VZCZCXRO8007
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3775/01 3290708
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250708Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3403
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003775 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF AMGT
SUBJECT: Challenges to Another Civilian Uplift: Moving Forward, but 
Carefully Q Sustainability, Supportability, and Accountability 
 
Ref. Kabul 1762 
 
¶1. (SBU) Introduction:  At the DepartmentQs request, Embassy Kabul 
in recent days has developed rough estimates of additional civilians 
that may be needed in the field under different scenarios for the 
deployment of additional military troops to Afghanistan.  (These 
estimates apply to increases above and beyond the QBeyond 421Q field 
positions requested by the Embassy in reftel, which we continue to 
support strongly.)  It may well be that an additional round of 
civilian intake proves justified, and we would certainly want to 
have an appropriate civilian team with any new command center 
established under new troop deployments.  For several reasons, 
however, we believe we also need to consolidate the dramatic 
civilian increases already underway before moving too quickly with a 
significant additional civilian uplift.  Provided below are some of 
the main challenges we already face in deploying civilians to the 
field.  The faster we go, the more severe these constraints will 
become.  End introduction. 
 
Lack of Track Record on the Civilian Uplift to Date 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Over the past year, the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan has 
more than doubled in size.  We will soon have roughly quadrupled the 
number of employees in the field.  With the anticipated additional 
approval of another large number of QBeyond 421Q field positions, 
another wave of Qcivilian upliftQ is already in train.  The 
expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in the field is not only 
making existing platforms (at the four Regional Commands, PRTs, and 
Brigade Task Forces) more robust, but we are standing up entirely 
new structures in the form of District Support Teams.  The logic 
behind these new structures is solid, but they have not been in 
existence long enough to build an actual track record of 
performance.  It makes great sense to allow time to assess the 
performance of what we are now building, especially the DSTs, and on 
the basis of actual experience determine where adjustments are 
needed.  (It is also important for the Department to assess the 
sustainability of such large numbers over a multi-year period.)  The 
exception to this would be that, if a new task force headquarters or 
PRTs were to be established with additional troop deployments in 
their care, we would want to include plans for staffing appropriate 
civilian teams more quickly.  Also, if additional AID funding is 
approved, we will require additional staff to assure efficient and 
careful management of AID programs. 
 
Locally Engaged Staff 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) The importance of hiring locally engaged staff in tandem 
with USG civilians cannot be overstated.  The reality is that very 
few American civilians can operate successfully in Afghan towns and 
villages without the assistance of local nationals.  The most 
fundamental reason for this is foreign language competence; very few 
USG civilians have sufficient competence in the local Afghan 
language to operate independently and must therefore rely on 
interpreters.  In a country where the majority of U.S. personnel 
serve for only one year, local staff also provide needed continuity. 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Beyond this, as at missions all over the world, LES serve 
as irreplaceable Qcultural interpretersQ of local norms, customs, 
and ways of doing business.  In a QnormalQ embassy the ratio of LES 
to American staff is usually at least 5-1.  In contrast, by the end 
of this year we will have nearly twice as many American personnel 
country-wide as LES.  At the village level in Afghanistan, such 
social rules can be nearly impenetrable without native familiarity 
of the environment.  Local staff can be crucial in identifying key 
leaders and initiating and maintaining relationships. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) While the demand for qualified LES support is great, the 
supply is very limited.  Competition among foreign and international 
organizations for the best help is fierce.   Many Afghans resist 
being transferred to jobs far from their homes, especially in 
insecure areas of the country, making the pool of potential 
applicants available for sub-national work even smaller.  Moreover, 
to the extent we are QsuccessfulQ in recruiting local talent, we may 
undermine another important U.S. policy objective Q building Afghan 
capacity Q by draining the best and the brightest from Afghan 
organizations, which cannot compete in terms of salary and benefits. 
 We also are cognizant of the reality that the more US personnel we 
send here, the more dependent Afghanistan may become on our 
presence.  Our large influx of personnel should be seen as temporary 
and primarily needed to ultimately wean Afghanistan from foreign-led 
development and help them become accountable for their own future. 
The USG is working with other international partners to increase 
vocational and higher education opportunities in order to expand the 
labor pool, but that is a long-term undertaking. 
 
KABUL 00003775  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) When the right local nationals can be found, two other 
specific issues also need to be addressed.  The first is our own 
security clearance requirements for large numbers of LES hires, a 
complicated undertaking in a country where few dependable records 
exist.  Related to security clearances is the question of access to 
bases where American military and civilians are located.  This will 
have to be negotiated with ISAF. But the bottom line is that we must 
put a very high priority on hiring locally employed staff. 
 
Constraints in RC-North and RC-West 
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¶7. (SBU) One of the largest challenges to placing Q421 civilians 
has been the multilateral structures of RC-N and RC-W, and the 
reality that we must obtain the concurrence of coalition partners 
for any new civilian placements.  Some countries are reluctant to 
give their consent for a host of reasons related to both policy 
concerns and resource constraints.  Resources are a critical issue 
for these partners.  In some cases they do not have any room to 
spare.  Even if Embassy Kabul were able to source and provide the 
necessary life support, coalition-led PRTs and RCs still struggle to 
have the space to accommodate additional connexes and the like. 
While we are confident we can place all of our currently planned 
increases in staff, there is no reason to think our partners will be 
more accommodating to the next wave of U.S. civilians Q if anything, 
the opposite may be true.  Individual arrangements will need to be 
negotiated to place civilians in foreign-led PRTs; we have initiated 
negotiations with partner countries on life/security/mobility 
support memoranda of understanding, but this will take some time 
(septel).  While initial contacts have been positive, we cannot 
assume what is agreeable to one PRT in any region will be agreeable 
to others. 
 
Additional Support Structure 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU) Absorbing another civilian increase would put significant 
additional pressure on the support structures currently in place, 
requiring additional resources both at PRTs and DSTs themselves and 
at Embassy Kabul to support the field.  This applies to space, 
personnel, equipment, supplies, and funds.  If another civilian 
increase is to be functional and transparent, all concerned players 
will need to agree on a timeline that allows these support assets to 
be in place by the time they are needed.  One high priority will be 
the acquisition of enough Containerized Housing Units to house 
incoming civilians at coalition partner bases. 
 
GIRoA Presence 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) To the extent that another round of civilian intake is tied 
to our COIN strategy Q- placing civilians behind the military in 
newly QclearedQ areas to advance and consolidate the QholdQ and 
QbuildQ phases Q- an essential question must be squarely addressed: 
QIs GIRoA present in the districts where we will be placing 
civilians?Q  The purpose of the USG civilians will be to promote 
stabilization, economic and agricultural development, and governance 
at the local level.   This makes sense, however, only to the extent 
that there is a GIRoA presence to partner with.  A limited presence 
(district governor and police chief) could be sufficient in the 
early stages of stabilization (assuming they are competent and 
honest).  Beyond a period of about 6 months, however, line ministry 
functions need to be staffed to justify continued USG civilian 
engagement. 
 
Uncertainties over Military Scenarios 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Finally, but crucially, estimates of additional civilians 
needed over the coming year, in large measure, hinge upon the 
military force augmentation decided upon by the President, and the 
military strategy pursued with that force structure.  Until those 
decisions are made, they remain imponderables.  When the decisions 
are made, the new force structures will need to include the capacity 
to provide assured levels of security and mobility for newly 
deployed civilians to be able to do their job.  Additional forces 
will also need to coordinate and plan QclearingQ operations more 
closely than in the past with civilians who will be expected to help 
Qhold, build and transferQ newly cleared areas. As noted, we will 
certainly want to provide appropriate civilian teams to any 
commands/headquarters and PRTs to be established, and we will want 
additional staff to carry out any additional assistance programs 
that may be funded. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The above considerations in no way diminish our support 
for the large number of QBeyond 421Q field positions already agreed. 
 
KABUL 00003775  003 OF 003 
 
 
 Nevertheless, it will be imperative that further increases of 
civilians continue to be thoroughly planned and aligned with a clear 
understanding of their roles, objectives and resources available for 
them to have a positive impact.  Much of Afghanistan remains a war 
zone, and we must carefully balance our mission objectives against 
potentially placing civilians at risk. 
 
MUSSOMELI