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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #1300/01 3101254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061254Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5331
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0079
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0007
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0043
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0196
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0342

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL KIRF KNNP CVIS BR IR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON AHMADINEJAD, IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AND 
VISAS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1170 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1112 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 773 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 658 
     ¶E. BRASILIA 477 
     ¶F. BRASILIA 387 
 
BRASILIA 00001300  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
¶1.  (U) Paragraphs 2 and 8 contain Mission Brazil action 
request. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary and Action Request.  With Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's November 23 visit approaching, 
President Lula has not adopted a position on the IAEA (P5 1) 
Geneva proposal or the Iran nuclear program as a whole, 
although Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE or Itamaraty) 
senior officials praised the P5 1 proposal and assured that 
Brazil would quietly support sanctions against Iran in the UN 
if IAEA-based talks fall through.  Iran and Brazil are 
expected to sign several bilateral agreements during the 
visit, including an agreement to waive visa requirements for 
holders of diplomatic passports traveling on orders.  Senior 
officials in MRE and the President's office say that Lula 
will discuss human rights issues with Iran, largely becuse of 
pressure from Brazilian civil society, but is only prepared 
to talk about the nuclear issue in general terms.  MRE 
acknowledged worries that Lula and his advisors will be 
publicly seen as overly friendly to Iran during the visit. 
Ahmadinejad's visit will follow closely on the heels of 
visits by Israeli President Shimon Peres (Nov. 11) and 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Nov. 14).  Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Vera Machado explained to the 
Charge d'Affaires on October 28 that Lula believes, based on 
his previous conversations with President Obama, that his 
communication with Iran and the Middle East will be 
appreciated by the USG and western governments.  Lula and his 
inner circle of advisors do not appear to fully grasp the 
negative feedback that will be created by the Iran visit, nor 
the potential policy complexities involved with hosting so 
many regional leaders at once.  Action Request: As Brazil 
makes clear that it will continue to pursue a more active 
role in the Middle East, Mission renews its request for a 
Washington regional expert to meet with senior counterpart 
officials about Iran and broader Middle East issues.  End 
Summary and Action Request. 
 
Brazil and the IAEA Proposal 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In his October 27 and subsequent meetings with 
poloff, MRE Iran/Central Asia Desk Director Roberto Luis 
Pires Ribeiro da Silva praised the multilateral approach of 
the IAEA proposal made to Iran in Geneva, particularly the 
roles of Russia to enrich Iran's low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
fuel and of France to convert the LEU to fuel plates.  He 
said that the inclusion of these two countries, rather than 
the details of the proposal itself, were noticed by President 
Lula and his advisors.  Pires said no decision has been taken 
by the GOB at the executive level to endorse the P5 1 IAEA 
proposal, even though the regional and science/technology 
desks at Itamaraty have recommended official support.  He 
believed that Iran would "half-accept" the proposal 
originally but would eventually agree to make a one-time 
transfer of 1200 kg of LEU.  (Other senior officials at MRE 
were less optimistic.)  Pires emphasized, as in previous 
meetings (ref A), that if talks fell through and sanctions 
against Iran were proposed at the UN level, Brazil would vote 
in favor -- but would be quiet about it.  In a November 4 
meeting, Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Marcel Biato 
told the Charge d'Affaires that Lula would bring up nuclear 
issues with Ahmadinejad, recommending dialogue with western 
governments and reaching an IAEA-based solution, but has not 
committed to discussing P5 1 proposal specifics. 
 
Ahmadinejad Visit: End of Visas for Iranians? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The MRE Central Asia/Iran division is busy preparing 
for Ahmadinejad's November 23 visit.  Pires said that the 
official agenda includes signing a series of pre-negotiated 
bilateral agreements, including an expected (but not yet 
finalized) agreement to waive bilateral visa requirements for 
bearers of diplomatic passports traveling on orders.  In 
 
BRASILIA 00001300  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
early November conversations, Pires and other MRE officials 
categorized as false October 27 Brazilian media reports that 
asserted, based on an interview with Iranian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Alireza Salari, that Iran and Brazil would reach an 
agreement to liberalize bilateral visa rules for all 
passports, giving Iran in effect visa waiver status to 
Brazil.  According to Pires, there has been and will be no 
attempt to adjust visa access for normal or official 
passports.  Other bilateral accords to be signed include a 
general economic assistance agreement, a more detailed 
agricultural assistance agreement outlining exchange of 
Iranian petrochemical inputs and fertilizers for Brazilian 
technology, and several memorandum of understanding, most 
notably one between each nation's central bank.  He 
characterized the agreements as "government to government," 
including nothing specific to Petrobras or other Brazilian 
companies that could fall under the Iran Sanctions Act. 
 
Internal Pressure 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Both Pires and MRE Middle East I (including Israel, 
Lebanon, and Syria) Desk Director Claudio Cesar Nascimento, 
who spoke briefly with poloff on October 28, noted that 
Itamaraty and Lula were getting pressured on a near-daily 
basis by Brazilian religious and ethnic minority groups 
opposed to the Iranian government's activities.  Brazil's 
Jewish community has employed their senior members within the 
President's party (PT) to advise Lula and his advisors 
against hosting Ahmadinejad.  The Brazilian Baha'i community 
has also been very active and Syrian-Lebanese Christians have 
registered concerns on a more ad hoc basis.  In response to 
public pressure, Pires said, Lula plans to press Ahmadinejad 
about release and treatment of Iran's domestic religious and 
political detainees -- including those arrested in the 
post-election demonstrations this summer.  Pires nevertheless 
expressed concern Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia (who is especially close to Lula) would change 
the vanilla talking points and remarks being prepared by 
Itamaraty, setting the stage for the President to downplay 
human rights concerns in the meeting or to make public 
comments about Iran and Ahmadinejad that could be 
misconstrued.  He suggested that Garcia had already done this 
prior to Ahmadinejad's aborted visit in May (ref E). 
 
Lula's Justification 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) As November 23 approaches, several local media 
outlets have published articles critical of the planned 
Ahmadinejad visit, posing essentially the same question 
raised by the USG and much of the international community: 
Why is Lula insisting on cultivating relations with Iran?  In 
an October 28 meeting with the Charge d'Affaires, MRE Under 
Secretary Vera Machado provided insight into Lula's thinking. 
 Machado said that, during a brief discussion on Iran between 
Lula and President Obama at the July G8 Summit in L'Aquila, 
at which she was present, President Obama responded to Lula's 
comments about wanting to meet with Iran by saying he would 
appreciate anything Lula could do to be helpful.  Lula has 
interpreted this to mean that the USG tacitly supports 
Brazil's efforts to engage Iran (and the broader Middle East) 
on key issues.  According to Machado and other MRE officials, 
Lula has been most interested in raising issues such as 
detainee releases, human rights, and general questions.  She 
confirmed that there is no indication that Lula is interested 
in discussing with Ahmadinejad the specifics of the IAEA 
Geneva proposal or Iran's activities in neighboring countries. 
 
Handling all the Visitors 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Handling agendas will be a delicate matter for 
Brazil, given the competing needs of its visitors this month, 
which include Israeli President Shimon Peres (Nov. 11), 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Nov. 14 or 15), and 
likely a rescheduled visit by Lebanese President Michel 
Sleiman after Ahmadinejad.  According to MRE and the Israeli 
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Peres visit will feature signing 
of several bilateral economic accords similar to those to be 
signed during the Ahmadinejad visit.  The Israeli Embassy is 
also pushing the Senate and Chamber of Deputies leadership 
for the opportunity to allow Peres to address both houses of 
Congress.  Senior congressional staff told poloff that 
Chamber President Michel Temer and other key leaders were 
 
BRASILIA 00001300  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
amenable to the idea and had received a green light (if not 
an endorsement) for the idea from the President Lula's 
office.  It now appears that Congress will not grant the 
request due to concerns that Ahmadinejad, in particular, 
would have to be given the same forum (which MRE reports he 
has not asked for).  Itamaraty had not been aware of the 
Israeli Embassy's request to Congress until early this week 
and has since sent signals that it would prefer that no 
visiting foreign leaders be given the podium in Congress. 
 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Despite growing contacts and a small number of 
experts on the Middle East in Itamaraty, the GOB as a whole 
still does not fully grasp the regional and multilateral 
dynamics surrounding Iran and the Middle East, and its 
frenzied effort to reach out to all players in the region is 
increasing the potential for missteps and misunderstandings. 
We believe the GOB is misreading the views and actions of the 
United States and other key players on these issues, even as 
Brazil wades purposefully deeper into the Middle East.  The 
upcoming visits of Ahmadinejad, Peres, Shimon, and Sleiman, 
combined with a likely January 2010 trip by President Lula to 
the region, are likely to compound, rather than alleviate, 
these problems, as Brazil seeks to burnish its image as the 
country that can talk to all sides.  Additional USG 
engagement, perhaps in concert with Britain, France, and 
other key international players, will be needed to press our 
point of view and inform Brazil's.  Mission renews its 
request (ref B) for a Washington Middle East expert visit  to 
Brasilia to address senior-level counterparts in the 
President's office and Itamaraty to present our views.  End 
Comment and Action Request. 
KUBISKE