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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003097 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EAP, EAP/CM 
PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV MARR MNUC MASS CH
SUBJECT: TRACK-1.5 CHINA-U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE 
 
BEIJING 00003097  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In recent bilateral track-1.5 discussions 
on strategic nuclear issues, several themes emerged, 
particularly with respect to PRC concerns regarding the 
direction of U.S. nuclear strategy and policy:  (1) China 
wants "strategic reassurance" from the United States that 
ballistic missile defense, militarization of outer space, and 
conventional weapon precision strike capabilities will not be 
pursued or deployed in a way that affects China's retaliatory 
strike capability; (2) In the Chinese view, the PRC nuclear 
strategic situation and strategy are appropriately 
transparent given China's "No First Use" (NFU) policy and 
relatively smaller nuclear stockpile, but pressure to be more 
transparent will increase as the U.S. and Russia decrease 
their nuclear stockpiles; and (3) many Chinese scholars see 
the U.S. policy of extended deterrence as "Cold War thinking" 
not in alignment with President Obama's vision of a nuclear 
weapons-free world.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The fourth round of the track-1.5 China-U.S. 
Strategic Nuclear Dialogue took place in Beijing November 2-3 
under sponsorship of the MND/PLA-affiliated China Foundation 
for International Strategic Studies (CFISS), the Pacific 
Forum CSIS, the Institute for Defense Analyses and the RAND 
Corporation.  Leading Chinese and American scholars and 
government officials in the disarmament and nonproliferation 
fields participated (see para 12 for participation list). 
 
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: WHAT CHINA HOPES TO SEE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Chinese scholars regularly referred to the ongoing 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in the United States as a litmus 
test of the "seriousness" of President Obama's call for a 
nuclear weapons-free world.  The Chinese said that they hoped 
there would be no mention of "targeting China" in the 
document.  Additionally, they would look for indications and 
reassurances that ballistic missile defense in the Pacific 
would be limited to targeting North Korea.  Several Chinese 
participants called for a public statement by the United 
States "accepting a mutual state of vulnerability."  U.S. 
scholars responded that though such a state existed, and 
would continue to exist, no U.S. leader would be willing to 
endorse such a public statement. 
 
NO FIRST USE: WE LIKE IT, YOU SHOULD TOO 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Several Chinese participants extolled the "virtues" 
of the No First Use (NFU) policy and called on the United 
States to adopt the doctrine.  Some Chinese indicated the 
belief that the NFU was supported by traditional U.S. allies 
in Asia.  CFISS' Zhang Tuosheng asked how the United States 
would respond to "Japan's desire" for the United States to 
adopt an NFU policy.  Center for Strategic and International 
Security Studies Senior Advisor Linton Brooks responded that 
there had been no such formal request by Japan and that many 
in Japan actually opposed NFU because of its possible effect 
on the deterrence value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 
 
TRANSPARENCY IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) U.S. and PRC scholars called for greater 
transparency on the part of the other.  Arms Control and 
Disarmament Association Secretary General Li Hong asserted 
that no country could be fully transparent about nuclear 
issues and that each country would be more or less 
transparent about particular aspects of its policy (e.g., 
numbers, technologies, etc.) based on the nuclear strategy 
being employed.  National Defense University Strategic 
Studies Director General Zhu Chenghu suggested that the 
United States was more transparent about nuclear capabilities 
and less so about intentions, while China was the opposite. 
Several U.S. participants called on China to demonstrate 
greater transparency about nuclear capabilities, emphasizing 
that doing so would be necessary for China to become a full 
participant in future arms control talks with the United 
States and Russia. 
 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE: NOT IN ASIA PLEASE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Several U.S. participants were surprised by the 
fervor and frequency of Chinese criticism of the U.S. policy 
 
BEIJING 00003097  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
of extended deterrence.  Several PRC participants claimed 
that the policy was the major cause of proliferation and the 
main reason North Korea had decided to pursue nuclear 
weapons.  Academy of Military Sciences Senior Colonel Yao 
Yunzhu asserted that extended deterrence was "a legacy of 
Cold War thinking," had "no nonproliferation effect," and 
mainly served to "maintain alliances."  Chinese participants 
also claimed extended deterrence was in conflict with 
President Obama's "Prague vision" of a nuclear weapons-free 
world. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Calling the extended deterrence policy a pillar of 
U.S. and international security policy, ISN Office of 
Strategic Transition Director Robert Gromoll asked whether 
Chinese participants were asking for a worldwide revamping of 
the extended deterrence policy, or only a regional reworking. 
 Yao Yunzhu clarified that China would like to have:  (1) 
removal of the nuclear portion of extended deterrence within 
Asia; and (2) assurances from the United States that the 
nuclear umbrella did not extend to Taiwan.  She maintained 
that the policy was "antagonistic and adversarial" and 
"should be rejected if the United States was serious about a 
nuclear weapons-free world." 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE AND MUTUAL VULNERABILITY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Chinese participants expressed firm opposition to 
missile defense.  China Academy of Engineering Physics Arms 
Control Research Division Director Sun Xiangli said that the 
continued development of U.S. ballistic missile defense 
systems could lead to increases in the quantity of China's 
ballistic missiles and "development of countermeasures," 
though it was at this point "premature to make those 
decisions."  Former President of the China Academy of 
Engineering Physics Hu Side said China needed "reassurances" 
about the scale of the U.S. planned missile defense network 
and the technology that would be used for missile defense in 
Asia so that China could be "confident of its counterattack 
capabilities." 
 
¶9. (SBU) President of Pacific Forum CSIS Ralph Cossa told the 
Chinese that China's lack of transparency made it difficult 
to address China's arguments, adding that some in the U.S. 
were convinced that U.S. missile defense planning would have 
no effect on China's opaque nuclear posture.  CSISS' Brooks 
asserted that most experts agreed that "ballistic missile 
defense would not work against a large opponent," so the 
United States "might as well get the political and practical 
benefits" of a dialogue with China on missile defense. 
 
SPACE, EEZ SURVEILLANCE AND PRECISION STRIKES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Chinese scholars outlined three other areas of 
concern that influenced China's current nuclear strategic 
policy:  (1) the potential militarization of space; (2) U.S. 
military surveillance in China's exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ); and (3) the potential use of conventional weapons to 
make preemptive precision strikes against nuclear forces. 
AMS Senior Colonel Yao maintained that "joint assurances" 
under which "China and the United States would agree not to 
use conventional weapons against each other's nuclear assets" 
would allow Chinese academics "to stop discussing whether to 
abandon NFU." 
 
¶11. (SBU) Several Chinese argued that U.S. military 
surveillance activity in China's EEZ was aimed at negating 
China's SLBM survivability, thereby harming China's 
retaliatory strike capability.  Various American scholars 
asserted that U.S. activities were in accordance with 
international law, with one noting that Russian vessels had 
operated in the U.S. EEZ for decades without complaint by the 
United States. 
 
PARTICIPANT LISTS 
----------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Chinese Participants: 
 
Chen Zhiya, Secretary General, China Foundation for 
International and Strategic Studies 
Chen Zhou, Research Fellow, Academy of Military Science of PLA 
Cheng Jingye, Director General, Department of Arms Control 
 
BEIJING 00003097  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
and Disarmament, MFA 
Fan Jishe, Research Fellow, Institute of American Studies, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Guan Youfei, Deputy Chief, Foreign Affairs Office, MND 
Hu Side, Former President, China Academy of Engineering 
Physics 
Hu Yumin, Senior Research Fellow, China Institute for 
International and Strategic Studies 
Li Bin, Director of the Arms Control Program, Tsinghua 
University 
Li Hong, Secretary General, China Arms Control and 
Disarmament Association 
Lu Dehong, Director and Research Fellow, China Foundation for 
International and Strategic Studies 
Niu Qiang, Secretary General, Chinese People's Association 
for Peace and Disarmament 
Sun Haiyang, Professor, Second Artillery Commanding College 
Sun Xiangli, Director, Arms Control Research Division, China 
Academy of Engineering Physics 
Teng Jianqun, Deputy Secretary General, China Arms Control 
and Disarmament Association 
Wu Jun, Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Studies, China 
Academy of Engineering Physics 
Xu Weidi, Senior Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University 
Yao Yunzhu, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Military 
Sciences, PLA 
Yang Mingjie, Vice President, China Institutes of 
Contemporary International Relations 
Zhu Chenghu, Director General, Strategic Studies Department, 
National Defense University 
 
U.S. Participants: 
 
Larry Welch, Delegation Head, Institute for Defense Analyses 
Linton Brooks, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and 
International Security Studies 
Cynthia Carras, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense 
Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS 
Abraham Denmark, Fellow, Center for a New American Security 
Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President, Science Applications 
International Corporation 
Bates Gill, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 
Robert Gromoll, Director, Office of Strategic Transition, 
ISN, Department of State 
David Hamon, Deputy Director for Research and Studies, 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
Eric Heginbotham, Political Scientist, RAND Corporation 
Michael Kiefer, Director, Asia Portfolio, Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency 
Christopher Twomey, Director, Center for Contemporary 
Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School 
HUNTSMAN