VZCZCXRO5326
PP RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #1054/01 3270240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230240Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0805
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 2075
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9103
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 7345
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5246
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3500
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 5184
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0719
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4299
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 9666
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 6960
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0040
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3842
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 001054 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (SFRC) FACT FINDING 
MISSION TO SRI LANKA 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On November 2-8, Senate Foreign Relations staff 
members Nilmini Rubin and Fatema Sumar visited Sri Lanka and held 
meetings with senior government officials, international 
organizations, political leaders, civil-society activists, and 
journalists to discuss post war reconciliation, resettlement of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), the humanitarian situation, and 
media freedom.  They also visited the South, East and IDP camp at 
Manik Farm.  The StaffDel observed that the post-war situation in 
Sri Lanka was complex, particularly in light of possible elections; 
Sri Lankans no longer sensed a strong partnership with the U.S.; the 
U.S. "tool box" in dealing with the government of Sri Lanka (GSL) 
was self-limited; a sense of palpable fear still hung over the media 
and civil society; and while the GSL was making progress and doing 
some good things, SL had a long way to go on reconciliation and 
resettlement.  Recognizing SL's geo-strategic importance to the U.S. 
and the current and long-term bilateral relationship, many SL 
interlocutors gave their recommendations on strengthening the 
relationship and noted a need for more U.S. assistance for 
resettlement and demining. END SUMMARY. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR: 
CRITICISMS NOT WARRANTED 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The president's brother, MP, and de-facto czar of the IDP 
and demining issues Basil Rajapaksa hoped to improve the bilateral 
relationship and build trust with the U.S.  He was critical of 
recent U.S. remarks and recommended that the U.S. should choose its 
words carefully.  For example, he noted that "the U.S. monitoring 
the progress" was perceived as "U.S. encroachment on SL's 
sovereignty."  While Sri Lanka was a small but proud country, SL did 
not warrant a "minority mindset".  He suggested that the U.S. should 
approach SL as "friends" and "give suggestions rather than make 
critical remarks," and such criticisms were a recent phenomenon.  In 
response to the "incident's report," Rajapaksa candidly remarked, 
"I'm not saying we're clean; we could not abide by international law 
- this would have gone on for centuries, an additional 60 years." 
He highlighted the GSL's excellent relationship with India, and 
argued that even India did not request monitoring of SL's progress. 
Basil spoke at length on the resettlement progress and noted that 
January 31 ends the 180-day plan, and that the GSL had promised to 
have 80% of the IDPs released in 180 days, but that "Blake had said 
our plan was too ambitious."  He asserted that 80% of the IDPs would 
be released by the end of January.  He did not want to release 
details of the government's plan because any delays or changes would 
leave the GSL open to international criticism.  Basil believed SL 
was well on its way "to win the hearts and minds of the people" and 
to resettle the IDPs.  On freedom of movement, the GSL was still 
concerned about LTTE sympathizers in the camps and took a paternal 
view of the safety of IDPs returning to cleared lands.  On media 
freedom, Basil argued that the media had not been singled out, and 
that high ranking police and army officials and members of the 
business community had also been imprisoned on the terrorism 
charges.  On media access to the camps, Rajapaksa emphasized that 
media restrictions in the camps were for the benefit of the IDPs and 
commented that "IDPs don't like media, cameras, because they don't 
want to be portrayed in those conditions."  He pointed out that free 
access would be only granted to those "genuinely interested" and 
only those "that could be truly trusted." 
 
DEFENSE SECRETARY:  NO 
RECOGNITION OF GSL'S PROGRESS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa expressed frustration 
that the U.S. and international community had not recognized the 
government's progressive transition to democracy, ethnic 
reconciliation, disarmament and demobilization of paramilitary 
groups, rehabilitation of child soldiers, and economic development. 
He repeatedly used the Eastern Province as an example of the 
government's demonstrated performance record and as a model for 
 
COLOMBO 00001054  002 OF 006 
 
 
plans in the North.  He regretted that SL was "poor at propaganda" 
and had done a poor job communicating its actions and intent to the 
international community, especially the U.S. and the West.  While 
quick to criticize, the U.S. had been slow to acknowledge SL's 
achievements.  Rajapaksa believed strongly in the value of repairing 
SL's relations with the U.S. and recommended that the U.S. should 
focus its attention on the future and not the past, judging the GSL 
on its record of performance in the Eastern Province, and not on the 
agendas of its critics.  Rajapaksa reiterated SL's real victory over 
the LTTE and contended that lasting peace would only be achieved by 
development in the North.  Rajapaksa noted that in defeating the 
LTTE terrorists the war had "not been clean," but was still a 
success. The Defense Secretary ruled out expansion of the military - 
dismissing it as "only the army talking" - and said he hoped to 
increase SL military's involvement in future UN peacekeeping 
operations.  According to Rajapaksa, the increases in the defense 
budget were meant to meet payment schedules for acquisitions during 
the war from China, Pakistan and Israel. The Defense Secretary took 
the opportunity to apologize to the staffers for involving them in a 
security incident at their hotel room the night before.  The 
incident occurred when they received a surprise visit to one of 
their rooms by Sri Lankan plain clothes police.  The police, acting 
on orders to investigate an anonymous tip that room 1603 (staffer's 
room) was harboring a terrorist, reacted by going directly to the 
room (not alerting the hotel) to investigate.  The Defense Secretary 
explained that he had personally received this tip; had he known 
that the staffers were the occupants of the room 1603, he would have 
prevented the incident.  While the Defense Secretary apologized for 
the incident, it demonstrated heightened security concerns and lack 
of an adequate information-screening process by the police and the 
Defense Secretary. 
 
JUSTICE MINISTER: "GOLDEN MOMENT" 
BUT "COMPLEX" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Minister of Justice Malinda Moragoda told StaffDel the GSL 
was very interested in greater engagement with the U.S. but said the 
political situation was "complex."  According to Moragoda, there was 
much resentment towards the old families and elites in Sri Lanka 
amongst the Sinhalese middle and lower classes for past economic 
focus on Colombo and appeasement of the LTTE, and some of this 
resentment spilled over into GSL relations with the U.S. and other 
western countries.  Nevertheless, with the end of the war, Sri Lanka 
was at a "golden moment" for building national reconciliation. 
StaffDel suggested that an independent investigation of war crimes 
allegations was a necessary step in national healing and 
reconciliation.  Moragoda said Sri Lanka "must find its own way" on 
dealing with the war crimes issue and noted "frankly" that while the 
panel of eminent persons recently appointed by the president was a 
reaction to the publication of the Congressional report on incidents 
during the war, Sri Lanka had a regrettably long history of periodic 
violence and so the publication of the State Department's report to 
Congress on incidents during the war had little relevance to most 
Sri Lankans. 
 
APRC CHAIRMAN: EMPOWER THE PEOPLE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The StaffDel met Minister of Science and Technology and 
All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) Chairman Tissa Vitarana, 
who emphasized the need for sustaining peace, working towards a 
political solution and empowering the people.  The key goal of APRC 
was permit the devolution of powers to the provinces under the 13th 
Amendment.  He informed the StaffDel that the APRC had submitted its 
assessment report to President Rajapaksa and was awaiting the 
President's response and comments.  Vitarana criticized the 13th 
Amendment as an Indian creation, but found some useful elements in 
the 17th Amendment.  His goal was to simplify and streamline the 
government, giving more power to traditional village councils.  This 
would give proper representation to small ethnic enclaves scattered 
 
COLOMBO 00001054  003 OF 006 
 
 
throughout the country.  He commented on his recent meeting with 
diaspora representatives in Europe as part of his work with ethnic 
community.  On human rights and media freedom problems, Vitarana 
instantly became defensive, and regretted that the international 
community did not understand the situation on the ground.  He 
praised the President as being "admirable" on improved relations 
with countries such as Iran, Libya and China when the West wouldn't 
help them finish the war against the LTTE, since the West was so 
weak now economically speaking. He thanked the U.S. for pushing Sri 
Lanka closer to China which represented the economic future. 
 
MANIK FARM, NORTHERN PROVINCE & 
THE EAST: SL'S CHALLENGING TASK 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Major General Kamal Gunaratne, Commander of Security Forces 
North and the Competent Authority (CA) for IDPs, briefed the 
StaffDel on IDP centers in Vavuniya, Mannar, and Weli Oya in the 
Northern Province and on the progress of resettlement and returns. 
When asked about U.S. assistance to IDPs and resettlement, Gunaratne 
was unaware of any U.S. assistance.  He remarked on his excellent 
relationship with the UN and other international organizations 
working under the UN umbrella.  Gunaratne reported as of 04 November 
154,483 individuals remained in 21 relief villages and IDP centers 
in Wanni, mostly in Vavuniya.  He hoped to resettle an average of 
4,000 per day.  During their visit to Zone 2 and 3 at Manik Farm, 
the StaffDel interacted with the IDPs, visited their living spaces, 
saw hygiene facilities and food distribution by the World Food 
Program (WFP) funded by USAID.  The military demonstrated their 
difficult and challenging demining efforts in Mannar territory in 
previously held by the LTTE.  To demonstrate their efforts on post 
war reconstruction and resettlement of the East, the GSL took 
StaffDel to visit two schools in Vakarai, a 99% Tamil community, one 
built by the GSL and one by the EU.  A SL civil affairs officer 
briefed on dozens of civil-military projects completed during the 
last two years and the projects such as schools, clean water, and 
fisheries. 
 
MEDIA:  FREE PRESS IN SRI LANKA? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Media discussion centered on the question:  "Is there a 
free press in Sri Lanka?"  Although most of the journalists were 
able to function as independent media, the consensus was that the 
press was not truly free.  Media reps noted that the GSL government 
did not exercise its control of the press through direct censorship 
or a dominant state-run propaganda machine; instead, it intimidated 
journalists by threatening, beating, and sometimes killing them. 
Since these actions depended on the topic and the whim of powerful 
figures, reporters and editors could not predict future actions 
against them.  To avoid violence, many journalists censored 
themselves and were unwilling to be quoted. As an example, the group 
pointed to a recent Ministry of Defense press release that 
discouraged reporting of the political ambitions of active duty 
military, forcing nearly all media outlets to drop coverage of 
military members, including CHOD General Fonseka, who is a likely 
presidential candidate.  Some of the media representatives insisted 
the situation was "not that bad" and most accepted that certain 
restrictions on the press were necessary for the government to win 
the war against the LTTE.  In addition, nearly all of them 
criticized some aspect of U.S. policy.  It would be incorrect to 
assume that a free local press would spontaneously agree with 
Western criticism of GSL actions. 
 
UNP LEADER:  "KEEP THE PRESSURE ON" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) United National Party (UNP) and opposition leader Ranil 
Wikremesinghe believed that the U.S. was on the right track in 
publishing the "Incidents Report" and should "keep the pressure on 
the GSL."  Wikremesinghe felt the Sri Lankans didn't want to lose 
 
COLOMBO 00001054  004 OF 006 
 
 
their relationship with the U.S. and the government's criticism of 
U.S. recent remarks were "complete nonsense."  He was not 
particularly concerned with China's developing relationship with Sri 
Lanka.  He countered that if China continued to expand its position 
in Sri Lanka, India would intervene and keep a balance on that 
front.  On the issue of media freedom, Wikremesinghe was very 
critical of the government's suppression of the free press.  He was 
optimistic about defeating President Rajapaksa in the upcoming 
elections, and was confident about becoming the next Prime Minister 
and doing the "needed surgery" to improve the conditions in SL. 
 
SRI LANKA MUSLIM CONGRESS (SLMC): 
POWER SHARING AND DEMOCRATIZAITON 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Minister of Parliament M.T. Hasen Ali and A. M. Faaiz, 
Director of International Affairs from the SLMC, told the StaffDel 
that the GSL needed to move forward in power sharing and 
democratization.  Faaiz noted that the power needed to be shared 
amongst the Tamils, Sinhalese and the Muslims since they shared 
similar minority concerns. While Faaiz commented that the Muslims 
needed to be included in the peace process, he offered no 
recommendations on avenues that the GSL should undertake to achieve 
political reconciliation goals.  On the IDP issue, SLMC discussed 
the lack of access by minority leaders to the IDP camps. Echoing the 
sentiment of no independent verification of information coming out 
of the IDP camps, Faaiz wanted the GSL to allow the free flow of 
information from the camps. 
 
CPA and NPC:  Constitutional Reform 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) At a roundtable discussion, Center for Policy Alternatives 
(CPA) Director P. Saravanamuttu, National Peace Council (NPC) 
Chairman Jehan Perera, University of Colombo Professor Dr. 
Keethaponcalan, and former SL Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Javed Yusuf 
discussed Tamil community concerns, freedom of movement of IDPs, and 
constitutional reform with the StaffDel.  Saravanamuttu stressed 
that the detention of the IDPs was "illegal under Sri Lankan law." 
The group emphasized the need for electoral reform and international 
election observers and mentioned a possible role for the Carter 
Center.  They explained the powers of devolution and 
decentralization, the weakness of the 13th Amendment and the GSL's 
ability to undermine the authority of the provincial council system. 
 Perera and Saravanamuttu believed that raising the issue of full 
implementation of the 13th Amendment was something of a "red 
herring" used by the GSL to avoid discussing reconciliation and a 
long-term equitable political solution.  National issues such as 
allocation of land, rule of law, and the non-implementation of the 
official languages policy continued to drive the conflict. The 
discussion underscored the president's failure to implement the 17th 
Amendment and the politicization of the commissions and therefore 
the politicization of promotions and transfers within the police and 
the judiciary. 
 
NGOS: TENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH GSL 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) CARE, Save the Children, and Asia Foundation noted their 
tense relationships with GSL.  The NGOs remarked on the GSL 
suspicions and accusations of NGOs being corrupt.  On the IDP 
situation, the NGOs believed the GSL's lack of transparency and 
coordination in handling every aspect of the inhabitants' treatment, 
release, and resettlement were serious concerns.  The NGOs described 
the camps' living conditions as poor to deplorable and noted the 
GSL's lack of a coherent plan for transporting and resettling the 
IDPs.  The NGOs believed international pressure was warranted and 
should continue.  They remarked that while SL's complicated 
situation was not as "black and white" as portrayed overseas, the 
GSL needed to work on political reconciliation and address minority 
issues. 
 
COLOMBO 00001054  005 OF 006 
 
 
 
ICRC: DELICATE SITUATION 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) In a separate meeting with International Committee of Red 
Cross (ICRC), representative Anthony Dalziel described ICRC's 
relationship with GSL as delicate and tense.  While the ICRC 
continued to have access to detention centers, their current mandate 
was under review, which prevented them from visiting the IDP camps. 
ICRC continued its work in helping the country to return to 
normalcy.  Dalziel noted that the GSL had made some progress with 
resettlement, but people were still unable to locate relatives and 
the screening of host families made people reluctant to help. 
Dalziel believed that people were glad that the war was over, but 
there was still a general sense of disappointment with the continued 
security checks.  He also lamented that the voice of Tamils was 
fading away.  In his opinion, the media continued to be suppressed 
and threatened. 
 
WOMEN'S GROUP: SILENT MAJORITY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) Tamil, Muslim, and Sinhalese representatives of women's 
activist groups briefed the StaffDel on women's issues.  Most of the 
discussion centered on lack of opportunities for women in politics, 
lack of female participation in policy-making, lack of compensation 
to women affected by the conflict, and grievances and hardships 
endured by women during the conflict.  In their criticisms of GSL 
handling of the post-war situation, the group believed that U.S. and 
international pressure and criticisms were on point and welcomed. 
They recommended that any donor funding of key development projects 
should consult with local women's organizations as prerequisite to 
future aid to SL. 
 
BILATERAL DONORS: RETURN OF 
IDPS AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) At a USAID-Mission-Director-hosted event, representatives 
from British, Canadian and Australian High Commissions; Norwegian, 
Swiss and Dutch Embassies; and European Commission on Humanitarian 
Aid (ECHO) briefed the StaffDel on humanitarian assistance provided 
through the UN and NGOs to the displaced populations.  Donor country 
representatives expressed their concerns on lack of freedom of 
movement granted to the IDPs, that safe and voluntary return of IDPs 
to places of origin be facilitated and that the future donors 
constructively engage with GSL to achieve these goals. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Indian Political Chief B. Shyam focused his discussion 
with the StaffDel on IDPs.  Shyam highlighted India's continued 
strategic interest in Sri Lanka and India's concerns on resettlement 
of IDPs and reconstruction.  Political chief noted India and SL had 
a strong bilateral relationship, and India's aid was primarily 
through ICRC and the UN and funding in the form of loans.  Shyam was 
dismissive of India's concerns of China's footprint on SL and felt 
that the "string of pearls" analogy was a far reach by many 
analysts. 
 
IMF: SL PERFOMING FISCALLY WELL 
------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) In the StaffDel meeting with IMF Resident Representative 
Koshy Mathai, he noted that SL was performing fiscally well, but 
should loosen its monetary policy.  In Mathai's opinion, there were 
no "conflict filters" built in the IMF, but argued that the IMF 
strictly focused on macroeconomic conditions.  While Mathai 
sympathized with the international community on the need to leverage 
the loan, he argued the Fund was not the correct international forum 
to address humanitarian conditions and political goals. The first 
tranche (roughly USD 320 million) of the loan was in the reserves at 
Central Bank as prescribed and the second tranche was also approved. 
 
COLOMBO 00001054  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB): 
SHIFTS FOCUS TO NORTH AND EAST 
------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) ADB Country Director Richard Vokes told the StaffDel that 
while they continued their work throughout the country, their focus 
had shifted to the North and East.  Vokes explained the lack of 
formal "conflict filter" test, but that ADB still examined their 
proposed projects that impacted different communities and conflict 
issues.  On corruption issues, Vokes explained that there were tools 
built in to address fraud and corruption and that ADB worked with 
tools that addressed "strengthening the anti-corruption mechanisms 
within the country." 
 
WORLD BANK (WB): "CONFLICT FILTER" 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The WB Country Director Naoka Ishii and Senior Economist 
Claus Astrup briefed the StaffDel on WB's "conflict filters" laid 
out in the 2009-2012 Country Assistance Strategy to ensure against 
WB activities inflaming the conflict.  Ishii noted that it had been 
a useful engagement tool and two of their projects had slowed as a 
result of the filter.  Ishii and Astrup recommended that the West 
and the International community try to bring SL back to normalcy and 
build the level of trust between SL and the West.  While the private 
sector was tilted to the West, WB's officials noted that SL's 
political orientation was moving away from the West. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The StaffDel noted in their out brief with the Ambassador 
that the current SL environment was post-war and not post-conflict, 
with reconciliation still a challenging issue.  They found ground 
reality in Sri Lanka "more nuanced" and "more complicated" than 
expected. They recommended that the U.S. think strategically and 
long-term and take a holistic approach in determining U.S. specific 
levers on key issues, and commented that by focusing only on human 
rights, "we shoot ourselves in the foot."  They were notably 
surprised that in comparison to India, China played a significant 
role in SL.  During their discussions, several Sri Lankan 
interlocutors commented on U.S. "under appreciation" of Sri Lankan 
success in defeating the LTTE and SL's progress that pushed SL 
towards the Chinese.   SFRC staffers remarked that the SL story 
being sold in Washington was one-dimensional that focused too much 
on the humanitarian situation.  IDP camps were "being sold as 
concentration camps," however, the realities in the camps were much 
more complicated.  The StaffDel departed SL with a better 
understanding of SL's challenging post-war environment, and an 
appreciation of U.S., International community and NGOs efforts in 
post-war Sri Lanka. End Comment. 
 
¶20. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staffers have 
cleared this cable. 
 
BUTENIS