VZCZCXRO9453
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1204/01 3090504
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050504Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0869
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1805
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0086
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND SCA/CEN 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC TI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN 
 
DUSHANBE 00001204  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Country Conditions 
 
¶1.  Tajikistan's continued poverty, high unemployment and 
dependence on remittances from family members abroad result in a 
significant number of working age Tajiks, mostly male, who leave 
Tajikistan for better prospects elsewhere.  Until recently, 
approximately one million Tajiks out of a population of seven 
million worked abroad, most in the Russian Federation.  However, 
the worldwide economic crisis has forced a number of unemployed 
Tajik citizens to return to Tajikistan.  At the same time, 
living conditions in Tajikistan have become more difficult, with 
rising prices in rural and urban areas and continued energy 
shortages during winter months.  According to the Committee of 
Statistics for the CIS countries, the inflation rate this year 
will reach 24%.  Some 40% of Tajikistan's working age population 
is underemployed and half of the entire population live under 
the poverty line, earning less than one to two dollars a day. 
Unsatisfactory education and medical care, coupled with poor 
employment prospects continue to drive a significant portion of 
the educated working age population to seek better economic 
opportunities and living conditions abroad.  With the recently 
signed decree on labor migration between Tajikistan and Saudi 
Arabia, part of the male working population forced to return 
from Russia may try to find low wage jobs in Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, the deteriorating economic situation likely will 
contribute to increased fraudulent U.S. visa applications 
related to labor migration and illegal immigration. 
 
NIV Fraud 
 
¶2.  Fraud in Tajikistan is much more primitive than that of 
fraudulent applicants in many other countries (petition-based 
fraud, for example).  We uncover most fraud easily at the NIV 
window with a short interview.  However, Post sometimes 
encounters relatively sophisticated attempts which require 
follow-up investigations and further action by the Fraud 
Prevention Unit or Regional Security Office.  During the 
reporting period, Post saw two more H1B cases in which 
applicants did not qualify for positions for which they had 
petitions.  In one case, the applicant's H1B petition was 
submitted by a medium sized convenience store/payroll management 
company (TFL) in Omaha, Nebraska, that was established by Tajik 
immigrants.  The applicant was unable to conduct the interview 
in English, a requirement for the position of accounting manager 
as described in the petition.  This petition was sent back to 
DHS for revocation.  The other case is under investigation, as 
the petition was not found in PIMS.  Both applicants have had 
previous refusals under different visa classifications. 
 
¶3.  Generally, when Post uncovers fraud, it is in connection 
with tourist (B1/B2) or student (F1) visas.  The majority of 
mala fide NIV applicants intend to go to the United States for 
economic reasons.  Discovery often occurs during the initial 
application review or during the interview when it becomes 
apparent that the applicant does not intend to fulfill the 
stated purpose of the trip and seeks either to work illegally 
for a short time or to join relatives who have already illegally 
immigrated.  Post currently sees an increase of applicants 
intending to emigrate to the United States.  Applicants often 
submit false employment and invitation letters in support of 
their applications.  Lexis/Nexis searches provide invaluable 
information in this regard.  Post has encountered fraudulent 
applicants traveling in groups for various sporting events 
(usually wrestling, arm wrestling or judo/taekwondo) in the 
United States.  During the reporting period Post adjudicated 
several groups of athletes who claimed their travel to the 
United States was for different sports competitions.  Mala fide 
applicants in these groups are sometimes well prepared for the 
visa interview, often are supplied with genuine supporting 
documents, and sometimes accompany legitimate travelers.  The 
Consular Section confirmed through local phone checks with 
families and ADIS information that the majority of members of 
such groups traveling with trainers or coaches have not 
returned.  In addition, Post received a letter from an organizer 
of one of the wrestling events, Christopher Moen, and a DHS 
official in Colorado expressing concern about the no-show of 
Tajiks at wrestling competitions.  During this reporting period, 
Post learned of at least one case when a Tajik with apparent 
strong ties through her international organization employer 
immediately resigned her job with immigrant intent shortly after 
arriving in the United States.  These cases demonstrate some of 
the complexities in assessing legitimate travel to the United 
States under the current economic conditions in Tajikistan. 
 
¶4.  Documents are generally untrustworthy in Tajikistan, with 
signatures and seals often forged.  The consular officer can 
detect many of these documents by asking for supporting 
information about the individual's work, economic situation and 
 
DUSHANBE 00001204  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
financial sponsorship or details of the proposed U.S. travel. 
Document forgers can be easily found in Tajikistan and provide 
fake job letters very inexpensively.  However, not all 
fraudulent documents are necessarily forgeries.  For a small 
bribe an applicant can have the appropriate government official 
write out a real birth or marriage certificate with false 
information, including all of the appropriate seals.  Data 
mismatches usually make this sort of fraud easy to detect. 
Corrupt government officials continue to thwart attempts to 
tighten the issuance and regulations of national identity 
documents.  Anti-corruption laws exist, but enforcement and 
implementation remain elusive, and internal controls on identity 
documents are lax. 
 
¶5.  As was noted in previous Fraud Reports, the majority of F1 
visa applicants in Tajikistan wish to study English as a Second 
Language in schools or programs where large Tajik communities 
exist.  Tajik students often have trouble proving their ability 
to fully finance their study in the United States.  Post has 
seen attempts to work around this by presenting suspicious 
letters of support from sponsoring firms or organizations and 
inflated bank statements.  Tajikistan remains a cash based 
economy, making it very difficult to confirm the real incomes of 
applicants.  One indicator of fraud is a bank statement that 
shows an even number such as exactly USD 9,000 or 15,000 in the 
account.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that an applicant can 
purchase such a statement for a hundred dollars; the money will 
be deposited into the account and will remain there for 
approximately a month. 
 
¶6.  Post frequently encounters fraudulent sponsorship letters 
provided by private organizations and companies.  During this 
reporting period, post continued to have many cases where 
applicants presented documents on legitimate letterhead claiming 
that a government office, private company or local NGO would 
sponsor the full cost of an individual's English study in the 
United States - which made little sense in these instances. 
Follow up phone calls usually reveal that employers who have 
signed the letter don't really intend to fund such training 
programs.  In other cases, phone calls to official phone numbers 
provided on company/organization letterhead reach a private 
party with no relationship to the company or organization.  In 
some cases where a relative (usually an "uncle") is claimed as 
the sponsor for the cost of study in the United States, fraud is 
commonly uncovered through contradictory information regarding 
trip details and financing provided by the sponsor and the 
person sponsored. 
 
¶7.  Applications for the 2009 Summer Work and Travel (SWT) 
program increased from 2008, the first year the program was 
carried out in Tajikistan.  Post approved 121 out of 139 
applications in 2009, and 18 were refused.  In 2008 Post 
received 110 SWT J1 applications; 86 were granted visas while 24 
were refused.  Post plans to conduct a validation study based on 
records of the students' return received from local implementing 
agencies as well as ADIS information obtained by the Consular 
Section.  The results will be reported separately to the 
Department of State. 
 
IV Fraud 
 
¶8.  Post accepts and processes a limited number of I-130 
petitions (on average one a month).  Marriage fraud in 
Tajikistan is not common, although we have seen some cases among 
DV applicants.  Tajik society is very traditional and is 
generally not open to marriage to foreign citizens.  In 
addition, there are relatively few Tajik-Americans, eliminating 
the types of marriage fraud found in connection with larger 
diaspora communities. 
 
DV Fraud 
 
¶9.  DV fraud in Tajikistan echoes that of the Central Asian 
region.  Almaty and Tashkent have seen suspected sham marriages 
in Tajik DV cases they processed.  Although it is difficult to 
draw conclusions based on unreliable high school equivalency 
documents, Tajiks fall roughly into two categories: 
agricultural laborers from villages and the mountains (unlikely 
to have earned a high school education) and city residents 
(often have college degrees in addition to high school 
equivalent education).  In the past, Post saw several suspicious 
cases of children added to a DV case after notification and 
before the interview.  In general, however, as Consular staff 
learned on a recent trip to observe IV processing in Almaty, 
most Tajik DV applicants are qualified. 
 
ACS and U.S. Passport Fraud 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00001204  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶10.  Post has not discovered any ACS or passport fraud in 
Tajikistan.  Due to the small American citizen community, the 
Consular Officer and Embassy local staff often are personally 
acquainted with resident Americans.  Few Tajiks have U.S. 
citizenship.  Post has yet to issue more than five Consular 
Reports of Birth Abroad per year, and many of the Americans 
residents in Tajikistan have diplomatic or official passports. 
Passports rarely are lost or stolen, and in the past few years 
lost passports often were returned within one week.  There are 
currently twelve children registered with the Embassy born to 
Tajik parents while in the United States (often as out-of-status 
students).  This is an area of concern for post. 
 
Adoption Fraud 
 
¶11.  On May 3, 2006, Tajikistan changed its Family Code to 
prohibit inter-country adoption of Tajik orphans.  Though 
couples which consist of at least one Tajik citizen may be still 
allowed to adopt, all other adoptions by non-Tajik citizens are 
forbidden by Tajik law. 
 
Use of DNA Testing 
 
¶12.  Post has not needed to require DNA testing of any 
applicants. 
 
Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud 
 
¶13.  Post provides all assistance requested by DHS to verify 
documents such as birth certificates or proof of 
nationality/ethnicity, many of which have turned out to be 
fraudulent.  No concrete asylum or other DHS benefits fraud has 
come to light in the past three quarters. 
 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
 
 
¶14.  Tajikistan is a source country for women trafficked through 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and 
Russia for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.  Women 
are also reportedly trafficked to Pakistan for the purposes of 
sexual exploitation and forced labor.  Men are trafficked to 
Russia and Kazakhstan for the purpose of forced labor, primarily 
in the construction and agricultural industries.  Boys and girls 
are trafficked internally for various purposes, including forced 
labor and forced begging.  There have been no reports of 
trafficking in persons from or through Tajikistan to the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
 
¶15.  Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, al-Qaida, and the 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement remain active in Central 
Asia, as do anti-Western, anti-semitic extremist organizations 
such as Hizb'ut-Tahrir.  Members of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan have been arrested and convicted for organized crime, 
murder, and weapons charges in Tajikistan.  Tajikistan is 
primarily a transit center for illegal terrorist travel.  Canada 
and Mexico do not have diplomatic representation in Tajikistan, 
and EU consular officials have not reported any use of 
fraudulent U.S. passports or visas to assist visa applications 
to EU countries. 
 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
 
¶16.  The Regional Security Office and Consular Section maintain 
a close working relationship.  Fraud, as stated above, is 
relatively simple.  Post's fraud prevention manager, the 
consular section chief, may refer the occasional case to the 
RSO.  The RSO in turn conveys the disposition of each case to 
the consular section chief.  During the last year, the Regional 
Security Office and Consular Section have cooperated on various 
cases.  One of these cases had been opened by the local 
authorities regarding a visa fixer and concluded with arrest and 
prosecution.  The Consular Section also has provided information 
to the RSO regarding Internet fraud, such as fake conference 
invitation letters requiring advance hotel payment using State 
Department letterhead, which were seen several times this 
period. 
 
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
 
¶17.  Post continues to have serious concerns about both the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
capacity in terms of the security and accountability of the 
passport issuance process.  For example, physical presence of 
the passport applicant is often not necessary.  All Tajik civil 
documents must be scrutinized carefully.  Post encountered cases 
 
DUSHANBE 00001204  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
of previously issued applicants receiving new Tajik passports 
with identities to which they had no legal claim. 
 
¶18.  Many members of the Tajik elite have returned to using 
traditional names, eliminating the Russian variants of surnames 
(the "-ev" and "-ov" endings for example) and patronymics.  Post 
continues to be cognizant of possible name variations to 
recognize any fraud such as visa reapplication under the "new" 
name to avoid discovery of adverse information or previous 
refusals. 
 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
 
¶19.  Document fraud is technically a criminal offense in 
Tajikistan.  In combating these crimes, the Tajik Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is at best an occasionally competent partner. 
The MFA periodically informs us by diplomatic note about the 
numbers of lost or stolen Tajik passports and also cooperates 
with Post's requests for verification of civil documents (though 
usually months later than requested).  However, endemic 
corruption, shoddy record keeping, and lack of prosecution for 
document fraud limit the usefulness of cooperation. 
 
Areas of Particular Concern 
 
¶20.  Despite some slowdown in applications during 2009, post has 
seen a steady increase in NIV applications since visa issuance 
began in 2006.  This results from the overall low living 
standards in the country and increased awareness of the 
possibility of applying for a U.S. visa.  Due to various factors 
mentioned above, Post expects that the number of applicants will 
increase in FY2010, albeit perhaps at a slower rate than in 
previous years.  We will remain vigilant about potential group 
based fraud such as the recent cases of athletes.  Post is also 
looking towards its third year of the Summer Work and Travel 
program in Tajikistan - and anticipates the number of applicants 
to continue to rise.  Local facilitators already have expressed 
interest in promoting other programs such as au pair and the 
intern program.  The increasing awareness by Tajiks of the 
opportunities a U.S. visa present combined with the difficult 
living situation in Tajikistan undoubtedly will lead to a rise 
in fraud, and Post expects that more sophisticated methods may 
be used to attempt to obtain visas fraudulently in the future. 
 
Staffing and Training 
 
¶21.  Consular Chief and Fraud Prevention Manager is Elisabeth 
Wilson.  Fraud Prevention FSN is Tahmina Dehoti.  Tahmina Dehoti 
has taken PC542 - FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop in Washington 
and recently traveled to Uzbekistan to observe IV fraud 
prevention practices. 
GROSS