VZCZCXRO0936
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHGZ #0631/01 3200709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160709Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1094
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0873
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0010
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE 0339
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0035
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0041
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0030

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUANGZHOU 000631 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - (PARA NUM ADDED) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO AND EAP/CM 
BEIJING FOR DCM, CG AND FPU 
POSTS FOR CONS/FPU 
 
DEPT PASS TO KCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CMGT ASEC PGOV PINS CH
SUBJECT: CHINA: ON-SITE FRAUD CHECKS STRENGTHEN VISA OFFICER 
UNDERSTANDING OF LOCAL CONDITIONS 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: In mid-September, Guangzhou's Fraud Prevention Unit 
(FPU) conducted on-site visits as part of a validation study 
focusing on the accuracy of issuances and refusals for students from 
Fuzhou, Fujian.  Fujian province has become notorious over the past 
30 years for immigration document fraud and human smuggling. 
Fifty-one (51) cases from those that had been referred to FPU by 
visa line officers were randomly selected for site visits.  All 
officers were able to gain better insight into what constitutes good 
and bad issuances from this area as well as how FPU investigations 
help visa officers improve the accuracy of their adjudications. End 
summary. 
 
Background: what we knew 
---------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Guangzhou FPU conducted a student visa validation study in 
¶2007.  That study revealed that of the nearly 4.8 percent of 
students issued visas in Guangzhou who drop out of status in the 
United States, nearly 10 percent of those students were from Fujian 
province.  Of those cases, 11.6% were from the provincial capital of 
Fuzhou.  Our objective was to check the accuracy of information 
provided by applicants on the nonimmigrant visa application form 
(DS-156) and to confirm that the adjudications by the officer made 
sense. 
 
Process 
--------- 
¶3. (SBU)  FPU gathered cases that had been referred by visa officers 
over a two month period prior to the site visit.  Cases consisted of 
applicants from Fuzhou who had been interviewed, referred, and 
investigated by Guangzhou FPU according to existing SOPs.  Fifty-one 
(51) cases that had either been issued or refused after FPU reported 
its investigation results back to the visa officers were randomly 
selected for on-site visits. The student applicant's home address 
and the work addresses of their parents were then plotted on a map. 
Five teams, each consisting of an officer and an FSN, including one 
team comprised of the ARSO-I and the FSN investigator, then divided 
the cases by geographic locations. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  The trip required coordination with the Foreign Affairs 
Office (FAO), the provincial arm of the MFA, which sent a 
representative to meet us at the airport.  Except for an arrival 
briefing on the procedure for issuing PRC official passports, FAO 
officials were not involved in our site visits.  We had hoped to 
visit some of Fuzhou's top public schools to talk with 
administrators.  Unfortunately, the FAO did not allow us to visit, 
claiming scheduling conflicts and H1N1 flu concerns. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The teams first attempted to visit the applicant's residence. 
If that was not possible, teams visited the parents' place of 
employment.  At the end of each day, team members convened to 
discuss their findings and the cases to be investigated the 
following day.  The on-site exercise did not end once we returned 
from Fuzhou.  Back in Guangzhou, officers checked the SEVIS (viz. 
current U.S. school enrollment) status of all students in the group 
who had been issued visas.  We also added case notes for each 
applicant that we visited so that our findings will be available to 
all visa officers should the applicant apply again. 
 
Findings 
----------- 
¶6. (U)  The 51 cases investigated consisted of 32 issued and 19 refused 
cases.  Of the issued cases, all of their SEVIS records have changed 
to ACTIVE status, indicating that the applicant is presently 
registered at a school or college and that an appropriate 
adjudication was made. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  The 19 refused cases included many that an FPU investigation 
had determined were inconclusive but with several signs pointing to 
fraud.  Indeed, a review of these cases shows that these doubts were 
with good reason.  For example, some had non-existent home 
addresses, or business addresses that were actually the offices of a 
visa "consultant."  Others had home situations so dire as to put 
into doubt the parent's ability to pay for the tuition.  In one 
case, a parent openly admitted to purchasing a set of fake documents 
from a visa broker. 
 
¶8. (U)  A handful of refused cases, however, stood out.  In two cases, 
the students were found at home and gave reasons for wanting to 
study that were consistent with the interview notes.  The family 
situation indicated a level of affluence likely sufficient to cover 
the cost of studying in the United States.  Two of the refused 
applicants later reapplied for student visas.  Interviewing officers 
were able to review the notes from the site visit and approved the 
visas of both applicants. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  The site visit exercise also confirmed the accuracy of some 
basic student visa adjudication criteria.  For example, many of the 
 
GUANGZHOU 00000631  002 OF 002 
 
 
issued cases involved students who had graduated from a numbered 
public high school, which have a good reputation in Fuzhou.  Refused 
students, on the other hand, often claimed to be attending an 
English language training academy.  Several refused cases also 
failed to list an apartment number with their address.  Because most 
housing in Chinese cities is in high-rise apartments, an apartment 
or floor number should be expected. 
 
Moving forward 
--------------------- 
¶10. (SBU)  All participants concluded that the Fuzhou site visits 
yielded useful information about the cases that were adjudicated as 
well as the criteria being used to decide future student visa cases. 
We are now expanding the use of the site visit exercise.  For 
example, NIV officers have launched "Fraud Fridays."  Once a month, 
section workload permitting, a team of one officer and one FSN will 
be given 3-5 cases to site visit.  The goal is to help all visa 
officers gain a better appreciation of the local environment and 
thus strengthen their own adjudication technique while sharing 
information with the other line officers.  Thus, a similar process 
of adding case notes and developing training materials will occur 
after each site visit exercise. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
¶11. (SBU)  We will continue to explore whether and to what extent 
China's economic transformation may be affecting the bona fides of 
visa applicants in traditionally high immigration fraud areas. 
Sending officer and FSN teams to conduct site visits on applicants 
helps officers to obtain a "street level" view of how people live in 
these cities.  Facts on the application form can quickly be 
confirmed, and notes taken to benefit future adjudications.  End 
comment. 
GOLDBECK