to Bardiya and Banke Districts in 
Mid-Western Nepal October 28-30, and met with the Chief 
District Officers (CDOs), senior police officers, human 
rights activists, party leaders, and officials from the 
National Human Rights Commission and Office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  EmbOffs also met with 
representatives of the Tharu ethnic group, the largest ethnic 
group advocating for greater autonomy (septel).  Bardiya and 
Banke districts were among the most affected by the 10-year 
Maoist conflict; in Bardiya district alone, more than 200 
people disappeared or were abducted, the highest number of 
any part of the country. 
 
Security Situation Improved but Uncertain 
----------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) The security situation in the two districts appeared 
generally calm, according to the CDOs and police officials. 
The Government of Nepal,s Special Security Plan (reftel) has 
had a positive impact in the districts; the increased police 
presence and enforcement had reduced the number of road 
blockades and overall criminal activity.  However, the police 
complained about the lack of needed resources -- manpower, 
vehicles, and radios -- to implement the plan.  Many Village 
Development Cooperatives (VDCs) had no police presence at 
all, only "symbolic" visits from time to time. 
 
¶4. (SBU) One of the large Terai-based criminal/political 
gangs, the Jwala Singh faction of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti 
Morcha, remained somewhat active in the region, and continued 
extorting money from wealthy residents.  The local officials 
complained that Jwala Singh members often fled to India when 
under pressure.  India and Nepali officials meet regularly, 
and cross-border cooperation was improving, Banke CDO 
Birendra Bahadur Baniya reported. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The local police reported that simmering tensions 
between religious (Hindu-Muslim) and ethnic 
(Tharu-Terai-Pahadi) groups remained their primary security 
concern.  Police worry that a small incident could spark a 
larger conflict, such as happened a few months ago when a 
fight between a Muslim and Hindu led to communal violence, 
forcing police to use tear gas.  Local populations often 
resent the government officials sent from the "hilly" 
(Pahadi) region of Nepal to run affairs in their region.  For 
example, in Nepalgunj, the capitol of Banke District in the 
Terai, Muslims account for nearly 40 percent of the 
population.  In Bardiya district, more than 50 percent of the 
population is Tharu.  Yet, none of the senior government 
officials in either district were Tharu, Madhesi, or Muslim, 
and only a handful of the police came from local communities. 
 
Peace Process Incomplete 
------------------------ 
¶6. (SBU) While the security situation is improved, little 
progress has been made on key peace process issues.  The 
local peace committees -- created by the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement to prevent conflict and promote peace at the local 
level -- are not functional in either district.  In Banke, 
the various parties are fighting over the nomination of the 
coordinator; in Bardiya, the Maoists have refused to 
participate.  Nepalgunj-based human rights activist Ganesh 
Regmi said the LPCs were a "great idea" that has been 
high-jacked by petty party politics. 
 
KATHMANDU 00001047  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the two districts, the Maoists have yet to return 
all of the land seized during the conflict -- a key 
requirement of the CPA -- although the picture is complex. 
During the conflict, the Maoists did not always seize the 
land for themselves, but rather handed it over to the 
"tillers" who previously farmed the land for landlords.  The 
tillers supported the Maoists not for ideological reasons, 
but because they personally benefited from Maoist policies. 
Now that the conflict is over, the tillers do not want to 
return the land, even if the local Maoists ostensibly request 
it.  In some cases, the Maoists have "negotiated" for the 
return of the land, but the tillers are allowed to keep a 
larger percentage of the crop (often half instead of a third) 
-- an unsatisfactory result for the landlords.  In some ten 
percent of the cases, the Maoists/tillers have yet to return 
any control, reported the Bardiya Nepali Congress leader 
Krishna Man Shrestha. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On the positive side, nearly all contacts reported 
that the criminal activity of the Maoist-affiliated Young 
Communist League had dropped considerably, with only sporadic 
reports of looting.  (Note: YCL activity is reportedly higher 
in certain parts of eastern Nepal.  End note.)  The local 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist leaders and local government 
officials also appear to cooperate well.  During EmbOff,s 
visit, the two sides met to discuss the modalities of 
upcoming Maoist protests to ensure they did not turn violent. 
 
 
Maoist Support Waning? 
---------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) In these two districts, most observers report that 
political support for the Maoists has decreased somewhat 
since the April 2008 elections.  (Although we tend to agree 
with these reports, they are anecdotal; there is no accurate 
polling data in Nepal.)  Many ethnic Tharus, who voted en 
masse for the Maoists, no longer support the party.  When the 
Maoists were in power, many Tharus believe they did little to 
help them.  Tharu leaders are discussing forming their own 
political party or joining with other oppressed ethnic groups 
(Janjatis) in a larger political movement (septel).  In 
Bardiya, Maoists no longer hold large rallies because no one 
comes, the CDO reported. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Other major political parties, the Nepali Congress 
and Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML) 
say they are trying to capitalize on the declining Maoist 
support, but with little success.  Organizing in rural areas 
in Bardiya district remains very difficult, according to 
district UML leader Ashok Koirala, where the violent conflict 
with the Maoists continues to loom large in the minds of the 
local population.  This "mentality of fear" is difficult to 
change.  While the Maoists may profess commitment to 
democracy, no one has any illusions about their ultimate game 
-- seizing absolute control.  One Nepali Congress leader 
suggested that the Maoists still have "guns and money," and 
thus will likely win the next election, regardless of their 
popular support. 
 
Constitution, What Constitution? 
-------------------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) Asked about the constitution drafting in Kathmandu, 
not a single Nepali, from senior official to storekeeper, had 
any faith in the process.  Comments like the leaders only go 
to Kathmandu to "eat and drink," the constitution "means 
nothing for my life," and "they won,t be done on time" were 
common.  Several leaders worried that the division of the 
country in ethnically-based federal states could spark 
conflict, given Nepal,s complex ethnic diversity.  If a 
Tharu state ("Tharuwaat") is declared in this part of the 
country -- as proposed by the Maoists and UML -- several 
observers worried violence might break out between Tharus and 
the Madhesis.  If the area becomes part of a Madhesi state -- 
as the Terai-based parties seek -- the Tharus will protest. 
The "hilly" (Pahadi) population, many wealthier landlords or 
government officials, are uncertain how they will fare in a 
 
KATHMANDU 00001047  003 OF 003 
 
 
new federal structure. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶12. (SBU) The generally calm security situation in 
previously-volatile regions is encouraging, but masks deep 
inter-ethnic and inter-party tensions.  The fragile situation 
underscores the importance of completing the peace process 
rapidly and reestablishing effective government control 
throughout the country.  If accurate, the reports of 
declining Maoist support among allies like the ethnic Tharus 
would pose serious political problems for the Maoists as they 
prepare for the next election. 
BERRY