VZCZCXRO5094
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3737/01 3260305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220305Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3329
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003737 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF ECON
SUBJECT:  RECLAIMING ARGHANDAB:  THE GATEWAY TO KANDAHAR 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  Kandahar's most pivotal district has a chance of 
significantly improved governance because U.S. military and civilian 
experts are on the ground at a district level, preparing the way for 
Afghan government engagement and working to reverse years of 
government neglect. Through a combination of continued development 
programs, improvements in Afghan-led security, and new authorities 
for the district governance, we can increase the prospect of keeping 
the Taliban at bay in the Arghandab valley.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On November 15, Ambassador Eikenberry visited the District 
Support Team (DST) and met with district leaders in Arghandab, a 
district north of Kandahar along the fertile Arghandab river valley. 
 The DST is a model of civ-mil cooperation. It is supporting the 
development of district governance, which is beginning to coalesce 
in a manner that gives some hope to the area.  Arghandab is a 
district in the balance.  Still far removed from the national 
government and with little support from the Kandahar provincial 
government, the fertile and scenic area is heavily contested by the 
Taliban.  Their chosen tactic has been assassinations designed to 
weaken and divide the tribes.  Arghandab is the temporary home of 
Stryker Brigade 5/2, which has fought hard and suffered 22 killed in 
action in 2009.  Recent fragile progress shows USG and Afghan 
efforts in Arghandab may turn out to be a model of how to build 
district capacity to deliver security and welfare:  the military 
invited civilians to be part of the effort from the beginning; 
USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) staff were 
integrated during the shape phase; innovative joint USG civ-mil 
efforts have led to sustained, synchronized development programming 
by USAID's AVIPA-plus agriculture voucher program and the Strategic 
Provincial Roads program.  These programs are augmenting ongoing OTI 
and CERP activities at the district levels and are helping to build 
an Afghan-led process.  They should continue.  Local leaders are 
beginning to work together, building the government from the ground 
up, as evident through the growing influence of the weekly shura 
which is increasingly vocal about standing against the Taliban. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) District leader Haji Abdul Jabar recently visited Nagahan, 
located on the west bank of the Arghandab river, formerly a no-go 
zone.  He attended the local shura to listen to grievances.  This 
visit led to elders from Nagahan attending the regular shura 
meetings in Arghandab, including six at the most recent shura with 
the Ambassador (see para 4).  This is a major development as it 
brings communities on the west bank of the river into the district's 
governance.  In the past month the Arghandab district center has 
seen an increase in the number of constituents approaching the 
district center with grievances, a positive development that 
indicates public recognition of the district "government." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Ambassador met with a shura of 30-35 district leaders 
during the visit to the DST.  The Ambassador told participants that 
U.S. and ISAF military and civilians were committed to working with 
them on rule of law and development, and stressed that these were 
key to local and national security.  He said the United States had 
made many sacrifices, including the loss of 20 soldiers and over 40 
wounded in Arghandab.  Now, it is time for the citizens of the 
district to do their part to help their own community.  We are 
committed to this mission, but we need your help - we can't stay 
forever, he told the shura.  He informed the district leaders the 
United States was committed to their security, but that we would 
rather spend a billion dollars on development than on security. 
"Please treat our soldiers like your own sons.  If you do this, we 
will fight with you." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Tribal leader Karimullah (age 27) and the chief of police 
were both present among the shura (comment:  a good demonstration of 
some level of unity; end comment).  Shura leaders spoke out against 
the Taliban, saying "if they take over, the whole area will 
collapse."  Some of the Taliban were locally recruited, but most 
were from outside the area, they explained.  The leaders admitted 
the disorganization of the tribes had allowed the Taliban to gain 
ground, but added that "tribes need protection."  Shura participants 
listed a number of priority needs including: road construction, 
fruit processing companies, reopening of electricity and cell phone 
towers, basic education and health services.  People of the district 
were disappointed by Kabul - "we need local people for local 
problems." 
 
Security Capacity Needs Focus 
----------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) ANSF capacity is weak in Arghandab.  There is a 
nine-to-one U.S. to ANA troop ratio.  When the ANA conducts 
operations, they bring only 20 to 40 troops, when they need over 
¶100.  There are three companies of ANA operating in the Arghandab 
area of operation, but the overall commander is in Kandahar.  The 
82nd Airborne has begun police training, but there is still a severe 
shortage of ANP. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Arghandab DST staffing is currently one USAID/OTI officer, 
 
KABUL 00003737  002 OF 002 
 
 
one State Rep (Democracy and Governance), and a USFOR-A Civil 
Affairs Team. 
 
 
Extraordinary Measures From Kabul Also Needed 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment.  In addition to security and development support 
and engagement at the local level, district governments such as 
Arghandab also need support from Kabul to build their capacities to 
deliver.  This would require extraordinary measures to take 
advantage of a short window of opportunity:  giving district 
governments limited authorities to hire personnel and pay higher 
wages with the goal of assembling 5-6 key ministry representatives 
to deliver key services including dispute resolution.  End Comment. 
 
 
MUSSOMELI