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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, PM AND T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL ETTC MASS BR
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES SECURITY COOPERATION, FIGHTER 
SALE AND COLOMBIA WITH MOD JOBIM 
 
REF: A. IIR 6 809 0087 10 
     ¶B. IIR 6 809 0084 10 
     ¶C. IIR 6 809 0079 10 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Lisa Kubiske.  Reason: 1.4(d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  In a November 9 meeting, Charge Kubiske 
and Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim discussed next steps in 
the United States-Brazil bilateral security relationship, the 
potential sale of U.S.-origin fighter aircraft and regional 
security.  Jobim showed strong interest in furthering 
security cooperation by signing the Defense Cooperation as 
soon as possible and completing an information security 
agreement.  Jobim told Charge that there would not be any 
decision on fighters until sometime after his return from 
international travel on November 23 and said that capability, 
technology transfer, benefit to Brazil's industrial capacity 
and price would be the criteria for decision.  He offered no 
signs of encouragement that the U.S. bid would be chosen. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Speaking of regional security issues, Jobim all but 
acknowledged presence of the FARC in Venezuela, offered a 
suggestion for building Colombia-Ecuador confidence along 
their border, and a possible border-monitoring arrangement 
for combating the drug flow between Colombia and Brazil. 
Jobim indicated concern about the contents of an USAF budget 
document which linked U.S. military access to bases in 
Colombia with "unfriendly governments" as evidence of a lack 
of understanding of Latin America.  He believed that recent 
inflammatory statements from Presidents Uribe and Chavez are 
aimed at domestic constituencies on the  eve of upcoming 
elections, and called a potential Uribe run for a third term 
a terrible precedent for Bolivarian governments in the 
region.  Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio 
Garcia's public offer, only two days later, to monitor border 
activities as a way to reduce tensions between Colombia and 
Venezuela shows Jobim's influence.  Despite the GOB's 
tendency to blame Colombia for current tensions, its efforts 
to maintain peace are sincere and should be encouraged.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Structuring the U.S.-Brazil Security Relationship 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Brazilian Defense Minister Jobim expressed support 
for moving forward with U.S.-Brazil security cooperation, 
first by signing the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), 
then moving on to other arrangements, including a information 
security agreement (GSOMIA).  Jobim said he would see SecDef 
Gates at the International Security Forum, November 20 in 
Halifax and could sign the DCA there, if it were ready.  If 
not, Jobim would like to sign before the December 10-11 
Bilateral Working Group.  Jobim also favored moving forward 
with an information security agreement, saying he would be 
discussing the issue with the Ministry for External Relations 
(MRE).  (Note: Polmiloff discussed the information sharing 
agreement with MRE pol-mil advisor Marcos Pinta Gama last 
week.  Pinta Gama was interested in moving forward as well 
and planned to consult with the MOD.  End note.) 
 
FX-2 Fighter Competition 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Asked about the Fx-2 competition, Minister Jobim 
repeated previous statements that the FX2 fighter competition 
would be based on capability, technology transfer, benefit to 
Brazil's industrial capacity and price.  Technology transfer 
will be evaluated in terms of how it will contribute to 
Brazil's future industrial capacity.  The Charge reiterated 
and deepened advocacy points in each of these areas, calling 
a decision to select the U.S. bid an accelerator for an 
already growing U.S.-Brazil military and commercial 
relationship.  Jobim informed the Charge that he and 
President Lula will review the Brazilian Air Force,s 
technical analysis of the three competing bids after he 
returns from international travel November 23.  Jobim will 
then make a recommendation to President Lula. Lula, in turn, 
will make a decision and inform the National Defense Council, 
 for its concurrence. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00001315  002 OF 002 
 
 
The U.S.-Colombia DCA and Regional Implications 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Jobim said he was aware of the purpose of the 
Agreement giving the United States access to Colombian bases, 
but the availability of an Air Force budget memo over the 
internet, which cited "unfriendly countries" in the area had 
complicated matters.  He said the document showed "a complete 
lack of understanding" of Latin America and said he had had 
to discuss the issue with the President to urge "moderation" 
from Lula. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Jobim then went into a lengthy discussion of 
security in the Andean region, including Colombia-Brazil, 
Colombia-Venezuela and Colombia-Ecuador dimensions with 
Colombia at the center of the region's potential instability. 
 He noted that both Presidents Uribe and Chavez have been 
making statements aimed at domestic constituencies that have 
contributed to tensions between them.  Jobim also was 
critical of Uribe seeking a third term, a move which he 
thought set a bad precedent for the "Bolivarists."  Jobim 
stressed Brazil's "moderate approach" and willingness to 
build confidence, in particular by providing aerial 
surveillance of border regions and by sponsoring exchanges of 
information on military movements in border areas.  Asked 
about the presence of the FARC in Venezuela, Jobim said that, 
were he to acknowledge its presence there "it would ruin 
Brazil,s ability to mediate." 
 
¶7.  (C)  COMMENT.  Minister Jobim was eager to discuss 
security agreements and animated about the regional issues, 
but was clearly not comfortable talking about the FX-2 
competition.  While he has been prominent in the press in 
recent days saying that "past problems" with USG "tech 
transfer" (in reality export licensing) cases undermined 
confidence in USG assurances about the Super Hornet sale, he 
did not raise this concern with Charge and avoided the 
opportunity to discuss any lingering concerns he might have. 
In discussing the eventual FX-2 decision, he tried to 
downplay the importance of price but instead highlighted 
contributions to Brazilian industrial capacity.  Given that 
the Boeing offer would integrate Brazilian companies with 
Boeing,s global business and thus offers excellent potential 
for long-term economic gain, this should be good news, and we 
pointed that out.  However, President Lula may choose a 
different means of evaluation.  Brazil's 2008 Defense 
Strategy requires that purchase of foreign made aircraft be 
made only if such purchase will lead to indigenous production 
of more advanced aircraft.  Should the political goal that 
Brazil should someday export fighters to its neighbors -- 
even if market conditions make this possibility remote -- 
trump Brazilian Air Force analysis of the aircraft and real 
economic possibilities, Lula and Jobim will most likely favor 
the French or Swedish offers, both of which highlight the 
possibility of export production. 
 
¶8.  (C)  COMMENT CONTINUED.  Within two days of the Charge's 
discussion with Jobim, Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio 
Garcia went public with Brazil's willingness to help ease 
Colombia-Venezuela tensions through border monitoring, 
including aerial surveillance.  This announcement shows 
Jobim's closeness to Lula on security issues and once again 
highlights Brazil's desire to be the continent's peacemaker. 
Although the GOB,s continued questioning of the intent of 
the U.S.-Colombia DCA and insistence on painting Uribe as the 
primary source of Andean tensions may limit the GOB,s 
effectiveness, we believe the GOB genuinely seeks to reduce 
tensions, and we should encourage these efforts. 
KUBISKE