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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1314, BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON COUNTRY-SPECIFIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1314 2009-11-13 21:01 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1314 3172101
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 132101Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5353
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0345
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DRL-MLGA AND IO-RHS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2014 
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNGA 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 116264 
     B. BRAZIL 1280 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Stephen Liston, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  On November 13, Charge d'Affaires delivered reftel 
demarche to Carlos Abreu, minister responsible for the United 
States in the Ministry of External Affairs (MRE), and poloff 
simultaneously delivered the demarche to Nathanael Souza e 
Silva of the MRE's Human Rights Division.  Charge gave Abreu 
copies of nonpapers on no-action motions, Iran, Burma and the 
DPRK taken from IO's Intranet site.  (Comment:  Abreu will be 
visiting Washington the week of November 16 with Brazilian 
U/S for Political Affairs Vera Machado, who is responsible 
for both the UN and human rights at the MRE, to consult on 
Brazil's upcoming rotation onto the UNSC.  Post recommends 
raising these points with Machado when she meets with IO A/S 
Brimmer.  End comment.) 
 
2.  (C)  In poloff's conversation with Silva, he noted that 
Silva had previously told him that Brazil opposed no-action 
motions (ref B), yet Brazil abstained, rather than voting no, 
on the Iran and Burma no-action motions.  Silva said that 
although Brazil was against such motions on principle, Brazil 
believed that discussion of human rights issues in the Third 
Committee and Plenary tended to politicize such issues and 
undermined the authority of the Human Rights Council (HRC). 
He said the HRC had the expertise and the appropriate 
mechanisms, specifically the universal periodic review, to 
deal with human rights cases in an even-handed way.  He noted 
that universal periodic reviews had already been scheduled 
for the DPRK on December 7, Iran next February and Burma in 
2011.  Poloff asked how Brazil squared its abstention on the 
Burma no-action motion with its vote in favor of the 
substantive resolution on Burma.  Silva answered that the 
international community was unanimous on Burma, in particular 
because of the case of high-profile political prisoner Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi. 
 
3.  (C)  Poloff asked Silva why Brazil was willing to take a 
position on Burma, but not on Iran or the DPRK.  Silva 
explained that Burma had taken a less cooperative stance with 
the HRC than had Iran or the DPRK. 
 
4.  (C)  Comment:  Silva's explanation notwithstanding, we 
believe that the discrepancy between Brazil's position on 
Burma, on the one hand, and the DPRK and Iran, on the other, 
has much to do with Brazil's efforts to deepen relations with 
the latter two countries over the last several months.  In 
this regard, we note that Brazil opened a diplomatic mission 
in Pyongyang in July and that Iranian President Ahmadinehad 
is scheduled to make an official visit to Brazil November 23. 
KUBISKE