VZCZCXRO0824
OO RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #1182/01 3090707
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 050706Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0389
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0163

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 001182 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR DRL/AWH AND EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV VM
SUBJECT: Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue Scenesetter 
 
HANOI 00001182  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) U.S. ties and engagement with Vietnam have advanced 
significantly since the last Human Rights Dialogue meeting in May 
¶2008.  Cooperation on trade, health and education, coupled with 
high-level visits and regular dialogues on defense, security and 
policy planning, have moved relations to their highest point since 
normalization.  However, fundamental differences of opinion over 
human rights remain.  These differences will not be resolved in the 
near term and, if not managed carefully, could complicate 
cooperation in other areas. Despite limited progress on religious 
freedom and prisoner releases, the Vietnamese government has 
intensified its crackdown on political dissent and implemented new 
restrictions on civil society, the press, and bloggers.  Since the 
last dialogue meeting, nearly three dozen political activists have 
been arrested, leading editors and journalists fired, and several 
well-known bloggers detained or forced to cease their activities. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Vietnam would like to separate human rights from other 
areas of the relationship and restrict discussion of the issue to 
the Human Rights Dialogue.  The Secretary's meeting with her 
Vietnamese counterpart in Washington in early October highlighted 
the importance that we attach to human rights as a critical part of 
our overall relationship.  The Human Rights Dialogue is a useful 
opportunity to reiterate this message and make clear that lack of 
progress on human rights could negatively impact progress in other 
areas.  In addition to expressing our deep concerns about the 
deteriorating human rights situation in Vietnam, we should use the 
Dialogue to explore concrete areas of cooperation in the areas of 
governance and rule of law.  However, the Dialogue is unfortunately 
not likely to produce an immediate improvement in the overall human 
rights situation in Vietnam.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
DG Trung and Vietnam's Approach to Human Rights Engagement 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The head of the GVN delegation, MFA International 
Organizations Director General Le Hoai Trung ("Choong"), is one of 
Vietnam's finest diplomats.  Thoughtful, well-spoken, and open to 
creative solutions, Trung is not afraid to toe the party line when 
challenged.  He passionately believes Vietnam has made great 
strides in improving the lives of its people and can be expected to 
ardently defend Vietnam's human rights record along the lines laid 
out by the Vietnamese delegation in Geneva during the UPR.  He will 
also defend the GVN's recent crackdown on dissent, especially with 
members of the Ministry of Public Security in attendance, stating 
that Vietnam is merely enforcing its existing laws.  At the same 
time, Trung is pragmatic and open to exploring ways to increase 
bilateral cooperation on specific projects - a trait he has 
displayed during Vietnam's human rights dialogues with other 
countries and one we recommend exploiting in our meeting.  As one 
of Vietnam's first Fulbright students (1993), Trung studied at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and speaks fluent English.  A 
protege of Deputy Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, Trung is a 
leading contender to succeed Minh as Vice Foreign Minister if Minh 
is promoted to Foreign Minister in January 2011. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) DG Trung will represent Vietnam's aspirations to be 
viewed as a responsible member of the international community, 
pointing to Vietnam's tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC 
and Vietnam's upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN.  Vietnam has become 
more comfortable with its human rights dialogues, both less 
woodenly doctrinaire and more savvy in deflecting criticism. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this was the extensive efforts that 
Vietnam took to control the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
process, which showed the government's sensitivity to criticism of 
its human rights record and the lengths it will go to influence 
international perception. 
 
 
 
Amnesties, Conventions/Rapporteurs, and the Rule of Law 
 
HANOI 00001182  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) As evidence of its growing sophistication on human rights 
issues, Vietnam sees the utility of agreeing to dialogues, in 
selective amnesties of political prisoners, in ratifying (but 
selectively implementing) international human rights conventions 
such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and in inviting UN 
Special Rapporteurs on less-controversial issues such as the Right 
to Food, the Right to Education and the Right to Health.  (The GVN 
is not likely to invite the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion.)  We have seen all of these tactics used in the 
year and a half since our last Dialogue.  For example, Vietnam 
ratified the Convention Against Corruption in June, and has 
indicated it intends to ratify the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities soon, as well as sign the Convention 
Against Torture by the end of this year.  These are calculated yet 
positive steps that provide grounds for fostering bilateral 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Following the last dialogue meeting, the GVN released Ms. 
Bui Kim Thanh from her involuntary commitment to a mental 
institution and permitted her to emigrate to the United States as 
part of the P-1 visa program.  This year the government granted 
amnesty to well-known journalist Nguyen Viet Chien, People's 
Democratic Party (PDP) activist Tran Thi Le Hang, land-rights 
protester Dang Tien Thong, four Khmer Krom Buddhist monks convicted 
for involvement in land protests (Kim Moeun, Danh Tol, Thach Thuong 
and Ly Hoang), and Nguyen Huu Hai and Nguyen Hong Son, adherents of 
an unrecognized branch of Cao Daiism who were deported from 
Cambodia and jailed in Vietnam.   More than 100 Montagnards from 
the Central Highlands who were convicted for violating national 
security laws in 2001 and 2004 were also released this year.  The 
government continues to maintain that there are no prisoners of 
conscience, and that no one is arrested for merely expressing 
dissent.  The dialogue offers a useful opportunity to press for the 
release of our core prisoners of concern. 
 
 
 
Labor 
 
----- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Vietnam and the Department of Labor have cooperated on 
six technical projects on industrial relations in the past.  USAID 
recently initiated a project to improve labor law, and has begun a 
new project to improve labor relations, collective bargaining and 
compliance with international labor standards in the area of 
freedom of association.  Vietnam's strong desire for GSP gives us 
leverage to press the GVN to take meaningful steps on labor rights, 
particularly on freedom of association.  Post is pleased that USTR 
is participating in the dialogue.  USTR's active involvement 
reinforces the message that trade and human rights are 
interconnected, and that Vietnam cannot expect to move forward in 
one area without progress in the other. 
 
 
 
Religious Freedom 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) There continues to be uneven progress in the area of 
religious freedom.  The government has improved registration and 
recognition of religious groups at the national level and, to a 
lesser extent, in the provinces.  The GVN has recognized 31 
religious organizations affiliated with 11 recognized religions. 
Since the Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designation was 
lifted in 2006, the GVN has recognized 16 new religious 
organizations, including eight new Protestant denominations, and 
more than 1,000 Protestant meeting points in the Central Highlands 
have reopened.  The most glaring exception to the progress on 
registration remains the Northwest Highlands, where hundreds of 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam-North (ECVN) congregations await 
responses to their registration applications.  Additional positive 
steps include efforts by the government to facilitate the education 
of thousands of new monks, priests, nuns, and pastors and 
 
HANOI 00001182  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
permitting Buddhists, Catholics, and Protestants to hold several 
large-scale religious services throughout the country, with more 
than 10,000 religious followers participating in each event. 
Caritas was registered last fall, and religions continue to 
increase their charitable activities.  The U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, however, equates political dissent 
with religious practice, and recommends Vietnam be returned to the 
list of Countries of Particular Concern. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Vietnam's improving record on religious freedom has been 
tarred by the forced eviction in September of nearly 400 monks and 
nuns affiliated with Thich Nhat Hanh's Plum Village Order from the 
Bat Nha Pagoda.  This eviction, and the violence associated with 
it, were preceded by months of intimidation, including physical 
attacks.  You should be frank with DG Trung that these incidents, 
especially the GVN's unwillingness to protect monks and nuns from 
violence and forced eviction, can impact our overall relations and 
gives ammunition to those who want Vietnam to be re-designated as a 
Country of Particular Concern.  Vietnam has been slow to 
acknowledge the damage caused by the Lang Mai/Bat Nha dispute, and 
DG Trung is likely to repeat the now-standard GVN line that the 
incidents reflected a convoluted intra-Buddhist disagreement.  As 
religious freedom progresses in Vietnam, religious groups are 
increasingly demanding more from the government than the right to 
worship freely -- including the desire to be more involved in 
charitable activities and seeking resolution to longstanding 
property disputes.  As we saw with the large-scale Catholic 
protests last fall in Hanoi and this summer in Quang Binh province, 
there are complicated historical and land-use issues at play, but 
until the government develops a transparent, fair process for 
adjudicating claims, problems will continue to fester and 
occasionally flair up. 
 
 
 
Crackdown on Political Dissent 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Vietnam's limited progress on religious freedom has been 
overshadowed by an increasing crackdown suppressing political 
opposition and silencing dissent in advance of anticipated 
leadership changes at the Party Congress in January 2011.  More 
than 35 dissidents, land rights activists, and political opponents 
have been arrested since our last dialogue; of these, at least 22 
are affiliated with the "Bloc 8406" political movement or the 
Democratic Party of Vietnam.  Most of these have been convicted for 
violating Article 88 -- Vietnam's catch-all national security law. 
The GVN has invoked Article 88 with increasing frequency since the 
last dialogue, and the threshold of what constitutes a crime has 
been lowered.  At the same time, jail terms have declined compared 
to previous periods.  Political prisoners awaiting trial include 
several on the Department's core list of prisoners of concern: 
leading attorney Le Cong Dinh, co-founder of the Viet Youth for 
Democracy Nguyen Tien Trung, leader of the Democratic Party of 
Vietnam Colonel Tran Anh Kim and prolific author Tran Khai Thanh 
Thuy. 
 
 
 
Freedom of Expression and the Press 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Several editors of Vietnam's leading newspapers have 
been dismissed from their jobs this year as recrimination for 
investigative reporting on a large-scale corruption scandal (known 
locally as "PMU-18").  These actions followed the October 2008 
conviction of the two reporters who broke the story.  The official 
mouthpieces of the Communist Party have not been immune from 
censorship and retribution.  The editor of the newspaper run by the 
Vietnam Fatherland Front, the Communist Party's umbrella 
organization of pro-government "mass organizations," was removed a 
year ago, and the editor in chief of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam's own website was recently fined $1,700 and formally 
reprimanded for reprinting a Chinese newspaper article on China's 
military exercises in the South China Sea. 
 
HANOI 00001182  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The GVN is considering a new "Access to Information" 
law, an effort to implement key provisions required under the 
Convention Against Corruption.  Unfortunately, the draft law falls 
short, specifically in the area of implementation and enforcement. 
Not surprisingly, it allows government agencies many "outs" in 
denying requests for information.  Nor does it spell out 
implementing mechanisms or delineate agencies responsible for 
releasing information.  Similarly, last fall the National Assembly 
considered and then shelved a new press law after concerns were 
raised by many embassies regarding overly broad political demands 
on journalists and editors, forced restructuring of media 
organizations, and restrictions on press conferences.  The draft 
law also included troubling restrictions on electronic media. 
Additionally, in October 2009 the Ministry of Information and 
Communication circulated new draft press regulations that would 
fine journalists who refuse to name sources or who write 
"subjective" articles that "cause serious consequences." 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) While Vietnam's blogosphere remains extremely vibrant 
and diverse, the government has taken steps to restrict online 
criticism.  Steps include new restrictions regulating blog content, 
and banning comments that could be perceived as political or 
critical of the government.  Thus far, there has been limited 
enforcement of the new regulations.  Since our last dialogue, the 
government also convicted well known blogger "Dieu Cay" for tax 
evasion and in August detained two well-known bloggers for ten days 
for postings that were critical of GVN policies towards China and 
their plans to print T-shirts critical of China.  The two were 
released only after they promised to stop blogging. 
 
 
 
Civil Society 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The Party also has taken additional steps to restrict 
the ability of civil society to voice opposition.  Many foreign 
NGOs that have operated in Vietnam for years are reporting 
increasing scrutiny.  The American Bar Association's application to 
open an office in Vietnam (with a DRL grant) has languished for 
more than two years, despite repeated interventions by the 
Ambassador and other Embassy officers.  The ABA and VLA have 
submitted documentation in support of the ABA's registration 
application, and a strong push during the dialogue could move the 
process forward.  "Decree 97", which prohibits independent 
scientific/technical institutes from publicizing research critical 
of the government or Party policies, achieved its immediate goals 
when its target -- the reform-minded think tank the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) -- closed its doors the day before the 
decree took effect.   The decree's long-term impact on stifling 
other organizations and the larger civil society is unclear, but 
our business, academic and civil society contacts fear the worst. 
The Ambassador, in concert with other like-minded Ambassadors, sent 
the Prime Minister two letters expressing our concerns about the 
decree and its impact on civil society, scientific research, 
education and foreign investment.  The GVN has been at pains to 
explain Decree 97, and has tasked the Minister of Science and 
Technology to meet with concerned COMs on November 6 to explain the 
new regulations. 
Palmer