Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI1409, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09AITTAIPEI1409.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI1409 2009-11-30 09:51 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1409 3340951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300951Z NOV 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2832
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9546
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0943
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage November 28-30 on Taiwan's economy, which showed signs of 
stable growth for the first time in eighteen months; on the 
controversy caused by the animated news story service launched by 
the "Apple Daily;" and on the 46th Golden Horse Awards, considered 
the Chinese-language equivalent of the Oscars, which was held in 
Taipei County on Saturday evening.  In terms of editorials and 
commentaries, an op-ed in the pro-independence, English-language 
"Taipei Times" discussed U.S.-China-Taiwan relations in the wake of 
U.S. President Barack Obama's China visit.  The article said Taipei 
is now facing a crisis, given that both China and the United States 
are urging both sides of the Taiwan Strait to engage in political 
talks.  A separate "Taipei Times" op-ed, written by a senior fellow 
at the American Enterprise Institute, called Obama's Asia trip a 
"self-defeating" tour as "Obama simply seems unable or unwilling to 
defend U.S. interests strongly and effectively."  End summary. 
 
A) "The Crisis after the Obama-Hu Statement" 
 
Lai I-chung, an executive member of the Taiwan Thinktank, opined in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (11/30): 
 
"The joint statement issued by Chinese President Hu Jintao and US 
President Barack Obama on Nov. 17 was cause for concern.  Taiwan was 
further marginalized in the triangle of relations between Taiwan, 
the US and China and is now in an unprecedented predicament.  Taiwan 
must amend the Referendum Act to state that 'cross-strait agreements 
shall be decided by public referendum.'  That is the only way for a 
united Taiwan to deal with the enormous pressure for political talks 
this nation can now expect from Hu. ... 
 
"The US' promises to Taiwan weakened and Washington violated its 
1982 'six assurances' to Taiwan by endorsing cross-strait political 
talks.  With Obama's endorsement, Hu is expected to pile on the 
pressure to achieve his dream of creating an irreversible framework 
for unification before he steps down in 2012. ...  Hu said recently 
that Taiwan cannot avoid political negotiations with China, meaning 
that such talks are likely to be on the table soon after an ECFA is 
inked.  Judging from his sophistication and deviousness, Hu will ask 
that Taiwan make a commitment during the signing process to pave the 
way for political talks and an agenda for a possible Ma-Hu meeting 
in 2011. 
 
"Just a week before the Hu-Obama meeting, China sent a large 
delegation of academics to Taiwan.  Their tough stance on 
unification indicates that Beijing was aware of Washington's support 
for cross-strait political talks in advance.  In the face of both 
the former's oppression and the latter's push, Taipei is facing a 
crisis: Political talks seem inevitable.  The situation today is 
even more critical than it was in 1979, when the US established 
diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China.  The US and 
China are now cooperating to lead Taiwan to the slaughter.  The only 
solution is to strengthen the nation's democratic mechanisms as soon 
as possible and give the public substantial power to decide its 
future. ...  If Taiwan does not amend the Referendum Act and put 
cross-strait agreements to referendums, it will find itself squeezed 
between China and the US into a difficult and irreversible 
situation." 
 
B) "Obama's Self-defeating Asia Tour" 
 
John Bolton, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 
opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
[circulation: 30,000] (11/29): 
 
"US President Barack Obama's first visit to Asia since his 
inauguration was one of the most disappointing trips by any US 
president to the region in decades, especially given media-generated 
expectations that 'Obamamania' would make it yet another triumphal 
progression. It was a journey of startlingly few concrete 
accomplishments, demonstrable proof that neither personal popularity 
nor media deference really means much in the hard world of 
international affairs. ...  Overall, Obama surely suffered his worst 
setbacks in Beijing -- on trade and economics, climate change and 
security issues. ...  Many media analysts attributed the lack of 
significant agreements in Beijing to the 'rising China, declining 
America' hypothesis, which suits their ideological proclivities. 
But any objective analysis would show that it was much more Obama's 
submissiveness and much less a new Chinese assertiveness that made 
the difference.  Obama simply seems unable or unwilling to defend US 
interests strongly and effectively, either because he feels them 
unworthy of defense, or because he is untroubled by their 
diminution. ...  If, by contrast, Obama continues to behave as a 
'post-American' president, China and others will know exactly how to 
take advantage of him." 
 
STANTON