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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1371, BRAZIL ON IRAN AT IAEA: NOT SUPPORTIVE OF P5+1 TABLING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1371 2009-11-27 09:48 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1422
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1371 3310948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270948Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5488
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0111
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0068
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0140
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0351
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0208
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO ELISA CATALANO 
DEPT ALSO FOR ISN/RA RICHARD NEPHEW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 
TAGS: PREL IAEA IR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON IRAN AT IAEA: NOT SUPPORTIVE OF P5+1 TABLING 
RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Cherie Jackson for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
REF:  STATE 120288 
 
1. (C) Science Counselor discussed reftel points and key messages on 
November 25 with Santiago Mourao, the Brazilian Ministry of External 
Relations' (MRE) Director of the Division for Disarmament and 
Sensitive Technologies.  A very well-informed Mourao said that Brazil 
still does not have a position on Iran going into the upcoming 
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors 
meeting starting on November 26.  Mourao stated that he had prepared 
a position paper and discussed the matter on November 24 with MRE 
Secretary-General Antonio Patriota, who then briefed MRE Minister 
Celso Amorim.  Brazil is supportive of seeing a resolution to the 
questions over Iran's nuclear program, but Mourao said he and 
Patriota thought that pressing a P5+1 resolution on Iran at this time 
would not be helpful.  He added that maybe in six months or a year 
such a resolution would be constructive.  Today, however, the 
Government of Brazil is not very happy if a P5+1 resolution were 
tabled, he stressed. 
 
2.  (C) Mourao said that Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva in his November 23 meeting with visiting Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad (SEPTEL) had been very explicit that the proposal on the 
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) was a good deal.  Mourao saw some signs 
of hope for a deal being worked out.  He explained that Ahmadinejad 
had indicated that there were internal sensitivities to the TRR 
proposal that needed to be resolved, mainly relating to a lack of 
confidence.  Mourao noted the Iranian proposal to have the enriched 
uranium for the TRR kept on an Iranian island, possibly with 
international oversight, and then exchanging it for processed fuel 
for the TRR.  He commented that such a deal would allow both sides to 
sit at the table and move forward. 
 
3.  (C) In addition to hearing from the USG, Mourao noted that he had 
also talked with the British, the French and the Germans about Iran 
and the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting. 
 
JACKSON