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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1369, S/NF) BRAZIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT BETWEEN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRASILIA1369 | 2009-11-25 20:45 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO0419
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1369/01 3292045
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 252045Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5485
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0058
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0028
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0013
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0006
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0005
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0012
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0012
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0003
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0020
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0137
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0065
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0109
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001369
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PINR PREL BR CO VE
SUBJECT: (S/NF) BRAZIL'S INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT BETWEEN
COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA (C-AL9-02389)
REF: A. SECSTATE 120006
¶B. BRASILIA 1342
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Below is initial post response to questions posed
ref A regarding Brazil's involvement in the conflict between
Venezuela and Colombia. Assessments are based on a number of
meetings with and public statements by senior officials over
the last several weeks, as well as a meeting November 24
between PolCouns and acting chief of the Ministry of External
Relations (MRE) South America II (Andean) Department,
Counselor Carla Barroso Carneiro.
- - - Strategy? What Strategy? - - -
¶2. (S/NF) The GOB does not appear to have a strategy per se
for reducing tensions, but is seeking opportunities to engage
both countries to encourage dialogue and reduce tensions and
instability. Citing the lack of troop movements as evidence
that neither side was intent on conflict, Carneiro said that
Brazil hopes for a gradual easing of tensions, as happened
between Colombia and Ecuador. According to Carneiro, the GOB
stands ready to help as requested, but does not feel the need
to be involved if others can mediate more successfully.
¶3. (S/NF) Although new Deputy Foreign Minister Antonio
Patriota told Charge November 18 that the November 26 Amazon
leaders summit would provide an opporunity to discuss the
conflict, Carneiro said there is no bilateral meeting
scheduled between Chavez and Uribe, and Brazil is making no
effort to plan to arrange one. We believe it is likely,
however, that President Lula and Presidential Foreign Policy
Marco Aurelio Garcia will make some effort to organize a
meeting on the spot if it appears it would be productive.
- - - South America Should Handle Its Own Problems - - -
¶4. (S/NF) Carneiro also cited the November 27 UNASUL meeting
in Quito as another possible forum for addressing the
conflict, although Brazilian congressional contacts recently
returned from Bogota told Consulate Recife that Uribe refused
to attend. Asked about Brazil's view on whether the UN, OAS,
or UNASUL would be the preferred forum, Carneiro said that
Brazil's goal is to reduce instability and the GOB would
support efforts in any forum, but that Brazil's preference is
for "South America to manage its own problems" via UNASUL, a
consistent refrain of GOB officials.
¶5. (S/NF) Carneiro and other officials maintain that it is
not Brazil's place to judge between the two sides. However,
Brazil has consistently dismissed President Chavez's talk of
war as inconsequential while insisting that Colombia should
provide assurances to the region that it will respect other
nations' sovereignty.
- - - U.S.-Colombia DCA a Continuing Issue - - -
¶6. (S/NF) Although Patriota deflected responsibility onto
Colombia (ref B), Brazil continues to express both public and
private concern with the U.S.-Colombia DCA, despite repeated
U.S. assurances and explanations, the publication of the
text, and Lula's own pronouncement during Uribe's visit this
month that he was satisfied with Uribe's explanation. GOB
concerns have been fanned by public USG documents that
suggest the United States has regional or extra-regional
reasons to use the bases, rather than purely domestic
assistance to Colombia. While ackowledging Colombia's right
to sign the accord and insisting that the issue should not
harm U.S.-Brazil relations, Carneiro noted Brazil's
continuing annoyance that it was "presented with a fait
accompli" rather than being consulted before the document
became public.
- - - Comment: Lack of Trust Meets Core Security Concerns - -
-
BRASILIA 00001369 002 OF 002
¶7. (S/NF) Brazil continues to view itself in competition with
the United States in South America and does not trust U.S.
intentions, in particular with regard to the Amazon, Brazil's
efforts at regional integration, and, more recently, Brazil's
off-shore oil. While acknowledging the sovereign right of
countries to conduct relations with the United States as they
see fit, the fact is that Brazilians view with suspicion any
U.S. presence or activity in South America (to include
foreign assistance, energy or infrastructure cooperation,
U.S. NGO activities, or USG law enforcement cooperation, as
well as military activities). At the same time, Brazil has
an almost neurotic need to be and be seen to be the equal of
the United States, and has taken to heart U.S. messaging
regarding Brazil as the regional leader to which we look to
manage problems in South America.
¶8. (S/NF) It is these two aspects of our relations that,
together, have made the U.S.-Colombia DCA so problematic for
Brazil. On the one hand, the GOB sees the U.S. presence as
encroachment on its turf, a threat to its leadership
and--both directly and, because of the tensions created with
Venezuela, indirectly--to its security. On the other hand,
it feels betrayed by the USG's failure to acknowledge
Brazil's primacy in the region by consulting in advance on
our activities in South America, and especially those with
regional security implications.
¶9. (S/NF) Brazil's overriding goal in South America is
stability, and it sees the possibility of a war between
Colombia and Venezuela--or any of its other neighbors--as a
direct threat to its security. The GOB does not trust either
Chavez or Uribe to act wisely, but at present sees Uribe as
the bigger threat to stability, in part because Colombia's
excursion into Ecuador last year showed what it can and will
do, and in part because of his U.S. backing. Under Lula, the
GOB has preferred to use personal presidential contacts,
combined with more intense minister-level contacts, to manage
relations with and among its more difficult neighbors. This
is likely to be the primary method Brazil will use to lower
tensions in this instance.
JACKSON