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DE RUEHBR #1381/01 3341836
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301836Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5502
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0121
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0070
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0142
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001381 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV EFIN EAGR EAID KGHG BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: LATEST ON CLIMATE CHANGE OFFER AND PRE-COPENHAGEN 
POSITIONING 
 
REF:  BRASILIA 1322 
 
BRASILIA 00001381  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
(U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  On November 13, the Government of Brazil (GOB) 
unveiled its position for the Conference of the Parties-15 (COP-15) 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Copenhagen.  The GOB has announced that it will seek to reduce its 
economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by between 36.1 and 38.9 
percent by 2020 compared with projected "business as usual" 
emissions.  Two-thirds of the reductions will come from reducing the 
deforestation rate in the Amazon region and - as part of a new 
measure - in the savannah region called the Cerrado.  Brazil has 
come to accept that Copenhagen will produce a political outcome and 
it understands that there are domestic constraints that preclude the 
USG from significantly increasing its proposed reductions in 
emissions for 2020.  The GOB has joined up with other countries - 
China, India and South Africa (the "BASIC" Group) and the Amazon 
countries - in an attempt to increase pressure on developed 
countries to make deep reductions in their emissions by 2020, to 
obtain commitments for significant amounts of financial assistance, 
technology transfer, and capacity building, and to obtain a 
commitment not to create trade measures related to climate change. 
END SUMMARY 
 
THE GOB PROPOSAL 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On November 13, the GOB rolled out the nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) that it plans to present at 
Copenhagen.  Despite earlier hesitation about announcing a voluntary 
economy-wide emissions target (REFTEL), Dilma Rousseff, the Head of 
the Presidency (Casa Civil) and head of the Brazilian delegation to 
Copenhagen, announced that Brazil would reduce its greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions - i.e., CO2 emissions or CO2 equivalents - by 
between 36.1 and 38.9 percent by 2020 compared with the projected 
emissions under a "business as usual" (BAU) scenario.  The GOB 
projects BAU emissions of 2.703 billion tons in 2020 and is aiming 
to have reductions of between 973 million and 1.052 billion tons. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The GOB has provided the following analysis of how it will 
achieve these reductions (in terms of tons of GHG emissions) 
contrasted with the projected emissions under a 2020 BAU scenario. 
The projected 2020 BAU emissions for each source and anticipated 
percentage reduction (shown in parenthesis) from the total 2020 BAU 
projection of 2.703 billion tons are indicated below for each set of 
NAMAs. 
 
NAMAs           2020 PROJECTED REDUCTIONS vs. BAU 
               (in millions of tons of CO2) 
Reducing Deforestation Rate   669(24.7%)     1084 
-Amazon Biome                  (564) 
-Cerrado Biome                 (104) 
 
Agriculture Practices   133 to 166(4.9-6.1%)  627 
-Recuperation of Pastures     (83 to 104) 
-Integrated Ag Practices      (18 to 22) 
-Direct "No Till" Planting    (16 to 20) 
-Biological Nitrogen Fixing   (16 to 20) 
 
Energy Measures         166 to 207(6.1-7.7%)  901 
-Energy Efficiency            (12 to 15) 
-Increased Biofuels Use       (48 to 60) 
-More Hydroelectric Power     (79 to 99) 
-Alternative Sources of Energy 
 (Bioelectricity, Wind, etc.) (26 to 33) 
 
Other Measures             8 to 10(0.3-0.4%)   92 
-Use of Sustainable Charcoal 
  in Pig Iron/Steel Sector     (8 to 10) 
 
TOTAL             975 to 1,052(36.1-38.9%)  2,703 
 
¶4.  (SBU) COMMENT.  The new development within this table is that 
the GOB has shifted from a roughly 50-50 split on reductions from 
reducing deforestation and from other NAMAs.  (REFTEL)  Now, the 
breakdown is roughly two-thirds from reducing deforestation and 
one-third from other measures.  To pump up the reductions from 
deforestation, the GOB has added a new NAMA - reducing deforestation 
in the savannah region called the Cerrado - which is projected to be 
cut by 40% or by about 100 million tons of GHG emissions.  Unlike 
its approach to deforestation in the Amazon biome, the GOB until now 
has not vigorously sought to reduce deforestation in the Cerrado 
and, in fact, lacks even basic information on the current rate of 
deforestation there.  Nonetheless, the GOB has made the Cerrado 
deforestation NAMA its second most important source of GHG emissions 
reductions.  END COMMENT. 
 
BRASILIA 00001381  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Achieving the reductions from the Amazon deforestation 
NAMA will not be as challenging for Brazil as it might look because 
the GOB is using a BAU emission rate of over 700 million tons for 
2020 when the current rate (SEPTEL) is really only about 300 million 
tons.  Thus, the GOB has already reduced emissions from this source 
by approximately 400 million tons (equal to 70 percent of the NAMA 
target and about 40 percent of its economy wide target), assuming it 
can hold the Amazon deforestation rate at or below the current 
level.  Reducing emissions from other sources will likely be more 
daunting.  The Ministry of Science and Technology released on 
November 25 its carbon inventory for 2005, which showed a 52 percent 
increase in emissions from non-deforestation sources (energy, 
industry, agriculture, etc.) from around 615 million tons in 1990 to 
935 million tons in 2005.  In fact, the GOB projects as part of its 
BAU calculations around a 70 percent increase in emissions from the 
non-deforestation sources by 2020, i.e., an increase of about 635 
million tons to 1.6 billion tons in 2020.  It is unknown how much 
the GOB included in its BAU projections for emissions related to 
bringing on line the production from the vast offshore oil and gas 
reserves Brazil has recently discovered. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) NOTE.  If Brazil can hold its emissions to about 1.65 
billion tons in 2020, this would represent a 25 percent decrease 
compared with the 2.2 billion tons emitted in 2005.  However, that 
level in 2020 would constitute a 21 percent increase compared with 
¶1990.  END NOTE. 
 
REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL AND A POLITICAL OUTCOME 
 
¶7.  (SBU) President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff 
have both said that Brazil is putting out an ambitious economy-wide 
emissions number to put pressure on the United States and China and 
others to do the same.  The GOB was not surprised by the proposals 
on emissions reductions and control recently put forward by the 
United States and China.  However, Brazil has been calling for 
deeper emissions reductions by the United States and other developed 
countries for 2020.  In that vein, Lula said on November 16, "The 
numbers President Obama presented are small for the amount of 
emissions the United States has produced over the last 200 years. 
The [emission reduction numbers] represent only half of Brazil's 
commitment to reduce deforestation in the Amazon.  If Brazil can do 
it, the United States can do a lot more."  On November 29, however, 
Minister of External Relations Celso Amorim told the press of his 
recent conversation with Secretary Clinton on climate change, among 
other topics.  Amorim called the USG proposal for Copenhagen a step 
in the right direction. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The announcement in Asia of the United States' and China's 
determination to seek a political commitment at Copenhagen instead 
of a legal agreement confirmed what the GOB had anticipated for some 
time.  After the announcement, Rousseff said that Brazil would also 
seek a political agreement at Copenhagen, which would be followed by 
a legal agreement. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In a letter to President Obama dated November 26, Lula 
said that he too would go to Copenhagen.  He stressed the need to be 
ambitious there and not to reduce expectations on the eve of the 
conference.  Lula wrote that he understood the domestic context 
facing the USG, but emphasized that the USG has a crucial role to 
play to achieve success at COP15.  He said national contributions 
need to be clear, and emphasized that specific numbers on mitigation 
and financing are necessary to generate a robust result.  Lula noted 
that Brazil had resolved to reduce emissions by 36 to 39 percent by 
2020, even though it was not an Annex I country. 
 
THE BASIC AND THE MANAUS GROUPS 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The GOB has been actively reaching out to other countries 
both from a defensive posture and in a positive fashion.  Most 
recently, Brazil joined China, India and South Africa ("BASIC" in 
Portuguese) in Beijing on November 26-27 to develop a joint position 
to take to Copenhagen.  The Indian press portrayed this as a 
threaten walkout unless the developed countries agreed to their 
demands.  These demands included a reduction by developed countries 
of their emissions by 40% by 2020 compared with 1990 and providing 
substantial financial assistance, as well as a statement that 
developed countries will not impose any trade barriers related to 
climate change.  Also the BASIC countries rejected inclusion of the 
peak year concept or any other binding emissions limitations for 
developing countries and international review of their mitigation 
actions if they are not supported by the international community. 
However, the Brazilian representative, Ambassador Marcel Biato 
(international affairs advisor to the Presidency), did not focus on 
a possible walkout in his press interview after the meeting. 
Instead, he said that "With a joint position, we will be able to do 
what the United States has done in recent international 
 
BRASILIA 00001381  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
negotiations, which is the "name and shame," which means "identify 
those responsible for the eventual failure of negotiations and 
attribute responsibilities."  On November 29, Minister Amorim 
emphasized to the press that Brazil would not accept an agreement 
that could lead to possible trade measures, a key BASIC group 
demand. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Biato explained that China had called the meeting out of 
concern that it might become the scapegoat in the event of a failure 
at Copenhagen.  "We have the perception that the developed countries 
are preparing themselves and we need to have our own common 
position, in order not to be at their mercy," Biato told the press. 
"The internal measures of the developing countries are domestic 
obligations, but cannot become obligations to the international 
community.  We have the potential to contribute more to address 
global warning, but without breaking the spirit of the Kyoto 
Protocol," stated Biato.  He considered as insufficient the proposal 
of the USG to reduce its emissions by 17% by 2020 against 2005, 
which is the equivalent of 4.8% in relation to 1990, well below the 
40% the emerging countries are calling for. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) COMMENT.  While it is possible that Brazil could join in 
a walkout with the other BASIC members, it seems unlikely or, if it 
did so, it wouldn't stay out long.  With Lula planning to attend 
Copenhagen, a walkout would tarnish his image, especially since he 
has been publicly urging President Obama and other leaders to come 
to Copenhagen.  Further, domestic politics are playing an increasing 
role.  The two strongest rival candidates for the presidency - Sao 
Paulo Governor Jose Serra and Acre Senator Marina Silva - are 
already claiming that Lula and Rousseff are not doing enough on 
climate change.  A walkout would signal a failure at Copenhagen and 
would probably play to the advantage of Rousseff's rivals.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) A day before on November 26 the BASIC meeting, President 
Lula chaired a meeting in Manaus of Amazon countries with 
representatives from Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Suriname, Guyana, and France. (COMMENT: Although billed as a summit, 
Guyanese President Jagdeo and French President Sarkozy--representing 
French Guyana--were the only other two heads of state who attended. 
Sarkozy was a late addition, and his participation clearly had more 
to do with France's effort to sell fighters than with concern over 
French Guyana's forest interests.  Although the paltry attendance by 
other leaders is being interpreted in Brazil as disinterest in 
climate issues (and as a defeat for Lula's leadership), a series of 
factors were at play: the relatively last-minute nature of the 
meeting, the ongoing dispute between Venezuela and Colombia, 
Bolivia's upcoming elections, the Peru-Chile spy scandal, and a 
previously scheduled trip to Belgium by Ecuadorian President Correa 
all made the invitation less than appealing to the various leaders. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶14. (SBU) The group issued a joint statement that included some of 
the demands of the BASIC group.  In particular on reductions by 
developed countries, it said: 
 
"We call upon all developed countries to implement significant 
emission reductions, according to their historical responsibilities. 
The adoption of ambitious quantified economy-wide reduction 
commitments by all developed countries is essential to ensure that 
their mitigation effort will be at a level of at least the 40 
percent reduction recommendation of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and compatible with the need to protect the 
climate system.  We call upon all developed countries, including 
those Annex I Parties that are not members of the Kyoto Protocol, to 
present clear, detailed and unconditional numbers for their 
commitments at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, as 
they are a key element to allow for an agreed outcome." 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The Manaus group reaffirmed the G-77 proposal calling for 
an allocation by developed countries of 0.5 to 1 percent of their 
GDP in support of climate actions by developing countries, as well 
as providing technology transfer and capacity building.  The Manaus 
group explicitly expressed support for including Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) in the results from 
Copenhagen, together with financial and technological support for 
the protection of biological diversity.  The Manaus group was 
concerned about trade measures, as was the BASIC group, saying that 
"Measures presented by developed countries as part of a mitigation 
effort should not generate unilateral trade restrictions or 
strengthen trade protectionism."  Unlike the BASIC group, however, 
the Manaus group did not voice an opinion on the concept of peak 
years for developing countries, and the Manaus group seemed to have 
a favorable view on monitoring of NAMA.  The group declared, "An 
instrument could be created to provide for the measuring, reporting 
and verifying of actions and support.  Non-supported actions should 
be internationally recognized." 
 
BRASILIA 00001381  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Brazil has gone farther with its proposal on emissions 
reductions than any other developing country in the BASIC group or 
the Manaus group.  Moreover, it is openly calling for China - not 
just the United States and other developing countries - to make an 
ambitious proposal at Copenhagen.  The GOB clearly wants to keep 
pressure on the United States and developed countries with respect 
to financing and technology transfer and capacity building, as well 
as precluding the creation of trade measures related to climate 
change.  As evidenced by Lula's letter to Obama, Brazil understands 
well that the United States will not be making significantly greater 
reductions for 2020 than already announced.  END COMMENT. 
 
JACKSON