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RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0003
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RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0065
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0109

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001369 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 
TAGS: PINR PREL BR CO VE
SUBJECT: (S/NF)  BRAZIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT BETWEEN 
COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA (C-AL9-02389) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 120006 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1342 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Below is initial post response to questions posed 
ref A regarding Brazil's involvement in the conflict between 
Venezuela and Colombia.  Assessments are based on a number of 
meetings with and public statements by senior officials over 
the last several weeks, as well as a meeting November 24 
between PolCouns and acting chief of the Ministry of External 
Relations (MRE) South America II (Andean) Department, 
Counselor Carla Barroso Carneiro. 
 
- - - Strategy?  What Strategy? - - - 
 
¶2. (S/NF) The GOB does not appear to have a strategy per se 
for reducing tensions, but is seeking opportunities to engage 
both countries to encourage dialogue and reduce tensions and 
instability.  Citing the lack of troop movements as evidence 
that neither side was intent on conflict, Carneiro said that 
Brazil hopes for a gradual easing of tensions, as happened 
between Colombia and Ecuador.  According to Carneiro, the GOB 
stands ready to help as requested, but does not feel the need 
to be involved if others can mediate more successfully. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Although new Deputy Foreign Minister Antonio 
Patriota told Charge November 18 that the November 26 Amazon 
leaders summit would provide an opporunity to discuss the 
conflict, Carneiro said there is no bilateral meeting 
scheduled between Chavez and Uribe, and Brazil is making no 
effort to plan to arrange one.  We believe it is likely, 
however, that President Lula and Presidential Foreign Policy 
Marco Aurelio Garcia will make some effort to organize a 
meeting on the spot if it appears it would be productive. 
 
- - - South America Should Handle Its Own Problems - - - 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Carneiro also cited the November 27 UNASUL meeting 
in Quito as another possible forum for addressing the 
conflict, although Brazilian congressional contacts recently 
returned from Bogota told Consulate Recife that Uribe refused 
to attend.  Asked about Brazil's view on whether the UN, OAS, 
or UNASUL would be the preferred forum, Carneiro said that 
Brazil's goal is to reduce instability and the GOB would 
support efforts in any forum, but that Brazil's preference is 
for "South America to manage its own problems" via UNASUL, a 
consistent refrain of GOB officials. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Carneiro and other officials maintain that it is 
not Brazil's place to judge between the two sides.  However, 
Brazil has consistently dismissed President Chavez's talk of 
war as inconsequential while insisting that Colombia should 
provide assurances to the region that it will respect other 
nations' sovereignty. 
 
- - - U.S.-Colombia DCA a Continuing Issue - - - 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Although Patriota deflected responsibility onto 
Colombia (ref B), Brazil continues to express both public and 
private concern with the U.S.-Colombia DCA, despite repeated 
U.S. assurances and explanations, the publication of the 
text, and Lula's own pronouncement during Uribe's visit this 
month that he was satisfied with Uribe's explanation.  GOB 
concerns have been fanned by public USG documents that 
suggest the United States has regional or extra-regional 
reasons to use the bases, rather than purely domestic 
assistance to Colombia.  While ackowledging Colombia's right 
to sign the accord and insisting that the issue should not 
harm U.S.-Brazil relations, Carneiro noted Brazil's 
continuing annoyance that it was "presented with a fait 
accompli" rather than being consulted before the document 
became public. 
 
- - - Comment: Lack of Trust Meets Core Security Concerns - - 
- 
 
BRASILIA 00001369  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Brazil continues to view itself in competition with 
the United States in South America and does not trust U.S. 
intentions, in particular with regard to the Amazon, Brazil's 
efforts at regional integration, and, more recently, Brazil's 
off-shore oil.  While acknowledging the sovereign right of 
countries to conduct relations with the United States as they 
see fit, the fact is that Brazilians view with suspicion any 
U.S. presence or activity in South America (to include 
foreign assistance, energy or infrastructure cooperation, 
U.S. NGO activities, or USG law enforcement cooperation, as 
well as military activities).  At the same time, Brazil has 
an almost neurotic need to be and be seen to be the equal of 
the United States, and has taken to heart U.S. messaging 
regarding Brazil as the regional leader to which we look to 
manage problems in South America. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) It is these two aspects of our relations that, 
together, have made the U.S.-Colombia DCA so problematic for 
Brazil.  On the one hand, the GOB sees the U.S. presence as 
encroachment on its turf, a threat to its leadership 
and--both directly and, because of the tensions created with 
Venezuela, indirectly--to its security.  On the other hand, 
it feels betrayed by the USG's failure to acknowledge 
Brazil's primacy in the region by consulting in advance on 
our activities in South America, and especially those with 
regional security implications. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Brazil's overriding goal in South America is 
stability, and it sees the possibility of a war between 
Colombia and Venezuela--or any of its other neighbors--as a 
direct threat to its security.  The GOB does not trust either 
Chavez or Uribe to act wisely, but at present sees Uribe as 
the bigger threat to stability, in part because Colombia's 
excursion into Ecuador last year showed what it can and will 
do, and in part because of his U.S. backing.  Under Lula, the 
GOB has preferred to use personal presidential contacts, 
combined with more intense minister-level contacts, to manage 
relations with and among its more difficult neighbors.  This 
is likely to be the primary method Brazil will use to lower 
tensions in this instance. 
 
JACKSON