VZCZCXRO1667
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHRL #1471/01 3221544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181544Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5832
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PREL MARR NATO EUN GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY AND BUNDESWEHR TRANSFORMATION: COMMITTED 
TO AN EXPEDITIONARY POSTURE BUT STRUGGLING WITH KEY 
DEFICIENCES 
 
BERLIN 00001471  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY.  DefMin Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg in his 
first speech to the new Bundestag on November 10 emphasized 
that the Bundeswehr must be "sleeker, even more efficient, 
and even more focused on out-of-area operations," indicating 
that the new MOD remains committed to developing a more 
mobile and expeditionary force.  However, the switch from a 
defensive military to an expeditionary force already has been 
in planning since 2004 when Bundeswehr Inspector General 
Schneiderhan kicked off Bundeswehr transformation.  The 
specific priorities highlighted in the 2006 White Book 
(strategic air-lift, reconnaissance, and attention to front 
line equipment and communications) remain unachieved, 
indicating that the new defense minister has a long road 
ahead of him.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHALLENGES TO A MODERN BUNDESWEHR 
 
¶2. (SBU) Unnoticed by the German public, Bundeswehr 
transformation entered its sixth year in 2009.  While DefMin 
Jung mainly executed reforms that were initiated by his 
predecessors, DefMin zu Guttenberg will have to refine the 
course of the Bundeswehr,s transformation.  Multiple 
contacts identify Germany,s lack of strategic air lift as 
the biggest limitation on the Bundeswehr and its increased 
participation in deployments.  To meet this need in the short 
term, the Bundeswehr in 2004 joined the Strategic Air Lift 
Interim Solution (SALIS) project.  The SALIS project charters 
six Russian and Ukrainian Antonov An-124-100 transport 
aircraft to transport equipment to out-of-area deployments, 
including Afghanistan.  Although envisioned as a stop-gap 
solution, the SALIS project remains in use due to delays in 
delivery of the new A400M strategic transport aircraft. 
Without further delays, delivery should occur in 2012. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The lack of reconnaissance capabilities also 
restricts the Bundeswehr,s ability to function during 
deployments.  This lack is especially apparent in 
Afghanistan, according to Colonel Olaf von Roeder, Deputy 
Head of the Bundeswehr Transformation Center.  However, the 
Bundeswehr is addressing the reconnaissance gap through 
recent procurements.  Since 2000, the Bundeswehr has operated 
the LUNA drone, a light weight, medium-range reconnaissance 
system, which was brought to Afghanistan in 2005.  Earlier 
this year, the Bundeswehr also deployed to Afghanistan a new 
mini-UAV, the KZO (Kleinfluggert Ziel Ortung), which allows 
for precise target acquisition.  On October 29, the MOD 
announced that the Bundeswehr,s Tornado reconnaissance 
aircraft now have the capability to provide live, "real time" 
imagery by replacing the old photo film system with an 
electronic version. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The lack of defensive armor on some units and the 
inability to operate in severe climates also limits 
Bundeswehr effectiveness in deployments such as Afghanistan. 
Many German helicopters do not have any defensive armor, 
according to Von Roeder, and the helicopters are ill-suited 
for the Afghan climate.  According to Sascha Lange of the 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
(SWP), German helicopters, engines are not designed to 
operate in hot weather, high altitudes, and dusty 
environments.   Of the 80 CH-53s that Germany has in its 
inventory, only 22 have been upgraded to the more advanced GS 
version (equipped with armor and electronic warfare) with an 
additional six helicopters to be similarly upgraded next 
year.  Only by 2014 will an additional 40 CH-53s be upgraded 
to the GA version, with improved avionics but no additional 
armor.  The Bundeswehr has ordered 80 armored Tiger 
helicopters from EADS Eurokopter, but they will be equipped 
with the PARS-3 anti-tank missile system, which makes them 
less than ideal for the counterinsurgency mission in 
Afghanistan.  Moreover, the Tiger's delivery has been delayed 
an indeterminate amount of time due to problems with the 
accompanying radar. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Bundeswehr recognizes the problems surrounding 
communications, but still lacks a unified system for the 
various services.  Currently, the Army,s communication 
system cannot be integrated with the communication systems of 
other military branches.  Additionally, conscription may 
serve as an growing obstacle to Bundeswehr transformation, 
given that conscripted soldiers are not allowed to be 
deployed for missions abroad, unless they volunteer to do so. 
 Although the MOD's official line is that there is "no 
problem" squaring the older system of conscription with 
Bundeswehr transformation, some Bundeswehr officers openly 
argue that moving to an all-volunteer force would give 
Germany a much more efficient and effective military 
 
BERLIN 00001471  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
structure and enable it to deploy units abroad much more 
easily, in contrast to the current system of putting together 
ad hoc forces to serve on international missions.  Moreover, 
the new coalition government's pledge to decrease mandatory 
service from nine months to just six calls into question 
whether a conscripted soldier will be able to perform any 
meaningful military tasks during the mandatory service 
period. 
 
LOOKING AHEAD 
 
¶6. (SBU) The financial crisis likely will impact the MOD 
budget in the near future.  Many experts expect the overall 
federal budget, and the defense budget in particular, to be 
affected by the current budget deficit of 86 billion euros. 
While it remains unclear whether this would be all covered by 
spending cuts, the MOD's 31 billion Euro budget -- Germany's 
third largest budget item -- is a likely to be trimmed or at 
least face a stagnant future.  Germany already spends just 
1.3 percent of its GDP on defense, far below the NATO goal of 
2 percent.  The unlikelihood of budget increases may cause 
the new defense minister to view the Bundeswehr,s current 
configuration of manpower and equipment as unsustainable, 
forcing a significant trimming of the military,s structure, 
according to SWP analyst Lange.  Moreover, the MOD already 
has allocated the procurement budget until 2015 on large 
ticket items like the Puma infantry fighting vehicle, the 
Boxer armored transport vehicle, and the A400M, limiting 
future discretion in procurement.  On top of that, Lange 
reports that the Bundeswehr remains behind schedule in its 
attempt to reduce its civilian work force to 75,000 employees 
by 2010. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Bundeswehr still faces bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, which have become more apparent following the 
Balkan and Afghan deployments.  The Afghanistan experience 
especially, according to Von Roeder, has shown that the 
Bundeswehr,s distinction among stabilization forces 
(70,000), support (147,500) and combat forces (35,000) is no 
longer applicable.  This argument likely will continue to 
have traction with the new government as the CDU/CSU already 
identifies the combat-support distinction as a potentially 
outdated concept.  Former CDU/CSU Defense Policy Spokesman 
Bernd Siebert expects the new government to reassess which 
capabilities/services the Bundeswehr actually needs and 
whether some services could be provided in a better way by 
other government agencies or "non-state partners." 
MURPHY