VZCZCXRO1035
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTH #1623/01 3161708
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121708Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1036
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0022

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ATHENS 001623 
 
SIPDIS 
FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO AMB VERSHBOW 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/12 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS NATO GR AF TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASD VERSHBOW'S VISIT TO GREECE 
 
ATHENS 00001623  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (C), 
(D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Welcome to Greece.  Your visit is an important one and 
reinforces efforts by recent high-level USG visitors (SACEUR ADM 
Stavridis, COMNAVEUR ADM Fitzgerald, PM A/S Shapiro, and CNO ADM 
Roughead) to demonstrate to the Greeks that we are serious about 
our Alliance and about working with them on global challenges. 
Since his election October 4, PM (and FM) George Papandreou has 
focused his energies abroad, hoping for quick progress on tough 
challenges like the Aegean, Cyprus, and the Macedonia name issue. 
Yet Greece's dire economic situation will soon catch up to him, and 
limit his hand.  U.S.-Greek military-to-military cooperation is 
good, particularly at the U.S. Naval Support Activity at Souda Bay 
on Crete, which plays a key role in supporting U.S. military 
operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, including 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Greece is also among the largest purchasers 
of U.S. military equipment.  At the same time, Greece's 
participation in NATO is politically sensitive, and it has provided 
only limited contributions to key theatres such as Afghanistan. 
While Greeks have affection for Americans in general owing to 
immigration links and the Marshall Plan, significant percentages 
have felt at deep odds with U.S. foreign policy.  However, 
President Obama's election has created a new opening to improve and 
permanently alter Greek views of the U.S. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Your participation in the High Level Consultative Committee 
(HLCC) and your bilateral meetings with MOD Venizelos and MFA 
officials can help move Greek positions on a range of important 
issues. I recommend that you encourage your interlocutors to: 
 
 
 
-- live up to the commitment the previous government made to 
President Obama to enhance their Afghanistan contributions; 
 
-- work vigorously to find a solution to the Macedonia name issue 
that would allow Macedonia to join NATO and the EU and strengthen 
stability in Greece's neighborhood. 
 
 -- continue to support Turkey's EU orientation; 
 
-- seek to foster goodwill in the Aegean, despite passionately held 
views and frustrations; 
 
-- keep an open mind and support us as we move forward on our 
Phased Adaptive Approach to European ballistic missile defense; and 
 
 
-- continue their efforts and look for ways to expand cooperation 
on counter-piracy and non-proliferation. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
Political Overview 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Since his election October 4, PM (and FM) George Papandreou 
has focused his energies abroad to a large extent, hoping for quick 
progress on tough challenges like the Aegean, Cyprus, and the 
Macedonia name issue.  Yet Greece's dire economic situation will 
force him to spend more time on domestic issues in the 
not-too-distant future.  The EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner 
recently noted that Greece's budget deficit this year is set to be 
12.7 percent of GDP (with an EU limit being 3 percent), criticized 
Greek economic data submitted to the Commission as "completely 
wrong," and stated that the challenges facing Greece are "high" and 
"a question of common concern for the whole euro area."  Greece 
 
ATHENS 00001623  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
will eventually have to pay the Euro-zone piper, and Papandreou 
will have to make some extremely difficult - and politically 
unpopular - economic decisions at home to avoid EU sanctions and 
penalties.  The budgetary restraints have already been reflected in 
the draft FY2010 defense budget, which contains some 500 million 
euros worth of cuts. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  New PM (and Foreign Minister) Papandreou has an American 
mother, has lived and studied in the U.S., and having been Foreign 
Minister under a previous PASOK administration, developed a good 
reputation in the international community as a thoughtful and 
constructive interlocutor.  While he must use careful rhetoric 
domestically to avoid the "Amerikanaki" (little American) label by 
detractors, our recent engagements with him have been positive. 
 
 
 
------ 
 
ISAF 
 
 ------ 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) MOD Venizelos is feeling the heat both domestically and 
within NATO, and we should keep the pressure on.  The prior 
government committed to President Obama to expand Greece's ISAF 
effort, by deploying its previously caveat-bound Kabul engineering 
battalion out to RC-West, standing up a 17-person OMLT in Jan/Feb 
2010, and taking control of the Kabul airport in April 2010.  Greek 
planners recently identified force protection concerns, which 
present both procurement and budgetary challenges.  Venizelos 
recently told the Ambassador the deployment would cost 65 million 
euros which were not in the Greek budget.  Additionally, the 
Ministry has requested from the U.S. at reduced cost, leasing, or 
grant 32 MRAP-type vehicles, 52 anti-IED ECM devices, and a host of 
other equipment including armored dump trucks and bulldozers. 
Compounding the issue is the fact that Greek participation in ISAF 
remains unpopular with the Greek population at large, and any 
casualties - particularly those that could be attributed to 
inadequate force protection measures - could result in extreme 
pressure on the government to remove its forces from ISAF.  In an 
encouraging sign, the Minister did tell the Ambassador that Greece 
would contribute 3-4 million euros to the ANA Trust Fund and would 
keep medical assets, there for elections support, deployed with 
Germany in RC-North for the future. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) The new government is likely to decide on the RC-West 
deployment soon.  They are keenly watching our review in 
Washington, and will be interested in your reassurance as to our 
future plans in Afghanistan.  We stand to make progress on this 
issue if you can assure your interlocutors of continuing U.S. 
commitment, our expectation that Allies increase their efforts, and 
our willingness to either help them deploy to RC-West, or to work 
with them bilaterally and at NATO to develop an alternate 
deployment that would fill an important ISAF CJSOR need for which 
they are presently equipped and could deploy quickly. 
 
 
 
--------- 
 
Balkans 
 
--------- 
 
ATHENS 00001623  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶7.  (C) PM Papandreou has launched an initiative calling for full 
integration of the Balkans into European institutions by 2014.  He 
has reached out to his Macedonian counterpart, and the Greeks have 
consistently told us they are willing to compromise on the 
Macedonia name issue as long as the formula is consistent with the 
bipartisan agreement in Greece about how far they can go.  Greek 
red lines include an insistence on "erga omnes" use internationally 
of a new name with a geographic modifier.  This controversy remains 
emotionally and politically salient for many Greeks.  We are 
pressing Greece to work to avoid a hard landing or "veto" of the 
opening of Macedonia's EU accession talks at the December 10 
European Council meeting. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In other parts of the Balkans, while Greece continues its 
non-recognition of Kosovo, it maintains two mechanized infantry 
battalions (roughly 600 soldiers) in NATO's KFOR, and is providing 
personnel and support to the EU's "Rule of Law Mission" there.  We 
welcome Greece's ongoing efforts to urge Serbia to take a 
forward-looking approach to its future in the European and 
Euro-Atlantic community.  In Bosnia, Greece participated in NATO's 
SFOR operation until its successful conclusion in December 2005. 
Greece maintains approximately 45 soldiers in the EU's follow-on 
"Althea" security and stability mission. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
Turkey: EU Accession and Aegean Issues 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The Papandreou government continues its predecessor's 
support for the accession of Turkey to the EU, but has told us that 
they will not give a "blank check" to Turkey unless they see 
satisfactory progress on key bilateral issues and Cyprus.  PM 
Papandreou told the Ambassador he hopes to make quick progress on 
improving Greek-Turkish relations, and while he would not 
compromise on sovereignty issues, would be willing to settle other 
differences with Turkey at the ICJ in The Hague.  Papandreou is 
proud of his record of cooperation with Turkey during his tenure as 
Foreign Minister (1999-2004), and took a bold first step in his 
first days in office by traveling to Istanbul - ostensibly for a 
Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial conference - during which 
he met bilaterally with Turkish PM Erdogan.  Erdogan reciprocated 
this month with a note to Papandreou, to which the PM has yet to 
reply.  Turkish EU accession negotiator Egemen Bagis visited Athens 
on November 5, during which he met with PM Papandreou, Alternate FM 
Droutsas, and gave a speech at a prominent think tank. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Greece and Turkey still differ on a host of Aegean issues, 
including air/seaspace demarcation, economic zones, 
demilitarization issues, flight safety requirements, and 
immigration.  During the HLCC you will hear Greek complaints of 
unannounced Turkish military flights into the Athens Flight 
Information Region (FIR), both inside the Greeks' claimed 10 
nautical mile airspace boundary (which the U.S. does not recognize, 
because of the disparity with their six nautical mile territorial 
sea claim), as well as within the internationally recognized six 
nautical mile limits.  To the chagrin of Turkey, Greece "tags" as 
hostile unannounced Turkish military flights in the Athens FIR, and 
Greek F-16s routinely intercept such Turkish aircraft.  Armed, 
low-level Turkish overflights of the inhabited Greek islands of 
Agathonisi and Farmakonisi dramatically increased in 2009 compared 
to prior years, though the Greeks told us that the Turks suspended 
 
ATHENS 00001623  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
these flights from September 7 until November 2.  Both countries 
have in the past attempted to use NATO exercises to press claims or 
to make points.  In your meetings, we recommend taking an overall 
strategic approach that emphasizes mutual respect, confidence 
building measures, and safety of flight with both countries, while 
encouraging the Greeks to be proactive in offering confidence 
building measures.  Suggesting that they should stop labeling 
unannounced Turkish flights into the Athens FIR as hostile would be 
a good step, consistent with what NATO has been encouraging in the 
past. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
Missile Defense 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Greek officials viewed the September recalibration of U.S. 
missile defense plans positively.  Most media, though, portrayed 
the step as a concession to Russia.  Press reports here have also 
speculated about Turkey's role in future missile defense plans, and 
intentions for the U.S. to sell Patriot missiles to Turkey. 
Government interlocutors have shown interest, as well.  We are 
aware of ongoing U.S. talks with Turkey over its potential role in 
the PAA, and their sensitivity.  Your meetings here, though, can do 
much to help the Greek government understand where southeastern 
Europe and the Med fit into the PAA.  We believe that our senior 
Greek interlocutors do understand the threat from Iran and the 
potentially important role Turkey can play.  Proactive engagement 
can help us keep the Greek government informed and on our side, and 
help them help us as they manage their domestic politics and media 
environment. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Counter-Piracy and Non-Proliferation 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C) We share many views with the Greeks on piracy; this is an 
issue where we can maintain a robust and fruitful dialogue.  Greece 
served as the flagship command of the EU's first ever naval 
operation, Atalanta, off of Somalia last year, has a frigate now in 
Atalanta's current rotation, and participated in NATO's Ocean 
Shield through its rotational contribution to NATO's Standing Naval 
Maritime Group 2.  Senior Greek Navy officials have told us, 
though, they will draw down in the Gulf of Aden if Turkey does in 
order to maintain a "balance" in the Aegean.  Greece is no longer 
in Ocean Shield, as SNMG-1 has taken over command of the operation. 
We would like to see a continued Greek presence in NATO 
counter-piracy efforts, given Greece's prominent role in 
international shipping. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) On non-proliferation, we have had good practical 
cooperation with Greek authorities and shipowners.  In the last two 
years they have allowed several boardings that uncovered sanctioned 
materials on their way to North Korea and Iran.  Bilateral 
negotiations have frozen regarding a formal Shipboarding Agreement 
in the Proliferation Security Initiative framework, yet 
non-proliferation remains an area for overall strong cooperation 
with the new Greek government. 
 
ATHENS 00001623  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
Bilateral Defense Relations: Souda Bay and Procurement 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (C) We have made a sustained high-level push over the past 
months with the MOD and MFA to get leaders to cut through the red 
tape and to provide the U.S. with written authorization to proceed 
with the construction of a badly needed new jet fuel pipeline and 
fuel storage tanks that would replace a decaying old pipeline that 
runs through an inhabited area, maintain high-capacity refueling 
capabilities and protect the environment at and around our Naval 
Support Activity at Souda Bay, Crete.  Permission to execute the 
project has been stuck in the Greek bureaucracy for nearly seven 
years, and the MOD at present is not certain whether or not it 
needs approval from cautious MFA lawyers to grant this 
authorization.  The Ambassador recently raised this issue with MOD 
Venizelos, who assured the Ambassador he was "ready to solve" this 
problem. Your follow up at the HLCC and bilaterally will be 
valuable; your message should be that we want to spend $32 million 
on the Cretan economy to upgrade our strategic relationship, 
safeguard the environment, and keep Souda a key facility for 
Greece, the U.S., and NATO.  Continued delay threatens the 
Congressional funding, and increases risk. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Greece is a large purchaser of U.S. defense goods.  We 
have over $8 billion in FMS cases and there is potential for more 
than $6 billion coming up for international competition over the 
next two years, though Greek budget difficulties may hamper that. 
MOD Venizelos complained to the Ambassador on November 4 about a 
problem with the defensive systems on the Peace Xenia III F-16s, 
and stated that U.S. companies need to take more responsibility. 
The ASPIS II defensive systems suite was programmed through direct 
commercial sale to go on the 60 Peace Xenia III aircraft.  Due to 
stalled negotiations between the Greek MOD and Raytheon, none of 
the 60 PX-III aircraft have defensive systems installed.  (Comment: 
This means that many of Greece's Aegean intercept sorties are being 
flown by aircraft with no/no defensive countermeasures.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
 
¶16.  (C) More broadly, we need to reinforce the new Papandreou 
administration's effort to bring transparency and fair competition 
into their procurement processes.  Greek national security as well 
as U.S. defense companies have suffered in the past when decisions 
were made based on political factors.  In some instances, Greek 
readiness and interoperability have been degraded.  The Ambassador 
has argued to interlocutors that U.S. companies will do well if the 
new government simply pursues what is good for the Greek taxpayer 
and Greece's own national security, as we believe U.S. defense 
products can stand on their own in a free market and fair 
competition. 
 
 
 
 -------------- 
 
Other Issues 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (C) OTHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS:   Greek contributions to 
 
ATHENS 00001623  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
other important initiatives are substantial and should not be 
overlooked.  The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force rely heavily on Naval 
Support Activity Souda Bay in Crete as a support hub for sea and 
air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
(Comment: Although it is fine to thank them privately during 
meetings, Greek public sentiment is generally anti-NATO, and 
anti-American military, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay 
and with frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they 
would like to keep private avoiding any public acknowledgments.) 
Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights of U.S. military aircraft a 
year; participates in NATO's Operations Active Endeavour; the EU's 
counter-piracy mission off of Somalia Operation Atalanta; and the 
UN's Lebanon mission, UNIFIL. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (C) IMMIGRATION:  You will hear about this from your 
interlocutors.  Greece has become an entry point of choice for 
illegal immigrants into the European Union.  The number of illegal 
migrants detained by Greek authorities has increased dramatically 
over the last two years, reaching 140,000 last year (in a country 
with a population of only about 11 million).  The presence of these 
migrants - many of whom originated in conflict zones in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East and entered Greece via 
Turkey - has become a major political issue.  It also roils 
Greek-Turkish relations on occasion, with the Greeks leveling 
accusations that Turkey does not do enough to stop the outflow to 
Greece, and indeed, aids and abets the illegal immigrants.  Greece 
is making a strong push for the European Union to take this issue 
on and to negotiate repatriation agreements with source countries 
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The EU's border security agency, 
Frontex, has its largest operation on Greek territory, which has 
caused irritation to Turkey at times. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) TERRORISM:  You should also be aware that Greece has been 
burdened with a resurgence of domestic terrorism.  Following 
several years of a lull with the wrap-up of the November 17 group, 
attacks by new groups have sharply increased.  On October 27, Greek 
terrorists opened fire on a police station and fled the scene, 
wounding six officers, two seriously.  An ammonium nitrate car bomb 
was detonated at the Athens Stock Exchange on September 2 this 
year, causing significant material damage, and a police officer was 
murdered in June.  The U.S. Embassy suffered an RPG attack in 
January of 2007.  The U.S. has been offering technical assistance 
and sharing intelligence through DHS, FBI, and other agencies, but 
the Greeks are woefully unprepared for any significant increase in 
terrorist activity.  We are also concerned that the rise of Greece 
as a migration path from troubled spots to Western Europe and 
vice-versa opens the door to international extremists making a 
foothold here or using Greece as a "safe house" for planning 
nefarious activities. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) We are very much looking forward to your visit and hosting 
you here in Athens. 
Speckhard