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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0117
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0045
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0089
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0203
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1605
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0347
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR P, WHA, NEA, CA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AORC CASC BR IR
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: MANAGING THE VISIT OF IRANIAN 
PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD TO BRAZIL (S/ES: 200921227) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 118094 
 
BRASILIA 00001341  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Lisa Kubiske, reason 1.4(b) and 
 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  CDA met separately November 18 with 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs II (Asia) Roberto Jaguaribe 
and Foreign Policy Advisor in the Presidency Marcel Biato to 
deliver demarche regarding the November 23 visit to Brazil of 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad (ref A).  She also raised the 
visit with newly appointed Secretary General (Deputy 
Minister) Antonio Patriota during a previously scheduled 
courtesy call that day (septel).  They indicated that the GOB 
sees the visit as part of a growing relationship with Iran, 
based on both commercial interests and a broader desire to 
engage more actively in the Middle East.  They were unanimous 
in expressing a belief that engagement and dialogue between 
Iran and the international community are essential.  They see 
sanctions as being of limited value, even while stressing 
that Brazil would fully comply with international sanctions. 
They believe Iran should accept the IAEA,s offer to provide 
fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and live up to its 
NPT and IAEA commitments more generally, and they will tell 
Ahmadinejad that.  They were aware of the situation with 
three detained Amcits and believe their release would be a 
good gesture on the GOI,s part.  Post believes it likely 
that Brazilian officials will follow through on all of these 
issues in private, but expects that public statements by 
President Lula and others will focus on Iran,s rights and 
the positive aspects of the bilateral relations, and that any 
provocative public statements by Ahmadinejad will likely go 
unanswered.  End summary. 
 
- - - Iran-Brazil Relations Growing as Brazil Becomes More 
Active in the Middle East - - - 
 
¶2. (C) The CDA asked U/S Jaguaribe, who was joined by 
Brazilian Ambassador to Iran Antonio Salgado, what Brazil 
hoped to get out of the upcoming visit, and what they thought 
Iran hoped to get out of it.  Jaguaribe described it as the 
"natural evolution of a consolidating relationship," as Iran 
and Brazil have common interests in trade and global affairs. 
 He said that Brazil is "keen to find mechanisms to expand 
trade," asserting that Iran,s trade with Brazil is far 
smaller than Iran,s trade with China, Germany, France, the 
UK, and others.  On the political side, he believed Brazil 
had an advantage over the United States and others in dealing 
with Iran because of the mistrust affecting many bilateral 
relationships.  Jaguaribe said he believes Iran sees Brazil 
as bringing it "credibility." For Brazil, credibility was not 
a factor; rather, the relationship risked damaging Brazil,s 
credibility, he said, but Brazil needed to stick to its 
principles of engaging with all countries.  Jaguaribe also 
thought that Iran likes dealing with a country that has an 
"independent foreign policy" and that it seeks to cultivate 
Brazil as a trade partner.  Both sides, he said, believe that 
there is clear commercial potential that has not been tapped, 
although he stressed once that Brazil would not trade in 
"sensitive" areas. 
 
¶3. (C) Asked the same question about the visit, Biato stepped 
back, saying, "The situation in the Middle East is one with 
which Brazil has increasingly to do," as it seeks to be more 
active in global governance.  "We have something to say, and 
we will say it."  Brazil,s more active stance would include 
officials "coming from and going" to the region.  (Note: The 
Israeli and Palestinian presidents also visited Brazil this 
month, and President Lula is likely to visit Israel, 
Palestine, and Iran early in 2010.  End note.)  At the same 
time, Brazil is committed to "not taking sides, even if we 
have our own perceptions" of the issues in the Middle East. 
Biato said that Brazil "wants to be an active trading 
partner" of Iran, and is looking at possibilities in oil, 
agriculture, and biofuels.  The two countries have already 
exchanged trade missions and Brazil is looking into helping 
Iran on export finance. 
 
- - - Engagement a Must despite Concerns, Respect for 
 
BRASILIA 00001341  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
Sanctions a Must despite Skepticism - - - 
 
¶4. (C) Jaguaribe said that that Brazil has "misgivings" about 
Iran,s behavior, and Biato said that Iran "has to make 
amends for a series of missteps" and "can,t expect to be 
treated as a full and equal partner until it comes clean." 
Biato stressed that "Iran has certain basic rights" -- the 
right to peaceful use of nuclear technology is key -- but has 
to cooperate with the international community.  At the same 
time, Jaguaribe, Salgado, Biato, and Patriota were unanimous 
in stressing that dialogue and engagement with Iran offer the 
best hope for positive results and that isolation is not an 
option.   "Our conversations can be beneficial for all," 
Jaguaribe said, "especially for the United States." 
Acknowledging that Brazil,s approach was different from that 
of the United States and others, Biato likewise felt that "we 
need to bring Iran out of the corner" and that "talking 
threats" won,t work.  Salgado, who has been in Tehran almost 
a year, described Iran as "a vibrant and dynamic society" 
that is "in the process of change."  Although "we don,t know 
when it will happen," Salgado was concerned that increasing 
the pressure on Iran could be counter-productive, as it would 
benefit the hard-liners in Iran.  Continuity of engagement is 
a critical factor to the internal dynamic in Iran, he said. 
Biato made a similar statement, saying that their exchange of 
trade missions is a significant element in Brazil,s policy 
of engagement. 
 
¶5.    (C) With regard to Ahmadinejad,s visit, Biato stressed 
that the timing was "neither here nor there." Brazil,s 
interest is "not sudden," as demonstrated by the canceled 
Ahmadinejad visit in May and various other lower level 
visits.  The fact that Ahmadinejad rescheduled the visit 
"suggests they believe Brazil has something to offer."  Biato 
said that Brazil,s stance would be low-key in public, as 
always.  He noted, for example, that many wanted Brazil to 
take a strong public stance against Israeli settlements 
during President Peres, November 11 visit, but Lula had not 
done so.  Brazil sees the visit itself as an important 
acknowledgement that Brazil has a role to play on the issue, 
but the GOB will be "cautious and prudent" in its public 
statements.  The CDA stressed that it was important Iran not 
leave Brazil thinking that they had been given a pass on 
their behavior.  Biato responded that just indicating an 
understanding of Iran,s concerns "won,t alter the balance" 
between Iran and the other key players. 
 
¶6.     (C) Jaguaribe, Biato, and Patriota were skeptical 
regarding the value of sanctions, while stressing that Brazil 
would fully implement all UNSC sanctions.  As already noted, 
Jaguaribe stressed more than once that, despite the interest 
in developing commercial relations, Brazil would avoid trade 
in "sensitive" areas; Biato said that both Iran and Pakistan 
had offered to work with Brazil on nuclear matters, but 
Brazil had declined. "There is no question whatsoever," 
Jaguaribe said, that Brazil would "fully comply" with UNSC 
sanctions, "even where Brazil might not agree."  Biato 
stressed that "we will take relations forward in a very 
transparent way," within the limts of the UN sanctions 
regime.  "The letter of the law will be respected," he said, 
"not more or less."  With regard to additional measures, 
Biato said that Brazil does not see Iran "at a point that 
sanctions or other actions are necessary." 
 
- - - Iran Should Take Up the TRR Offer - - - 
 
¶7. (C) Jaguaribe described the offer on the TRR as a "good 
offer," "intelligent," "clever," one that is "face-saving for 
both sides."  Iran should take it, he said, and Brazil will 
tell Ahmadinejad that.  He added that FM Amorim has already 
spoken to Iranian FM Mottaki about and other Iranian 
authorities about it.  He believed that Brazil would be ready 
to join with other non-aligned countries in a statement 
supporting such an agreement.  He added that a particularly 
positive aspect of the offer was the "tacit acceptance" of 
continuing enrichment within Iran. 
 
¶8. (C) Jaguaribe thought it was a positive sign that the GOI 
took the offer back to Iran, and was not surprised no 
 
BRASILIA 00001341  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
response had yet been received: "It is going to be a lengthy 
process," he said.  Citing "growing pressure" in the United 
States and a "complex society" in Iran, Jaguaribe worried 
that, "Both sides have major figures as potential saboteurs" 
of an agreement.  He noted that Ahmadinejad seems most 
disposed among Iranian leaders to accept it, while others 
have criticized the offer as "capitulation."  Biato also 
warned that the domestic political dynamic in Iran is 
complicated and that "this is one of two or three issues that 
cut across all sectors of Iranian society" and is "a lifeline 
for the government." 
 
¶9. (C) Jaguaribe saw the need for "tenacity and audacity" on 
both sides to reach agreement.  He asked what bearing 
acceptance of the TRR offer would have on U.S. sanctions. 
Saying it was too early to discuss that, CDA stressed that 
the USG had already been audacious in backing the TRR offer, 
and that dialogue requires more than a U.S. willingness to 
engage.  Jaguaribe responded that the GOI sees the offer "as 
a minor step" and is "disconcerted" by comments from the U.S. 
Vice President and Secretary of State, which they see as 
sending a "mixed signal" regarding U.S. intentions. 
 
¶10. (C) At the same time, Jaguaribe said he believed that the 
GOI had "legitimate concerns" that the agreement might not be 
followed, based on its past experience (he referred 
specifically to French actions with regard to Iranian 
investments).  Jaguaribe felt that there were many points to 
be cleared up.  Regarding, IAEA compliance, he asserted that 
there were "clear grounds for controversy" regarding Iran,s 
compliance, insisting that Iran had complied with every 
demand, except to address alleged reports to which it had no 
access.  The GOI claims to be abiding by its commitments 
regarding nuclear materials, he said, and there is "no 
evidence" of deviation of any such materials.  In 
Jaguaribe,s view, Iran,s objective is to develop the 
capability to build weapons, but not actually to do so.  He 
noted that Iran is "surrounded by four nuclear powers" -- 
Russia, Pakistan, India, and Israel -- and suggested that 
Iran,s concern is, therefore, understandable. 
 
- - - Human Rights Important; Iran Should Release Amcit 
Detainees - - - 
 
¶11. (C) The CDA raised human rights issues with Biato and 
Jaguaribe, stressing the situation had deteriorated markedly. 
 Jaguaribe said that the Brazilian Jewish, Baha,i and GLBT 
communities had approached the GOB regarding problems there, 
and that "we are addressing human rights in many ways." 
President Lula has "spoken frankly" to Ahmadinejad and is 
committed to addressing all the human rights issues, 
particularly about his denial of the holocaust, but will not 
make public declarations.  The holocaust denial was 
important, Jaguaribe said, both because of Brazil,s 
influential Jewish community and because Brazil sees it as 
providing an excuse to "demonize" Ahmadinejad.  Biato said 
that, as with Cuba, Brazil raises human rights concerns in 
private, as they believe raising them publicly is always 
ineffective.  "We do make these issues clear, and we do bring 
them up," he said, citing the Baha,i issue in particular. 
Salgado said that many were saying the repression after the 
elections was "brutal."  But he also suggested that external 
pressure on Iran can make the human rights situation worse, 
as it gives the government an excuse for additional 
repression.  The CDA raised the pending UNGA Third Committee 
no-action and substantive votes on Iran with Jaguaribe and 
Biato, asking them to vote against the former and in favor of 
the latter.  Both said they were not following it, but would 
look into Brazil,s position.  (Note: UN votes are handled by 
U/S for Political Affairs I Vera Machado, who was returning 
from Washington, but post had already raised the issue with 
her key deputies.  End note.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) The CDA raised the case of the three Amcit 
detainees with Biato and Jaguaribe, who were both aware of 
the issue.  (Note: Jaguaribe and Salgado said papers had 
reported the three had been charged with espionage, contrary 
to the information in ref A.  End note.)  Jaguaribe thought 
that releasing them would be "a good signal from Iran outside 
 
BRASILIA 00001341  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
the nuclear area." 
 
- - - Iran-U.S. Relations Are Key - - - 
 
¶13. (C) Jaguaribe stressed that "it is not good for the world 
that Iran does not have relations with the United States," 
and that bilateral U.S.-Iran discussions are more important 
than the ongoing multilateral talks: "The United States is 
key."  The CDA stated that the United States has demonstrated 
a commitment at the highest levels to engage Iran, but Iran 
needs to respond.  Jaguaribe said he had been telling the 
Iranians that "the United States is prepared to take 
important steps," which he said the Turkish president has 
also told them.  But he said there was a "deep mistrust" of 
the United States and other Western countries*particularly 
the United Kingdom. 
 
¶14. (C) SG Patriota, just back from a trip to Washington, 
said that Brazil is pleased the United States is engaging 
Iran.  In response to the CDA raising the issue, he stated 
that "no one (in the executive) had ever mentioned any 
disquiet" on Iran.  To the contrary, according to Patriota, 
when Presidents Obama and Lula had spoken at the G-20 in 
September, with Patriota present, President Obama had told 
Lula that "I think it,s positive you are talking to them." 
Lula has consistently demonstrated "wisdom" in international 
affairs and a willingness to take risks, and is putting both 
to use with Iran out a belief that it is in no one,s 
interest for Iran to be isolated.  In his meetings the 
previous week, Patriota had heard no disapproval of Brazil,s 
dialogue with Iran, only concern with conveying the right 
message with regard to Iran,s nuclear program.  Patriota 
said that Brazil was committed to seeing Iran have a peaceful 
nuclear program. 
 
- - - Comment: Brazil,s Public Remarks, Private Discussions 
Likely to Differ Significantly - - - 
 
¶15.   (C) Post believes it likely that Brazilian officials, 
including Lula, will follow through on all of these issues in 
private, encouraging Iran to engage seriously, to take the 
TRR offer, to improve its human rights, and to release USG 
Amcits.  We also expect that public statements by President 
Lula and others will avoid pressing Iran on any of these 
issues.  When confronted with the possible disconnect between 
public and private statements, Biato suggested we should read 
Brazil,s official statements (and not, by implication, 
listen to what Lula says in his press conferences).  "Our 
position is clear."  The man who blamed "blue-eyed white 
people" for the global financial crisis while standing next 
to UK PM Gordon Brown takes only general guidance from 
Brazil,s MRE and foreign policy advisors.  But if his 
statements are unpredictable and sometimes quirky, they are 
also calculated; he made the "blue-eyed white people" comment 
three more times despite the negative international reaction. 
 Lula, and GOB foreign policymakers more generally, are 
basking in the international attention Brazil is getting from 
a growing succession of international leaders.  They are 
intent on cultivating a broad range of relations with other 
emerging powers, while avoiding enunciating potentially 
controversial positions or being publicly confrontational 
where they believe they can play a role in mediating 
difficult global issues.  As a result, Brazilian public 
statements during Ahmadinejad,s visit are likely to focus on 
Iran,s rights and the positive aspects of the bilateral 
relations, and any provocative public statements by 
Ahmadinejad will likely go unanswered. 
KUBISKE