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Viewing cable 09KABUL3559, ACCUSATIONS REGARDING CHILD SOLDIERS IN DEPARTMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL3559 2009-11-05 10:24 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9704
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3559/01 3091024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051024Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2886
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003559 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EIND ELAB ETRD PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: ACCUSATIONS REGARDING CHILD SOLDIERS IN DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 92560 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Department of Labor (DOL) &2008 
Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor8 (reftel) 
incorrectly identifies Afghanistan as a country recruiting 
children into its armed forces. The report's introduction 
suggests that a central economic issue for Afghanistan is 
that the GIROA actively militarizes its youths. But this view 
seriously mischaracterizes both the source and depth of the 
country's economic situation, and the armed forces efforts in 
adopting careful vetting practices.  Although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that insurgent recruitment of children is 
on the rise, to suggest that the GIROA is primarily at fault 
in this situation is misleading and does little to advance 
human rights. Post requests a retraction of this year's 
remarks and will work to change next year's DOL report to 
more accurately characterize Afghanistan's labor situation. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On September 10, 2009, the Department of Labor (DOL) 
released its &2008 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor.8 Embassy Kabul is concerned by two sentences in the 
report's introduction. DOL cites Afghanistan twice regarding 
the recruitment of children into the armed forces: &In 
Afghanistan, there was increasing evidence of children being 
recruited into both state and non-state armed forces, though 
the prevalence of the occurrence was unclear8 (page xxiii). 
And: &Countries whose national armies continue to recruit 
children, such as the Central African Republic, Chad, and 
Afghanistan, have demonstrated a lack of commitment to 
address the most grievous forms of child labor8 (page 
xxxiv). These sentences contradict our human rights reporting 
on the subject of child soldiers, and present, we believe, a 
distorted picture of the situation in Afghanistan by 
suggesting that the GIROA militarizes its youth by recruiting 
youth into the armed forces. Further, raising concerns with 
GIROA about possible child soldiers may distract GIROA energy 
and attention from the more pressing issues of child labor, 
include child sexual exploitation. 
 
3. (SBU) Child and forced labor in Afghanistan is a 
significant and dramatically obvious problem. Insufficient 
employment options for youth and the lack of sustainable 
income-generating activities for older men and women, who 
must rely on youth to assist in feeding and sheltering their 
families, are key problems. Economic conditions probably do 
compel underage boys and sometimes girls to seek work in the 
armed forces. But such a likelihood is distinct from the 
assertion that the armed forces recruit underage soldiers. 
(NOTE: Fewer than 10 percent of children are registered at 
birth; thus accurate birth age is typically difficult to 
prove. END NOTE.) 
 
4. (U) Insurgent recruitment of underage soldiers is widely 
reported and, based on anecdotal evidence,  appears to be on 
the rise. But national armed forces recruitment of children 
is much harder to substantiate; we have thus far been unable 
to verify the allegations of deliberate child recruitment by 
national forces. 
 
5. (U) Though the DOL's rules permit them to use sources up 
to seven years old, we believe that sources from within two 
years do not support such assertions. Furthermore, the 
presence of child soldiers in Afghanistan is hardly 
comparable to countries with famously-egregious records of 
child soldiering. A recently-released RAND report titled 
&The Long March: Building An Afghan National Army,8 states 
"the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A) confirmed that recruiting young soldiers to the ANA 
has not been a major problem" (page 15) despite the high 
numbers the ANA needs to meet their recruitment targets. Our 
POL-MIL office asserts that the ANA vetting procedures are 
reputable. Our ISAF office points out that CSTC-A, which 
trains armed forces, verifies both ANA and ANP recruiting and 
vetting procedures. 
 
6. (SBU) Embassy Kabul welcomes DOL's efforts to monitor 
child labor and forced labor conditions in the countries and 
goods on the TVPRA List, but believes that this report 
mischaracterizes the economic and military situation in 
country by grouping Afghanistan with countries known for 
their active reliance on child soldiers. 
 
7. (SBU) CSCT-A does due diligence to ensure ANA and ANP 
compliance with recruitment and vetting procedures, but given 
fundamental weaknesses in Afghan birth registry systems and 
the difficulty in verifying the age of recruits, Embassy 
Kabul cannot assert that no child soldier exists within the 
ANA or ANP. Embassy Kabul further acknowledges that there may 
be problems of which we are unaware with the recruiting and 
vetting practices for the relatively undefined civilian 
 
KABUL 00003559  002 OF 002 
 
 
militias.  Militias sponsored by GIROA may not be as tightly 
monitored as the ANA and ANP. 
 
8. (SBU) However, we are confident that the ANA and its 
subsets, including the Afghan National Army Air Corps 
(ANAAC), and the ANP and its subsets including the Afghan 
Border Police, Customs Police, Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 
Afghan National Civil Order of Police (ANCOP), Afghan Public 
Protection Force (APPF), Counter-Narcotics Unit, Anti-Crime 
Unit, and the Afghan Police Protection Program (AP3) have 
robust recruiting and vetting practices in place against 
child soldiers. 
 
 
9. (U) We do not agree with the DOL's assessment regarding 
GIROA recruitment of child soldiers. We recognize that the 
ANA, working in concert with CSTC-A, actively vets recruits 
and rejects underage applicants. Therefore: 
 
A. We request and will work for a retraction of this year's 
DOL summary comments. 
 
B. We will work to change next year's DOL report to more 
accurately characterize Afghanistan's labor situation. 
 
EIKENBERRY