VZCZCXRO1019
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3707/01 3220207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180207Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3241
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8115
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 5697

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003707 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INL/AP 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS TO USDA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR USFOR-A COS, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAGR AF
SUBJECT:  Helmand's Agriculture Department's Dysfunction Inhibits COIN 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Demonstrating that provincial government can 
deliver needed services is the cornerstone of the counterinsurgency 
strategy in Afghanistan. In Helmand, given the importance of 
agriculture, improving Helmand's Department of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Livestock (DAIL) is our best available opportunity to reach the 
maximum number of Afghans with information and services that will 
tangibly improve people's livelihoods. Despite this tremendous 
opportunity, Helmand's DAIL is corrupt and dysfunctional. The USG 
Inter-Agency Civ-Mil Agriculture Team on the ground in Helmand is 
dedicated to increasing the capacity of Helmand's DAIL.  However, 
achieving a functioning DAIL requires commitment from the Kabul-based 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) to appoint 
better officials, support district-based staff and place greater 
emphasis on service delivery to farmers. 
 
History of Corrupt Leadership Undermines COIN 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) Corruption investigations and dismissals at HelmandQs DAIL 
entrench local mistrust of DAIL and GIRoA.  The acting Director of the 
Helmand DAIL was arrested on November 3 by the National Directorate of 
Security (NDS) on charges of corruption related to a UK-funded wheat 
seed distribution program.  This comes less than six months after the 
long-serving previous Director was dismissed under suspicion of selling 
MAIL-owned land for personal profit.  In this environment, DAIL civil 
servants, historically trained to work in a highly centralized 
organization, are left without leadership and cannot effectively 
execute their responsibilities.  Signaling the importance of 
agriculture in Helmand, an acting Director was named within a week of 
the arrest of the previous director by the Governor.  This paperwork 
has been sent to Kabul for the Ministry's approval. 
 
Lack of District Presence 
------------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) All Helmand districts have funded and staffed civil service 
positions for district-based DAIL employees; however, in a recent USDA 
survey, all but one district reported no DAIL employees living or 
working in the district. Nearly all of Helmand's district DAIL staff 
live and work in Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, and claim that 
significant security issues make living and working in the districts 
impossible. In reality, according to Helmand Governor Mangal, 
employees use security as an excuse to, "sit in Lashkar Gah, drink tea 
and collect their salaries."  The USG Inter-Agency Civ-Mil Agriculture 
Team in Helmand facilitated the return of DAIL employees to the 
recently cleared Nawa and Khanashin districts, but this was 
unfortunately a short-lived win, as these extension workers returned 
to Lashkar Gah after short periods.  In Nar-e-Saraj district, which 
includes the Helmand's key commercial city of Gereshk, DAIL maintains 
Helmand's sole district office, with six employees. Unfortunately, 
these employees deliver few (if any) Afghan government programs to 
farmers. 
 
Low Salaries, but Little Left for Services 
------------------------------------------ 
¶4.  (SBU) Poor budget management and low pay severely restrict Helmand 
DAIL's ability to deliver GIRoA programming and services.  During the 
last Afghan budget year, HelmandQs DAIL spent $25,000, only 7% of its 
budget, on goods and services for agriculture producers and spent 93% 
of its budget on salaries.  During a USAID-facilitated DAIL employee 
shura held in August, employees asked "why should they be expected to 
drive out to districts when DAIL couldn't even reimburse the cost of 
using personal transportation for on-farm extension work?" Helmand's 
DAIL salaries are paid on the national pay scale, despite the higher 
cost of living in Helmand and inherent risk to government workers in 
this volatile province.  Extension workers salaries average $100-$150 
per month, while day laborers earn around $150 per month, and seasonal 
poppy harvesting work pays up to $10-$15 per day. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Comment:  Helmand's DAIL has U.S. and international partners 
and programs that are collaborating at the national, provincial and 
district level.  Helmand's DAIL, in its current form, is not currently 
a reliable partner for U.S. efforts to improve agricultural production 
in Helmand, and persistently demonstrates weak and ineffective 
government to all of Helmand's population.  Critically, DAIL's failings 
are most apparent to farmers in the districts, the very population for 
which GIRoA is competing with the insurgency.  USG agriculture 
programming, therefore, must work with whatever community-based 
governance bodies are available, including District Councils and 
Community Development Councils.  With basic personnel changes and some 
initiative from the Ministry in Kabul - especially with respect to 
appointments, pay, and mandating district presence - this situation 
could be reversed.  Incentivizing existing DAIL district staff to 
return to districts, with either a pay increase or danger pay 
supplement, increased program funding for extension and delivery 
programs, and appointing effective leaders should be priorities for 
the Ministry in Kabul.  The USG Inter-Agency Agriculture Team waits 
with an open hand of partnership for the Helmand DAIL, but the 
initiative to take the next step now resides in the Kabul Ministry's 
hands. 
EIKENBERRY